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CULTURE REPORT

Europe: Closed Doors or Open Arms?

Culture and Migration

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Whether it is religion, language, upbringing, education, sport or media – culture holds the key to successful integration. The various strategies of Europe's Member States could hardly be more different. There are signs that civil and socioeconomic integration policies are beginning to be harmonised in Europe, but the cultural dimension is still determined by national concepts and ideas. Which strategies have proven their worth? What can culture achieve? And what does Europe need to do to improve the integration of migrants into mainstream society? How can Europe resolve the conflict between a repressive refugee policy and a rational migration policy? 40 authors from 20 countries look for answers to these questions.

Picture spread: Hoyerswerda by Espen Eichhöfer
In the early 1990s, the East German town of Hoyerswerda was a dark stain on the map. Refugees fled their homes en masse after being bombarded with Molotov cocktails for days on end. Now the town has opened a new centre for asylum seekers. Photographer Espen Eichhöfer visited the scene. The photos in this publication are a record of his journey.

Overcoming barriers

In today's society, migration and mobility play a truly unprecedented role. According to UN statistics, 232 million people are living outside the land of their birth. For everyone involved, migration is a more or less dramatic process of change, firstly for the migrants themselves as they start out on a new life in a strange land, but also for the receiving society, which has to find ways of dealing with this increase in diversity. This throws up some fundamental questions. How does society deal with these changes? How can we improve the general population's acceptance of immigrants and refugees? How can cultural diversity be used to the advantage of the countries of origin, the host countries, and the migrants themselves?

In his contribution to this publication, Umberto Eco draws a distinction between migration and immigration. While immigration relates to the movement of individuals and can be managed politically, migration is an uncontrollable natural phenomenon. "The Third World is knocking at our doors, and it will come in, whether Europe wants it or not", is Eco's drastic description of the situation. Europe is becoming a "coloured" continent. "That's how it will be, whether we like it or not." But he is looking ahead at the centuries to come, so we still have a little time to prepare ourselves.

Peace researcher Jochen Hippler warns us that Europe has a problem. The tensions arising from xenophobia, racism, Salafism and jihadism will only be resolved if they are addressed politically, socially and culturally. US political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously pronounced "the end of history" in 1989, a rather premature statement that he subsequently retracted. He believes that radical Islamism and jihadism are basically the same; they are both responses to the quest for identity among Muslims who live in the West. In general, Muslim societies have traditionally been more tolerant than Christian societies, but Europe makes it particularly difficult for newcomers from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to feel a sense of belonging. It is high time for a discussion on identity, even if history makes it difficult for some countries –including Germany – to address this issue.

In his article, Zygmunt Bauman, the eminent Polish political scientist and Adorno award winner who was born in Poznan in 1925, furiously asserts that the erosion of identity and solidarity are very real phenomena, but that their causes are rooted in much wider economic and political changes. Claus Leggewie, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities in Essen, also traces migration pressures primarily back to the transnationalisation of the labour markets. He reminds us of the deportation of forced labourers in the Second World War and explains that, even today, workers are being exploited in what amounts to little more than slavery. This leads us to a shocking contradiction: the rich countries of the North are keen to attract labour from the global South for economic reasons, but at the same time they are sealing themselves off from them because of security considerations and fears of being overrun by foreigners.

This contradiction is being played out in particularly dramatic terms in the Mediterranean. Since 1988, 20,000 people have been killed in their attempts to reach Europe, and two thirds of them have drowned in the Mediterranean, according to British writer Kenan Malik. And how have the European nations reacted to this? He claims that they have simply battened down the hatches and even closed down Mare Nostrum, the Italian Navy's marine rescue operation. It is now time to lift these barriers by developing a rational immigration policy – and not just for theoretical reasons.

All our contributors agree on this. We need constructive and productive debate about how we should deal with all the people who are coming to Europe in search of a better life. This is necessary to counter actual threats to society and also to combat the way right-wing parties are manipulating people's unfounded fears of being overrun by foreigners. But above all, this debate must be objective. In this book, many of the authors tackle the question of how culture can contribute to successful migration management. It cannot simply be done through rhetoric. Journalist Heribert Prantl claims that phrases such as "welcome culture" are "no more than the chives that garnish the soup of prejudice". It is as if this sickly-sweet word simply "wipes away all the misery of policies directed at foreigners and asylum seekers over recent decades". This rhetoric has no credibility as long as the ruling parties fail to confront the myth that immigrants are only coming to wealthy Europe in order to claim benefits.

Effective migration management encompasses a number of areas: labour migration, refugee policy, the fight against people smuggling and trafficking and the interplay of migration and development. But culture also holds one of the keys to successful integration policy. Participation in cultural life (not only as consumers but as active participants), language skills and education are some of the key issues. But social media can also be an effective tool for migrants, says Louis Reynolds from the British think tank Demos. American sociologist and urban researcher Richard Sennett describes how town planning can influence the way that different cultures live together. He deplores the phenomenon of gated communities. He gives a striking example of the gap between rich and poor in a small space by describing the luxury apartment blocks in São Paolo, which have swimming pools on every floor and a fine view over the favelas. The construction of such edifices inevitably leads to social conflict.

If we are to take an objective view of the migration debate, it is important to understand mobility as an opportunity. People who are flexible, open, resilient, motivated, willing to take risks, articulate and with good intercultural skills are likely to make a good impression at any job interview. The Erasmus exchange programme is one of the European Union's most successful initiatives and the best proof that migration does not have to be a burden, but can also be a pleasure. Who better than EUNIC with its network of 2,000 branches around the world to help awaken interest in mobility and other countries?

This seventh edition of the Culture Report is also the fourth edition of the EUNIC Yearbook. I would like to express my warm thanks to all the authors and translators, and particularly to the European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam, who made it possible for us to produce this English version.

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Chapter 1: Inclusion or exclusion? Europe in an age of refugees, terror and globalization

The terror attacks in Paris and Copenhagen have highlighted the extremes of violence and hate that can result from misguided attempts at integration. They have turned the spotlight on the cracks and tensions that have already been prevalent in European societies for many years. And while the continent of Europe has been shoring up its Mediterranean coastline to keep boatloads of refugees at bay, many migrants have already been living in EU countries, sometimes for several generations, without being adequately integrated into society as a whole. The defeat of extremists, whether jihadists or right-wing rabble-rousers, now depends on every single European. One million young migrants are needed every year if we are to compensate for Europe's growing numbers of senior citizens. It is clear that Europe has to urgently rethink its attitude towards migration and immigrants.

Jihadism, integration and culture

Terror attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, anti-Islam demonstrations in Germany, Sweden and elsewhere. What is going wrong in Europe? European societies have been experiencing tensions for some years now. Xenophobia, racism, Salafism and Jihadism are political, social and cultural phenomena. They combine a roughly-hewn 'Us versus Them' mentality with the projection of individual or social problems onto a collective image of the enemy.

By Jochen Hippler

Most of us have noticed that we have a problem. In fact, we have more than one. We have a whole mess of problems. In the Netherlands the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) led by Geerd Wilders provides another indication of the widespread sense of dissatisfaction in Dutch society, particularly with regard to migration policies. In France, the Front National has managed to become a major party, while in the UK the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is spreading fear among the established parties. And in Greece the neo-fascist Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) and right-wing populist Anexartiti Ellines (ANEL, Independent Greeks) parties have been racking up election successes. For a while in Germany, PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), LEGIDA and other grassroots movements loudly proclaimed their criticisms of culture and politics, grouped around feelings of xenophobia and Islamophobia. The populist AfD party (Alternatives for Germany) has picked up on this mood, partly for tactical reasons and partly out of conviction. Rabble-rousing and attacks on Jews have increased in Europe over recent years.

Alongside the rise of right-wing populist and radical right-wing parties and movements, we cannot ignore the radicalization of some migrant groups. Ghettoization and pauperization have led to regular protests, and not only in the French banlieues. These have mainly involved young people (2005 particularly in Paris, 2007 in Villier-le-Bel, 2010 in Grenoble and 2012 in Amiens). Other countries have also found themselves facing crises caused by social and cultural factors linked to the shortcomings in past integration policies.

Of course the rise in jihadism has set alarm bells ringing and has already led to terrorist acts in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels and Copenhagen. Over 3,500 European jihadis have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join extremist groups such as Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front. Of these, over one third have come from France and almost 700 from Germany and the UK respectively, followed by Belgium.

Taken together, this phenomenon of the rise of extremist and populist right-wing views and the simultaneous strengthening of jihadist and Salafist tendencies in Europe demonstrate the cultural spectrum of European societies and are also a symptom of the crisis that is evidence of the underlying problems in our societies.

3,500 European jihadis

Xenophobia, racism, Salafism and jihadism are political, social and cultural phenomena. They combine a roughly-hewn 'Us versus Them' mentality with the projection of individual or social problems onto a collective image of the enemy.

It is worth noting that hostility towards certain groups is not due to the fact that these groups make up a significant proportion of the population or are dramatically increasing in numbers. In France, Jews make up barely 1 percent of the population, in Germany the figure is less than a quarter of one percent. The number of Muslims in

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Saxony – the German state where the PEGIDA/LEGIDA movement has attracted far and away the most support – stands at just 0.1 percent.

In Germany at least, it seems that Islamophobia is strongest where there are practically no Muslims. This is an initial indication that politically and culturally-shaped perceptions of a group are much more significant than the relevance or character of the group in real life. Society obviously has some underlying contradictions and problems that are projected onto particular groups of people – whether it be foreigners, Jews, 'infidels', gays or Muslims. Therefore such phenomena of political and cultural exclusion must be taken seriously as symptoms of crisis, without taking the corresponding discourses and mentalities at face value.

This is precisely where the problem lies when it comes to attempts to deal with them constructively. Xenophobia and jihadism are clearly cultural phenomena, but they are not only cultural; they are also closely linked to social and political issues. So they cannot be given a superficial treatment solely through cultural policy, or through educational programmes, enlightenment and intercultural dialogue. All these programmes and actions may be useful, but they will have little effect if they remain isolated and are not supplemented by social and political measures.

Let us take as an example the problem of the rise of Salafism and jihadism in Europe. This is mainly concentrated in three social groups: migrants from the Middle East who only stay in Europe temporarily; the children or grandchildren of Mus-

lim immigrants who were born and raised here; and European converts to Islam. But we must remember that extremists in these three groups make up very tiny minorities. The radicalized members of the latter two groups cause the most problems, both in terms of quality and quantity. This means that although Salafism and jihadism in Europe may be linked to problems in the rest of the world, they are not imported phenomena but have sprung up within European society itself. The prerequisites and conditions for this extremism are home-made. It is only their cultural manifestation that has been directly or indirectly influenced by the discourses and problems taking place in the Middle East and South Asia.

In German society, they are mainly caused by ethnic Germans, German citizens, or at least foreigners who have grown up in Germany. This points to social and cultural cracks in German society that may have been deepened, coloured and culturally expressed through factors relating to external conflicts, but they have not been caused by them. The situation in other European countries such as France, the UK and Belgium is similar, though it is less pronounced in the UK.

When we look at the Salafist and particularly the jihadist scene in most European countries, it becomes clear that many of their adherents have led troubled lives, in contrast to many Salafist cadres in the Middle East. In an above-average number of cases, Salafist extremists, and particularly those who belong to groups with links to al-Qaeda, who want to join up with Islamic State or

who at least sympathize with them, have a poor educational record, little or only moderate success at work and have often been through at least one phase of (often petty) criminality.

Weak sense of identity and lack of prospects

Some of today's Salafists and jihadists have a background of alcohol or drug abuse and have led lives far removed from their ideals of today. A weak sense of identity, lack of prospects and feelings of failure either lead to them actively seeking out new, better ways of living or opens them up to new ideas coming from outside that promise them a 'better' and 'righteous' life. Added to this there are always emotional factors such as the quest for recognition and closeness, the desire to replace families with a real peer group and/or an imaginary community of 'true believers'.

It is clear that there is no single route to radicalization. It is equally clear that in most cases a number of factors have to coincide. However, it is striking that a clear majority of political and Salafi jihadists in Europe are not intellectuals, not doctors and lawyers, not even successful tradesmen or businesspeople, but generally people who are socioeconomically, socially and to an extent culturally marginalized, whether objectively or subjectively.

From such a position of real or perceived weakness, the offerings of political and Salafi jihadism can appear attractive. Along with

the chance to be part of a peer group of 'brothers' the members can now feel themselves to be 'strong', an elite, superior to others (that is to say, non-Salafist Muslims, Jews, Christians, atheists, seculars and German society). They feel and believe that from being individual losers they are now a collective avant garde. This is something that is particularly attractive to weak egos and people who feel they have no place in society. The nest provided by their 'brothers' makes them feel warm and safe, while the elitist demand that they steadfastly represent the true faith in a sea of non-believers and take whatever risks are required to assist its breakthrough gives their failed lives a sense of meaning and importance.

In a broader sense, all these are also cultural manifestations, even if at a very personal level. The reasons behind them have nothing to do with God or theology; indeed they are not even specific to Islam. They express problems that also affect non-Muslim groups and people who feel they are not really integrated into society. Personal or social insecurity, objective or subjective lack of prospects, the search for meaning when they feel there is no meaning, a sense of lack of identity or weak ego – these are secular factors arising

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from a personal or social context rather than religious or theological factors. However, these factors can open the door to religious (and also non-religious) radicalization. So it is no coincidence that many of the factors described above also play a role for right-wing extremists and hooligans. There are other similarities: the emphasis on masculinity and 'strength'; the implicit or explicit denigration of women and 'others'; the denigration of external groups; the emphasis on being 'resolute'; and having a history of violence or affinity with violence.

In short, Salafism is simply a culturally adapted variant of right-wing extremism. People with migrant backgrounds from Turkey, Arab countries or Pakistan would find it difficult to extol the 'white race', 'Germanness' or 'Greekness', apart from the inevitable problems of gaining credibility and acceptance among right-wing extremists. Salafist and jihadist extremism provides a fully-fledged replacement which fulfils the same psychological and political functions. Instead of resorting to 'race' and 'Germanness', it turns to a particular religious community – an "imagined community", to use the term coined by the American political scientist Benedict Anderson.

Right-wing or Salafist 'cultures' are therefore not isolated occurrences but are closely linked to personal, psychological, social and political phenomena. It is impossible to understand or influence them without taking these factors into account. The underlying problems are not ideological (such as particular religious or nationalist leanings), but are largely based on a lack of orientati-

on, social insecurity, lack of prospects and a weak sense of identity. Without these factors – which appear to be personal but which have their roots in society – the propagandists for extreme ideologies would have little chance of attracting more than one or two supporters. Radicalization is not triggered by reason but by psychological needs, which are assuaged by joining radical groups and espousing radical ideologies.

It is also no coincidence that the majority of Salafists are uneducated in theological terms. They are more attracted by the sense of elitism provided by Salafism and its intellectual simplicity than by theological considerations. In Europe, Salafism is often a tool for separating groups from their surroundings, sharpening their sense of group identity and isolating group members from their environment and society. In this respect, extremist overstatement works better than theological subtleties. Political and Salafi jihadism are first and foremost political and social movements. Their religious aspects are secondary, if we use the reality of these groups as the yardstick, rather than their propaganda.

Islamophobia without Muslims

In the same way, the activities of the anti-Islam PEGIDA/LEGIDA movements only express their Islamophobia as something of an afterthought. Instead, they display a general xenophobia, dissatisfaction with the political system, the German political parties, the political environment and an overall

sense of social insecurity. This is also the reason why people in Dresden and Leipzig are Islamophobic without having contact with Muslims. It is simply a cultural marker which gives voice to a broader and deeper crisis of existential orientation.

Even if the number of Muslims living in Saxony were to sink from 0.1 percent to zero, this would be unlikely to change anything about the sense of social insecurity that is currently being felt by large swaths of the population in this region. The difference with the Salafist scene is clearly that PEGIDA is extremely heterogeneous, has no common, integrative ideology, and latches on to the prejudices and moods at the centre of society. Xenophobia, hostility towards political parties, discontent and fear of 'others', the rejection of those in power, scepticism towards the mass media – these are all rife in large sections of the population. The attraction of PEGIDA lies much more in the way it combines these feelings, loads them with emotion and uses them to mobilize the population.

The ideological side of the PEGIDA scene is only incidental, while the expression of discontent and protest lies at its heart. So it is hardly surprising that, during the recent split in the movement, in a matter of days one element managed to shift the focus from 'Islamophobia' to 'strengthening direct democracy'. Some of the movement's supporters felt tactically overwhelmed by the speed of this change, but it is an indicator of how randomly feelings of social discontent can be expressed in different ideological ways.

Thoughts about how to push back or

prevent cultural manifestations such as xenophobia, political Salafism and ideological radicalization as a whole must focus on causes not symptoms. This means a purely cultural reaction would not be sufficient. Instead, cultural measures must be linked to political and sociopolitical actions. It would be as pointless to try to enlighten anti-Semites about Judaism or Islamophobes about Islamic theology and customs as it would be to provide racists with scientific proof that racism is wrong and senseless. Extremists do not become extremists because of gaps in their knowledge, or as a result of argument and logical reasoning. The vast majority become extremists because of a mixture of personal and emotional needs, the search for an individual and collective identity, and sociopolitical insecurity, which ultimately takes a political, ideological form.

Any relaxation or piercing of the ideological armour of the extremist core (not necessarily of the leadership, whose ideologization is often set in stone) also has to take into account these non-ideological dimensions. In the long term it is important to work on the factors that lie at the heart of radicalization. And as actual or perceived marginalization, erosion of meaning and lack of social integration in most cases provide a basis for cultural and political radicalization, these should be afforded particular attention when developing preventive and

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curative deradicalization strategies.

Extremist propaganda – racist, nationalist or jihadist – does not have the same effect on everyone. It only radicalizes those who need it to fulfil an emotional function. In Europe, successful people with good prospects are seldom affected by racist or jihadist propaganda because it has no meaning for them.

In Germany, the primary targets for anti-radicalization programmes are groups whose lives are full of uncertainty, who suffer from lack of social status, worry about social change or fear potential or real social marginalization and isolation. It is precisely these groups who are particularly difficult to reach using purely cultural programmes. This is because of their below-average levels of education (not necessarily below-average levels of intelligence). They do not become radicalized because they needed it from the outset, but because their radicalization offers them apparent or real solutions that compensate for the fragility of their lives.

It would therefore be appropriate to think about how to reduce the number of people in Europe who have slipped to the edges of society, or who find themselves trapped there. It is not easy to increase social inclusion for weaker sections of the population – in the labour market, the education system and culturally – nor to improve prospects for people with troubled past lives. But this is the key to preventive deradicalization.

This not only applies to people with migrant backgrounds from Turkey or Arab countries, but also to underprivileged neighbourhoods of capitals such as Paris and

Brussels, or cities in eastern Germany and the German Ruhr region. It is not simply a case of preventing developments such as in the French banlieues, but of narrowing the growing gap between rich and poor and combating increasing poverty in one section of society, as has been the case in Europe for many years.

Social insecurity without any prospect of being able to improve one's situation in the medium or long term eventually leads to socioeconomic, political and cultural marginalization and undermines the legitimacy of society and the political system. Taken together, they make the process of radicalization even easier and increase the number of potential recruits.

If it were possible to substantially reduce the number of people in precarious situations, both socially and economically, along with the proportion of the population who feel marginalized, this would make a major contribution to long-term, preventive deradicalization. This would provide the basis for new opportunities to push back radical ideologies through interventions based on cultural policy. It is very likely that there are and always will be individuals who take extremist positions. But whether they remain in tiny, isolated 'crackpot' groups or gradually attract supporters and become a factor with political relevance depends on whether they live in a functioning society which integrates all groups, on whether the political system is legitimate, and on whether broad sections of the population are viewed as aliens.

Within the framework of a fair, functioning society and an undoubtedly legitimate form of politics, an effective contribution may be made by providing education about minorities and religious and ethnic groups and through dialogues on conflict reduction. But the effect of this will be limited if the basic conditions are not in place.

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Who are we? Since 11th September, a small industry has sprung up trying to show how violence and even suicide bombings have deep Koranic or historical roots. It is important to remember, however, that there have been many periods in history when Muslim societies have been more tolerant than their Christian counterparts. Above all, radical Islamism and jihadism arise in response to the quest for identity of Muslims living in the West. *By Francis Fukuyama*

Modern liberal societies have weak collective identities. Postmodern elites, especially in Europe, feel that they have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation.But if our societies cannot assert positive liberal values, they may be challenged by migrants who are more sure of who they are.

Modern identity politics springs from a hole in the political theory underlying liberal democracy. That hole is liberalism's silence about the place and significance of groups. The line of modern political theory that begins with Machiavelli and continues through Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and the American founding fathers understands the issue of political freedom as one that pits the state against individuals rather than groups. Hobbes and Locke, for

example, argue that human beings possess natural rights as individuals in the state of nature—rights that can only be secured through a social contract that prevents one individual's pursuit of self-interest from harming others.

Modern liberalism arose in good measure in reaction to the wars of religion that raged in Europe following the Reformation. Liberalism established the principle of religious toleration—the idea that religious goals could not be pursued in the public sphere in a way that restricted the religious freedom of other sects or churches. (As we will see below, the actual separation of church and state was never fully achieved in many modern European democracies.) But while modern liberalism clearly established the principle that state power should not be used to impose religious belief on individuals, it left unanswered the question of whether individual freedom could conflict with the rights of people to uphold a particular religious tradition. Freedom, understood not as the freedom of individuals but of cultural or religious or ethnic groups to protect their group identities, was not seen as a central issue by the American

founders, perhaps because the new settlers were relatively homogeneous. In the words of John Jay (in the second *Federalist Paper*): "A people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles."

In the West, identity politics began in earnest with the Reformation. Martin Luther argued that salvation could be achieved only through an inner state of faith, and attacked the Catholic emphasis on works—that is, exterior conformity to a set of social rules. The Reformation thus identified true religiosity as an individual's subjective state, dissociating inner identity from outer practice.

The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has written helpfully about the subsequent historical development of identity politics. Rousseau, in the *Second Discourse and the Promenades,* argued that there was a big disjuncture between our outer selves, which were the accretion of social customs and habits, and our true inner natures. Happiness lay in the recovery of inner authenticity. This idea was developed by Johann Gottfried von Herder, who argued that inner authenticity lay not just in individuals but in peoples, in the recovery of what we today call folk culture. In Taylor's words, "This is the powerful ideal that has come down to us. It accords moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own inner nature, which it sees as in danger of being lost… through the pressures toward social conformity."

The disjuncture between one's inner and

outer selves comes not merely out of the realm of ideas, but from the social reality of modern market democracies. After the American and French revolutions, the ideal of *la carrière ouverte aux talents* was increasingly put into practice as traditional barriers to social mobility were removed. One's social status was now achieved rather than ascribed; it was the product of one's talents, work and effort rather than an accident of birth. One's life story was the search for fulfilment of an inner plan, rather than conformity to the expectations of one's parents, kin, village or priest.

Taylor points out that modern identity is inherently political, because it demands recognition. The idea that modern politics is based on the principle of universal recognition can be traced back to Hegel. Increasingly, however, it appears that universal recognition based on a shared individual humanity is not enough, particularly on the part of groups that have been discriminated against in the past. Hence modern identity politics revolves around demands for recognition of group identities—that is, public affirmations of the equal dignity of formerly marginalised groups, from the Québécois to African-Americans to women to indigenous peoples to homosexuals.

It is no accident that Charles Taylor is Canadian, since contemporary multiculturalism and identity politics were in many ways born in Canada, with the demands of the francophone community for recognition of its rights. Law 101 of 1977 violates the liberal principle of equal individual rights: French speakers enjoy linguistic rights not

shared by English speakers. Quebec was recognised as a 'distinct society' in 1995, and as a 'nation' in 2006.

Multiculturalism—understood not just as tolerance of cultural diversity but as the demand for legal recognition of the rights of racial, religious or cultural groups—has now become established in virtually all modern liberal democracies. US politics over the past generation has been consumed with controversies over affirmative action for African-Americans, bilingualism and gay marriage, driven by formerly marginalised groups that demand recognition not just of their rights as individuals but of their rights as members of groups. And the US's Lockean tradition of individual rights means that these efforts to assert group rights have been tremendously controversial—more so than in modern Europe.

The radical Islamist ideology that has motivated terror attacks over the past decade must be seen in large measure as a manifestation of modern identity politics rather than of traditional Muslim culture. As such, it is familiar to us from earlier political movements. The fact that it is modern does not make it less dangerous, but it helps to clarify the problem and its possible solutions.

The argument that contemporary radical Islamism is a form of identity politics has been made most forcefully by the French scholar Olivier Roy in his 2004

book *Globalised Islam.* According to Roy, the root of radical Islamism is not cultural—that is, it is not a by-product of something inherent in Islam or the culture that this religion has produced. Rather, he argues, radical Islamism has emerged because Islam has become "deterritorialised" in such a way as to throw open the whole question of Muslim identity.

The question of identity does not come up at all in traditional Muslim societies, as it did not in traditional Christian societies. In a traditional Muslim society, an individual's identity is given by that person's parents and social environment; everything—from one's tribe and kin to the local imam to the political structure of the state—anchors one's identity in a particular branch of Islamic faith. It is not a matter of choice. Like Judaism, Islam is a highly legalistic religion, meaning that religious belief consists of conformity to a set of externally determined social rules. These rules are highly localised in accordance with the traditions, customs, saints and practices of specific places. Traditional religiosity is not universalistic, despite Islam's doctrinal universalism.

According to Roy, identity becomes problematic precisely when Muslims leave traditional Muslim societies by, for example, emigrating to Western Europe. One's identity as a Muslim is no longer supported by outside society; indeed, there is strong pressure to conform to the West's prevailing cultural norms. The question of authenticity arises in a way that it never did in the traditional society, since there is now a gap

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between one's inner identity as a Muslim and one's behaviour vis-à-vis the surrounding society. This explains the constant questioning of imams on Islamic websites about what is haram (prohibited) or halal (permitted). But in Saudi Arabia, the question of whether it is haram to shake hands with a female professor, for example, never comes up because such a social category hardly exists.

Responses to the quest for identity

Radical Islamism and jihadism arise in response to the resulting quest for identity. Those ideologies can answer the question of 'Who am I?' posed by a young Muslim in Holland or France: you are a member of a global umma defined by adherence to a universal Islamic doctrine that has been stripped of all of its local customs, saints, traditions and the like. Muslim identity thus becomes a matter of inner belief rather than outward conformity to social practice. Roy points out that this constitutes the 'Protestantisation' of Muslim belief, where salvation lies in a subjective state that is at odds with one's outward behaviour. Thus could Mohammed Atta and several of the other 9/11 conspirators allegedly drink alcohol and visit a strip club in the days before the attacks.

Understanding radical Islamism as a form of identity politics also explains why second and third-generation European Muslims have turned to it. First-generation immigrants have usually not made a psy-

chological break with the culture of their land of birth and carry traditional practices with them to their new homes. Their children, by contrast, are often contemptuous of their parents' religiosity, and yet have not become integrated into the culture of the new society. Stuck between two cultures with which they cannot identify, they find a strong appeal in the universalist ideology of contemporary Jihadism.

