What does foreign cultural policy mean? More answers (2)

Indeed, at the beginning, it was about nothing else. When countries such as Great Britain and France made culture into an instrument of foreign policy in the  19th century, their most important aim was "to soften their hegemony, particularly in the colonies, and to communicate the superiority of their own culture", as foreign cultural policy expert Kurt-Jürgen Maaß put it. Germany, too, launched its foreign and cultural policy enterprise after the turn of the century in a political climate that was strongly characterised by nationalism and a sense of mission.

After 1945, foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic of Germany was conceived anew, in conscious contrast with the "Third Reich". Diversity and pluralism took the place of the state abuse of culture and education by the Nazis. Henceforth, it was decided that foreign cultural work should no longer be done directly by the government, but by state-financed, institutionally independent organisations, the so-called intermediary organisations.

Today, Germany's international cultural activities cover a very broad spectrum, ranging from language courses, art exhibitions, dialogue and exchange programmes and media contributions to crisis prevention, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and initiatives for politically persecuted artists.

The answers given to these questions are related to the political persuasion of the respective government, the circumstances at the time and the actors themselves. For liberal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, for example, the focus was on foreign cultural policy’s function as a "door-opener" for economic interests, whereas Frank-Walter Steinmeier followed on conceptually from Joschka Fischer's ideas.

Overall, however, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Social Democrat of cultural policy, attached much greater value to culture than Joschka Fischer, the Green. As Rüdiger Schaper once commented in the Tagesspiegel on Fischer's term of office: "Culture did not mean much to him."

That's not the way things should stay, however. Of course, dialogue on equal terms between partners who are very different, materially and culturally, always comes up against its limits. The outward "two-way street of publicly-funded cultural exchange with the world" said Johannes Ebert, former Secretary General of the Goethe-Institut, always "aspires to be an autobahn", while in the opposite direction, it has become "a country road, at least". "What does 'equal terms' mean now in Afghanistan, Egypt, Mexico?" asks Helmut K. Anheier, former President of the Hertie School in Berlin rhetorically: In an understanding of culture based on dialogue, you simply cannot overcome such power differences.

The same applies to Europe's isolationist policy, which signals anything but the wish to engage in dialogue. The success of nationalist and racist movements in Europe do the rest to weaken the credibility of European discourses on democracy and human rights.

Project managers from Germany had hardly any time between arriving and leaving to get to know their counterparts, let alone to engage in any kind of real exchange. And when an artist such as Pina Bausch is flown in with her dance theatre for just one performance, that comes pretty close to old-style cultural export.

Thus, one of Hampel's central takeaways is this: Let's get away from short-term project orientation and move towards process financing, even if that comes at the price of limiting oneself to fewer projects.

That the principle of the one-way street may turn out to be a cul de sac, also in purely economic terms, is something the Chinese are currently experiencing in the Global South. Their Belt and Road Initiative projects are developed primarily by Chinese companies and workers, lack transparent tenders and involve very little transfer of know-how.

That worked well for a long time. Meanwhile, however, there is growing dissatisfaction, particularly in Africa and Latin America. And that has much to do with the lack of involvement of civil society as well as environmental degradation, corruption and high financing interest.

Who could benefit if China's Belt and Road Initiative were to weaken? "The Europeans", is the answer often heard (usually from Europe), "the Europeans! With their economic power, their soft power and their trademark, civil society dialogue!"

But be warned against complacency. Unless soft power manages to build long-term trust, it has little other value. That is not a rule that applies exclusively to autocracies. Decisively developing the two-way street towards the South is something even European will not be able to avoid.