Olivier Roy overstates the case for viewing radical Islamism as a primarily European phenomenon; there are many other sources for radical ideologies coming out of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan have all exported radical Islamist ideology, and Iraq may do so in the future. But even in Muslim countries, Roy's analysis remains valid because it is the importing of modernity into those societies that produces the crisis of identity and radicalisation. Globalisation, driven by technology and economic opening, has blurred the boundaries between the developed world and traditional Muslim societies. It is not an accident that so many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist plots and incidents were either European Muslims radicalised in Europe or came from privileged sectors of Muslim societies with opportunities for contact with the West. Mohammed Atta and the other organisers of the 9/11 attacks fall into this category, as do Mohammed Bouyeri (the murderer of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh), the 11th March Madrid bombers, the 7th July London bombers and the British Muslims accused of plotting to blow up an aircraft

"As Fritz Stern, Ernest Gellner and others have shown, modernisation and the transition from *Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft* constitute an intensely alienating process that has been negatively experienced by countless individuals in different societies. It is now the turn of young Muslims to experience this."

last summer. It should also be noted that al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are both educated men, with plenty of knowledge of and access to the modern world.

If contemporary radical Islamism is understood as a product of identity politics and hence a modern phenomenon, then two implications follow. First, we have seen this problem before in the extremist politics of the 20th century, among the young people who became anarchists, Bolsheviks, fascists or members of the Baader-Meinhof gang. As Fritz Stern, Ernest Gellner and others have shown, modernisation and the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* constitute an intensely alienating process that has been negatively experienced by countless individuals in different societies. It is now the turn of young Muslims to experience this. Whether there is anything specific to the Muslim religion that encourages this radicalisation is an open question. Since 11th September, a small industry has sprung up trying to show how violence and even suicide bombing have deep Koranic or historical roots. It is important to remember, however, that at many periods in history Muslim societies have been more

tolerant than their Christian counterparts. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides was born in Muslim Córdoba, which was a diverse centre of culture and learning; Baghdad for many generations hosted one of the world's largest Jewish communities. It makes no more sense to see today's radical Islamism as an inevitable outgrowth of Islam than to see fascism as the culmination of centuries of European Christianity.

Second, the problem of jihadist terrorism will not be solved by bringing modernisation and democracy to the Middle East. The Bush administration's view that terrorism is driven by a lack of democracy overlooks the fact that so many terrorists were radicalised in democratic European countries. Modernisation and democracy are good things in their own right, but in the Muslim world they are likely to increase, not dampen, the terror problem in the short run.

Populism and laissez-faire

Modern liberal societies in Europe and North America tend to have weak identities; many celebrate their own pluralism and multiculturalism, arguing in effect that their identity is to have no identity. Yet the fact is that national identity still exists in all contemporary liberal democracies. The nature of national identity, however, is somewhat different in North America than it is in Europe, which helps to explain why the integration of Muslims is so difficult in countries like the Netherlands, France and

Germany. According to the late Seymour Martin Lipset, American identity was always political in nature and was powerfully influenced by the fact that the US was born from a revolution against state authority. The American creed was based on five basic values: equality (understood as equality of opportunity rather than outcome), liberty (or anti-statism), individualism (in the sense that individuals could determine their own social station), populism and laissez-faire. Because these qualities were both political and civic, they were in theory accessible to all Americans (after the abolition of slavery) and have remained remarkably durable over the republic's history. Robert Bellah once described the US as having a "civil religion", but it is a church that is open to newcomers.

In addition to these aspects of political culture, American identity is also rooted in distinct ethnic traditions, in particular what Samuel Huntington calls the dominant "Anglo-Protestant" culture. Lipset agreed that the sectarian Protestant traditions of America's British settlers were very important in the shaping of American culture. The famous Protestant work ethic, the American proclivity for voluntary association and the moralism of American politics are all by-products of this Anglo-Protestant heritage.

But while key aspects of American culture are rooted in European cultural traditions, by the beginning of the 21st century they had become decoupled from their ethnic origins and were practised by a host of new Americans. Americans work harder than Europeans, and tend to believe—like

Weber's early Protestants—that dignity lies in morally redeeming work rather than in the solidarity of a welfare state.

There are, of course, many aspects of contemporary American culture that are not so pleasant. The culture of entitlement, consumerism, Hollywood's emphasis on sex and violence, and the underclass gang culture that the US has re-exported to Central America are all distinctively American characteristics that some immigrants come to share. Lipset argued that American exceptionalism was a double-edged sword: the same anti-statist individualism that made Americans entrepreneurial also led them to disobey the law to a higher degree than Europeans.

In Europe after the Second World War there was a strong commitment to creating a 'post-national' European identity. But despite the progress that has been made in forging a strong EU, European identity remains something that comes from the head rather than the heart. While there is a thin layer of mobile, cosmopolitan Europeans, few think of themselves as generic Europeans or swell with pride at the playing of the European anthem. With the defeat of the European constitution in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, ordinary citizens were once again telling elites that they were not ready to give up on the nation state and sovereignty.

But many Europeans also feel ambivalent about national identity. The formative experience for contemporary European political consciousness is the two world wars, which Europeans tend to blame on nationalism. Yet Europe's old national iden-

tities continue to linger. People still have a strong sense of what it means to be British or French or Dutch or Italian, even if it is not politically correct to affirm these identities too strongly. And national identities in Europe, compared to those in the Americas, remain more ethnically based. So while all European countries have the same commitment to formal, political citizenship equality as the US, it is harder to turn that into felt equality of citizenship because of the continuing force of ethnic allegiance.

The Dutch, for example, are famous for their pluralism and tolerance. Yet in the privacy of their own homes, the Dutch remain quite socially conservative. Dutch society has been multicultural without being assimilative, something that fits well into a consociational society that was traditionally organised into separate Protestant, Catholic and socialist 'pillars'. Similarly, most other European countries tend to conceive of multiculturalism as a framework for the coexistence of separate cultures rather than a transitional mechanism for integrating newcomers into a dominant culture (what Amartya Sen has called "plural monoculturalism"). Many Europeans express scepticism about whether Muslim immigrants want to integrate, yet those who do want to are not always eagerly welcomed, even if they have acquired the language and cultural knowledge of the host society.

It is important not to overstate the differences between the US and Europe in this regard. Europeans argue, with some

justice, that they face a harder problem in integrating their immigrants—the majority of whom are now Muslim—than does the US. Europe's Muslim immigrants tend to come from quite traditional societies, while the vast bulk of newcomers to the US are Hispanic and share the Christian heritage of the dominant culture. (Numbers also matter: in the US there are 2-3 million Muslims in a country numbering nearly 300 million; were this Muslim population proportionally the same size as in France, there would be over 20 million.)

A ticking time bomb

Whatever its exact causes, Europe's failure to better integrate its Muslims is a ticking time bomb that has already contributed to terrorism. It is bound to provoke a sharper backlash from populist groups, and may even threaten European democracy itself. Resolution of this problem will require a two-pronged approach, involving changes in behav-iour by immigrant minorities and their descendants as well as by members of the dominant national communities.

The first prong of the solution is to recognise that the old multicultural model has not been a big success in countries such as the Netherlands and Britain, and that it needs to be replaced by more energetic efforts to integrate non-western populations into a common liberal culture. The old multicultural model was based on group recognition and group rights. Out of a misplaced sense of respect for cultural differences—and in some cases out of im-

"The US has a 'civil religion'. but it is a church that is open to newcomers."

perial guilt—it ceded too much authority to cultural communities to define rules of behaviour for their own members. Liberalism cannot ultimately be based on group rights, because not all groups uphold liberal values. The civilisation of the European Enlightenment, of which contemporary liberal democracy is the heir, cannot be culturally neutral, since liberal societies have their own values regarding the equal worth and dignity of individuals. Cultures that do not accept these premises do not deserve equal protection in a liberal democracy. Members of immigrant communities and their offspring deserve to be treated equally as individuals, not as members of cultural communities. There is no reason for a Muslim girl to be treated differently under the law from a Christian or Jewish one, whatever the feelings of her relatives.

Multiculturalism, as it was originally conceived in Canada, the US and Europe, was in some sense a "game at the end of history." That is, cultural diversity was seen as a kind of ornament to liberal pluralism that would provide ethnic food, colourful dress and traces of distinctive historical traditions to societies often seen as numbingly conformist and homogeneous. Cultural diversity was something to be practised largely in the private sphere, where it would not lead to any serious violations of individual rights or otherwise challenge the essentially liberal social order. Where it did intrude into the public sphere, as in the case of language policy in Quebec, the deviation from liberal principle was seen by the dominant community more as an irritant

than as a fundamental threat to liberal democracy itself.

By contrast, some contemporary Muslim communities are making demands for group rights that simply cannot be squared with liberal principles of individual equality. These demands include special exemptions from the family law that applies to everyone else in the society, the right to exclude non-Muslims from certain types of public events, or the right to challenge free speech in the name of religious offence (as with the Danish cartoons incident). In some more extreme cases, Muslim communities have even expressed ambitions to challenge the secular character of the political order as a whole. These types of group rights clearly intrude on the rights of other individuals in the society and push cultural autonomy well beyond the private sphere.

Asking Muslims to give up group rights is much more difficult in Europe than in the US, however, because many European countries have corporatist traditions that continue to respect communal rights and fail decisively to separate church and state. The existence of state-funded Christian and Jewish schools in many European countries makes it hard to argue in principle against state-supported religious education for Muslims. In Germany, the state collects taxes on behalf of the Protestant and Catholic churches and distributes revenues to church-related schools. (This was a legacy of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic church.) Even France, with its strong republican tradition, has not been consistent on this issue.

"National identity continues to be understood and experienced in ways that sometimes makes it a barrier for newcomers who do not share the ethnicity and religious background of the native-born."

After the French revolution's anti-clerical campaign, Napoleon restored the role of religion in education and used a corporatist approach to manage church-state relations. The state's relationship with France's Jewish community, for example, is managed by the Ministre des Cultes through the Consistoire Israélite, which served as the model for Nicolas Sarkozy's recent efforts to create an authoritative Muslim interlocutor to speak for (and to control) the French Muslim community. Even the 1905 law enshrining the principle of *laïcité* had exceptions, as in Alsace, where the state still supports church-related schools.

These islands of corporatism where European states continue to officially recognise communal rights were not controversial prior to the arrival of large Muslim communities. Most European societies had become thoroughly secular, so these religious holdovers seemed quite harmless. But they set important precedents for the Muslim communities, and they are obstacles to the maintenance of a wall of separation between religion and state. If Europe is to establish the liberal principle of a pluralism based on individuals rather than groups, then it must address these corporatist institutions inherited from the past.

The other prong of the solution to the problem of Muslim integration concerns

the expectations and behaviour of the majority communities in Europe. National identity continues to be understood and experienced in ways that sometimes make it a barrier for newcomers who do not share the ethnicity and religious background of the native-born. National identity has always been socially constructed; it revolves around history, symbols, heroes and the stories that a community tells about itself. This sense of attachment to a place and a history should not be rubbed out, but it should be made as open as possible to new citizens. In some countries, notably Germany, 20th-century history has made it awkward to discuss national identity, but this is a dialogue that needs to be reopened in the light of Europe's new diversity—for if existing citizens do not sufficiently value their national citizenship, then European countries can scarcely expect newcomers to value it either.

And that dialogue is being reopened. A few years ago, Germany's Christian Democrats gingerly floated the idea of *Leitkultur*—the notion that German citizenship entails certain obligations to observe standards of tolerance and equal respect. The term *Leitkultur*—which can be translated as a 'guiding' or 'reference culture'—was invented in 1998 by Bassam Tibi, a German academic of Syrian origin, precisely as a non-ethnic, universalist conception of citizenship that would open up national identity to non-ethnic Germans. Despite these origins, the idea was immediately denounced by the left as racist and a throwback to Germany's unhappy past, and the

Christian Democrats quickly distanced themselves from it. But in the past few years, even Germany has had a much more robust public debate about national identity and mass immigration. During last the recent successful soccer World Cup, the widespread expression of moderate national feeling became completely normal, and was even welcomed by Germany's neighbours.

Despite its very different starting point, America may have something to teach Europeans here as they attempt to construct post-ethnic forms of national citizenship and belonging. American life is full of quasi-religious ceremonies and rituals meant to celebrate the country's democratic political institutions: flag-raising ceremonies, the naturalisation oath, Thanksgiving and the 4th of July. Europeans, by contrast, have largely deritualised their political lives. Europeans tend to be cynical or dismissive of American displays of patriotism. But such ceremonies are important in the assimilation of new immigrants.

And Europe does have its own precedents for creating national identities that are less based on ethnicity or religion. The most celebrated case is French republicanism, which in its classic form refused to recognise separate communal identities and used state power to homogenise French society. With the growth of terrorism and urban unrest, an intense discussion has been under way in France about why this form of integration has failed. Part of the reason may be that the French themselves gave up the old concept of citizenship in favour of a version of multiculturalism. The headscarf

ban of 2004 was the reassertion of an older concept of republicanism.

Britain has recently been borrowing from both American and French traditions as it seeks to raise the visibility of national citizenship. The Labour government introduced citizenship ceremonies for new citizens as well as compulsory citizenship and language tests. It also started citizenship classes in schools for all young citizens. Britain has experienced a sharp rise in immigration in recent years, much of it from the new member states of the EU such as Poland, and—in imitation of the US—the government sees immigration as a key part of its relative economic dynamism. Immigrants are welcome so long as they work rather than draw welfare and, thanks to US-style flexible labour markets, there are plenty of low-skilled jobs to take. But in much of the rest of Europe, a combination of inflexible work rules and generous benefits means that immigrants come in search not of work but of welfare. Many Europeans claim that the less generous welfare state in the US robs the poor of dignity. But the opposite is true: dignity comes through work and the contributions one makes through one's labour to the larger society. In several Muslim communities in Europe, as much as half the population subsists on welfare, directly contributing to the sense of alienation and hopelessness.

So the European experience is not homogeneous. But in most countries, the de-

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bate about identity and migration is opening up—albeit driven in part by terror attacks and the rise of the populist right.

The dilemma of immigration and identity ultimately converges with the larger problem of the valuelessness of postmodernity. The rise of relativism has made it harder for postmodern people to assert positive values and therefore the kinds of shared beliefs that they demand of migrants as a condition for citizenship. Postmodern elites, particularly those in Europe, feel that they have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation and have arrived at a superior place. But aside from their celebration of endless diversity and tolerance, postmodern people find it difficult to agree on the substance of the good life to which they aspire in common.

Immigration forces upon us in a particularly acute way discussion of the question "Who are we?", posed by Samuel Huntington. If postmodern societies are to move towards a more serious discussion of identity, they will need to uncover those positive virtues that define what it means to be a member of the wider society. If they do not, they may be overwhelmed by people who are more sure about who they are.

Francis Fukuyama was born in 1952 in Chicago. He lectures in Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. He gained his PhD in Political Sciences at Harvard University and was a member of the US State Department's planning committee as an expert on Eastern Europe. In 1989 he produced his best-known essay The End of History, which he was to renounce some years later. Fukuyama has spoken out about the key issues of recent global politics and has constantly returned to the question of how much culture people need – and how much government?

Liberty, equality and intolerance The classical liberal credo of freedom of opinion and liberties has not prevented Europe's public spheres and lifeworlds from becoming hotbeds of cultural struggle; nor has it led to intracultural solidarity within them. Only a minority recognize non-European cultures and religions, particularly Islam, as part of contemporary European culture. What can be done to combat this? *By Kai Hafez*

One of the key problems facing liberal democracies in Europe today is that Islamophobic attitudes – which may be considered a specific form of racism – are extremely common in bourgeois society. The generally inclusive character of the political system and the basically positive attitude of majorities and minorities towards the political system have not, unfortunately, brought about the kind of social peace we might have hoped for. Beneath the patina of loyalty to the system and the apparent stability of political systems, conflicts smoulder between Europe's Muslims and non-Muslims. If the majority do not believe that a minority is loyal to the constitution and are convinced that this minority is completely unwilling to integrate socially and adapt culturally, and if this minority generally feel discriminated against, then we are living in an unstable and fear-ridden society.

In present-day Europe, constructs of the 'enemy' are booming and extend far into bourgeois society. Though only a minority are open about their racism, the greater part of the majority society believe that Islam is more violent than Christianity and/or incompatible with Western values and Western culture. Everyday discrimination is not inevitable but it is certainly a widespread reaction. Islamophobic violence is relatively rare but it is a problem that exists throughout Europe, despite the fact that there is as yet little public recognition of this fact.

The turning point for images of Islam was not the attacks of 11 September 2001 but the Iranian revolution of 1978/1979. Here the latent Islamophobia inherent in Europe's cultural legacy was reanimated through the politicization of a fundamentalist movement. The attacks of 2001 did little to alter the substance of the image of Islam, but they were of crucial importance to the approach taken towards Islam within Western society. They massively bolstered the notion of Islam as the 'enemy' among right-wing populist parties, increased discrimination and led to violence towards Muslims. There are certain differences in the perception of Islam in specific European countries. A fundamental Islamophobia is widespread in Central Europe, while it is present in a somewhat attenuated form in Western Europe.

Public constructions of Islam in Europe show clear signs of collective perceptual extremism: they are highly selective, sloganeering, disparaging and marked by a radical mentality. To describe these negative images of Islam as 'racist' is justified in that what we see today is a racism 'without races', whose key differentiating criterion is not so much physical characteristics as affiliation to a particular culture or religion. So far, most Europeans and the major media have managed not to relapse into genetic racism. Cultural racism, meanwhile, is not even regarded as racism and is generally trivialized.

It is only this restructuring of concepts of the enemy that has made it possible for a majority of contemporary Europeans to claim that they are not racist, to openly denounce anti-Semitism while at the same time cultivating negative prejudices towards Islam and Muslims. Through this interplay, Islamophobia has become a kind of politically correct, respectable form of prejudice, whose reach extends far into bourgeois circles. Far from representing an extreme and radical element, this is a component of European popular culture.

It is true that the Islamophobia of the majority is not necessarily intentional, and it does not necessarily find expression in everyday discrimination or Islamophobic violence. But there is more than enough evidence to suggest that far-right Islamophobic perpetrators of violence regard such prejudices as the driving force behind their actions. In this sense, bourgeois society has an at least indirect responsibility for Islamophobic attacks of the kind we have seen all over Europe, with murderous attacks in Germany and Norway. Given that popular images of Islam are a powerful source of xenophobia, the deeds of individuals are everyone's responsibility.

Academic scholarship can have no interest in making knee-jerk criticisms of the majority for their 'racism' and of minorities for a 'refusal to integrate'. The imperative is to produce a nuanced assessment of the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims and non-Muslims. Islamophobia is clearly more common than any fundamental aversion to Western culture and the Christian religion among Europe's Muslims. This sense that there is an asymmetry of cultural perception is quite explainable. It is congruent with the power gap that exists between the two groups in Europe. Similar resentment is of-

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ten felt towards autochthonous religious minorities in the Islamic world. The existence of cultural hegemony in modern immigrant societies is an unresolved problem across the world. Despite its liberal-democratic political framework, Europe is no exception here.

Not every image of the enemy is unjustified. Some enemies are real. Certain sections of Europe's Muslim population do in fact exhibit high levels of criminality, educational shortcomings and signs of economic deprivation. None of these problems should be dismissed even if we are critical of the concept of 'integration'. From the perspective of the liberal-democratic theory of politics and society, we must make a sharp division between minimal political, economic and cultural requirements of immigrants and the freedom to be different within a pluralist society, a freedom both intended and generated by the system.

But the problems currently faced by many immigrants do touch on the foundations of social solidarity, such that policies of integration and recognition must be fused together. We must remember that all the empirical studies show that the integration problems of Muslims in Europe have very little to do with the religion of Islam. Statistically, it is quite clear that it is not religious affiliation and not even the degree of religiosity that is decisive but rather immigrants' social background, which is in turn often linked with their regional origins. The sociodemographic structure of Turkish immigration to Germany, for example, is quite different from Arab and Iranian immigration. Arab immigration to France, on the

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other hand, is quite different from that to Germany. Iranians and many Arabs in Germany exhibit very high levels of integration. Even within socially deprived strata, often of Turkish origin, there are many different aspects to integration.

Despite the problems that exist, there is absolutely no cause for social alarmism or excessive fears of 'parallel societies'. Furthermore, Muslims as a whole not only exhibit a high degree of trust in the political and social system of the European states, but extremist political views are no more common than in the rest of society. There is absolutely no reason for culturalization or Islamophobia.

A large number of publications have appeared dealing with tolerance and recognition from a theoretical perspective. But the views expressed in this literature are rarely connected with the theory of liberal democracy. This weakness of liberal thought has been criticized by other theoretical schools. In the United States, much of this criticism has come from communitarianism, which ultimately includes 'multicultural nationalism'. It seems implausible that we might create a society based on positive tolerance in which multicultural ideals of community prevail on the basis of liberal theory's demands for negative toleration.

If we look at racism, regardless of the ideological and power-political guidelines set

by the political system, a large number of causal complexes lie hidden deep within the societal structures of modernity. The dearth of intercultural contact, global educational deficiencies, social deprivation and the exclusion of immigrants will not be resolved solely through a liberal theory of politics. The question we must face is how the metavalues of tolerance and recognition can be cemented without regressing to traditional group ideologies and artificial forms of Islamization, which provide the raw material for modern ethno-religious constructs of the enemy. Modern recognition within the multicultural society entails acceptance of the other as well as rejection of ways of thinking and behaving that are incompatible with human rights and the liberal principle of democracy. This form of recognition is open to conflict and dialogue-intensive So far, the discourse of recognition and tolerance has largely remained an annex to constitutional debates. For the most part, however, the problems we are faced with in liberal democracy and the battle against Islamophobia cannot be solved by the legal and political system alone:

Habitual-cultural defensive responses

Value deficiencies: there is a pronounced connection between Islamophobia and authoritarian, dogmatic values, particularly in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. Values of religious freedom are certainly widespread, but in Europe – in clear contrast to

the United States – they have not been fused with the values of an immigrant society and seemed to be limited to the Christian, and perhaps Jewish, religion.

Social deprivation: Islamophobia is partly dependent on socioeconomic factors. It is to some extent 'determined by the economy' in much the same way as the anti-Semitism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But it would be reductive to regard Islamophobia as a consequence of poverty, because what matters is relative deprivation. Any trends towards middle-class decline reinforce habitual-cultural defensive responses among members of this group. Cultural distinction and the cultural rejection of 'others' are a key characteristic of this new middle class. Furthermore, we should not overlook the fact that socioeconomic crises tend to reinforce rather than trigger Islamophobia, which has also existed during periods of economic boom.

Lack of intercultural contact: while Muslims are often accused of failing to integrate socially, many non-Muslim citizens of Europe do nothing to cultivate contact with Muslims and consciously keep their distance, which is a significant factor in maintaining stereotypes and prejudices. Regardless of their growing numbers and immediate presence in local spaces, Muslims often remain the 'absent other'.

Eurocentric education: education is generally believed to diminish racism. With regard to Islamophobia, there is evidence of a positive influence of a high level of formal education, though even among educated people Islamophobia remains much stronger

than anti-Semitism and other forms of racism. European democracy seems stable yet European societies exhibit a high degree of xenophobia and Islamophobia. This is partly bound up with the failures of the political system and legal system. In their key spheres of activity, namely the legislative, executive and judicial branches, they have made major progress towards achieving legal equality for Islam. But there are major deficiencies in their ideological development and this influences how societies' core, shared values are defined. Other manifestations of Islamophobia, however, show that the political system is not solely and perhaps not even chiefly responsible for Islamophobia. In addition to the responsibility of each individual, several functional systems of society that might help resolve the problem of racism exhibit major deficiencies. In general, the less subsystems have to perform state and constitutional functions, the greater their shortcomings.

The problems of Islamophobia and discrimination are highly pronounced in the media – the mass media and the Internet – and in the private economy. The overall state of play in the academy and schools is somewhat better. Not all fields, however, have been adequately researched. Nonetheless, the major problems of Islamophobia today do not lie in the field of political control, but in the fields of values, knowledge and communication within modern society.

The political system of liberal democracy has two key characteristics: the liberal constitutional state and democratic sovereignty. The highest principle of the constitutional

state is equal treatment. Secularism means the equality of the individual before the law. Other aspects of secularism such as the separation of religion and politics or the 'privatization' of religion, which amounts to the withdrawal of religion from the public into the private sphere, are secondary. The relationship between liberal law and democracy is conflictual, since in reality democracy embodies the principle of hegemony.

Therefore democratic majorities intervene in much of Central and Northern Europe. What we see in these states is a belated adaptation to the requirements of immigration. It is also apparent that the European Union has strengthened cultural pluralism. Islamic organizations are given a hearing in Brussels, and the antidiscrimination laws that have now been introduced in Europe have to a large extent been at the instigation of European policymakers.

Overall, European national governments and policies formulated in Brussels are clearly playing an increasing role as immigrants' guardians, protecting them against discrimination in society. This is evident, for example, in the many statements by heads of state over the last few years and decades promoting the idea of Islam as part of Europe, as well as in state-run conferences on Islam and state advisory committees.

Leading European politicians still make statements critical of Islam as representatives of their parties or the official opposition, but ministers, heads of government and above all representative heads of state tend to deploy an inclusive rhetoric. At least on the level of symbolic politics, this is consonant with

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the requirements of the multicultural liberal constitutional state. Taking power at the state level thus has a 'civilizing' effect. State policies of tolerance in Europe continue to make their presence felt.

Whilst policies of recognition have made progress, the field of internal security has faced new challenges, above all since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Combating terrorism through dragnet policing and searching of non-suspects in their homes and mosques is not just a danger to the liberties of Muslims, but to the liberal order itself. European governments sometimes cross the line between legitimate defensive measures and institutional discrimination. Vital distinctions such as that between violent and nonviolent Islamic fundamentalists are ignored.

Collective characteristics as a criterion for prosecution

In much the same way as in the United States, collective characteristics such as actual or alleged affiliation to Islam become criteria of prosecution (ethnic profiling), which is an infringement of human rights and allowed by European courts only if there are very strong grounds for suspicion. On the whole, from the perspective of the liberal theory of democracy, state policies on Islam are ambivalent. Executive policies will re-

main susceptible to discrimination against Muslims as long as there is no comprehensive multicult-ural consensus among the political class at the level of political parties and ideologies. The legislative sphere in particular, however, finds itself exposed to increasing pressure from right-wing populist parties and an Islamophobia that extends deep into the heart of bourgeois society.

State and society encounter and intersect one another in the political culture, made up of political attitudes, values and norms, which are often more important than institutional systems. Unless the values of liberal democracy are lived by the people, no political system is capable of maintaining a corresponding order. Values exist on a number of different levels, from religious, metaphysical convictions through individual lifestyles to the norms of social and political coexistence, but only the latter are included in the liberal theory of democracy. Liberal orders aspire to facilitate diversity in the field of religious conviction and lifestyle, but in return they demand an integrative consensus on basic political values. And Muslims in Germany do in fact exhibit high levels of trust in the state.

So is the sphere of political values problem-free? It may be a shortcoming of classical liberal theory that multicultural recognition occurs only indirectly – via a general tolerance for different lifestyles within the framework of constitutions and laws. Paradoxically, a sense of community is generated through the recognition of difference, and here difference is understood essentially as a basic attitude rather than as an obligation

to establish a dialogue between minorities and majorities.

So in liberal systems community values do not come about by dealing with others, but through – shared – loyalty towards a third party, namely the constitution. It is no great surprise, then, that a high level of trust in the system among minorities and majorities in Europe goes hand-in-hand with mutual distrust. This represents a major gulf in values, and there is a risk of rupture between the inclinations of European political systems and European societies. To recall the slogan coined in the French Revolution: the majority of citizens have internalized the goals of 'liberty and equality', but 'fraternity', in the sense of a feeling of multicultural solidarity and togetherness, is not widespread. What Rosemarie Sackmann has said about the Netherlands probably applies to much of Europe: "politics has focused on the integration of immigrants while neglecting the integration of the indigenous population".

After the Second World War, Europe created political and economic systems that served as role models all over the world – but the cultural development of its majority societies did not keep pace with these changes.

The notion propagated by liberals such as the English historian Timothy Garton Ash that we must tolerate Islamophobia because freedom of opinion means people must be allowed to express such views is legitimate. But the classical liberal credo of freedom of opinion and liberties has not prevented Europe's public spheres and lifeworlds from becoming hotbeds of cultural struggle; nor has it led to

intracultural solidarity within them. Only a minority recognize non-European cultures and religions, particularly Islam, as part of contemporary European culture.

The dangers that can arise from such a situation are apparent in the many parallels with the European anti-Semitism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The rapidly advancing legal emancipation of Jews was not matched by respect for Judaism within society. When Judeophobia began to gain ground within political parties in Weimar Germany, increasing numbers of Jews began to realize that they were facing an existential threat. Like the anti-Semitism of the past, Islamophobia is currently spreading within the European party system. As in the past, some observers have already noted the looming rupture between the political system and society. They worry about the stability of political systems in Europe. But there is a difference between the present and the situation in Weimar, and it may be decisive. It is not the established parties that are becoming more Islamophobic. Instead new populist parties are forming on the extreme right wing, which are profiting from the tensions between system and society and offer citizens a pro-system political platform for political racism. Whether this will help stabilize the system of liberal democracy, however, is as yet unclear. Right-

"After the Second World War, Europe created political and economic systems that served as role models all over the world – but the cultural development of its majority societies did not keep pace with these changes."

wing populism may be just the beginning of the gradual erosion of liberal democracy, the start of a transformation culminating in a populist radical democracy or authoritarian systems. There are anti-Islamophobic networks in Europe but they can scarcely be described as strong.

Since Islamophobia is a phenomenon present in many fields of bourgeois society, even in left-wing and intellectual circles, such networks often have great difficulty in mobilizing people. To the extent that racism is becoming embedded in the bourgeoisie, anti-fascism will have to find new approaches, while major social institutions such as trade unions also need to step up their efforts.

Culturalization of the discourse

Some, of course, might suggest that democracies at present are more stable than in the Weimar period and that Europe's Muslims therefore face no real danger. Meta-values such as 'freedom' seem more firmly anchored than ever; political systems appear more solid than in any other period in European history. So we would be well advised to be cautious about comparing historical anti-Semitism and modern day Islamophobia. Europe's societies have changed in all kinds of ways over the last century. One example is the growing influence of the media and the spread of public communication. Media facilitate the communication between state and society necessary in a democracy. The mass media in particular have increasingly

attained a position that makes communication seem like the third resource of political and social development alongside power and the economy. The stability of the political order and social model, but also their transformation, depend to a large extent on the institutions of mass communication. They stimulate the emergence of constructs of the other. Though the media's impact on society is contested, they can both advance multicultural recognition and reinforce racism.

Explicit verbal stereotypes about Islam appear to be diminishing in German and European media, but stereotypical perspectives are being reproduced through agenda setting, thematic foci and imagery. This entails reconfiguring the culturalization of Muslims and the Islamic world and the negative discourse about them to make them politically correct. The result is a seemingly paradoxical 'enlightened Islamophobia'. It is not justified criticisms of individual Muslim actors, practices, and so on that is problematic, but the stereotypical character of media coverage, which is rooted primarily in the management of topics and imagery. These suggest that there is a fundamental difference between the Islamic and Western worlds. Media and societal Islamophobia tend to go hand-in-hand. But the mainstream mass media has at least eliminated a great deal of verbal racism and the representation of Muslims is improving, though thematic constraints often preclude genuine participation. The contribution of the Internet to participatory forms of social and democratic development may be substantial. Racist discourses, however, appear to have

been strengthened on the Internet.

Power relations between majorities and minorities are reflected online, and may even be intensified in the absence of the traditional filter institutions of the media. To a great extent, the European Internet has become a sphere of Islamophobic 'hate speech', home to racists and Holocaust deniers. With respect to the topic of Islam, the Internet is not just a reflection of right-wing populist and right-wing extremist milieus. To take just one example, about 50 per cent of Internet weblogs are Islamophobic, which equates to a far larger number of people than those supporting right-wing populists. A substantial portion of the bourgeois middle of society, which may not vote for neo-populist parties, is evidently expressing Islamophobic views online.

Regardless of what people write online, virtual Islamophobia is not necessarily linked with violence, but it is almost always mentioned as a source of inspiration by perpetrators of Islamophobic violence. At the heart of European society, a phenomenon is gaining ground that used to be found only on the margins of society – the communitization of racists. These virtual communities cannot be compared either with the traditional conversation over a beer at the local pub or with neo-Nazi cadres, but we should not under-estimate their potential for mobilization at the centre of social life.

Under the sign of the debate on Orientalism, European academic scholarship has undergone numerous processes of revision over the last few decades. Though at present almost all the impetus for critical debate

on the position of Islam in Europe is to be found within Western scholarship, comes from Western academies or is published by Western publishers, it is far from clear that those disciplines not specifically concerned with Islam and the Islamic world have really overcome Eurocentric traditions.

Sensationalization of knowledge markets

As a whole, however, academic scholarship functions as a pioneering system for the grounded critique of Islamophobia. But serious problems arise at the interface between scholarship and the public sphere, in the field of public intellectualism. Over the last few decades, the European public sphere has generated many public figures who present themselves as 'experts on Islam' and have achieved enormous popularity as fundamentalist critics of Islam. As a rule, their impact remains limited to particular nations, though there are exceptions such as Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci. But they are far more likely than academic scholars to become public opinion leaders.

Public intellectual culture in Europe is by no means well-equipped to deal with Islamophobia. It is in fact fundamentalist critics of Islam who set the tone for popular Islamophobia and are nurturing the rupture between political system and society. There is clear evidence of a process of deliberalization among formerly liberal and left-wing intellectual elites when it comes to the subject of Islam.

The causes of their success, however, are complex. The media evidently have a great need for seemingly independent expertise, but instead of being supported by the academic system this is 'staged' by the media themselves. The resonance achieved by these critics of Islam is generally fostered by their concurrent presence in a number of different media markets. Key here is the interplay between book production, publishing houses' public relations and the mass media's fixation on events, which make an 'event' out of Islamophobic critics of Islam themselves, attracting a vast audience.

So media opinion leaders on Islamophobia are generated by an external tendency towards sensationalization of knowledge markets and the internal problems of European intellectualism, with its occasional susceptibility to reactionary radicalism, something that has no means disappeared as a result of the Second World War or the 1968 students movements.

As far as the state school sector in Europe is concerned, the multicultural reconstruction of syllabuses and schoolbooks is well underway throughout much of Europe.

Yet Islam-related knowledge appears to find very little expression in the syllabuses for specific subjects. At times the entire process of diversification of teaching materials is restricted to special projects on 'global learning'. Syllabuses for the subject of history, for example, have often been purged of earlier stereotypes, but the growth in know-

ledge of relevance to Islam remains limited. It is above all with respect to the Middle Ages that attention is paid the Islamic world, while in the modern era selected insights into regional conflicts dominate (Middle East conflict, Gulf wars, terrorism, and so on).

In modern history in particular, there are major knowledge gaps. The image of Islam is extremely fragmentary and fixated on conflict, while a distinct and comparative perspective on the development of Middle Eastern societies over the last few centuries is almost entirely lacking. More attention is being paid to topics such as 'migration' with respect to politics, society and economics, but in some cases recent studies have highlighted persistent analytical clichés (such as the concept of the 'identity conflict'). Too little attention is paid to Islamophobia as a distinct theme. Overall, it is unclear to what extent schoolbook knowledge is capable of counteracting the distorted image of the Islamic world gleaned from the media. Few studies have examined the practice of teaching, which goes beyond syllabuses and schoolbooks, so it is impossible to evaluate it.

That the problems of contemporary Islamophobia are being fostered by an interplay between different subsystems of society is also evident with respect to the Christian churches. Key documents produced by the leadership of the Protestant church in Germany, for example, exhibit a profound need to emphasize boundaries with Islam. There is no sign here of an attempt to advance a global ecumene. Fundamental truth claims dominate. Even more significant from the point of view of liberal theory is the transfer-

"As far as the state school sector in Europe is concerned, the multicultural reconstruction of syllabuses and schoolbooks is well underway throughout much of Europe."

ral of this need to accentuate difference into everyday social practice. Common prayer among Christians and Muslims is prohibited, while Protestant social institutions are discouraged from employing Muslims. The attitude of the Catholic Church towards Islam is ambivalent and is informed both by the dialogical approach outlined by the Second Vatican Council as well as occasional polemics against Islam. Intermediary theological institutions of both churches, particularly the Christian academies responsible for adult education, seem significantly keener on interreligious dialogue. Here the distinction between the churches' fundamental theological functions and their role in promoting social dialogue is more evident. It is impossible to say with complete certainty to what extent the grassroots of the Church is involved in the Islamic-Christian dialogue. But it is highly doubtful that the churches are acting consistently as societal intermediaries with respect to Europe's Muslims.

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Europe's sense of humanity According to British writer Kenan Malik, we are so bedazzled by the existential fear of immigration that migrants have come to be seen less as living, breathing human beings than as so much flotsam and jetsam to be swept away from Europe's beaches. Fortress Europe has created not only a physical barrier around the continent but an emotional one too – around Europe's sense of humanity. *By Kenan Malik*

A 'mega mosque' has recently been built in the south London borough of Merton. Inevitably, it has attracted its fair share of controversy. In his book *The British Dream*, David Goodhart takes the mosque as symbolic of the unacceptable change that immigration has wrought upon the nation. The mosque, he writes, "replaced an Express Dairies bottling plant which provided a few hundred jobs for local people and lots of milk bottles – an icon of an earlier, more homogenized age."

There was, in fact, a seven-year gap between the closing of the dairy in 1992 and building work beginning on the mosque. In those seven years the abandoned dairy was, according to local accounts, turned into a crack den. So, one story we could tell is that of economic forces closing down an

unprofitable dairy, with the loss of several hundred jobs, and of local Muslims subsequently rescuing the abandoned, crime-infested site, creating new jobs and, in the process, transforming Merton for the better. But critics of immigration want to tell a different story. In their eyes, the mosque is symbolic not of the rescue of a site from abandonment and crime, but of the original closure of the dairy and of the transformation of Merton's old way of life.

The story of the Merton mosque and the retelling of that story as a narrative of cultural loss cuts to the heart of the contemporary debate about immigration, one of today's most fiercely debated and toxic issues. The debate is, however, less about the facts than about the existential impact. Immigration has become symbolic of the disruption of communities, the undermining of identities, the fraying of the sense of belonging, the promotion of unacceptable change. For Goodhart, "large-scale immigration" has created "an England that is increasingly full of mysterious and unfamiliar worlds". He quotes one man from Merton: "We've lost this place to other cultures. It's not English any more."

The roots of *The British Dream* lie in Goodhart's 2004 essay *Too Diverse?* publis-

hed in *Prospect* magazine, of which he was editor at the time. Liberals, he suggested, had to face up to a "progressive dilemma". Too much immigration undermined social solidarity, particularly in a welfare state. We had to choose between the two. The essay caused considerable controversy, but over the past decade the idea that too much immigration undermines social solidarity has entered the common consciousness.

It is a claim that lies at the heart of Paul Collier's *Exodus*. Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Oxford University's Blavatnik School of Government and Co-Director of the Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Collier has long been concerned with questions of poverty and justice. In *Exodus* he seeks to unpack the impact of immigration on both the host community and those left behind in the countries of origin. Too much immigration, he suggests, adversely affects both groups. It drains poor countries of human resources and undermines the social stability of rich countries.

Collier, like Goodhart, accepts that economic fears about the impact of immigration on host nations are largely misplaced. But, again like Goodhart, he insists that too much diversity creates social problems, in particular by destroying "mutual regard", the willingness to cooperate and redistribute resources. Both authors draw upon the work of American sociologist Robert Putnam, who has shown that the more diverse a community, the less socially engaged are its members – they vote less, do less community work, give less to charity, have fewer friends. Most strikingly, Putnam discovered that people in more diverse communities show greater distrust – not just of members

of other ethnic groups but also of their own.

Putnam's work has long been used by critics of immigration to suggest that diversity undermines the social fabric. More recent research has, however, questioned his conclusions. The latest such study, led by Patrick Sturgis, director of Britain's National Centre for Research Methods, investigated the relationship between diversity and trust within London. It discovered the opposite relationship to Putnam. Once the researchers had allowed for social and economic deprivation, they found that "ethnic diversity is [...] positively related to social cohesion, with significantly higher levels of cohesion evident as ethnic heterogeneity increases".

The atomization of society

We should, of course, no more view Sturgis's research as demonstrating that diversity creates trust than see Putnam's work as a demonstration that diversity undermines trust. A key problem, as Putnam himself has pointed out, is that such studies offer only a snapshot of attitudes at one moment in time. Yet diversity is not a static phenomenon; it is something that changes over time, as does our political response to it. Over the past few decades, we have witnessed the demise of movements for social change, the rise of identity politics, the atomization of society, a loss of belief in universal values, all of which has led to civic disengagement and a greater sense of anomie. So the real problem being exposed by a study like Putnam's may not be diversity as such but the political context in which we think about it. What is missing from Putnam's

> "The existential fear of immigration is almost as old as immigration itself."

data is also missing from the accounts of critics like Goodhart and Collier – a sense of historical context.

The existential fear of immigration is almost as old as immigration itself. Had Arthur Balfour been able to read Goodhart's account of the creation of an England "full of mysterious and unfamiliar worlds", of an England that "is not English any more", he would undoubtedly have nodded in agreement. Balfour was Prime Minister in 1905 when Britain introduced its first immigration controls, aimed primarily at European Jews. Without such a law, Balfour claimed, "though the Briton of the future may have the same laws, the same institutions and constitution [...] nationality would not be the same and would not be the nationality we would desire to be our heirs through the ages yet to come." Two years earlier, the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration (an 'alien' was, in the early 20th century, both a description of a foreigner and a euphemism for a Jew) had expressed fears that newcomers were inclined to live "according to their traditions, usages and customs" and that there might be "grafted onto the English stock [...] the debilitated sickly and vicious products of Europe".

The sense that Jewish immigration was uncontrolled and that "We've lost this place to other cultures" was palpable in the discussions. "There is no end to them in Whitechapel and Mile End", claimed one witness while giving evidence to the 1903 Royal Commission. "These areas of London might be called Jerusalem." The Conservative MP

Major Sir William Eden Evans-Gordon expressed the same sentiment through a quite extraordinary metaphor. "Ten grains of arsenic in a thousand loaves would be unnoticeable and perfectly harmless," he told Parliament, "but the same amount put into one loaf would kill the whole family that partook of it."

By the 1950s, the Jewish community had come to be seen as part of the British cultural landscape. The same arguments used against Jews half a century earlier were now deployed against a new wave of immigrants from South Asia and the Caribbean. A Colonial Office report of 1955 echoed Arthur Balfour, fearing that "a large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life would weaken [...] the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached". There were worries, too, about the uncontrolled nature of immigration. "The question of numbers and of the increase in numbers," Enoch Powell insisted, lies at "the very heart of the problem". "Whole areas, towns and parts of England", he claimed, were being "occupied by different sections of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population". A decade later Margaret Thatcher gave a notorious TV interview in which she claimed that there were in Britain "an awful lot" of black and Asian immigrants and that "people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture". The echoes are unmistakable, both of the earlier debate about Jews and of the contemporary immigration debate.

Just as Jews became an accepted part of the cultural landscape, so did postwar

immigrants, though their acceptance was more grudging and often not extended to Muslims. Today, the same arguments that were once used against Jews and later against South Asian and Caribbean immigrants are now being aimed at Muslims and East Europeans. A succession of authors such as Mark Steyn, Oriana Fallaci, Melanie Phillips and Christopher Caldwell warn that Muslim immigration is threatening the very foundations of European civilization. The melodramatic title of Caldwell's book, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, is a nod to Edmund Burke and reflects Caldwell's belief that the impact of postwar immigration has been as dramatic as the fall of the ancien régime in 1789. Muslim migration in particular has been akin to a form of colonization. "Since its arrival half a century ago," Caldwell claims, "Islam has broken – or required adjustments to, or rearguard defences of – a good many of the European customs, received ideas and state structures with which it has come in contact." Islam "is not enhancing or validating European culture; it is supplanting it".

For Caldwell, prewar immigration between European nations was different from postwar immigration from outside Europe because "immigration from neighbouring countries does not provoke the most worrisome immigration questions, such as 'How well will they fit in?' 'Is assimilation what they want?' and, most of all, 'Where are their true loyalties?'" In fact, those were the very questions asked of European migrants in the prewar years. "The notion of the easy assimilation of past European immigrants", as the historian Max Silverman has written, "is a myth." Throughout the 20th cen-

tury, virtually every wave of immigration, whether of Irish and Jews to Britain, Italians and North Africans to France, Catholics and Chinese to America, was met with the claim that the influx was too large, too culturally distinct, too corrosive of stability and continuity. Come the next, larger wave of immigration, and the previous wave now came to be seen as acceptable in terms of what the nation could absorb but the new wave was not. And it is against this background that we need to understand the fears of Goodhart, Collier and Caldwell. All insist that Europe today faces a unique danger. All the arguments recycle the panic expressed in response to every wave of immigration.

Recycled panic

The current debate takes place, however, in a new context. When Balfour warned of the impact of Jewish immigrants, there existed a strong sense of British identity, rooted primarily in the concepts of race and empire. Hostility to immigration was part of a racialized defence of national identity.

Behind contemporary hostility to immigration lies a sense of the dissolution of such identity, of the erosion of common values. There lies also the breakdown of traditional political mechanisms, the growing chasm between the elite and the public, and the abandonment by mainstream parties of their traditional working-class constituencies. As a result, argues Goodhart, what he calls the "left behind" white working class experience immigration "as a loss, either directly because they lived in a neighbourhood that was rapidly changed by it or indirectly

> "Almost inevitably, immigration has come to be viewed by many not as something that has enriched their lives, but as something that has diminished them."

because their working class culture and institutions seemed to be pushed aside by the same market forces that then ushered in the newcomers".

The transformation of working-class life, the erosion of the sense of working-class identity, the breaking of bonds of solidarity, the marginalization of labour as a political voice – all are real phenomena. But all have roots not in mass immigration but in broader economic and political changes. When the first wave of postwar immigrants arrived in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, it was a period of full employment, an expanding welfare state and strong trade unions. Today, Britain's manufacturing base has all but disappeared, working class communities have disintegrated and the welfare state has begun to crumble. Trade unions have been neutered, the Labour Party has largely cut its roots with its working class base, and the very idea of class-based politics is derided. All this has helped erode the bonds of solidarity that once shaped working class communities, leaving many feeling voiceless and detached from the political process.

Immigration has played almost no part in fostering these changes. It has, however, come to be a means through which many perceive these changes. Partly this is a consequence of the way that the public discussion has been framed, with politicians at both ends of the spectrum presenting immigrants as a problem, even a threat. Partly

also it is because the forces of globalization, or the internal wranglings of the Labour Party, are difficult to conceptualize. One's Bangladeshi or Jamaican neighbour is easy to see. Almost inevitably, immigration has come to be viewed by many not as something that has enriched their lives, but as something that has diminished them.

Goodhart himself acknowledges that "social and economic change would have swept away the old working class ways even if there had been zero immigration". Why, then, bring immigration into this debate at all? So great has become the obsession with immigration that it has come to be felt as the problem even when reason informs us otherwise.

This is particularly apparent in *Exodus*. Throughout the book, Collier chastises other participants in the immigration debate for allowing their prejudices to shape their reasoning, and for using reason "to legitimize judgments that we have already made on the basis of our moral tastes". And yet it would be difficult to find a more apt description of Collier's own approach. Everything from the changing nature of British criminal culture to recent "policies of reduced taxation and increased reliance on the market" to the London riots of 2011 may be attributed to "the pronounced increase in cultural diversity brought about by immigration". He provides no evidence. Indeed, he suggests that "the purpose" of his "anecdotes in which immigration appears to have undermined social capital, is decidedly not to strengthen an argument". But why else introduce them? Much of his book reads like a search for a narrative to bolster an already formulated argument about immigration.

Goodhart and Collier both claim that in "liberal circles" immigration "has become a taboo subject". "The only permissible opinion", writes Collier, "has been to bemoan popular antipathy to it." In reality, though, what is rarely questioned is not immigration but the idea that immigration is responsible for Europe's social ills.

After the Lampedusa tragedy in October when a boat carrying migrants sank in the Mediterranean, leading to the deaths of more than 300 people, European politicians expressed much anger and grief. What no one was willing to acknowledge was that the tragedy was not merely an accident but the gruesomely inevitable consequence of EU border policies. For more than three decades the EU, driven by an obsession with immigration, has been constructing a Fortress Europe to keep the 'unwanted' from landing on the shores of the continent, spending hundreds of millions of euros on external border controls. Since 1988 some 20,000 migrants have died trying to enter Europe, two thirds of them perishing in the Mediterranean. And what have European nations done in response? They have continued to strengthen Fortress Europe and charged fishermen who saved drowning migrants with aiding illegal immigration.

So bedazzled have we become by the existential fear of immigration that migrants have come to be seen less as living, breathing human beings than as so much flotsam and jetsam to be swept away from Europe's beaches. Fortress Europe has created not only a physical barrier around the continent but an emotional one, too, around Europe's sense of humanity.

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Do we need a new Enlightenment?
The modern Enlightenment emerged in Europe and is a European project in spatio-temporal terms. But the Islamic world had its own Enlightenment. The European and Islamic Enlightenments both rest on the primacy of reason. If Muslims would only think back to their own Enlightenment, this could provide a basis for building bridges between Muslims and Europeans and perhaps depriving fundamentalists of their ideology. *By Bassam Tibi*

The question 'Do we need a (new) Enlightenment?' is not simply an academic question, for three reasons. Firstly, from a historical point of view, the Enlightenment is part of Europe's identity. So abandoning the Enlightenment would mean abandoning Europe's identity. My book *Europa ohne Identität? (Europe without Identity?),* published in 1998, is a defence of the Enlightenment. In it I refer to the Jewish philosopher Max Horkheimer, who fled to America in 1933 but returned to Frankfurt in 1950. In his *Critical Theory* he warned: "The identity of Europe is the Enlightenment; defending this identity is the duty of every thinking being".

Secondly, in today's post-Cold War period, we need global peace and global democracy. When people from different cultures and civilizations come together, they need to have something in common. If they do not have this, they end up talking at each other rather than to each other. Talking to each other means addressing problems and looking for solutions. Any dialogue without this cannot be truly called dialogue. Enlightenment should provide a common foundation for global discourse and global peace.

Thirdly, I am a Muslim and a migrant. But I did not come here as a migrant. I came here to study and planned to return home. But for various personal and political reasons I ended up staying in Germany and becoming a migrant.

Today we are experiencing a huge flood of migrants to Europe. A few figures: in 1950 there were fewer than 1 million Muslims living in Europe. Around 800,000 were living mainly in France and the UK, a hangover from these countries' colonial past. Very few Muslims were living in other countries such as Austria and Germany. In 1962, when I arrived in Frankfurt, there were at most two or three hundred Muslims in the city. Today, 35 percent of Frankfurt's population is non-German. And the Islamic community makes up the majority of these. This means

that Islam has arrived in Europe. We have to find ways of communicating with it and integrating Islam and Muslims.

But on what basis? I believe it should be on the basis of the Enlightenment. Do we need a new Enlightenment? I have divided my article into four sections, each of which begins with a particular theory.

My first theory is that we live in an age of nihilism. This means that we do not have a particular value orientation that binds us all together. Some people have a value orientation which completely or partially guides their lives. But it seems to me that most people are living in an age of nihilism in which the Enlightenment finds itself coming under fire. Criticism of the Enlightenment comes from Postmodernism. Postmodernism affords other cultures almost unconditional respect in the name of cultural relativism. This is set against European thought as universalism, in as much as it requires universal validity, and also discredits what should be relativized. Respect for other cultures means accepting what they produce. It means relativizing, which includes human rights. In Europe, torture is a breach of human rights. In Turkey – I know, because I have lived there – torture is a normal part of police interrogation.

I know from my time in Damascus that beatings on the soles of the feet are incredibly painful. People soon start talking. They say this is not a violation of human rights. Respect for other cultures seems to require that we agree to keep quiet about human rights violations. A few years back, a court in Frankfurt rejected a divorce petition from a woman who had been badly beaten by her husband. The judge justified her verdict by claiming it was necessary to respect other cultures and stating that in Islamic countries it is normal for husbands to beat their wives. The verdict was overturned. But this demonstrates the cultural relativism of Postmodernists who insist on the end of the Enlightenment. Perhaps we need a new Enlightenment, perhaps not. Whatever the case, we have to defend the Enlightenment against the attacks of the Postmodernists. Enlightenment is not a dogma. There is nothing that cannot change. Even enlightenment can change. But it has one principle that cannot and should not change. In his book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* (in my view, his most important work), Jürgen Habermas quotes Immanuel Kant when he describes reason "as the supreme tribunal, before which anything that claims validity must be justified." This principle of the Enlightenment has not changed – if enlightenment is to truly remain enlightenment.

The primacy of reason: when I say something is right or wrong, this can only be decided through the application of reason. No-one has a monopoly on reason and rationality. Whether or not something is rational is revealed through discourse. And I believe

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this was also the case in Islam. It is not only in Europe that people believe in the primacy of reason. It is also defended by people in Africa, Asia, Latin America and in Islam. In this respect, Max Weber speaks of the primacy of the "disenchantment of the world". In his *Discourse*, Habermas applies a momentous abstraction to this understanding of Modernity. He separates Modernity from its modern European roots and stylizes it as an archetype in which the spatio-temporal dimension has been neutralized.

In Damascus I learned to view the world through the lens of the Koran, through my religion. The same applies to Christians, Buddhists, and so on. Yet, if it starts raining, I know that it is a natural phenomenon that I can explain by reason. At one time I lived in Morocco, a country that sporadically suffers from drought. Its people pray: "Allah, Allah, send us rain!" It depends on Allah whether it rains or not! Of course it has nothing to do with Allah. Rainfall has a scientific explanation. The origins of the disenchantment of the world and the Enlightenment are in Europe. But the Enlightenment must have a universal validity that is removed from its roots and stylized as an archetype in which the spatio-temporal dimension has been neutralized.

There is an essential, and not only academic, difference between universality and universalism. Every 'ism' designates an ideology. For example, Islam is a religion, Islamism is an ideology. The same is true of universalism. I am against universalism but for universality. This differentiation is not just academic nitpicking. Universality and universal refer to things that every human being shares, such as the need to drink water.

Reason is the supreme tribunal

This is not African, European or Asian. Similarly, a universal human right is the right not to be tortured. People say this is a European idea. Its roots are in Europe, but we can and must defend this right and this idea as a universal standard in Immanuel Kant's sense that human reason is the supreme tribunal, before which everything that claims validity must be justified and applied universally. For example, when I hold lectures in Islamic countries, it is always possible for someone to point to the Koran and say "You're wrong. In the Koran Allah says..." There is a contradiction, a conflict, between beliefs and human reason. How should we address this problem? By making human reason the supreme tribunal and not the text of a holy book, whether it is the Bible, the Talmud or the Koran. In an age of globalization, people are moving closer together than ever before.

I can cite an example of this from my own experience. In 1992 I lived in Dakar in Senegal. While living there, I developed my concept of European Islam. 85 percent of Senegalese are Muslims. I lived among them, observed how they practised Islam and visited other areas of the country. In rural areas, barter is more important than money. I met some young people and swapped some spare shirts and trousers for some very beautiful wooden figures. I had the

following exchange with a young boy of 10 or 11: "Monsieur, vous êtes raciste!" "Moi, raciste!", I said, "Allah preserve me, I'm a Muslim like you. I've got white skin, but I'm still a Muslim. What makes you think I'm a racist?" The boy replied: "I gave you a great wooden figure and you gave me a shirt with an old-fashioned collar. It's out of fashion." The boy had never been to Europe. So how did he know that? Because there are magazines, television, mobile devices. Young people see and know what's in and what's out. The collar, the shirt, that I tried to swap was out, no-one wore shirts like that anymore. This is an example of how people are being brought together more closely than at any time in human history, an example of globalization.

When people come together so closely, there has to be a minimum amount of true commonality if they are to get along. This minimum includes democracy, enlightenment and cultural modernity. We have to build bridges.

In 2012 I published a book entitled *Islam and Global Conflict*, with the subtitle: *Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging*. This means delving beneath the surface and talking to each other about the causes of problems and about justice. We have to ask questions such as: what is justice, what is injustice? Justice is a normative structure. We need an understanding of justice that can be shared globally. In other words, justice must have or be given a secular basis. In 1993 an international conference on human rights was held in Vienna. The Saudi foreign minister's position was: "Human rights ba-

sed only on sharia law". We should not only look at Europe, but also further afield. Why should a Hindu or a Confucian accept sharia law? There is no basis for this, no reason. We need a communal set of values when creating a basis for the law and how it is practised. The law is a value system.

My second theory is that today there is a synchrony between structural globalization and cultural fragmentation. This may sound academic, but it has a significant sociopolitical impact. Europe's financial crisis affects America, Asia, Africa and Australia. Globalization is expressed in information technology, politics and communication. But alongside this, globalization is not expressed in cultures. My American colleagues are always talking about 'cultural globalization'. In America it is possible to be a straight talker without insulting anyone: "Come on, stop now. This is nonsense!" Everyone wears jeans, has a cell phone, wears fashionable shirts, drinks Coca Cola. This is often considered to be cultural globalization. One of my colleagues, Benjamin Barber, has written a book entitled *Jihad versus McWorld*. McWorld is a world that shares everything. But Muslims are waging jihad against McWorld. A few years ago we were both in the United Arab Emirates and debated this issue. The fundamentalists I have met in places such as Egypt all eat burgers and drink Coca Cola. But they want the introduction of sharia law. How do they reconcile this? My colleague does not understand this. But culture is not consumption; culture is a production of meaning. This is something I learned from the great American anthropo-

logist Clifford Geertz in Princeton.

However, many American social scientists interpret cultural behaviour as consumer behaviour. The fact that people consume the same goods does not mean they espouse the same values. Values and value systems arise from the production of meaning. So there is cultural fragmentation. People may live in the same age and be linked via networks and globalization, but they still have different value systems. I think this cultural fragmentation harbours conflicts. Cultural tensions arise because of the incompatibility of different value systems. A good example of this is the way court proceedings may involve Muslims invoking their faith, as often happens in Germany. The accused says to the judge: "I don't accept it. I'm a Muslim. I only abide by sharia law, you're not a Muslim. You are basing your verdict on German law. That is not my law. So I accept neither you nor your verdict." When these kinds of tensions are politicized – and thus also become problems for cultural policy – then we have a conflict, a problem. Then we are in difficulties.

My third theory is that enlightenment, or as Max Weber terms it, the disenchantment of the world that should have universal validity, is now being called into question by the emergence of religious fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalists believe that Western secularism is part of a Zionist/ Crusader conspiracy that aims to destroy

"The fundamentalists I have met in places such as Egypt all eat burgers and drink Coca Cola. But they want the introduction of sharia law. How do they reconcile this?"

their religion. The Jews are behind it all. This is based on the research I carried out for my book *Islamism and Islam*, which was published by Yale University Press in 2012. It contains 50 pages on the Islamization of anti-Semitism. Islam is not the source of all evil. Anti-Semitism is a European ideology. The Islamists have Islamized it. Between 2008 and 2010 I worked in the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. and focused on the idea that secularism is a conspiracy against Islam promoted by Jews. We're back on religion, but not on belief in God. This is a subject that has to be addressed. I respect every religion. This is why I have been active in interfaith dialogues in Europe, Africa and India. In 1994 in New Delhi I acted as a mediator between Hindus and Muslims. Respect for religion and religious practice is a human right. But when religion is politicized, then religion is no longer faith. Respect for religious faith does not apply to ideologies masquerading as religion.

At the Central European University in Budapest, I worked on a research project entitled *The Return of Religion to Public Space*. The return of religion to public space occurs in Islam, but not only in Islam. It is a global phenomenon. Four words are important in this respect. Once again they are academic words, but they are eminently related to our everyday lives and to our social and political lives. They are postmodernity, absolutism, relativism and multiculturalism.

Postmodernity has a message which says: modernity – another word for enlightenment and cultural modernity – has run its course. This means that Jürgen Habermas'

book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* is also out of date. Postmodernity states that it is passé. And with the return of religion, absolutist thought has also re-emerged. Here is a brief example of this: if the response to an argument is: "Then you are against Allah" (as has happened in Cairo), that is absolutist. If the response to the comment "Don't live in a sharia state" is "That is not up for discussion", that is absolutist. But rational arguments simply come up against a brick wall, particularly in scholarly arguments. The word 'state' does not appear in the Koran at all, while the word 'sharia' only appears once, in sura 45, verse 18. If one's opponents turn to the Koran for justification and are unable to answer a query such as "Tell me where Allah used the word sharia in the Koran", then they have lost. But this is not a rational argument. The weapon in my armoury is that I know the Koran by heart. I had no choice in the matter. But this should not be the rule. The rule should be: argument against argument, on the same level – the level of rationality.

The opposite of absolutism is relativism. Europeans have become relativists. And relativists always come off worse in arguments with absolutists. The best book about Postmodernism, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, was written by the anthropologist, sociologist and philosopher Ernest Gellner, who died in Prague in 1995. On page 85 he writes: "Their attitude (of the culture relativists) is roughly that absolutism is to be tolerated". Respect for other cultures is a wonderful thing. But it should not be a blank cheque. The problem for Europe and

Europeans is that other cultures have to be respected as they are. Europe takes a relativist view of culture. Religious fundamentalists are, according to Gellner, absolutist and rarely successful. And what about supporters of the Enlightenment? They are accused of "fundamentalist rationalism". I knew Gellner personally, and he was often misunderstood when he defended the Enlightenment. He did not want to place defending the Enlightenment on the same level as religious fundamentalism. He simply wanted to express that we should bring the same passion to defending the Enlightenment as the fundamentalists bring to their religion.

Multiculturalism is a minefield

Multiculturalism is a minefield. Anyone who criticizes multiculturalism or who has a naive understanding of multiculturalism is immediately suspected of being a right-wing radical. If multiculturalism were to succeed, if people from different cultures were to live together in harmony, then it would be impossible to criticize it. But multiculturalism has another meaning, the idea that anything goes, that values are random. According to this understanding, I have no right to criticize other cultures. I have to respect them as they are. But the main thing I learned from Max Horkheimer in Germany is the importance of criticism, criticism without taboos. In Germany, any silencing of criticism is a breach of the country's constitution. The German constitution guarantees scientific freedom. And science means critical thin-

king, and critical thinking means enlightenment in Kant's sense of the word: reason is the supreme tribunal, before which anything that claims validity must be justified.

Over recent years a battle cry has emerged: 'Islamophobia', suggesting that Islam is the enemy. If you say that sharia law and human rights do not go together, you can be silenced by being called an Islamophobe. This is much worse in the US than in Europe – much, much worse. After 11 September, the Islamists have won. In American academic circles, it is now very difficult to criticize Islamism. I know that from firsthand experience. I have taught and carried out research at all seven Ivy League universities, rounding off my academic career at Yale. This is where I wrote my book about the difference between Islam as a faith and Islamism as a political ideology. In Austria, if you get along with the editor and the editor likes your book, it will be published. No problem. But dealing with the University Press in the USA is like gaining approval for a doctoral thesis and requires three assessors. And if three are not enough, they draft in some more. The assessment of my book *Islamism in Islam* took two years, from 2009 to 2011. It involved four rounds of assessment and a total of 11 assessors. These assessors are all anonymous. They know me but I don't know them. Many of them were against publishing my book. In the end, the assessment file was a thick as the book itself.

"The Saudis are waging an ideological campaign against enlightenment under the banner of dialogue. We have to get involved in these ideological campaigns and fight for enlightenment."

Finally, the editorial committee approved the book for publication.

This is a restriction of freedom of expression and scientific freedom. Enlightenment means that I can think, express my thoughts, and publish them. This is no longer the case. So what is to be done? The term 'war of ideas' is very prevalent in the US. Ideas do not wage war, yet there are ideological conflicts and military campaigns. For example, the Saudis are waging an ideological campaign against enlightenment under the banner of dialogue. We have to get involved in these ideological campaigns and fight for enlightenment.

My fourth theory is that enlightenment is also part of Islam's history, despite the general view that the problem with Muslims is that they have not experienced an Enlightenment (as stated in an interview by Cardinal Franz König, the former Archbishop of Vienna). This could provide an opportunity to build bridges on the foundations of enlightenment. Like Cardinal König, Pope Benedict also spoke about Muslims and enlightenment when he was a cardinal.

But in reality, their history is otherwise. At the end of the 8th century, Christian Arabs translated Greek works. And from the 9th to the early 13th centuries there was an ongoing process: the Hellenisation of Islam. These were the centuries of the Islamic Enlightenment. The discussion that we are having today about what matters – what the holy scriptures tell us, and what reason tells us – was also held in Islam. And all the Islamic philosophers were unanimous about the primacy of reason. Al-Kindi was the first,

„Wir brauchen
offene Türen
für Verfolgte."

Bundespräsident
Joachim Gauck

„Wir wählen
die Fre[iheit]

Bundeskanzler
Konrad Adena[uer]
1949 – 1963

brother

in the 9th century. In the 10th century Al-Farabi wrote *The Perfect State*, based on Plato's *Republic*. In the 11th and 12th centuries there was an ongoing discussion about whether reason or revelation should be afforded priority. Defenders of Islamic orthodoxy argued in favour of a literal interpretation of the Koran, for scripturalism, while the Islamic proponents of enlightenment fought for the primacy of reason.

The difference between Voltaire and the Islamic philosophers is in the radical stance towards the church and religion. The Islamic philosophers were not looking to create conflict, which was perhaps a mistake. Today we would say they were placatory, perhaps even appeasers. This is the basic position taken by Immanuel Kant. Several centuries before Kant, the Islamic Kant, Ibn Rushd (Latinized as Averroës), anticipated what Kant would write in this three *Critiques*: there is not only truth, but truths: the truth of religion, which applies in the mosques, and the truth of life, which applies in public.

One truth arises from reason, the other from religious faith. And both of these truths have their own domains. The Islamic Enlightenment lasted for more than 300 years and is recorded in countless works. For a 50-page summary, see my book *Der wahre Imam (The True Imam)*. This also highlights the difference between fiqh and sharia, a difference that is hugely important in discussions with Muslims.

In the Koran, sharia describes the ethical principle of proscribing evil and prescribing good. This is the only meaning of sharia in the Koran. This is something that a Christian or an atheist can happily support. Sharia is neither a legal system, nor a governmental system. In my book *Islam Between Culture and Politics*, which I published with the support of Harvard University in 2001 and 2005, I demonstrate the following: in general, what Muslims say about sharia is incorrect. For example, the belief that everything in the Koran is sharia is quite simply false. In the Koran, sharia is what Allah says. However, what Islamic scholars read into their interpretations of the Koran are in fact – according to Islamic understanding and religious study – fiqh, human understanding of sharia. Sharia comes from God. But scholars make out that Islamic law, which is fiqh, is actually sharia. When debating with Muslims, it is absolutely essential to know and respect the difference between fiqh and sharia. Without this understanding, you have already lost before you start a dialogue with proponents of conservative Islam, particularly Islamic orthodoxy.

Francis Fukuyama, an American with a Japanese surname, has become well-known in Europe since the publication of his book *The End of History*. At a reading in Washington he said that Muslim migration has led to Europe becoming a "battlefield" between Islam and "European identity". I would like to use this as the basis for my fifth theory. "Islam belongs to Germany": these words are wrong, in historical terms simply wrong.

"The difference between Voltaire and the Islamic philosophers is in the radical stance towards the church and religion. The Islamic philosophers were not looking to create conflict, which was perhaps a mistake."

They were uttered by former German president Christian Wulff and recently repeated by Chancellor Angela Merkel. As a Muslim academic I cannot agree to this. There is the Islam of Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd, the Islam of the Enlightenment, which came to Europe via Toledo and Cordoba. This Islam belongs to Europe. But it no longer exists. Yet Europe needs it to be reborn. Europe needs a kind of Euro-Islam, even if the fundamentalists oppose it.

Baden-Württemberg is home to Germany's second-largest mosque, known as the Fatih. In Turkish and Arabic, this means 'conqueror'. Turkish sultan Mehmed the Second was known as Fatih because he conquered and Islamized Constantinople, turning it into Istanbul. In Istanbul I asked: "Do you want to Islamize and conquer, or do you want to engage in dialogue? Why is the Baden-Württemberg mosque not called the Al-Farabi mosque? Al-Farabi was a Turk who wrote in Arabic, the language of the Koran. During the 9th and 10th centuries, he was the first great political thinker of Islam. Many Turks have never heard of him. They are Muslims, yet they have never heard of Islam's greatest political thinker! The Al-Jabri project (named after the late philosopher Al-Jabri) is a project being conducted at Rabat University in Morocco. It is aiming to revive Islamic philosophy as enlightenment, a project to ignite a renaissance of Islamic philosophy.

I have been involved in this project. Of course the modern Enlightenment emerged in Europe and is a European project in spatio-temporal terms. But before the second European Enlightenment, one took place in the Islamic world. The European and Islamic Enlightenments rest on the same foundation: the primacy of reason.

Universal reason

And reason is universal. If, as Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas have argued, the spatio-temporal dimension of the European Enlightenment were to be neutralized, and if Muslims would only think back to their own Enlightenment, this could provide a basis for building bridges between Muslims and Europeans. Then there would be a good chance of depriving the fundamentalists of their ideology, their belief that enlightenment and democracy are Jewish instruments that are used against Islam. My Euro-Islam project for Europe is based on enlightenment. But I have to admit that my project has had little success so far, because I have received no support from Europe. Perhaps the project will die with me. Or perhaps not. Of course I hope the latter is true.

I developed my concept of Euro-Islam when I was in Senegal. This was the first country I had ever visited which was Islamic but not Arab. I heard the words "C'est notre islam" - "It's our Islam", and also "This is Afro-Islam".

Islam has been around since the 7th century and arrived in West Africa between the 13th and 15th centuries. That is not so long ago. But Islam has really become entrenched there. Why? Why is this the case? Because it has been Africanized. This gave me the im-

petus to develop my idea of Euro-Islam as a response to the challenge of Islam in Europe. Ten years later, in 1992, the French government ditched its programme of assimilation and instead focused on a programme of integration. Assimilation no longer worked when faced with floods of migrants entering the country. Today 8 million of France's 63 million population are Muslims. So: integration. This means accepting the values expressed in the French constitution. I took on the task of developing a concept and showing how Islam can be interpreted in a European way and thus become native to Europe. I accomplished this in just ten pages, under the title: *Les Conditions de l'Euro-islam.* The aim was for Muslims to say: "This is our Islam". But this Islam also has to be acceptable to French people.

One thing is clear, its foundation remains enlightenment. It cannot be based on fundamentalism. Fundamentalism can have many names and many faces. I agree with the two great American theologians, Martin Marty (a Protestant) and Scott Appleby (a Catholic): Religion is coming back. But not as faith. It is coming back with a desire to remake the world in line with religious principles. Let's assume for a moment that the world were to be organized along Christian lines. Muslims could and would not accept that, nor would the Hindus or the Sikhs. And of course Christians could not and would not accept an Islamic world order. So the world can only be organized in a way that is religiously neutral, so based on secularism. Enlightenment is secular. Of course Europe is Christian. But since the Reformation, and particularly since the Renaissance, Europe has exchanged the sources of inspiration for the European idea, from Jerusalem to Athens, from Christianity to Hellenism. Of course Christianity is still the dominant

religion in Europe in people's private lives, but cultural modernity has been shaped by Hellenism, not by Christianity. Hellenism also had an impact on Muslims in their heyday. So we have a common foundation: enlightenment as the primacy of reason.

With regard to the creation of a modern world order, Oxford professor Hedley Bull pointed out that this can only work on the basis of shared values. I would add that these values must be based on a global enlightenment if it is to lead to true world peace in the Kantian sense.

Bassam Tibi, was born in Damascus in 1944. He is the founder of the theory of Euro-Islam. From 1973 to 2009 he was Professor of International Relations at the University of Göttingen. From 1988 to 1993 he was Research Associate, and from 1998 to 2000 Bosch Visiting Professor at Harvard University. From 2004 to 2010 he was A.D White Professor at Cornell University. In 2005 he was Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore/Asia Research Institute. In 2008 and 2010 he was Resnick Senior Fellow at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington D.C. His books have been translated into more than 16 languages. In 1995 he was awarded the German Cross of Merit, 1st class, for his work to promote "a better understanding of Islam in Germany and to communicate it between cultures". In 2003 he won the annual prize of the Schweizer Stiftung für europäische Werte (Swiss Foundation for European Values).

The indigenization of Islam If we look beyond Europe's ugly colonial past, its two world wars and the crimes committed by the Nazis, we see there is another side too: a Europe of freedom, of individual human rights, democracy, pluralism and civil society. These are ideals that can be shared by non-Europeans, including Muslims.
By Bassam Tibi

I find myself regularly urging that we should revisit Henri-Pirenne's ideas in his article *Sans Mahomet pas de Charlemagne.* The Belgian historian, who died in 1935, argued that the Christian western world of Charlemagne would not have existed without the challenges posed by Islam. What Pirenne meant was that, in historical terms, both Europe as a western entity and Islam as a civilization developed at the same time and ultimately represented a significant challenge to each other. And nothing has really changed since their common inception.

The migration of Muslims to Europe (there were only 800,000 Muslims in Western Europe in 1950, today there are 20 million) has created problems for both sides and represents the contemporary expression of the classic conflict between Islam and Europe that Henri Pirenne was trying to describe. In my book *Crusade and Jihad*, in which I reconstruct this particular period in history in eight epochs, I take up Pirenne's argument and suggest that the relationship between Islam and Europe is one of centuries of mutual "threat and fascination". Both have posed a threat to each other, whether through jihadi conquest, crusades or colonization, but both have also enriched each

other in both cultural and civilizational terms, including Islam's borrowings from western Hellenistic traditions in the Middle Ages and the influence of Islamic rationalism on the European Renaissance.

We can consider Muslims living in Europe today as a part of this historical development. The US expert on Islam John Kelsay speaks of "Islamic enclaves that exist within Europe, but are alien to its culture". The question now is whether it is possible to find a way of bridging the gap between Europe and Islam, as has been the case in the past. As a pro-reform Muslim, I presented my vision of Euro-Islam back in 1992 and intended it to incorporate this very concept of bridge-building. Is it possible to speak about such issues freely? As a Muslim who lives in Europe as an immigrant and carries out research in the USA, my experience is that I generally have more freedom to openly discuss this question in America than I do in Europe. For this reason, I decided to develop my concept as part of two projects I carried out at Berkeley and Cornell between 1998 and 2006. Contrast this with the

reception my idea of Euro-Islam received in Europe, with one Orientalist in the German press negatively characterizing it as "Professor Tibi's one-man sect". What is the issue at stake here?

In November 1992 a group of experts came together at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris to look for new ideas on assimilation and integration. The existing concept of assimilation as a prerequisite for *citoyenneté* was no longer working. This was due to the huge influx of new migrants from the world of Islam who not only insisted on maintaining their cultural identity, but also on having this identity recognized within Europe. The experts therefore recommended that the concept of assimilation should be abandoned in favour of the new concept of integration that had been presented in Paris.

Integration does not mean cultural surrender

Integration does not mean cultural surrender through total conformity, but rather being a part of the value orientation of civil society. Unlike assimilation, integration is limited to the adoption of an identity as a citizen within a civil society. It is more about the rights and duties of a *citoyen* as an individual. In Paris the discussion focused on the question of integration ou insertion communautaire? This is also the subtitle of the book which included my paper on Euro-Islam, a potential concept for integration. Islam is at the heart of the debate because Muslims make up some twelve percent of the French population and so represent the largest single group of immigrants.

I chose the meeting in Paris to present my concept in Europe for the first time because it was pertinent to this particular French de-

bate. The term Euro-Islam was first coined in my paper *Les Conditions d'une Euro-islam* and later appeared in the policy advisory work *Islams d'Europe: Integration ou Insertion Communautaire*. The concept is based on my experiences in the 1980s in West Africa, where I observed a distinct Africanization of Islam. Armed with the knowledge that Islam in West Africa had not developed into either a foreign or indigenous culture, in spite of its Arabic origins, I started to wonder whether a Europeanization of Islam in Europe might not be a good thing. This would achieve something that is already a reality in Africa, but is lacking in Europe, namely the indigenization of Islam. In contrast to Africa, the Islam of the immigrant population has remained largely foreign for the simple reason that it is not European. The question, therefore, is whether a process of Europeanization would allow Islam in Europe to be indigenized and, therefore, become European, in the same way that it has become African in Senegal or South East Asian in Indonesia? And how would this be achieved?

Let me be clear right from the start. I do not believe that a Euro-Islam is possible without some form of cultural change involving religious reform. Put another way, Islam can only be Europeanized if Salafist concepts such as sharia and jihad or the idea of Islamization through dawah and hijra are abandoned as part of a process of religious and cultural reform. Only an Islam that is in tune with modern cultural principles (democracy, individual human rights, civil society, pluralism), and that is able to adopt the values inherent in that pluralism, would have earned the right to be known as Euro-Islam. It should also be noted that the concept of a

Euro-Islam only refers to Europe itself and is not some form of universalism like earlier ideas of an all-encompassing westernization of the world, including the world of Islam.

When we speak of Europeanization, we are referring to Muslims who live permanently in Europe or in those countries that want to be part of Europe (such as Turkey). This concept of Euro-Islam has not yet become reality. Of course we also have the Islamic world that borders on Europe. The EU considers the Islamic world to be part of the European Neighbourhood. The integration of Muslims in Europe could have a positive effect on the democratization of this European 'neighbourhood'.

As a Muslim and migrant myself, I recognize that Europe has its own civilizational identity and the right to preserve that identity, if it so desires. This statement is not directed against Muslims, because the idea of Europe is supposed to be inclusive. It can respect the identity of immigrants, but with the expectation that these immigrants will make certain adjustments in order to abide by European cultural values, without the need to entirely abandon their own culture. Islam and Europe together would effectively create what amounts to Euro-Islam.

A European identity that is understood to be both democratic and enlightened should be viewed as an inclusive identity that envisions a Europeanization of Islam in Europe, especially as the EU expands. As a Muslim, I learned to appreciate the idea of Europe as an "island of freedom in an ocean of despotism" from my Jewish teacher Max Horkheimer, who was a survivor of the Holocaust and therefore familiar with the other, darker side of Europe. Here, we are talking about the Europe of freedom.

The Europeanization of Islam aims at a kind of cultural synthesis. If we look beyond

the ugly colonial past, its two world wars and the crimes committed by the Nazis, we see that Europe has another side too: a Europe of freedom, of individual human rights, democracy, pluralism and civil society. These are ideals that can be also shared by non-Europeans, including Muslims. The concept of Euro-Islam is an attempt to make the idea of Europe for Muslims more attractive as a 'European identity' that involves a synthesis with Islam. The question is, can Muslims not only become European citizens in the legal sense, but also 'citizens of the heart' through the assimilation of European values and an orientation towards the concept of Euro-Islam?

In any discussion of these issues, it is important to distinguish between Islam and Islamism. Islam is a religion and a cultural system, while Islamism is a totalitarian ideology. Europe's cultural modernity led to the Enlightenment with its "disenchantment of the world" and a universalism of values that is neither ethnic nor religious and should therefore be seen as universal. Let me say once again that I believe this inclusivity is about openness to others. Far from being merely academic jargon in the negative sense, this is in fact a reality that, as a Muslim and Arab, I am familiar with from my own life in Europe. This inclusiveness has been demonstrated by Europe in the context of its policies on migration. For their part, immigrants need to demonstrate that they are making an effort to bring their own identities into line with Europe and its cultural systems. Euro-Islam is an idea that would aim to do just this. In spite of suggestions to the contrary, the idea of Europe is not Christian, it is secular and has its roots

in Hellenism. This same Hellenism was at the heart of medieval Islamic rationalism during the heyday of Islamic civilization, so there is a bridge that links the two.

A Muslim can be European without being Christian and without having any ethnic roots in Europe. The sole precondition is a willingness to adopt European values that have developed out of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This does not mean no longer being a Muslim. But how can Muslims wholeheartedly become European citizens and espouse the "Europe, a beautiful idea?" project without actually ceasing to be a Muslim? Islamists who have ensconced themselves among the Islamic diaspora do not share this idea of a 'beautiful Europe'. Instead, they view integration in Europe as little more than a form of Christian proselytism and reject it out of hand. Islamists do not want integration, they want to Islamize Europe through jihad. Europeans can only avoid this by working together with Euro-Muslims. In this particular conflict, it is also of vital importance to determine exactly what Euro-Islam is.

Many European politicians make speeches in favour of the idea of Europe but do they actually take themselves and their own statements seriously? Many Muslims who live in Europe as European citizens are sceptical of the idea of Europe as a community of shared values and so are equally sceptical of the idea of Euro-Islam, for while Europeanization of the Islamic challenge is championed as a form of inclusion, this kind of rhetoric is rarely backed up by actual deeds.

It should be seen as a positive sign that today's Europeans are moving away from their earlier Eurocentrism, though unfortunately not always towards something better. Today, many of them are renouncing the

validity of European values. In recent years there has been debate over whether the Enlightenment was in fact a form of fundamentalism, though this would appear to indicate not only a degree of intellectual confusion, but also a loss or orientation. Postmodern moral relativism is not the kind of openness that Europe needs. The vision offered by Euro-Islam stands in stark contrast to the moral relativism of many of today's Europeans, first and foremost with regard to the EU as a community of shared values. This assumes a commitment to European values that is not shared by Islamism. The Egyptian philosopher and moderate Islamist Hasan Hanafi once correctly observed at a meeting on Europe in Madrid that Europe is in fact in crisis and has lost its orientation. He went on to suggest that Islam might be the solution to the problem! But is Islam really the thing that could bring Europeans and Muslims together? I don't think so!

Openness rather than
postmodern moral relativism

With the influx of Muslims into Europe from Asia and Africa, but also especially from the southern and eastern Mediterranean regions, where identity is a matter of collective consciousness, some Muslim clerics are suggesting that the Dar al-Islam/house of Islam should be expanded to include Europe. Orthodox Islamic doctrine dictates that Hijra/migration should serve the worldwide dissemination of Islam. The emergence of parallel societies is surely the first step in this direction and, notwithstanding the rules of political correctness,

it should be possible to discuss this issue openly. However, we need to be wary of any potential misrepresentations in this respect. When Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss professor of Islamic studies and publicist of Egyptian origin, talks of Europe as a Dar al-Shahada, he is simply applying the term Dar al-Islam/house of Islam to Europe as though it is an Islamic territory. The implication is more than clear – Europe is seen as a part of the Dar al-Islam and so has, to all intents and purposes, been appropriated for no other reason than that it has opened up to Muslims.

The London-based imam Zaki Badawi, who was decorated by the Queen and died in 2006, argued along similar lines when he said at the World Economic Forum in Davos that any territory where Muslims live belongs to the Dar al-Islam. Euro-Islam seeks to counter the views of naive Europeans, orthodox Salafists and Islamists and make Islam a part of Europe and share its identity, not the other way around.

Even the President of Turkey and former Chairman of the JDP, Tayyip Erdogan, has spoken of a "shared value community". What does this mean exactly? What are the European values, and what exactly constitutes the identity of Europe? Must Western universalism by definition go hand-in-hand with European moral relativism? The problem is not just that these questions are seldom addressed in today's European discourse, it is that they actually appear to be considered taboo subjects. However, as a Muslim and European by choice, I claim my right to speak freely and ignore taboos when speaking about Europe.

America still remains the land of the free, despite the escapades of former president George W. Bush. As a Muslim, I have had more freedom to discuss these questions openly in the USA than I have in Europe.

The concept of the Europeanization of Islam promises to provide some answers to the questions raised above. Here, I would once again like to make reference to the *Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe* project that was initiated at UC Berkeley's Center for Middle East Studies. This acknowledged that Europe's identity has been changed by the penetration of Islam that has been brought about by migration. The two Americans who identified this trend are both of Euro-Islamic origin: the Egyptian Nezar AlSayyad, a specialist in Middle Eastern studies, and the Spaniard Manuel Castells, an expert in European studies. While looking for solutions to the conflict that were free from Eurocentric arrogance, some years ago the two of them invited me to integrate my concept of Euro-Islam as a bridge between civilizations into their project. The result was their book, published in 2002, entitled *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam*? The question in the title clearly expresses the opposing alternatives options available: either Europe Europeanizes Islam, or Islam Islamizes Europe. Two universalisms collide. It is vital that Europeans do not respond to the issues presented by these competing models with either silence or censorship in the form of political correctness. Things are developing in this direction anyway, whether we like it or not, and they will continue to do so regardless of whether people choose to keep quiet on the subject or are prevented from discussing it by some other means.

The debate is about processes that are already underway and has nothing to do with confrontation or hostility towards Islam. I was aware of this potential danger when, as a Muslim, I contributed to the book

Preventing the Clash of Civilizations by the former German President Roman Herzog, which was written in response to Samuel P. Huntington's own *Clash of Civilizations*.

The way for Europeans to meet this particular challenge is through a policy of Europeanization In contrast to the universalist ideology of Westernization, the concept of Europeanization is limited to bringing European values and standards to bear on Europe, i.e. within the territory of Europe itself. Contrary to the beliefs of Islamists and orthodox Muslims, Europe does not belong to Dar al-Islam and has an identity of its own that is clearly not Islamic. This means that anybody who wants to come to Europe must also be willing to become a part of its community and adopt the democratic consensus expressed in its value system. Basically, they must want to become European and share in the European identity, rather than the other way round. Their goal should be Europeanization not Islamization. If this idea became a political concept that the EU were willing to adopt, and if there were sufficient political will to see such a concept put in place, then the Islamic enclaves of the parallel societies and mosque associations in city districts where the Turkish or other clearly non-European flags are displayed would no longer be tolerated. The alternative to this type of cultural segregation is inclusive Europeanization, not exclusion. The same applies to Islamic Turkey, which would like to join the EU.

I was able to further develop my thinking on the potential Europeanization of Islam in the European diaspora during my time at Cornell University, where I was involved in the *Transnational Religion and Accession*

project, which was chaired by the German-born political scientist Peter Katzenstein. The project focused not just on Islam, but also on Eastern Orthodox Christianity. One of the key assumptions of the project was that 'accession' – inclusion in the political culture of the EU – presupposes Europeanization in the sense described above, i.e. limited to the territory of the EU itself. In accordance with secular standards, Europeanization would be separate from religion and ethnicity and linked solely to the values of democracy, individual human rights and civil society.

That this concept is not Eurocentric is amply illustrated by the potential for a synthesis of Islam and Europe into Euro-Islam within the framework of a European interpretation of Islam, an idea I have been advocating for 25 years. If it had felt that this idea was based on European arrogance, the Turkish magazine *Turkish Policy Quarterly,* which appears in Istanbul, would not have published my article about the Cornell project, which argues in favour of Europeanization as a criterion for the acceptance of diaspora Turks as European citizens and also for the acceptance of Turkey into the EU. But indeed this article was published and was met with general approval. However, neither today's Turkey, which is currently governed by AKP Islamists, nor the German Islamic Council really like the idea, mainly because they do not meet the criterion of Europeanization. This fact has been corroborated by the many enlightened Turks I have spoken to on my frequent visits to Ankara.

When looking at the question of a Euro-Islamic community of shared values and the political will to realize the Europeanization of Islam, I feel it is worth looking back to the ideas of the last major Islamic philosopher, who died 600 years ago. This Islamic thin-

ker Ibn Khaldun coined the term Asabiyya (esprit de corps), as a means of measuring the strengths and weaknesses of a civilization. According to Ibn Khaldun, Asabiyya is the value consciousness of a civilization.

How strong is European Assabiya? Only when Europeanization is successfully adopted as a democratic response to the Islamic challenge can one speak of a strong European Asabiyya as understood by Ibn Khaldun. The aim should be to integrate Europe into a pluralistic world as a civilizational entity that has its own Asabiyya i.e. a clear idea of what makes it civilizational. It should remain open to others and incorporate them into its community through a process of Europeanization. Europe is more than an economic or business community and Europe as a 'beautiful idea' is something that is worth preserving. This can be achieved with the participation of Muslims, provided that the vision of Euro-Islam becomes an accepted political concept. The task of preserving Europe with Islamic participation is a peace project for the 21st century.

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A pact with democratic society Culture is our way of coping with the environment, not some fixed, unchangeable repertoire of how to do things. The traditions of different places and previous times may still prevail, but they are of no consequence to the sort of agreement one enters when joining a new, democratic polity. What should matter is whether people subscribe to the values and norms that have been democratically agreed upon by the group they decide to join. *By Bernd Reiter*

The myth that nations are made up of homogenous groups is just that: a myth. At a time when generic variation among humans can be traced back to single genes, it becomes less and less plausible to classify humans according to the color of their skin. Yet most public policies in Europe do just that, clinging on to a classification of humans as white, red, black or yellow and allocating certain essential characteristics to each group. For the sake of political correctness, nowadays the word 'race' is avoided in this exercise and replaced by 'culture'. There is 'our' culture and there is theirs – different, out of sync, and inassimilable in many respects. It tends to be the case that the more removed it is from the white majority the worse it is perceived to be. So, light brown people are closer to 'us' than dark brown people, and 'yellow' people are harder to assimilate than light browns. The methods for assessing differences and categorizing human beings have changed little from the days when scientists measured heads and classified nations according to their 'racial stock'.

Yet biological diversity is both constant and relatively minor. Most of all, it does not matter. What matters for politics is not the biological variation of people and groups, but how this variation is treated and how it is categorized. These categorizations and the exact points where the lines are drawn are never defined or predetermined. They are the result of deliberate decision-making and policies. When counting and classifying people who look different, they can either all be thrown into the same pot or they can be sorted by age, religion, skin color, where they were born, who their parents were, the size of their noses or the texture of their hair. All of these, sadly, have been tried. But however they are classified, it does not change the people themselves – at least not immediately or essentially.

However, all these classifications have an impact on them, as this kind of categorization is almost always done for a specific purpose. This counting, classifying and differentiating is generally done in order to justify hierarchies and increase control. This is clearly seen in the way the counting is carried out: if the main aims were justice and equal opportunities, then the main categories would be rich/poor, employed/unemployed and need for education, health care, and government assistance. Instead, most governments record factors such as ethnic background, country of birth and parentage – in other words: race and culture.

Emphasizing differences

In a democracy, that is to say, a society that believes what matters most is not what you are but what you do, origins and culture should not matter at all. What should matter is whether you subscribe to the values and norms that have been democratically agreed upon by the group you decide to join. This is how modern European citizenship began in medieval European cities

"Belonging should not be regulated by ethnicity, descent, culture, appearance or religion. It must be regulated by the free will to partake, share, support, and uphold the values, norms, and rules that the community decides for itself."

– at least if we believe the account of Max Weber. It began with a group of people who entered into a pact to ensure and protect their own freedom. Of course, right from the beginning, this pact was exclusive to Christians – Jews were not allowed to join. Even then, drawing such a line to exclude the Jews was despicable and unjustifiable on moral grounds, but it is even worse to do so today. Belonging should not be regulated by ethnicity, descent, culture, appearance or religion. It must be regulated by the free will to partake, share, support, and uphold the values, norms, and rules that the community decides for itself. This also implies that for people to accept a rule, they have to have a say in making it. It also means that once decided, commonly agreed norms and rules are binding and a condition for belonging.

In other words: in a democracy, by definition, the bonds that make community must be of a civic nature. Everything else is racist in one way or another, because it assumes that people are essentially different and have different values based on their appearance or culture. But culture is not fixed. It is in a state of constant flux. People have their own traditions from home, but when they move elsewhere they quickly adapt to the new challenges. Culture is our way of coping with the environment, not some fixed, unchangeable repertoire of how to do things. Culture changes. Culture is not the cause of differences, it is the result. The traditions of different places and previous times may still prevail, but they are of no consequence to the sort of agreement

one enters when joining a new, democratic polity. What matters is something that is totally independent of one's culture or traditions: the willingness to be part of the civic (not cultural) bond that characterizes the host community.

Classifying people according to systems favored by the Nazis such as eugenics – into white, black, brown, yellow, and red – seems utterly grotesque, but this is exactly how people and groups are still categorized today in most European Member States. Let me be more specific and provide some concrete examples.

The citizens of France are biologically, culturally, religiously, and ethnically heterogeneous and, indeed, this has always been the case. This implies that non-whites are not necessarily foreigners and immigrants. Presenting them as foreigners is at the very core of the problem – or, to be more precise, it makes them the problem. However, this way of looking at them is very prevalent in France and elsewhere in Europe. In a very telling interview broadcast in October 2005 on prime-time French TV, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, a French historian and distinguished member of the Académie Française, was asked about the reasons for the riots by black youths in the French banlieues. She responded: "I am not surprised at all: how could young Blacks, coming directly from their African village, adapt to the French way of life?" (Millot 2005).

There is, however, no reason to believe that the black youth who took to the streets in France in 2005 and thereafter were foreigners – let alone immigrants. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the case of the two black boys who were electrocuted while running from the police after playing soccer on October 27, 2005, was more typical: both Bouna and Zyed were born in France. It generally takes a long history of broken promises, frustrated hopes, failed help, and discouraging experiences in one's own country – not the country of others – to produce the kind of protests the world has been witnessing in France.

Broken promises, frustrated hopes

Research conducted by Le Cran, the French Representative Council of Black Associations (an umbrella organization for black associations in France) shows that 81 percent of blacks in France are indeed French citizens. Yet the widespread perception is that most blacks in France are foreigners. In this, France is similar to Germany, where the same general perception informs daily interactions with non-white Germans, who are labeled and treated as 'immigrants', 'guest workers', 'visitors', 'second-' or even 'third-generation immigrants' – all different words for 'foreigner'. For how many generations can someone remain a foreigner? The reality is that, in 2014, most of the non-whites living in Europe are citizens, or aspire to becoming citizens if the conditions are right. "They cannot go back anywhere—their country is here" (Patrick Lozès, Le Cran, Paris, interview conducted on June 20, 2011).

In a 2007 survey carried out by Sofres, France's leading market research company, 3.86 percent of adults interviewed identified themselves as 'black'. Of those, 56 percent declared that they had experienced racism in their everyday lives. Research has further demonstrated that young black French citizens are 2.5 times as likely to be unemployed than their white counterparts, which means that their unemployment rates hover around 30 percent. Non-whites also drop out of school more often than whites and have difficulties in finding jobs, even when compared to whites with the same qualifications (Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007).

The example of France allows us to discern several causally relevant mechanisms that produce exclusion and create second-class citizens. It demonstrates that racism can survive and indeed articulate itself in a very civic way. The French system is such that it initially encourages people to become French – and then classifies certain people and groups as being impossible to integrate. The frustration that such a system produces among those so classified can hardly be overstated – and the vehemence of youth protests held by minorities since the beginning of the 2000s gives ample evidence of this frustration. It is not just unfair, but wickedly racist to declare that everyone can become French – except you.

"They are labeled and treated as 'immigrants', 'guest workers', 'visitors', 'second-' or even 'third-generation immigrants' – all different words for 'foreigner'. For how many generations can someone remain a foreigner?"

By practicing this sort of schizophrenic classifying of human beings and groups, while at the same time ensuring that they have no means of classifying themselves (achieved by not providing any official numbers on the situation of minorities), the French state reveals the deep contradictions of its liberal, republican foundation. In fact, the republican ideal of self-governance, as expressed so radically by Rousseau, was only ever intended to include white European males.

Worse still, it used non-whites to construct the very position from which it proclaimed its own superiority. By doing so, it also demonstrated the hollowness of the classical Western liberal tradition on which this discourse ultimately rested. The thinkers who developed this idea believed that if individuals were to govern themselves as a collective, they had to be rational and autonomous. However, they believed this description only applied to certain men, not at all to women and not to those whose poverty or divergent societal and developmental models pushed them down the social ladder, according to the mono-dimensional evaluation model of the European classifiers. In fact, white European males believed they were the only ones who were worthy of self-governance and democracy. The rest of the world – black, brown, or yellow as classified during colonial times – was lacking and at best only able to learn Western ways after long and arduous work and training. Some, especially Africans, were deemed inassimilable. It was important to say so, otherwise

how else could they be enslaved, dominated, controlled and radically dehumanized by treating them as tools, things, and machines? In its treatment of non-whites and non-Christians, this supposed 'universalism' reveals its profound particularism and bias. The high-minded rhetoric about liberalism, republicanism, equality, brotherhood, and justice was nothing more than that: rhetoric.

"People always talk about Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, and yes, there is freedom, but not everywhere and for everyone. Remember, we're French; we were born here. Our grandparents fought in wars to defend France. Back then, they were considered unsuitable, and today so are we." (Siyakha Traoré, *Open Letter to France,* 2006)

Holding on to these values and classificatory systems poisons and undermines all the positive aspects of the high ideals of republicanism and liberalism. To move forward and create a fairer and more just Europe, we need to cleanse our values, laws, and policies from this legacy of double standards, lies, and false promises.

The situation is similar in Portugal, where the black presence stretches back to colonial times. Slavery was legal in Portugal until 1836 and practiced until the 1880s. In early colonial times, some 150,000 Africans were brought to Portugal as slaves – at a time when Portugal itself only had a population of some 1 million. According to historical accounts, in the 16th century African slaves accounted for 10 percent of Lisbon's total population. Most of the African slaves brought to Portugal gradually

"People always talk about Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, and yes, there is freedom, but not everywhere and for everyone. Remember, we're French; we were born here. Our grandparents fought in wars to defend France. Back then, they were considered unsuitable, and today so are we."

Siyakha Traoré, "Open Letter to France", 2006

blended into the Portuguese citizen body.

In the 1970s, after African independence, almost one million Africans moved to Portugal. Some of them claimed Portuguese ancestry, a claim substantiated by the simple fact that they were white. The Portuguese national assembly changed the naturalization laws from residence to descent for these white 'home-comers'. In doing so, they also closed the door to all those blacks who had worked for and supported the Portuguese colonial enterprise in Africa and who could no longer stay there after Portugal lost the war of independence. Once again, descent, and ultimately race, trumped civic bonds and solidarity.

Portuguese society has always been heterogeneous, though there are no specific data on this, as the Portuguese state follows the French model of not differentiating among its citizens. However, cities such as Lisbon have a significant population of non-white citizens who go to school with, and compete for jobs against, the majority

white population. Instead of recognizing this biological diversity – which, it should again be stressed, has no bearing on a democracy – and finding ways to mitigate the very prevalent discriminatory practices by white citizens against their non-white fellow citizens, the Portuguese state prefers to deny the existence of black Portuguese citizens, insisting on Portugal's homogenous whiteness. To them, whiteness is a capital that symbolizes European belonging – a highly desirable good. This strategic use of whiteness and associating it with the advance of civilization and progress also reveals the deep-seated bias of a European racial project.

In this way, the citizenship projects of both France and Portugal are ethnically informed and therefore racist. They rely on the same classificatory scheme as that used in eugenics 100 years ago by classifying people into white, red, yellow, and black and then attributing essential characteristics to each group.

In this, France and Portugal are certainly not the exceptions; they are the rule. Almost all EU Member States have shifted the way they regulate citizenship and belonging from the once-dominant *jus soli* to the now prevalent *jus sanguini*: from soil to blood. People's ideas and values are not what matters. In contemporary Europe, the privilege of being a citizen is bestowed according to descent and hence ethnicity. This also closes out any possibility of

"Minority citizens get routinely blamed for all the economic, social and political problems that many European countries are experiencing."

making democracy and democratic values the cornerstone of European membership. Instead of constructing a democratic Europe, we are constructing a white Europe.

So far, Europe has not been a civic project, but an ethnic one. By defining belonging along ethnic lines and descent, it also becomes a racial project in that it creates 'race' by excluding some people and forcing them into the category of excluded, disrespected, undesirable Others. So Europe is creating a racial project because ethnically defined nationalism has become the norm. Although its emergence can be explained by the late formation of some EU Member States, such as Germany, other states, such as France or Portugal, have only recently shifted away from (in the case of Portugal) or restricted the reach of (in the case of France) the *jus soli* rules that have long been a cornerstone of their democracies. The contemporary strength of ethnic nationalism must therefore be seen as the result of deliberate political action aimed at redrawing the rules of belonging.

However, ethnic nationalism does not only serve to perpetuate the exclusion of non-whites by defining them as not belonging to the national community. It also stands in the way of achieving truly universal citizenship and democracy with strong civil, political and social components. The persistence and even growth of ethnic nationalism lies at the root of many of the problems Europe is facing today, because it competes with the development of civic bonds among an increasingly heterogeneous European citizenry.

A complication to this problem is caused by the almost exclusive focus on citizenship rights, to the detriment of citizenship duties and responsibilities. Ethnically defined nationalism, coupled with a widely held belief that citizenship is a matter of rights without responsibilities and duties, has created a situation where ethnic white Europeans arrogantly insist on their 'rights' as citizens, presenting them as entitlements, while conveniently overlooking their responsibilities towards their non-white fellow citizens. Instead, minority citizens get routinely blamed for all the economic, social and political problems that many European countries are experiencing.

It is my belief that the lack of focus on civic solidarity and a civically defined European membership is also at the core of the often awkward difficulties experienced by many European states and societies when dealing with anti-democratic elements in their midst. Instead of focusing on anti-democratic agents as the prime culprits of terror and insecurity, blame is commonly shifted away from civic matters towards cultural and ethnic issues. This leads to undue blame being placed on certain religions, cultures and ethnic groups for violent acts and 'tendencies' and perpetuates stereotypes about others. Ethnic minorities have become second-class citizens who are not allowed to experience the full extent of the social role that comes with the status of being a citizen.

Ethnic nationalism is thus at the core of many of the problems facing contemporary European states and societies. Instead of blaming immigrants, EU Member States should be concentrating on their core democracy and making membership dependent on citizens' willingness to actively support and defend democracy, which would imply a stronger focus on citizenship responsibilities.

Political elites have successfully shifted the focus onto migrants and foreigners and made them the culprits for most of the social problems facing European societies today. This allows those same elites to avoid being blamed for the problems for which they are ultimately responsible. Expert studies that focus excessively on immigrants and foreigners contribute still further to a general sense of hegemony which transforms non-whites into foreigners and intruders, supports political elites in their maneuvering and affords them legitimacy.

If anything, social scientists should produce more studies on failing and unresponsive states, inefficient bureaucracies, and the dearth of democratic institutions. They should also unveil more of the injustices and problems that are routinely faced by a significant part of the European citizenry. This could help us to improve the current situation and work towards more just and inclusive democracies – which could also be more economically effective.

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A culture of exclusion

French urban ghettoes that originally had the character of 'transit' or 'passage' stations for new immigrants turned into 'spaces of relegation' once employment was deregulated, becoming precarious and volatile, and unemployment became durable. This eminent sociologist, born in Poznan in 1925, reveals how the resentment and animosity of the established population grew into a virtually impenetrable wall, locking out the newcomers-turned-outsiders.

By Zygmunt Bauman

In his thorough study of the genealogy of modern fears, the French sociologist Philippe Robert found out that starting from the early years of the 20th century (that is, by more than a sheer coincidence, from the early years of the social state) fears of crime began to subside. They went on diminishing until the middle 1970s, when a sudden eruption of personal safety panic focused in France on the crime apparently brewing in the banlieues where immigrant settlers were concentrated. What erupted was however, in Robert's view, but a "delayed action bomb": explosive security concerns had already been stored up by the slow yet steady phasing out of the collective insurance that the social state used to offer and by the rapid deregulation of the labour market. Re-cast as a danger to safety, the immigrants offered a convenient alternative focus for the apprehensions born of the sudden shakiness and vulnerability of social positions, and so they were a relatively safer outlet for the discharge of anxiety and anger which such apprehensions could not but cause.

In the view of German penologist and criminal law expert Hans-Jörg Albrecht, it is only the link between immigration and public disquiet about rising violence and fears for security that is novel; otherwise nothing much has changed since the beginning of the modern state – the folkloristic images of devils and demons that used to soak up diffuse security fears in the past "have been transformed into dangers and risks".

Strategy of general dangerization

According to Albrecht, demonization has been replaced by the concept and the strategy of dangerization. Political governance, therefore, has become partially dependent on the deviant other and the mobilization of feelings of safety. Political power, and its establishment, as well as its preservation,

are today dependent of carefully selected campaign issues, among which safety (and feelings of lack of safety) is paramount. And immigrants, let us note, fit better into such a purpose than any other category of genuine or putative villains. There is a sort of 'elective affinity' between immigrants (that 'human waste' of different parts of the globe unloaded into 'our own backyard') and the least bearable of our own, home-grown fears.

When all places and positions feel shaky and are deemed no longer reliable, the sight of immigrants rubs salt into the wound. Immigrants, and particularly the fresh arrivals among them, exude the faint odour of the waste disposal tip which in its many disguises haunts the nights of the prospective casualties of rising vulnerability. For their detractors and haters, immigrants embody – visibly, tangibly, in the flesh – the inarticulate yet hurtful and hateful presentiment of their own disposability. One is tempted to say that were there no immigrants knocking at the doors, they would have to be invented … Indeed they provide governments with an ideal 'deviant other', a most welcome target for the carefully selected campaign issues.

Stripped of a large part of their sovereign prerogatives and capacities by globalization forces which they are impotent to resist, let alone to control, governments have no choice but to carefully select targets which they can (conceivably) overpower and against which they can aim their rhetorical salvos and flex their muscles while being heard and seen doing so by their grateful subjects.

Over-general, unwarranted or even fanciful as the association of terrorists with asylum and economic migrants might have been, it did its job: the figure of the asylum seeker, once prompting human compassion and spurring an urge to help, has been sullied and defiled, while the very idea of asylum, once a matter of civil and civilized pride, has been reclassified as a dreadful concoction of shameful naivety and criminal irresponsibility.

As to the economic migrants who have retreated from the headlines to give room for the sinister, poison-brewing and disease-carrying asylum seekers, it did not help their image that they embody, as the security expert Jelle van Buuren has pointed out (in his article *Die Europäische Union und ihr Cordon sanitaire*), everything that the dominant neoliberal creed holds sacred and promotes as the precepts that should rule everyone's conduct (that is, "the desire for progress and prosperity, individual responsibility, readiness to take risks, etc.").

Flotsam and jetsam of the planetary tides

Already accused of sponging and sticking to their wicked and disreputable habits and creeds, they could not now, however hard they tried, shake off the wholesale charge of terrorist conspiracy stuck to 'people like them', the flotsam and jetsam of the planetary tides of human waste. This is the new use to which wasted humans, and particularly those who have managed to land on affluent shores, have been put.

The images of economic migrants and asylum seekers both stand for 'wasted humans', and whichever of the two figures is used to arouse resentment and anger, the object of the resentment and the target on which the anger is to be unloaded remains much the same. The purpose of the exercise remains the same as well: to reinforce (salvage? build anew?) the mouldy and decaying walls meant to guard the hallowed distinction between the inside and the outside in a globalizing world that pays it little if any respect and routinely violates it.

'Wasted humans'

The sole difference between the two types of 'wasted humans' is that while asylum seekers tend to be the products of successive instalments of order-designing and order-building zeal, economic migrants are a side-product of economic modernization, which, as already discussed, has by now embraced the totality of the planet. The origins of both kinds of 'human waste' are currently global, though in the absence of any global institutions able and willing to strike effectively at the roots of the problem, a furious search for locally manageable responses to the global waste disposal and/or recycling challenge should hardly come as a surprise.

There is one more useful function that 'human waste' can perform to keep the world going as it is. Refugees, the displaced, asylum seekers, migrants, the sans papiers – they are the waste of globalization. But they are not the only waste turned out in ever rising volumes in our times. There is also the 'traditional' industrial waste which accompanied modern production from the start. Its disposal presents problems no less formidable than the disposal of 'human waste', and ever more horrifying – and for much the same reasons: the economic progress that is spreading to the most remote nooks and crannies of the 'filled-up' planet, trampling on its way all remaining forms of life alternative to consumer society.

Consumers in a consumer society, like the inhabitants of Italo Calvino's Leonia, need rubbish collectors, and many of them, and of the sort who will not shun touching and handling what has already been confined to the rubbish heap – but the consumers are not willing to do the rubbish collectors' job themselves. After all, they have been groomed to enjoy things, not to suffer them. They have been educated to resent boredom, drudgery and tedious pastimes. They have been drilled to seek implements to do for them what they used to do themselves. They were tuned to the world of the ready-to-use and the world of instant satisfaction.

This is what the delights of consumer life are all about. This is what consumerism is all about – and it certainly does not include the performance of dirty, gruelling, wearisome, or just unentertaining, no-fun jobs. With each successive triumph of consumerism, the need for rubbish collectors grows, and the numbers of people willing to join their ranks shrinks. People whose orthodox and forcibly devalued forms of making a living have already been earmarked for destruction, and who themselves have been assigned

"When all places and positions feel shaky and are deemed no longer reliable, the sight of immigrants rubs salt into the wound."

to disposable waste, cannot be choosers.

In their night dreams they may fashion themselves in the likeness of consumers, but it is physical survival, not consumer revelry, that fills their days. The stage is set for the meeting of human rejects with the rejects of consumer feasts; indeed, they seem to have been made for each other…

Behind the colourful curtain of free competition and equal trade, homo hierarchicus lingers. In the caste society only untouchable people could (and had to) handle untouchable things. In the world of global freedom and equality, lands and population have been arranged in a hierarchy of castes. Not all industrial and household waste can be transported to the far-away places where 'human waste' may do, for a few pence, the hazardous and dirty job of waste disposal. One may try to arrange the necessary meeting of material and 'human waste' closer to home.

Fortress continents

According to the Canadian journalist and publicist Naomi Klein, the ever more popular solution (pioneered by the European Union but quickly followed by the United States) is a "multi-tiered regional stronghold". "A fortress continent is a bloc of nations that joins forces to extract favourable trade terms from other countries, while patrolling their shared external borders to keep people from those countries out. But if a continent is serious about being a fortress, it also has to invite one or two poor coun-

> "With each successive triumph of consumerism, the need for rubbish collectors grows, and the numbers of people willing to join their ranks shrinks."

tries within its walls, because somebody has to do the dirty work and the heavy lifting."

Fortress America – the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the US internal market extended to incorporate Canada and Mexico (Naomi Klein points out that "after oil, immigrant labour is the fuel driving the southwest economy' of the US) – was supplemented in 2001 by Plan Sur, according to which the Mexican government took responsibility for the massive policing of its southern boundary and for effectively stopping the tide of impoverished 'human waste' flowing to the US from Latin American countries. Since then, hundreds of thousands of migrants have been stopped, incarcerated and deported by Mexican police before reaching US borders.

As to Fortress Europe: "Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the postmodern serfs, providing the low-wage factories where clothes, electronics and cars are produced for 20-25 percent of the cost to make them in western Europe."

Inside fortress continents, "a new social hierarchy" has been put in place in an attempt to find a balance between the two blatantly contradictory yet equally vital postulates of airtight borders and of access to cheap, undemanding, docile labour ready

to accept and do whatever is on offer; or of free trade and the need to pander to anti-immigrant sentiments. "How do you stay open to business but closed to people?" asks Klein. And answers: "Easy. First you expand the perimeter. Then you lock down."

Refugees and immigrants, coming from far away yet making a bid to settle in the neighbourhood, are uniquely suitable for the role of the effigy to be burnt as the spectre of global forces, feared and resented for doing their job without consulting those whom its outcome is bound to affect. After all, asylum seekers and economic migrants are collective replicas (an alter ego? fellow travellers? mirror images? caricatures?) of the new power elite of the globalized world, widely (and with reason) suspected to be the true villain of the piece. Like that elite, they are untied to any place, shifty, unpredictable. Like that elite, they epitomize the unfathomable 'space of flows' where the roots of the present-day precariousness of the human condition are sunk. Seeking in vain for other, more adequate outlets, fears and anxieties rub off on targets close to hand and re-emerge as popular resentment and fear of the 'aliens nearby'. Uncertainty cannot be diffused or dispersed in a direct confrontation with the other embodiment of extraterritoriality: the global elite drifting beyond the reach of human control. That

elite is much too powerful to be confronted and challenged point-blank, even if its exact location was known (which it is not). Refugees, on the other hand, are a clearly visible, and sitting, target for the surplus anguish.

The "great unknown"

Let me add that when faced with an influx of 'outsiders', the waste of the planet-wide triumph of modernity but also of a new planet-wide disorder in the making, "the established" (to deploy Norbert Elias' memorable terms) have every reason to feel threatened. In addition to representing the "great unknown", which all "strangers in our midst" embody, these particular outsiders, the refugees, bring home distant noises of war and the stench of gutted homes and scorched villages that cannot but remind the settled how easily the cocoon of their safe and familiar (safe because familiar) routine may be pierced or crushed and how deceptive the security of their settlement must be. The refugee, as Bertolt Brecht pointed out in 1941 in his poem *Die Landschaft des Exils*, is "ein Bote des Unglücks" ("a harbinger of ill tidings").

Deepening sense of desperation

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that there was a genuine watershed in modern history in the decade separating the "glorious thirty years" of post-war reconstruction, of social compact and of the

> "'A fortress continent is a bloc of nations that joins forces to extract favourable trade terms from other countries, while patrolling their shared external borders to keep people from those countries out.'"
>
> Naomi Klein

developmental optimism that accompanied the dismantling of the colonial system and the mushrooming of "new nations", from the brave new world of erased or punctured boundaries, information deluge, rampant globalization, a consumer feast in the affluent North and a "deepening sense of desperation and exclusion in a large part of the rest of the world" arising from the "spectacle of wealth on the one hand and destitution on the other", to quote British sociologist Steward Hall.

During that decade, the setting in which men and women face up to life challenges was surreptitiously yet radically transformed, invalidating extant life wisdoms and calling for a thorough revision and overhaul of life strategies. One fateful aspect of the transformation was revealed relatively early and since then it has been thoroughly documented: the passage from a 'social state' model of inclusive community to a 'criminal justice', 'penal', or 'crime control', exclusionary state.

The Danish migration expert Ulf Hedetoft notes that "borders are being redrawn between Us and Them more rigidly" than ever before. He goes on to suggest that borders have turned into what could be called "asymmetric membranes" that allow exit, but "protect against unwanted entrance of units from the other side". "Control measures at the external borders have been stepped up, but just as importantly visa-issuing regimes in countries of emigration in the South have been tightened. Borders have diversified, as have border controls, taking place not just at conventional places [...] but

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in airports, at embassies and consulates, at asylum centres, and in virtual space in the form of stepped-up collaboration between police and immigration authorities in different countries."

Where family and communal businesses were once able and willing to absorb, employ and support all newly born humans, and at most times secure their survival, the surrender to global pressures and the laying open of their own territory to the unfettered circulation of capital and commodities made them unviable. Only now do the newcomers to the company of moderns experience that separation of business from households which the pioneers of modernity went through hundreds of years ago, with all its attendant social upheavals and human misery but also with the luxury of global solutions to locally produced problems – an abundance of no man's lands that could easily be used to deposit the surplus population no longer absorbed by the economy emancipated from familial and communal constraints: a luxury

not available to the latecomers.

Tribal wars and massacres, a proliferation of guerrilla armies (often little more than barely disguised bandit gangs) busy decimating each other's ranks yet absorbing and annihilating the 'population surplus' (mostly the young, unemployable at home and without prospects) in the process – in short a neighbourhood colonialism or poor man's imperialism – are among such global solutions to local problems that the latecomers to modernity are forced to deploy or rather have found themselves deploying.

Rigid borders between Us and Them

Hundreds of thousands of people are chased away from their homes, murdered or forced to run for their lives outside the borders of their country. Perhaps the sole thriving industry in the lands of the latecomers (deviously and deceitfully dubbed 'developing countries') is the mass production of refugees. It is the ever more prolific products of that industry which a former British Prime Minister proposes to unload "near their home countries", in permanently temporary camps (deviously and deceitfully dubbed 'safe havens'), thereby exacerbating the already unmanageable 'surplus population' of immediate neighbours who willy-nilly run a similar industry.

The aim is to keep local problems local

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and so nip in the bud all attempts of latecomers to follow the example of the pioneers of modernity by seeking global (and the sole effective) solutions for locally manufactured problems. However earnest, the efforts to stem the tide of economic migration are not and probably cannot be made a hundred percent successful. Protracted misery makes millions desperate, and in an era of global frontier-land and globalized crime one can hardly expect a shortage of businesses eager to make a buck or a few billion bucks capitalizing on that desperation.

Hence the second formidable consequence of the current transformation: millions of migrants wandering the routes once trodden by the 'surplus population' discharged by the greenhouses of modernity – only in a reverse direction, and this time unassisted (at any rate thus far) by the armies of conquistadores, tradesmen and missionaries. The full dimensions of that consequence and its repercussions are yet to unravel and to be grasped in all their many ramifications.

A few years ago, a case was held in front of a High Court judge in London to test the legality of the treatment accorded to six asylum seekers, fleeing regimes official recognized as 'evil' and/or as routinely violating, or negligent of, human rights, such as Iraq, Angola, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Iran. Keir Starmer QC told the judge, Mr. Justice Collins, that the new rules introduced in Britain have left hundreds of asylum seekers "so destitute that they could not pursue their cases". They were sleeping rough in the streets, were cold, hungry, scared and sick; some were "reduced to living in telephone

boxes and car parks". They were allowed "no funds, no accommodation and no food", and were prohibited from seeking paid work while being denied access to social benefits. And they had no control whatsoever over when, where and if their applications for asylum would processed.

A woman who had escaped from Rwanda after being repeatedly raped and beaten ended up spending the night on a chair at Croydon police station – on condition that she did not fall asleep. A man from Angola who found his father shot and his mother and sister left naked after a multiple rape ended up being denied all support and sleeping rough.

Deregulation of wars

The numbers of homeless and stateless victims of globalization grow too fast for designation and construction of camps to keep up. One of the most sinister effects of globalization is the deregulation of wars. Most present-day warlike actions, and the most cruel and gory among them, are conducted by non-state entities, subject to no state laws and no international conventions. They are simultaneously outcomes and auxiliary but powerful causes of the continuous erosion of state sovereignty and the continuing frontier-land conditions in the 'interstate' global space. Intertribal antagonisms break into the open thanks to the weakening hands of the state, or in the case of the 'new states', hands never given time to grow strong; once let loose, they render the inchoate or entren-

ched state-legislated laws unenforceable and practically null and void.

The population as a whole finds itself in a lawless space; the part of the population that decides to flee the battlefield and manages to escape finds itself in another type of lawlessness, that of the global frontier-land. Once outside the borders of their native country, escapees are deprived of the backing of a recognized state authority that could take them under its protection, vindicate their rights and intercede on their behalf with foreign powers.

Refugees are stateless, but stateless in a new sense: their statelessness is raised to an entirely new level by the non-existence of a state authority to which their statehood could be referred. They are, as French anthropologist Michel Agier once put it, "hors du nomos", outside law; not this or that law of this or that country, but law as such. They are outcasts and outlaws of a novel kind, the products of globalization and the fullest epitome and incarnation of its frontier-land spirit. To quote Agier again, they have been cast in a condition of "liminal drift", with no way of knowing if it is transitory or permanent.

Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call 'final' remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of

"It is because of that provisional, undecided, underdefined character that they are the sources and the target of acute tension erupting daily into reconnaissance skirmishes and boundary clashes."

"On the way to the camps, the future inmates are stripped of every single element of their identities except one: that of stateless, placeless, functionless refugees. Inside the fences of the camp, they are pulped into a faceless mass, having been denied access to the elementary amenities from which identities are drawn and the usual yarns of which identities are woven."

the transience, indefiniteness and provision nature of any settlement.

The plight of Palestinian refugees, many of whom have never experienced life outside the camps hastily patched together more than fifty years ago, has been well documented. As globalization takes its toll, new camps (less notorious and largely unnoticed or forgotten) mushroom around the spots of conflagration. On the way to the camps, the future inmates are stripped of every single element of their identities except one: that of stateless, placeless, functionless refugees. Inside the fences of the camp, they are pulped into a faceless mass, having been denied access to the elementary amenities from which identities are drawn and the usual yarns of which identities are woven.

Refugees, the 'human waste' of the global frontier-land, are the outsiders incarnate, the absolute outsiders, outsiders everywhere and out of place everywhere except in places that

are themselves out of place – the 'nowhere places' that appear on no maps used by ordinary humans on their travels. Once outside, indefinitely outside, a secure fence with watching towers is the only contraption needed to make the 'indefiniteness' of the out-of-place hold forever.

Urban ghettoes

It is a different story with the redundant humans already 'inside' and bound to stay inside as the new fullness of the planet bars their territorial exclusion. In the absence of empty places to which they could be deported and the locking up of the places to which they would travel of their own free will in search of sustenance, waste-disposal sites must be laid out inside the locality which has made them supernumerary. Such sites emerge in all or most large cities. They are urban ghettoes, which, named or unnamed, are ancient institutions.

The orthodox ghettoes might have been enclosures surrounded by insurmountable (even if non-material) physical and social barriers and with the few remaining exits exceedingly difficult to negotiate. They might have been instruments of class and caste segregation and might have branded their residents with the stigma of inferiority and social rejection. Unlike the 'hyperghettoes' that have grown out of them and took their place towards the end of the last century, they were not however dumping sites for the surplus, redundant, unemployable and functionless population.

Prisonization of public housing

Unlike its classical predecessor, the new ghetto, in the words of French sociologist Loïc Wacquant "serves not as a reservoir of disposable industrial labour but a mere dumping ground [for those for whom] the surrounding society has no economic or political use".

Abandoned by their own middle classes, who ceased to rely on black clientele alone and chose to buy their way into the higher grade security of the voluntary ghettoes of gated communities, the ghetto dwellers cannot create their own substitute economic or political uses to replace the uses denied to them by the greater society. "Whereas the ghetto in its classical form", according to Wacquant, "acted partly as a protective shield against brutal racial exclusion, the hyperghetto has lost its positive role of collective buffer, making it a deadly machinery for naked social relegation."

In other words: the American black ghetto has turned purely and simply into a, virtual single-purpose, waste disposal tip. Wacquant lists a number of parallel and mutually coordinated processes that bring the American black ghettoes ever closer to the model of prisonlike 'total institutions': a 'prisonization' of public housing ever more reminiscent of houses of detention, with new projects fenced up, their perimeter placed under beefed-up security patrols and authoritarian controls. And then there is the transformation of state-maintained schools into institutions of confinement, whose primary mission is not to educate but to ensure custody and control. As far as ghettoes in other parts of the world are concerned, and particularly the ghettoes emerging in the great number of European cities with a significant immigrant population, a similar transformation may be fairly advanced but remains incomplete. Racially or ethnically pure urban ghettoes remain a rarity in Europe. Besides, unlike American blacks, the recent and relatively recent immigrants who populate them are not locally produced 'human waste'; they are 'imported waste' from other countries with a lingering hope of recycling.

Halfway inns

The question of whether such 'recycling' is or is not on the cards and so whether the verdict assignment to waste is final and globally binding remains open. These urban ghettoes remain, we may say, halfway inns or two-way streets. It is because of that provisional, undecided, underdefined character that they are the sources and the target of acute tension erupting daily into reconnaissance skirmishes and boundary clashes.

This ambiguity that sets the immigrant and thus far mixed-population ghettoes of European towns apart from the American hyperghettoes may not however last. As the already mentioned French sociologist Philippe Robert found, French urban ghettoes that originally had the character of 'transit' or 'passage' stations for new immigrants, who were expected soon to be assimilated and ingested by established urban structures, turned into 'spaces of relegation' once employment was deregulated, becoming precarious and volatile, and unemployment became durable.

An impenetrable wall

It was then that the resentment and animosity of the established population grew into a virtually impenetrable wall locking out the newcomers-turned-outsiders. According to Robert, the quartiers, already socially degraded and cut off from communication with other parts of the cities, were now the only places where [the immigrants] could feel chez soi, sheltered from the malevolent looks of the rest of the population.

Fellow sociologists Hughes Lagrange and Thierry Pech note in addition that once the state, having abandoned most of its economic and social functions, selected a "policy of security" (and more concretely of personal safety) as the hub of its strategy aimed at recouping its fallen authority and the restoration of its protective importance in the eyes of the citizenry, the influx of newcomers was overtly of obliquely blamed for the rising uneasiness and diffuse fears emanating from the ever more precarious labour market.

The immigrants' quartiers were depicted as hothouses of petty criminality, begging and prostitution, which were accused in their turn of playing a major role in the rising anxiety of 'ordinary citizens'. To the acclaim of its citizens desperately seeking the roots of their incapacitating anxiety, the state flexed its muscle, however flabby and indolent in all other domains, in full public view, criminalizing those margins of the population who were the most feeble and living the most precariously, designing ever more stringent and severe 'firm hand' policies and waging spectacular anti-crime campaigns focused on the 'human waste' of foreign origin dumped in the suburbs of French cities.

The social state is gradually, yet relentlessly and consistently, turned into a garrison state that increasingly protects the interests of global, transnational corporations. Real issues such as a tight housing market, massive unemployment, homelessness, youth loitering and drug epidemics are overlooked in favour of policies associated with discipline, containment and control.

'Wasted humans'

The immediate proximity of large and growing agglomerations of 'wasted humans', likely to become durable or permanent, calls for stricter segregationist policies and extraordinary security measures, lest the health of society, the normal functioning of the social system, be endangered. The noto-

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rious tasks of "tension management" and "pattern maintenance" that, according to American sociologist Talcott Parsons, each system needs to perform in order to survive boil down almost entirely to the tight separation of 'human waste' from the rest of society, its exemption from the legal framework in which the life pursuits of the rest of society are conducted, and its neutralization. 'Human waste' can no longer be removed to distant waste disposal sites and placed firmly out of bounds to normal life. It needs therefore to be sealed off in tightly closed containers.

The penal system supplies such containers. At best, the intention to rehabilitate, to reform, to re-educate and to return the stray sheep to the flock is only paid an occasional lip service, and when it is, it is countered with an angry chorus baying for blood, with the leading tabloids in the role of conductors and leading politicians singing all the solo parts. Explicitly, the main and perhaps the sole purpose of prisons is not just any 'human waste' disposal but a final, definitive disposal. Once rejected, forever rejected.

For a former prisoner on parole or on probation, a return to society is almost impossible and a return to prison almost certain. Instead of guiding and easing the road back to the community for prisoners who have served their term of punishment, the function of probation officers is keeping the community safe from the perpetual danger temporarily let loose. In a nutshell, prisons, like so many other social institutions, have moved from the task of recycling to that of waste disposal.

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A most urgent imperative faced by every government presiding over the dismantling and demise of the social state is therefore the task of finding or construing a new legitimation formula on which the self-assertion of state authority and the demand of discipline may rest instead. Being felled as a collateral casualty of economic progress, now in the hands of free-floating global economic forces, it is not a plight which state governments can credibly promise to stave off. But beefing up fears about the threat to personal safety from similarly free-floating terrorist conspirators, and then promising more security guards, a denser net of x-ray machines and wider scope for closed-circuit television, more frequent checks and more pre-empting strikes and precautionary arrests to protect that safety, looks like an expedient alternative.

By contrast with the all-too-tangible and daily experienced insecurity manufactured by the markets, which need no help from political powers except to be left alone, the mentality of a besieged fortress and of individual bodies and private possessions under threat must be actively cultivated. Threats must be painted in the most sinister of colours, so that the non-materialization of threats rather than the advent of the foreboded apocalypse can be presented to the frightened public as an extraordinary event, and above all as the result of the exceptional skills, vigilance, care and goodwill of state organs. And this is done, and to spectacular effect. Almost daily, and at least once a

week, the CIA and the FBI warn Americans of imminent attempts on their safety, casing them into a state of constant security alert and holding them there, putting individual safety firmly into the focus of the most varied and diffuse tensions.

That strategy is eagerly, even if so far with somewhat less ardour (less because of lack of funds rather than will), copied by other governments overseeing the burial of the social state. A new popular demand for a strong state power capable of resuscitating the fading hopes of protection against a confinement to waste is built on the foundation of personal vulnerability and personal safety, instead of social precariousness and social protection.

Collateral casualties

This includes, for example, locking up the aliens (euphemistically called 'asylum seekers') in camps, giving 'security considerations' unquestioned priority over human rights, writing off or suspending many a human right that has stayed in force since the time of the Magna Carta and habeas corpus, a zero tolerance policy towards alleged budding criminals, and regularly reported warnings that somewhere, sometime, some terrorists will surely strike. We are all potential candidates for the role of collateral casualties in a war we did not declare and to which we did not give our consent. When measured against the threat, hammered home as much more immediate and dramatic, it is hoped that the orthodox fears

of social redundancy will be dwarfed and possible even put to sleep.

These new kinds of fears also dissolve trust, the binding agent of all human togetherness. Epicurus already noted (in the letter to Menoeceus) that "it is not so much our friends' help that helps us as the confident knowledge that they will help us". Without trust, the web of human commitments falls apart, making the world a yet more dangerous and fearsome place. The fears aroused by the frontier-land variety of waste tend to be self-reproducing, self-corroborating and self-magnifying. Trust is replaced by universal suspicion. All bonds are assumed to be untrustworthy, unreliable, trap-and-ambush-like – until proven otherwise; but in the absence of trust, the very idea of a 'proof', let alone a clinching and final proof, is anything but clear and convincing.

What would a credible, really trustworthy proof be like? You wouldn't recognize it if you saw it; even staring it in the face, you wouldn't believe that it was indeed what it was pretending to be. The acceptance of proof, therefore, needs to be postponed indefinitely. The efforts at tying up and fastening bonds line up in an infinite sequence of experiments. Being experimental, accepted on a trial basis and always of a provisional 'let's wait and see how they work' kind, human alliances, commitments and bonds are unlikely to solidify enough to be proclaimed fully and truly reliable. Born of suspicion, they beget suspicion.

Commitments (employment contracts, wedding agreements, living together arrangements) are entered into with a cancellation option in mind; and by the firmness of the opt out clauses, it is clear from the very start that a waste disposal site will indeed be, as it should and as it is bound to be, their ultimate destination. From the mo-

ment of their birth, commitments are seen and treated as prospective waste. Frailty (of the biodegradable sort) is therefore seen as their advantage. It is easy to forget that the bond-tying commitments were sought in the first place, and continue to be sought, for the sake of putting paid to that mind-boggling and blood-curdling fragility of human existence...

Bereaved of trust, saturated with suspicion, life is shot through with antinomies and ambiguities it cannot resolve. Hoping to get on under the sign of waste, it stumbles from a disappointment to a frustration, each time landing at the very point it wished to escape when starting its journey of exploration. A life so lived leaves behind a string of faulty and abandoned relationships – the waste of the global frontier-land, conditions notorious for recasting trust as a sign of naivety and as a trap for the unresourceful and gullible.

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Critique of humanitarian reason

The asylum seeker, the stateless and the refugee have become metaphors as well as symptoms of a much deeper malaise in the politics of modernity. So it is all the more important to defend moral and legal cosmopolitanism where every human being is considered as a person entitled to basic human rights and not because they are a national or a citizen.
By Seyla Benhabib

On 16 February 2014, The New York Times Magazine ran an article entitled 'Container City'. 'Container City' refers to the Kilis camp in southern Turkey housing 14,000 refugees from Syria. Protected by high gates and surrounded by barbed wire, Kilis from the outside shares features with many refugee camps all over the world that make them indistinguishable from prisons or criminal detention centres. Kilis houses its population in 2,053 identical containers, spread in neat rows. The pictures that accompany the article remind one of shipping containers at a harbour. Each container is a 23-by-10-foot trailer with three rooms; and a colour TV with close to 1,000 channels, probably picking up programmes from all the surrounding countries of the Mediterranean.

Yet there are some unique features of Kilis besides the cleanliness of its streets and the organization of proper electricity, water and sewage services, which led one Syrian resident to refer to it as "a five star hotel."[1] There are schools in the camp, sex-segregated according to the wishes of the Syrians; three grocery stores where refugees can buy supplies with a credit card; a beauty salon and a barbershop where refugees get free haircuts and other services; art workshops and gymnastics classes. But despite all this: "Nobody likes living there [...I]t is hard for us," said Basheer Alito, the section leader who was so effusive in his praise for the camps and the Turks. "Inside, we're unhappy. In my heart, it's temporary, not permanent."[2]

The camps are no longer temporary. The Kilis refugee camp is by now one of hundreds in dozens of countries around the world. A report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees notes that by mid-2013, the number of refugees worldwide stood at the highest level on record, namely at around 38.7 million; and with no end in sight to conflicts in places such as Syria, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo it is likely

that this number has now increased to over 40 million.[3] As the number of refugees has grown worldwide, not only has the number of camps grown as well, but the camps have ceased to be places where one held people temporarily; rather, they have become semi-permanent. The largest refugee camp in the world, Kenya's Dadaab, is 20 years old and houses 420,000 refugees. The Palestinian refugee camps in Southern Lebanon are in many cases nearly 50 to 70 years old, depending on whether the refugee population was created in 1948 or 1968. The refugees who live in these camps, and who in some cases have spent their entire lives there, become PRSs, that is, those in a 'protracted refugee situation.'

Precarious lives

The scale of the human tragedy afflicting migrants who seek entry to Fortress Europe has increased dramatically of late, triggering a new European debate on laws, borders and human rights. A debate riddled with the complex, often epic, narratives that underlie immediate crisis situations. Refugees, asylees, IDPs (internally displaced persons), PRSs, stateless persons: these are new categories of human beings created by an international state-system in turmoil, human beings who are subject to a special kind of precarious existence. Although they share with other 'suffering strangers' the status of victimhood and become the objects of our compassion – or as the UNHCR report puts it, become "persons of concern" – their plight

reveals the most fateful disjunction between so-called 'human rights' – or 'the rights of man', in the older locution – and 'the rights of the citizen'; between the universal claims to human dignity and the specificities of in-dignity suffered by those who possess only human rights.

From Hannah Arendt's famous discussion of the "right to have rights" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to Giorgio Agamben's *homo sacer* to Judith Butler's "precarious lives" and Jacques Rancière's call to "the enactment of rights", the asylum seeker, the stateless and the refugee have become metaphors as well as symptoms of a much deeper malaise in the politics of modernity.

Yet as political fatigue about internationalism has gripped the United States in the wake of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and president Obama's politics of caution in Syria has created further moral quagmires, we have moved from 'the right to have rights' to the 'critique of humanitarian reason'. Didier Fassin, who for many years worked with Médecins Sans Frontières in a high capacity, and to whom we owe this term, defines it as follows: "Humanitarian reason governs precarious lives: the lives of the unemployed and the asylum seeker, the lives of sick immigrants and people with AIDS, the lives of disaster victims and victims of conflict – threatened and forgotten lives that humanitarian government brings

"With no end in sight to conflicts in places such as Syria, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo this number will only continue to increase from its present 45 million."

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into existence by protecting and revealing them."[4] Subtitled *A Moral History of the Present*, Fassin's felicitous book signals a more widespread retreat from the politics of human rights which began shortly after the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq to a denunciation of human rights, in the words of the Columbia historian, Samuel Moyn, as an "antipolitics" that survived as a "moral utopia when political utopias died."[5]

The rights of the rightless

This intellectual and political disillusionment was heralded even before Moyn's 2010 book. In a trenchant article from 2004 entitled *Who is the subject of the rights of man?*, after the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were at their height, Jacques Rancière begins by noting how the rights of man, or in more contemporary language, human rights, which were rejuvenated by the dissident movements of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and '80s, became transformed in the first decade of the twenty-first century into "the rights of the rightless, of the populations hunted out of their homes and land and threatened by ethnic

slaughter. They appeared more and more as the rights of the victims, the rights of those who were unable to enact any rights or even any claims in their name, so that eventually their rights had to be upheld by others, at the cost of shattering the edifice of international rights, in the name of a new right to 'humanitarian interference' – which ultimately boiled down to the right to invasion."[6] "Human rights, the rights of the rightless" became for Ranciere the ideological scaffolding for "humanitarian reason" at best and for "humanitarian intervention" at worst.

This prevalent mood of disillusionment and cynicism among many concerning human rights and humanitarian politics is understandable; but it is not defensible. Developments in international law since 1948 have tried to give new legal meaning to 'human dignity' and 'human rights'. Admittedly, these developments have in turn generated the paradoxes of 'humanitarian reason', but the way to work through these paradoxes is not to turn against the *jus gentium*, the law of nations, of our world; instead, we need a new conceptualization of the relationship between international law and emancipatory politics; a new way of understanding how to negotiate the 'facticity' and the 'validity' of the law, including international human rights and humanitarian law, such as to create new vistas for the political.

In a well-known passage of *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* Hannah Arendt wrote: "We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to

some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation [...] The right that corresponds to this loss and that was never even mentioned among the human rights cannot be expressed in the categories of the eighteenth-century because they presume that rights spring immediately from the 'nature' of man [...] the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible."[7] The "right to have rights" has become the well-known phrase through which to capture the plight of the stateless, the refugee, the asylee and displaced persons – that is, the plight of those who have been cast out of the framework "where one is judged by one's actions and opinions."

Throughout this discussion, Arendt polemicizes against the grounding of human rights upon any conception of human nature or history. For her, conceptions of human nature commit the mistake of treating humans as mere substance, as if they were things in nature. But following Augustine and Heidegger, for her humans are the ones for whom the question of being has become a question. She quotes Augustine: "Quid ergo sum, Deus meus? Quae natura sum? ("What then am I, my God? What is my nature?") The answer is simply, "quaestio mihi factus sum", "I have become a question for myself."[8] And this capacity for self-questioning is also the source of one's freedom. Although human freedom is not limitless

and is subject to the facticity of the 'human condition' – namely worldliness, plurality, natality, labour, work, and action – it is with reference to this condition alone and not in the light of a fixed 'human nature' that we must try to justify the right to have rights.

Acting "against the grain of history"

Arendt's rejection of any justificatory role that the concept of history may play is complex. We know that from the late 1950s she was engaged in a conversation with Karl Marx, whom she accuses of having brought the tradition of western political thought to an end by substituting a philosophy of history for a political philosophy proper. Arendt's reading of Marx is often dismissive and I am not concerned to evaluate it here. But for her, as for Walter Benjamin, whose *Thesis on the Philosophy of History* she brought over to the United States with her in a suitcase after his suicide in Port-Bou and from whom she learned a great deal, any deterministic account of history, either privileging a mechanism of social forces that act as the engines of change, or any teleological account of history which attributes to it an end-goal, a telos, is intellectually shallow. Even more, it is morally reprehensible because it makes humans into "instruments of a world-spirit" and robs them of oppositional agency. One has to act "against the grain of history", to use a Benjaminian locution.

These philosophical puzzles of the justification of human rights continue in our own days as well. Thus, the first article of

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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

Yet despite these moving and noble words, it is also a noted fact that "we are not told what theory justifies 'human dignity' as the source of rights, or how human dignity is defined or its needs determined or how preserving human rights will promote peace in the world."[9] According to an influential interpretation by John Rawls the UDHR can be read as if it were the result of an "overlapping consensus", that is as the result of a minimal agreement that has emerged in the world community after the atrocities of World War II that these ought never be repeated.

The defenders of a more robust concept of human dignity, such as John Tasioulas, argue that no matter how undeveloped this concept may have been at the time of the writing of the UDHR, in the intervening years it has come to form the point of convergence among differing religious and metaphysical traditions, in addition to playing an impressive role in comparative constitutional jurisprudence. It is also clear, as the so-

called 'political' or 'functionalist interpretation' school of human rights, represented among others by Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz, have noted that the impressive development of international law and international human rights has placed significant political constraints on state sovereignty. What are these constraints? I want to turn to the more institutional and doctrinal developments of international law, in order to capture some of the salient changes in the international system of states since WWII that have been brought about in part with the rise of international human rights.

Changing political landscapes

Since Hannah Arendt penned her discussion of "the right to have rights", international institutions and international law have changed the landscape against the background of which she wrote. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Articles 13, 14 and 15 addresses some of these questions. Article 13 reads: "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Article 14 encodes "the right to asylum": "(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Article 15 seeks guarantees against

"denaturalization" or "loss of citizenship": "(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." [10]

Regime of legal cosmopolitanism

Together with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the 1951 Geneva Conventions on the Status of Refugees and in particular the two international human rights covenants, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (open to signature in 1966 and entered into force in 1976 with 167 out of 195 state parties party to it as of 2013) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened to signature in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, with 169 state parties,) these documents and the institutions of compliance and monitoring they have created, have altered the legal domain for the entitlement to and the "enactment" of human rights in Jacques Ranciere's terms.

Should we characterize these transformations as leading to a regime of legal cosmopolitanism or do these changes produce a dualistic regime of legal sovereignty which gives rise to an international order of global governance institutions on the one hand and sovereign states on the other? I have defended a position of moral and legal cosmopolitanism in works such as *The Rights of Others* (2004), *Another Cosmopolitanism* (2006) and

> "States remain the principal actors for the guarantee of respect for human rights and well as being the domain within which human rights are enacted and interpreted."

Dignity in Adversity (2011), which I have defined as the proposition that we ought to consider each human being qua human being as a person entitled to basic human rights and not because they are a national or a citizen. This is not a descriptive claim about the way the international state system functions; it is rather a regulative ideal in the Kantian sense. A regulative ideal is an 'ought' statement addressed to agents who through their actions can bring about the state of affairs that the regulative statement only posits. The issue is whether legal cosmopolitanism can become not just a regulative but a constitutive ideal as well. There are some institutional developments that are now mediating the gap between the 'regulative' and 'constitutive' dimension of human rights.

The distinctive feature of many human rights covenants of the post-war period is that while states are the signatories of these covenants, in doing so, they undertake to bind their own legislation, policies and regulations in accordance with their international obligations. This means that states remain the principal actors for the guarantee of respect for human rights and well as being the domain within which human rights are

enacted and interpreted. However, this situation is changing drastically. At a time in which institutions of global governance such as the IMF, WTO, WHO and NATO are constantly multiplying, these organisations are increasingly expected to not only uphold human rights but ensure they are propagated.

International policy on human rights

The EU's signing of the European Convention on Human Rights confirms these developments. Since the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, agreed in January 1997 on the tenth anniversary of the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the UN Covenant on Social Rights, states and other global governmental institutions are obliged to "respect, protect and safeguard" human rights. The fact that states continue to be the primary framework for demanding and interpreting human rights does not, however, mean that they form the only political public of our times. In reality, an international and transnational policy on human rights has been created that goes beyond national borders but at the same time has a major impact on the battle for human rights within nations. Arendt could not have

> "At a time in which institutions of global governance such as the IMF, WTO, WHO and NATO are constantly multiplying, these organisations are increasingly expected to not only uphold human rights but ensure they are propagated."

foreseen this development.

With the advent of international human rights law, individuals are recognized as holding human rights directly under international law. What does this mean concretely? It is clear that there is a lot of controversy both in doctrine as well as practice about the implications of human rights law particularly for those constitutional liberal democracies which have their own Bills or Charters of Rights. But the accession to major human rights covenants creates possibilities for citizens of signatory countries with less than fully developed constitutional democracies to criticize the doctrine and practice of human rights in their own countries in the light of internationally acknowledged human rights standards.

Particularly the transnational women's movements across the globe have used CEDAW (The Convention Against the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women) to force their governments and public institutions to comply with the Convention's standards for equal pay for equal work, against sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and for consideration of women's special health and physical needs.

Other examples can mainly be found in the global south in legal disputes that have been made possible by the UN's social covenant and battles fought by indigenous populations for sovereignty and their own culture. Since the UK signed the European Convention on Human Rights, there has been controversy about whether prisoners should have the right to vote, after a recent

decision by the European Court of Human Rights in this respect.

A 'jurisgenerative' struggle

In all these cases, international human rights instruments have created a conceptual and normative space within which a 'jurisgenerative' struggle is taking place between international human rights and institutionalized civil and political rights. By 'jurisgenerativity' I mean the following: laws acquire meaning in that they are interpreted within the context of certain rules and significations which often cannot be controlled. There can be no rules without interpretation; rules can only be followed insofar as they are interpreted; but there are also no rules, including legal norms, which can control the varieties of interpretation each rule can be subject within all different hermeneutical contexts.

Law's normativity does not consist in the grounds of its formal validity, i.e. legality, alone. Law can also structure an extra-legal normative universe by developing new vocabularies for public claim-making, by encouraging new forms of subjectivity to engage with the public sphere, and by interjecting existing relations of power with forms of justice to come – à venir, in Derrida's terms. Law is not simply a method of coercion and an instrument of domination or of the silencing of "dissensus" (in Rancière's terms). Undoubtedly, it is also such an instrument and such a medium as well. But the disjunction between the facticity and the validity of

> "Law is not simply a method of coercion and an instrument of domination or of the silencing of 'dissensus'."

the law is the space into which a politics of jurisgenerativity can be inserted which both underlines the presence of this gap and tries to bridge it in the name of future forms of justice to come.

This changed landscape of international human rights norms and humanitarian activism is among the many factors that is giving life and legitimacy to movements such as those of Les Sans Papiers in France; the Dreamers in the United States and Los Indignados in Spain, many of whom are migrant workers with or without proper legal status.

As Fassin rightly notes, we should be cognizant not to emphasize just the triumphal side of these developments but also to be sober about their shortcomings: sometimes there are legal victories that oblige recipient states to grant undocumented (or illegal) migrants with AIDS the rights to stay, who would most likely perish if they were rendered back to their countries of origin.

At other times, even a parent of an American child who remains without parental supervision is deported, as has happened through the 'drag-net' operations against suspected terrorists in the wake of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Sometimes the application of a refugee for asylum is denied after ten years; in the meantime this person has married and has integrated into the civil society of the country in which

she is illegally in residence; in some cases she is summarily deported to a country 'of origin' and a life which she has never known. In other cases, as in the Netherlands, for example, humanitarian reason is exercised through 'Dulden', which roughly translates as 'tolerance', so as to enable those undocumented migrants to disappear into the folds of civil society and live below the radar of legality. This leads him to conclude: "I have tried to grasp what this humanitarian reason means and what it hides, to take it neither as the best of all possible governments nor as an illusion that misleads us. It seems to me that by viewing it from various angles [...] we can render the global logic of humanitarian reason more intelligible."[11]

The sea-change from 'the right to have rights' to the 'critique of humanitarian reason' should neither lead us to the defence tout court of the sovereigntist nation-state system nor should it produce a flippant dismissal of the realm of law and international institutions as products of an imaginary "consensus". Rather, one has to recognize the unending tension and disjunction between facticity and validity of the law and of institutions in general as they give rise to those cracks and fissures into which a politics of jurisgenerativity can intervene.

> "This changed landscape of international human rights norms and humanitarian activism is among the many factors that is giving life and legitimacy to movements such as those of Les Sans Papiers in France; the Dreamers in the United States and Los Indignados in Spain."

The concept of human dignity

Not only at the institutional level, but in terms of the moral history of the present as well, the concept of human dignity has acquired a global dimension. Surely, the origins of this concept go back to the Judeo-Christian tradition of human beings as imago dei being created in the image of God. Human dignity on the one hand suggests that we must respect one another yet this respect can only be exercised insofar as a certain vulnerability is not violated. It is not because we are rational creatures capable to acting in accordance with the moral law alone that we ought to be respected; it is also because we are embodied and vulnerable creatures whose bodily existence makes them susceptible to experiences of torture, rape, slavery, servitude, degradation and violence that we must be protected. To treat a human being with dignity is not only to treat them with respect; it is also to prohibit the exercise of cruelty against them.

When the Tunisian fruit and vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, a spark was lit which ignited the Arab revolts. His dignity had been violated through the humiliation he suffered in the hands of a municipal offer who confiscated his wares and insulted him. We all at some level understand the meaning of this act of humiliation, and his protest through self-immolation painfully expands the arc of our moral universe.

When a young Indian woman student, traveling in the company of her boyfriend, was gang-raped by a group of four men, her

body was not only violated and eventually perished, but the insult to her dignity became the insult to the dignity of millions of women in India and around the world. Again at some level we all condemn this act of cruelty and the fundamental violation of human dignity it represents even if there may be great cultural divides across the countries which we inhabit. And no matter where we are, in the Global North or the Global South, the disfigured face of the young Pakistani woman, Malala Yousafzai, fighting against all odds for the rights of young girls to receive an education, has become the universal face of dignity in our world. Surely, the moral history of the present, must not only critically examine the hypocrisies and dilemmas of humanitarian reason but it also must bear witness to the expansion of the meaning of human dignity and of "the right to have rights."

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[1] Mac McClelland, "Container City", The New York Times Magazine (16 February 2014), p. 30.
[2] Ibid: 31.
[3] http://www.unhcr.org/52af08d26.html
[4] Fassin, Didier: Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (University of California Press, 2012): 4.
[5] Moyn, Samuel, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010): 214.
[6] Rancière, Jacques, "Who is the subject of the rights of man?", South Atlantic Quarterly 103, nos. 2-3 (spring/summer 2004): 297-310: 298
[7] Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (Meridian Books, 1962): 296-7; first published Schocken Books, 1951.
[8] Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (University of Chicago Press, 1958): 11.
[9] Louis Henkin, Louis, The Age of Rights, (Columbia University Press, 1990): 282
[10] http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
[11] Fassin, Didier, Humanitarian Reason, 246

2.

Chapter 2: Culture and migration in Europe –

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Where are we, and where are we going?

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Whether it is religion, language, upbringing, education, sport or media – culture holds the key to successful integration. The various strategies of Europe's Member States could hardly be more different. There are signs that civil and socioeconomic integration policies are beginning to be harmonised in Europe, but the cultural dimension is still determined by national concepts and ideas. Which strategies have proven their worth? What can culture achieve? And what does Europe need to do to improve the integration of migrants into mainstream society? How can Europe resolve the conflict between a repressive refugee policy and a rational migration policy?

The end of multiculturalism in Europe?

Islam is a protest ideology of socioeconomically deprived Muslim populations in Europe, especially of the second and third generations. Islam is available as a protest ideology because of geopolitics: there is a global Islamic movement which provides the script. Even if there were perfect Muslim integration in Europe, there would still be Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan. How can Europe free itself from this?

By Christian Joppke

The conventional wisdom is that immigrant integration proceeds in distinct 'national models': say, Britain is multicultural, France is assimilationist, and Germany is segregationist (or non-integrationist). This view is misleading because policy converges on essential parameters: civic integration for newcomers and antidiscrimination for settled immigrants and their descendants. Both policies follow different logics or philosophies: in civic integration, the burden of adjustment is on the newcomer; in antidiscrimination, the burden of adjustment is on the receiving society. This shows that the official logo

undergirding integration is deceptive: this is not a two-way process but in reality two one-way processes that co-exist uneasily and not without contradiction.

For another instance of convergence, also consider the astonishing fact that the national leaders of the aforementioned 'national model' countries all declared multiculturalism "dead", almost simultaneously. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called multiculturalism an "utter failure"; former French President Sarkozy noted that there had been too much concern about "their" identity and that now it was time to talk about "our" identity; British Prime Minister David Cameron declared the end of "state multiculturalism" and pleaded for "muscular liberalism".

Each of these 'death proclamations' responds to a particular situation. Merkel had to respond to an immensely popular anti-Islam book (by Social Democratic Party maverick Theo Sarrazin), which—among other, more reasonable things—feared that Germany was demographically inundated by intellectually inferior Turkish Muslims (the book is entitled *Germany Abolishes Its-*

elf). However, in the same moment Merkel also announced a new policy to fund Islam faculties at German universities, so that the long-standing process of 'nationalizing' Islam is not aborted but instead has entered into a new round.

In France, Sarkozy tried to placate voters of the right-wing populist National Front, who were already the main addressees of his 2010 law prohibiting the burqa in all public places. But, as in Germany, this is not an attempt to roll back Islamic integration, which has been thoroughly institutionalized in the past few years under the very stewardship of Sarkozy (who helped create, back in 2003, the national umbrella organization Conseil français du Culte Musulman [CFCM]).

David Cameron addressed the failure of the anti-terrorism strategy launched under the Labourite Blair government after the bombings of the London Tube in July 2005, which consisted of lavishly funding radical Islam organizations in the hope that they would pacify the grassroots (the so-called PREVENT strategy). Now such organizations would have to pass a liberal values test before receiving state funding, if at all.

There is an interesting communality in all three anti-multicultural interventions: Islam and problems of Muslim integration are central of all of them.

In general, there are two critical issues of cultural integration as pertaining to im-

migrants: language and religion (there is a third critical marker, race, but it is prominent only in America, barely at all in Europe). Two American political scientists, Ari Zolberg and Litt Woon, argued that Spanish is to the United States what Islam is to Europe: the main cultural integration issue on both sides of the Atlantic.

Language versus Religion

If that is the case, the US has a much smaller cultural integration problem than Europe. This is because language is additive and capacity-enhancing: one can speak more than one language, and one is even expected to acquire more languages in school. By contrast, religion is exclusive: one can adhere to only one religion but not to several at the same time. This has implications for state policy. States cannot be anything but de facto assimilationist on language (the state must have an official language). Conversely, states cannot be anything but de facto multiculturalist on religion, because religion cannot be forced but has to be respected in a liberal-constitutional state. Such respect for religion is mostly not in terms of policy but of constitutional law that prescribes religious liberty rights.

But then it must surprise that Islam is the main integration problem in Europe (as suggested by the aforementioned 'death proclamations' of multiculturalism). Why is this? It is not, as many American observers wrongly believe, due to an inherent Christian bias in European societies, espe-

> "In France, Sarkozy tried to placate voters of the right-wing populist National Front, who were already the main addressees of his 2010 law prohibiting the burqa in all public places."

cially of their states, from which the US is thought to be luckily free (this ignores the elasticity of liberal institutions, especially of autonomous legal systems that have successfully accommodated Islam in the past two decades).

In reality, Islam is a protest ideology of socioeconomically deprived Muslim populations in Europe, especially of the second and third generations (as Islam specialist Olivier Roy observed, in the past Marxism-Leninism was central to third world opposition, now it happens to be Islam).

Islam is available as a protest ideology because of geopolitics: there is a global Islamic movement which provides the script. Even if there were perfect Muslim integration in Europe, there would still be Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan etc. providing targets of mobilization. Note that foreign policy has been a key grievance of (otherwise fairly integrated) British Muslims all along, particularly under the Blair government. Note further that there is not a Buddhist, Sikh or Hindu problem in Europe, even if there are immigrants from these quarters; among other reasons, this is because there is no global Buddhist, Sikh, or Hindu movement mobilizing around a West versus Rest divide.

Finally, and bordering on the politically incorrect, there is an inherent feature of Islam that makes it more difficult to integrate than other religions or cultures. As the philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner observed, Islam is "secularization-resistant". It is a religion of law that does not easily allow the compartmentalization

"Islam is available as a protest ideology because of geopolitics: there is a global Islamic movement which provides the script."

of life, prescribing instead a unity of belief and ritual, private and social practices, which is an irritation to liberalism (and may be defined as the "art of separation", in the words of American political philosopher Michael Walzer).

In sum, there is a general suspicion in Europe that Islam's integration is only tactical, not intrinsic, which has triggered "muscular liberalism" in response (that, in turn, may be a bigger threat to liberalism than Islam could ever be).

Muscular liberalism

"Muscular liberalism" is a rabid variant of civic integration, which has become the convergent mainstream policy for immigrant integration across Western Europe today.

The civic integration policy started in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, as a remedy to the massive unemployment, high school drop-out rates, and extreme residential segregation that plagued immigrants and their offspring, and this in the shadow of one of Europe's (few) torch-bearing policies on multiculturalism.

Initially, the policy had a neo-liberal, economic focus, seeking to make immigrants self-sufficient, that is, to be in work

not on welfare, which above all required competence in the host-society language (no easy game with Dutch, which is a small language with high acquisition costs and not portable to other countries). Over time, however, the civic integration policy took on a cultural focus, urging immigrants to adopt Dutch norms and values. The cultural inflection of the policy is due to the polarization of Dutch domestic politics in the age of Pim Fortuyn and Geerd Wilders, and the ideologically motivated murders of Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh.

A liberal trick

Along with the shift from economics to culture, the punitive and control-minded aspect of the policy also increased over time. Initially, making civic integration mandatory was a liberal trick to oblige the government to provide civic integration courses (especially language courses). But the tying of residence permits to successful integration today signals the fusing of immigration control with immigrant integration at large, which is perhaps the main Western European innovation in terms of immigration policy in the past few decades. The fusion of control and integration is especially visible in integration from abroad, also pioneered by the Netherlands, which requires family migrants from North Africa and Turkey (which are targeted by the po-

"The Netherlands now provides the model for Europe, and Germany, France, Britain, Austria, and Denmark all practice variants of civic integration."

licy) to show a modicum of (language and civic) integration already before arriving in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands now provides the model for Europe, and Germany, France, Britain, Austria, and Denmark all practice variants of civic integration. But not everywhere has such as harsh policy as that of the Netherlands; it tends to vary.

France's *contrats d'acceuil et d'intégration* are not punitive but service-oriented (lacking French language competence upon entry is not a problem in France, because the majority of newcomers are Francophone);

Germany's *Integrationskurse* are heavily language-focused, because most immigrants do not speak German on arrival. The policy, however, is not as harsh as in the Netherlands: if you fail the integration test or integration course requirement, you lose entitlements to social benefits but generally not your residence permit.

British civic integration originated in nationality law and was only later applied to immigration law. There is no language problem for immigrants in Britain. Instead, at least until recently, the civic integration test had an applied-culture inflection (how to pay bills, how to behave in a pub, how to queue), which may actually be useful for acculturation.

Underneath these national variations, the general thrust of civic integration is to narrow (rather than widen or stabilize, as is the suspicion of multiculturalism) the cultural difference between immigrants and host society, and to make them understand

its norms, rules, institutions.

The key issue everywhere is knowledge of norms and rules, but moral identification with the latter is not generally expected. This reflects the fact that liberalism must respect the distinction between law (which regulates external behavior) and morality (which is internal to the individual). Muscular liberalism may be defined precisely by transgressing from law to morality. This is potentially destructive of liberalism itself.

The Muslim Test

An example of muscular liberalism is the so-called Muslim Test practiced a few years ago in the German Land of Baden-Württemberg, which sought to find out—by way of morally inquisitive trick questions – whether (Muslim) applicants for German citizenship really identified with the principles and values of the liberal state constitution (that they formally have to sign up to).

Generally, however, civic integration is self-limiting, even in the Netherlands. The famous introduction video that newcomers are required to watch on (or already before) arrival in the Netherlands, which shows naked women and kissing homosexuals, among other typically 'Dutch' everyday scenes, does not tell Muslims to undress and to become 'liberal' (or rather 'libertine') themselves; they are only informed about (and perhaps meant to be deterred by) the fact that these things are common in this 'liberal' country.

Multiculturalism is rejected today not as explicit policy (that was mostly never the case) but as previous laissez-faire and non-intervention of the state in matters of integration, which is now found wanting.

Religion is the key cultural integration issue in Europe; but it is processed more in terms of constitutional law than policy (apart from the recent moves to establish Islam Councils, which is no late-blooming multiculturalism but part of a campaign to nationalize or domesticate Islam).

Civic integration is the dominant immigrant integration policy today. Generally, it is not muscular but self-limiting, with a legitimate emphasis on binding newcomers into mainstream institutions. Overall, the room for manoeuvre that is available to states on cultural integration is limited by legal and constitutional parameters, and the degree of variation of policy has been exaggerated by some scholars.

What is to be done?

European countries must fight discrimination more effectively. Fighting discrimination in key societal sectors (employment, education, housing, etc.) has been part of European Union law since 2000, and Member States are required to imple-

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"Minorities have to respect majority culture. Under multiculturalism, only 'minorities' had legitimate cultural claims. But majorities matter too."

ment this EU directive domestically. Much like US civil rights law, European law acknowledges 'indirect' discrimination and is grounded in civil law (rather than penal law, which is more protective of wrongdoers). However, affirmative action (or positive discrimination) is generally rejected in Europe, because immigrants have a weaker justice claim than US racial minorities (especially blacks).

Interestingly, antidiscrimination is not affected by the current retreat from multiculturalism. This suggests that both policies follow a different philosophy: antidiscrimination seeks to abolish difference (it aims at the "deracialization" of society, as the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin phrased the purpose of affirmative action in the US); by contrast, multiculturalism seeks to affirm difference.

Minorities have to respect majority culture. Under multiculturalism, only 'minorities' had legitimate cultural claims. But majorities matter too. Unless their cultures and traditions are acknowledged by the political mainstream, the issue will be seized (or already has been seized) by the populist right fringe. An interesting recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (which safeguards the Europe-

an Convention of Human Rights) could show the way. In its Lautsi v. Italy decision of July 2011, the European Court allowed the Italian government to hang Christian crosses in its public schools, the argument being that the cross was a symbol of majority culture that should be respected. At the same time, the Court argued that this privileging of majority culture was all the more opportune as it occurred in a context of pluralism in Italian schools, which were at the same time open to minority religions. Symbolic or cultural majority privileges combined with pluralism for minorities seem to be a better policy to deal with cultural or religious difference than either a militant secularism or multiculturalism.

For Europe, it is a case of selecting the 'right' immigrants. When Canadians point out that civic integration and multiculturalism may happily go together (rather than be substitutive), this reflects the fact that Canada has achieved a positive equilibrium between selecting mostly highly skilled immigrants and benign (multicultural) integration policies. If you only take in the immigrants you want, why throw sticks at them? The problem in Europe is that the vast majority of newcomers are unwanted asylum-seekers and family migrants, who are often ill-equipped for post-industrial economies. No wonder that integration policy in Europe has taken on nasty, heavily control-minded undertones. The only way out of this is to turn from predominantly unwanted to 'wanted', skill-based selection (former French President Sarkozy called it a move from "suffered" to "chosen" immi-

gration). But this is not easily done because the current majority of 'unwanted' (asylum and family) immigrants have rights that must be acknowledged in a constitutional state. At the same time, it is not possible to revert to selectivity based on national origins, because such policies would be discriminatory.

Robust debate must not be suppressed. The most vitriolic debates on immigration (or rather Islam) are precisely in those countries where robust debate was previously suppressed under a cordon of political correctness (examples being the traditionally liberal Denmark or the Netherlands). In general, much of Europe's accommodation of Islam and Muslims occurred through autonomous courts and the legal system. The problem is that this 'integration by stealth' bypasses public or democratic arenas, and thus bears certain risks: it is invisible and ordinary people are not aware of it or do not understand it. Legal integration generates a political backlash. To avoid this, integration has to pass the court of public opinion. This seems to be happening now, as one sees in current conflicts surrounding visible Islam, like minarets (prohibited in Switzerland after a 2010 public referendum) or burqas (prohibited by laws in France and Belgium in 2010 and 2011, respectively).

Two extremes need to be avoided here: no democracy (all Europe pre-2001) or too much democracy (for which Switzerland, with its referendum process and direct democracy is a pertinent example). In principle, representative democracy is a suitable compromise between both extremes,

whereby "public views" pass "through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" (as described in James Madison's famous *Federalist* #10). However, representative institutions are impaired today by populist "audience democracy" (Bernard Manin), where political leadership is in short supply (and leadership equals populism) and where public opinion and not the 'right' or 'just' solution is the benchmark of public policy.

The limitations of policy

Finally, the limitations of policy have to be recognized. One can do only so much by way of policy. Note that the United States, the proverbial and most attractive of all 'nation(s) of immigrants', does not have an integration policy at all. Instead, flexible labour markets and informal society and the fabulously absorptive American culture are the key engines of integration. One could generalize this: immigrant-unspecific, general institutions are much more important for integration than any specific integration policy could ever be. Labour market structures and education systems are particularly important.

To begin with the first point, immigrants are not resented if they are in work and not a burden on society. This is the case in the United States (and all the other classic nations of immigrants), where the notion of the unemployed immigrant is virtually unknown. By contrast, the key to strong anti-immigrant resentment in Europe is the fact that immigrants (and their offspring) are disproportionately unemployed or not even looking for work at all (as is the case with many Muslim women). Not to mention that immigrants are vastly overrepresented in the European prison population, a fact that also has no parallel overseas.

Secondly, of pivotal importance for successful integration are comprehensive education systems that separate children from their (immigrant) parents at an early point in their lives and for long hours of the day. For this reason, France and Scandinavia are much better at fostering social mobility in the second generation than Germany or Austria, whose schools start late and finish early, and stratify early and rigidly.

The message is that immigrant-unspecific institutions are more important for integrating immigrants than even the best integration policy. The European debate suffers from an over-attention to policy and a neglect of the role of institutions.

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A game of musical chairs

Immigration should not be an issue that only shows its face in hotels, restaurants and residents' registration offices. Immigration has a different face: in schools, in all kinds of educational curricula, in school textbooks, in theatre repertoires and in the many different ways that we talk about integration. Integration means giving migrants a new home and, from the migrants' point of view, finding a new home.

By Heribert Prantl

Perhaps you know the party game Musical Chairs. The game can be played by any number of people. This is how it works: a number of chairs are set out in a circle, but there is one chair less than the number of players. The players arrange themselves in a circle and when the music starts, they all walk around the chairs. The organizer of the game stops the music at a random moment and everyone has to try to sit down on one of the chairs. The person who is left standing is out of the game. Another chair is removed and the game continues. The longer the game goes on, the more people are out. If we transfer this game to real life, it gives us an insight into the process of exclusion.

In many countries, people feel they are playing musical chairs when it comes to jobs and opportunities. In the game, one player is excluded in each round because there are not enough chairs. In real life (including in the countries of the European Union) it is even worse because a great many more people are being excluded. The rules of the game vary slightly in Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, the UK, Italy and Germany in terms of the number of chairs (or perhaps we should now say opportunities and jobs) that are available for the players. Some countries only have half the chairs that they need. And because there are so few chairs and the music plays so rarely, people who are already sitting stay sitting and those who are standing stay standing.

In Southern and Eastern Europe, opportunities for young people are extremely scarce. As a result, young, often highly-skilled people are leaving their home countries, their societies (their chairs) and heading to other countries such as Germany on the hunt for more chairs. They are not leaving their countries just for fun or because of a sense of adventure. They would rather stay. They would rather stay with their families and friends in a country whose language they speak. This is why tens of thousands of young people have been taking to the streets and occupying the squares of European cities. They have quickly been labelled the 'lost generation', but they do not want this tag. "We are not leaving" chanted the indignant youth of Madrid, Barcelona and Seville. Rallies in support of this 'Spanish revolution' were held in Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, London, Prague and Budapest – wherever young people felt they could soon be playing their own game of musical chairs.

No gateway to the sun

Yet many have already allowed themselves to be exiled, not only from the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, from the squares that housed their protests, but also from their home countries, which no longer offer them a gateway to the sun. Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians – they are all being driven from their countries, where unemployment is soaring, the mood is bleak and life is hard. Sometimes this migration is driven by desperation. After years of struggling with the crisis, growing numbers of people are sliding inexorably into poverty. They are moving to countries where the game of musical chairs is not so horribly difficult to win.

For a long time, Germany was a country of immigration against it will, but in 2012 and 2013 it became the world's second most popular destination and the number one destination for migrants within Europe. Just a few short years ago, Germany was an emigration country, with more people leaving the country than moving to it. But in 2012 it became a destination for 400,000 immigrants – still lagging far behind the USA, which took in more than one million new immigrants, but well ahead of the UK and Canada. Europe has been experiencing a re-Europeanization of migration. Germany is a country of immigration. Free movement within the EU has been gaining momentum. Almost 10 percent of people in the European Union were not born in their country of residence.

Along with being the most attractive destination for migrants in Europe, Germany has also become a magnet for the migration of wealth. The migration of money precedes the migration of people. In the shadow of the huge bailouts handed out during the financial crisis, many people in Germany feel they have become Europe's paymaster. They are under the impression that horrendous amounts of taxpayers' money are draining away to Europe's southern nations. But in fact the exact opposite is true. People fail to realize that very little money has actually been paid out. Instead, the government has simply provided default guarantees – not so much with a view to helping Greece and

"For a long time, Germany was a country of immigration against its will, but in 2012 and 2013 it became the world's second most popular destination and the number one destination for migrants within Europe."

Spain, but as a way of protecting the returns of northern banks. Germany became Europe's safe haven for money and earned big profits – thanks to the crisis. It is no coincidence that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble is boasting about a balanced budget. The fall in interest rates on sovereign debt has led to a natural reduction in Germany's debt. The Finance Minister calculated that the country would be able to save almost €41 billion in interest payments between 2010 and 2014. Between 2010 and 2012 new borrowing was €73 billion lower than expected. And when investors' money flows into Germany, it is followed by people from its countries of origin. Why should that be surprising?

Despite all its failings and despite the complaints and anger directed from Southern Europe towards Germany's austerity policies, the European Union is the best thing that has happened to Europe in its long history. There were seven wonders of the ancient world: the Hanging Gardens of Babylon; the Colossus of Rhodes, the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus; the Lighthouse of Alexandria; the Pyramids of Giza; the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus and the Statue of Zeus at Olympia. Today there is the European Union and the European Parliament, the world's only directly-elected supranational institution. A true wonder of the world. This modern wonder also encompasses the European Charter of Human Rights, freedom of movement, the right of asylum, protection for people who are persecuted in their home countries – all this is part of it, even if it is not always the case in practice.

The European Union is the best thing that has ever happened to Germans, French, Italians, Czechs, Danes, Poles, Spaniards, Flemish and Walloons, the Dutch, Greeks, Bavarians, Basques and the Baltic peoples. Europe is the culmination of all those historic peace treaties which never actually brought peace. The European Union is the conclusion of an almost thousand-year war, waged by almost everyone against almost everyone else. It is an undeserved paradise for the people of an entire continent. The two letters EU represent a golden age in European history.

A golden age in two letters

We write them down, we say them, and we are almost afraid because they are no longer in tune with the general mood. Fewer and fewer people believe in them because in daily life the European emphasis is being worn away and swamped by economic concerns and the social anxieties of its citizens. People are afraid, and many European politicians respond to this fear by repeating the above accolades, saying the European Union is the best thing that has ever happened to Germans, French, etcetera, etcetera throughout their long history.

Of course this is true – yet such celebratory phrases become mere empty words if and for as long as people view the EU as a community that predominantly serves business and the financial industry rather than as a community that protects its citizens. Social policy is and must never be a mere

appendix to economic policy. Good social policy is policy that creates a home. Wisely crafted social policy can turn a European state structure, the somewhat unwieldy EU – which is still too much of an economic community – into a home for the people who live in it. Anyone who feels their country is their home does not want to be driven out of it. When their own country becomes weak, they want to turn to Europe as their second home. Therefore it is not unreasonable for protesters across Europe to repeatedly demand that their governments act with a certain degree of economic integrity in a globalised world. Internal peace relies on rules for a form of economic activity that is also socially responsible.

Right now, too many citizens simply do not know why they should want Europe. They are told that only the EU can be a powerful player on the world stage, but they feel no sense of this power. Particularly in the countries of Southern and Southeast Europe, there is a general feeling that the nations of Europe are losing their influence, but that the EU is not gaining it. It is growing in size but not in power. This has to change.

> "Up to now, people in Europe have generally travelled from north to south – on holiday, for recreation, for relaxation and enjoyment. Meanwhile, people have migrated from south to north in order to work and make a living. As long as things are so one-sided, so anti-cyclic, Europe will never be in balance."

Up to now, people in Europe have generally travelled from north to south – on holiday, for recreation, for relaxation and enjoyment. Meanwhile, people have migrated from south to north in order to work and make a living. As long as things are so one-sided, so anti-cyclic, Europe will never be in balance.

Migration in Europe should not be migration of necessity; there should not be a sense of having to migrate in order to survive. Migration within Europe should be a positive choice that is not driven by mere survival but by a desire to improve oneself and create a better life. Ideally, people should not only think of themselves as being Greek, Italian, Polish or Romanian, but also as being European, because Europe has become or is becoming their second home.

It would be wonderful if the people who sally forth in Europe had the same experience as that of Goethe during his travels to Italy in 1786. Not necessarily in terms of his 'night and fog', but by sharing his aim of finding a new orientation, gaining inspiration from new people and new places, the stimulus of the unknown. European exchange programmes, Erasmus and European student networks all provide vehicles for the kind of migration that is driven by choice. I have personal experience of this, as my daughter Nina has become an enthusiastic and committed European since her time with ELSA, the European Law Students Association. This European student network helped her to begin thinking of Europe as her home.

Today, Germany is a country of immi-

gration. The German word *Einwanderung* (immigration) has largely been replaced by the neologism *Zuwanderung* (in-migration). So the German Immigration Act of 2004, which came into force on 1 January 2005, is not the *Einwanderungsgesetz* but the *Zuwanderungsgesetz*. Its sub-heading takes a negative tone, focusing not on the acceptance and integration of migrants, but on their rejection and the sense of unease caused by excessive immigration. The full title of this Act, which created a new basis for German laws on aliens, is the "Act for the Control and Limitation of Immigration and for Regulation of the Residency and Integration of Citizens of the European Union and Foreigners".

Former Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth and her committee worked hard on drafting this Act, with the intention of rolling out the red carpet for immigrants and paving the way for good integration. The idea was to provide a proper structure for immigration by setting up a points system similar to that used in Canada. But the red carpet turned into something of a wet blanket in the wake of vehement protests from the conservative CDU/CSU and the intervention of Roland Koch, the Minister-President of Hesse, whose successful campaign against dual citizenship was not exactly welcoming towards foreigners and immigrants. Nevertheless, a number of problems have been tackled with some success. For example, a concept has been developed for running language, orientation and integration classes: 600 hours of "Germany made easy".

Germany is now becoming something

that it has tried to avoid for so long; something that ruling politicians have refused to accept for so long. It is an immigration country. This is mainly because conditions in the Member States of Southern and Eastern Europe do not exactly encourage young people to stay put. It is 25 years since immigration to Germany was as high as it is today. But back then, most of them were not labour migrants but refugees. Unlike today, the trade associations did not get excited about the arrival of these immigrants. Today, businesses are keen to welcome young skilled and unskilled workers. Back then, migrants who were seeking asylum triggered an agonizing and painful debate about Germany's basic asylum rights, which until that point had been cherished by constitutional experts and lawmakers as a guiding light of the constitution. By the end of this debate and the anti-foreigner campaigns, basic asylum rights had been scaled down and policies on refugees tightened.

Flight from the Middle East

Today the situation is very different. The terrible circumstances in the Middle East have inevitably led to an increase in the number of refugees heading for Germany. But over two thirds of all migrants come from within the European Union. They are not seeking asylum in Germany but are enjoying the freedom of movement offered by the EU. They are seeking good jobs and a decent living. Taxpayers' money is being spent on encouraging skilled wor-

"The EU countries that were particularly badly hit by the crisis are losing their highly-skilled young people to other labour markets."

kers to move to Germany. Turks were once the archetypal immigrants, who generally moved to the Ruhr area – or at least this was the public perception. In the 1990s, more and more Russian-speaking people arrived in German cities as resettlers. They were joined by growing numbers of asylum seekers from Syria and Afghanistan and by Roma from Serbia. But now it is Poles who are viewed as typical immigrants. According to the German government's 2012 report on migration, one in six of all migrants come from Poland. Polish tradespeople, specialists and care workers have given German immigrants a new face, accompanied by Romanians and Bulgarians. Despite good economic growth in Eastern Europe over the last few years, there is still a growing wages gap, if people in Bratislava or Bucharest manage to find a job at all.

According to 2012 figures, most of the new migrants come from Poland (197,000), followed by Romania (135,400) and Hungary and Bulgaria with 60,000 each. A new trend is Germany's growing attraction for people from Southwestern Europe. More and more young Italians are moving to Germany (Italy takes third place in the rankings, with 60,700 migrants). Spaniards, Croats, Portuguese and Greeks are also heading for Germany to seek their fortune. In some of these countries, youth unemployment is over 50 percent.

Immigration from European Union countries to Germany doubled between

2009 and 2012. The high rates of migration from Eastern Europe can also be explained by the catch-up effect – full freedom of movement for citizens of Eastern European Member States was postponed for seven years after their accession. When the European Union accepted ten new members in 2004, only three countries (Sweden, UK and Ireland) immediately opened up their borders to workers from the new Member States. The others were slower to open up, resulting in the catch-up effect that they are now experiencing. Romania and Bulgaria, which both joined the EU in 2007, had to go through a long transition period before gaining full freedom of movement to Germany at the beginning of 2014. This is one of the reasons for the surge in the numbers of migrants coming to Germany. The second reason, as previously mentioned, is the economic crisis and the high unemployment rates experienced in the countries of Southwestern Europe.

It is mainly migrants from Southeastern Europe who are producing the changed migration flows. People flooded to Spain during the construction boom: in 2007 alone, one million men and women moved to Spain to work. Almost 900,000 Romanians and Bulgarians were living on the Iberian Peninsula one year before the economic crisis hit. The Spanish economy crashed and what was once an immigration country has now become a country that is given a wide berth, almost an emigration country. The people who moved to Spain have now moved on, and no-one is taking their place.

The EU countries that were particu-

larly badly hit by the crisis are losing their highly-skilled young people to other labour markets. Initially it acts as a reprieve, as it reduces pressure on the labour markets of the crisis-ridden countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, along with the attendant pressure on their welfare systems. But it also means that these countries will find themselves facing a shortage of skilled young people when their economies begin to grow again. But how are they to grow without skilled workers? Their loss is dangerous if – and because – it moves from being a symptom to a cause of the crisis, and could potentially lengthen it.

Willkommenskultur (culture of welcome) has become one of the most popular words in Germany in the context of immigration and integration. Just as there are trends in children's names, the same is true of political terminology. Maximilian and Sophie are the two most popular children's names in Germany at the moment, while *Willkommenskultur* is the most popular word in politics. Today the word is everywhere. In every corner of Germany, *Willkommenskultur* is discussed at conferences and repeated ad infinitum in politicians' speeches. This new culture of welcome is reflected in the countless citizenship ceremonies that are being held all over the country. Willkommenskultur: it is as if using and relishing this word as often as possible wipes away all the misery of policies directed at foreigners and asylum seekers over recent decades and makes us forget that the infamous riots of Rostock, Solingen and Hoyerswerda ever happened. But rhetoric is not enough,

particularly when this kind of rhetoric of welcome (as heard in the everyday politics of 2014) is no more than the chives that garnish the soup of prejudice. There is clearly a sense of institutionalized mistrust towards people from Eastern Europe – not only in terms of refugee laws, but also in general laws on immigration and labour. Workers who move to Germany from Romania and Bulgaria are often accused of only coming in order to claim unemployment and other benefits.

At the turn of the year 2013/2014, the conservative Bavarian CSU introduced this kind of campaign into politics. The CSU is a party that is very rooted in tradition. But it is a bad tradition to call people 'abusers' – abusers of asylum rights, welfare rights, legal rights. Most of the time, the CSU views refugees as abusers, and in election campaigns they are often referred to as 'asylum cheats'. Over the past year, politicians have found a new target for their campaigns: workers from Romania and Bulgaria. "Who cheats is out", is the CSU's slogan in its attacks on Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants. Unfortunately, the German federal government has played a part in this campaign by passing new laws in the Bundestag.

In the event of the alleged abuse of rights, EU migrants are forbidden to return to Ger-

"The plight of poor immigrants is shamelessly exploited.
Romanian chambermaids and Bulgarian care workers often find themselves working for a pittance while their employers brazenly charge them for accommodation in run-down buildings."

many for a certain period of time. A tax number is required in order to prevent duplicate child benefit claims. This is all designed to prevent 'welfare abuse'. This drastically reduces freedom of movement for workers within the European Union. The new laws have a particular impact on migrants from the poorest EU states. By removing their welfare rights and benefits, the government is making them even more vulnerable to exploitation, low wages and exorbitant rents.

Just one year ago, at the end of 2013, when the campaign against poverty migrants was in full spate, my editorial colleague at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* Roland Preuss, made the following apology: "At this time, we should extend a hand to our Romanian and Bulgarian colleagues, if we have any, and bid them welcome once again. We should take the opportunity to tell them that we don't believe they are here in Germany to claim child benefit, but because they are looking for a good job. That would be only fair. Because the current debate obstructs our view of these people, of the positive consequences of their right to freedom of movement." This had to be said out loud before the problems could be discussed. Because far removed from all the uproar about low wages and alleged welfare cheats, freedom of movement has caused and is still causing a number of problems. These are hard to ignore in cities such as Duisburg, Dortmund and the inner-city Neukölln area of Berlin, where people are falsely claiming to be self-employed while marketing themselves as day labourers. Others try to survive by begging or claiming child benefit. At the bottom end,

there is cut-throat competition for places in homeless shelters, accommodation and emergency medical care.

The campaign against East Europeans basically accuses all migrant workers from Eastern Europe of only coming to Germany in order to claim benefits and other social services. This is clearly not true. It is based not on statistics but on prejudice. In fact the opposite is true. As a percentage, Bulgarians and Romanians in Germany claim fewer benefits than other foreigners in Germany. Only one in ten Romanians and Bulgarians claim Hartz IV unemployment benefits, and these are generally people who have to supplement their wages because they are so badly paid.

The real problem is not the alleged welfare fraud but the shameless exploitation of the plight of poor immigrants. Romanian chambermaids and Bulgarian care workers often find themselves working for a pittance while their employers brazenly charge them for accommodation in run-down buildings. The majority of workers who come from Eastern Europe are certainly not 'abusers', but all too many of them are abused, by employment agencies, sub-contractors and employers on the one hand and by politicians on the other, who only succeed in making matters worse.

The terrible treatment of poor migrants cannot be laid solely at the door of ruthless exploiters. Unfortunately it is also brought about by a policy of low wages which certainly makes 'us' world leaders in terms of exports but which is not good for Europe's economy. It creates and perpetuates the con-

ditions that produce poverty migration. Immigration must not be used to keep wages low, for example those of care workers in retirement and nursing homes. Immigration must not be used to drive the cost of training people in the specialist skills that are sought. Immigration must not be used to fuel low wages. It must not mean we save on training here at home and transfer the costs to the countries of origin. So we have to be careful when we support the pro-migration argument that Germany has a shortage of skilled workers, an argument that is so popular in business circles. The German Institute for Economic Research advises great caution when handling information on the skills shortage, stating: "Experts agree that Germany currently does not have a blanket skills shortage, but it only exists in certain occupations."

Karl Brenke, an expert on the German labour market, comments as follows on the often-mentioned shortage of engineers: "The fact that we can't buy one litre for one euro doesn't mean we have a petrol shortage." If companies want to find engineers, they have to offer them something. Attempts to attract foreign engineers via a blue card at a minimum wage of €33,000 are improper attempts to buy petrol for one euro.

Let's return to the legislation against poverty migration: the law against poverty migration that was passed in the German Bundestag last November did not turn out to be quite as draconian as was called for by the campaign. Instead, it has tightened up and strengthened some existing clauses. But this is still bad enough, because the German

government is using it to dignify prejudice towards workers from Eastern Europe, and the grand coalition is supporting the campaign in terms of its overall direction and outcome, if not in its details. I believe this is a very dangerous step.

The myth of welfare tourism

Romania and Bulgaria have been members of the EU since 2007, but they were only granted freedom of movement at the beginning of 2014 after a long period of transition. Now the law on preventing welfare abuse is pouring cold water on the people who are using this right to freedom of movement. That is not good. It discredits labour migration – one of the cornerstones of the EU – and turns it into welfare tourism. That is anti-European. Welfare tourism is merely a perception. According to an EU report, the percentage of EU migrants in the countries studied who receive benefits is in the low single digits. Over two thirds of EU migrants move to another country in order to find work. The majority of those who are not working are retired or have independent income. That's a fact. Welfare tourism is not a fact, but a myth.

Legislation on refugees was recently expanded with the passing of a law regarding 'safe' countries of origin, named as Bosnia-Herzogovina, Serbia and Macedonia. Refugees from these countries have almost zero chance of gaining asylum because these states are considered to be 'safe'. In parallel with the passing of this new law designed

to stem the flow of refugees from the Balkans, a study was published which showed that of all the minorities in Germany, it is the Sinti and Roma who face the harshest treatment. This is demonstrated by the inflexible way they are and will be deported from Germany to the Balkan states. Surely we should be giving these forgotten peoples a future? They are often referred to as 'travellers', as if migrating is part of their DNA. But their insecure gypsy life has never been fun. These travellers are always on the move because they are still unwelcome in every corner of Europe. In the Balkans, they are forced to keep moving because of the harsh realities of poverty, pogroms and daily violence. Here in Germany, they are subject to strict deportation laws. The future of these people does not lie in asylum. We all need to work together to turn Europe into a home for the Sinti and Roma. The new law on safe countries of origin will do nothing to create this.

In the past, people used to take their washing off the line when the gypsies arrived. Today they stuff it in the dryer. But the prejudices against the Sinti and Roma remain, in Germany and across Europe as a whole. The above-mentioned study showed that the Sinti and Roma in Germany are treated more harshly than other asylum-seekers, more harshly than Muslims.

We can rail against the persistence, tenacity and vigour of prejudices. But this kind of generalized lament changes nothing. It also does not change the fact that the Sinti and Roma are treated worse than any other

minority in Europe. They are Europe's forgotten people. The cruel persecution that they suffered at the hands of the National Socialists has largely been forgotten. This fact has not been altered by the speech given by Holocaust survivor Zoni Weisz in the German Bundestag, nor by the dedication in 2012 of a memorial in Berlin to the Sinti and Roma who were murdered by the Nazis. Politicians across Europe treat this minority like pariahs and harass them at every turn. It is demonstrated by the strict rules on their deportation. No-one wants anything to do with them, as is reflected in surveys.

Dead Sinti and Roma – those killed by the Nazis – now have their own memorial, dedicated to them two years ago on 24 October 2012 in Berlin. But living Sinti and Roma have almost nothing – no work, no housing, no protection and no help. In Southeast Europe they are harassed and persecuted; in Germany and France they are forced into barracks and deported – back to the countries where they are harassed and persecuted. This is not a glorious chapter for Europe. In his speech to the Bundestag, Holocaust survivor Zoni Weisz made it clear that this is not a German problem, but a European problem. "We are Europeans" he says. It is time to give a future to this persecuted people by respecting their differences and not insisting that they integrate in the generally accepted sense of the word.

French historian Fernand Braudel, an expert on the Mediterranean region, once called migration a 'necessity' of civilization. Ideally, migrants learn to be flexible and spontaneous, both major advantages in our

"But the prejudices against the Sinti and Roma remain, in Germany and across Europe as a whole."

globalized world. International corporations have recognized this opportunity.

In a survey conducted by leading global recruitment firm Hays AG, the overwhelming majority of respondents said they employed foreigners because: "Intercultural competence is important for our business". Cost-savings are of lesser importance. The survey also reveals that migrants who come to work in another country have a reputation for being flexible, intelligent, open, resilient, articulate and willing to take risks. It also shows that migrants can contribute to social progress in their home countries. By returning home with their new experiences, they can help turn the original brain drain into a brain gain, an increase in experience, knowledge and money.

This is good to know, but an immigration policy based on circular migration is a delicate one if its focus on migrants returning home affects their integration. A recent study by the German Foreign Office (I am now moving away from the area of internal European migration) shows that most migrants from Africa and the Middle East are members of the educated middle classes. Indeed, it is increasingly the case that migrants are more highly qualified than the domestic population. In Germany, 29 percent of migrants are academics, whereas the proportion in the general population is only 19 percent. Global economic institutes have long been arguing for migration and mobility to be viewed as an opportunity, not a problem. And not because they are a source of cheap labour. During one of the events at the 2014 new year conference or-

ganized by Germany's public broadcaster, Das Erste, Dilip Ratha, Head of the World Bank's Migration and Remittances Unit said that migrants were among "the key investors of our time, because they want to build something".

Articulate, cross-cultural, mobile and active – wonderful! Turks are a prime example of this. According to German cultural expert Claus Leggewie, the migration of hundreds of thousands of Turks to Central and Northern Europe has resulted in "highly mobile cohorts who move between Turkey and Europe without quite giving up their national identity". One thing is clear: these cultural 'converters' enrich the cultural sector and society in general. In cultural, social and business circles, there is a feeling that it is time to start viewing migrants as potential entrepreneurs rather than as day labourers. And it is time stop talking about migration and start talking about mobility.

Highly mobile cohorts

When I read these wonderful, substantive analyses of the value of mobility, it brings to mind a cartoon that hangs in my entrance hall at home. It shows refugees whose boat is helplessly adrift in the Mediterranean. A rescue vessel approaches and someone calls out to the shipwrecked, asking: "Any IT specialists or engineers?" It is a bitter image of European realities beyond all the fine words and studies. The EU is still sealing itself off, despite all these beautifully illustrated findings. The full, cruel power of this isolation

is being played out in the Mediterranean. In any case, in the medium term the firewall being erected by Frontex and Eurodac will not be able to withstand the pressure of migration. History shows us that people will migrate if they have a good reason to do so. And in Africa and Asia in particular there are plenty of reasons for emigration, many of which are rooted in the trade policies of the industrialized nations. But the rich countries restrict themselves to pumping money into the South in the form of development aid, a paternalistic form of assistance that is becoming less and less welcome.

There is already one way of improving conditions in the migrants' home countries: fair trade. As long as European butter is cheaper in Morocco than local butter, as long as French poultry costs less in Niger than the local poultry, as long as floating fish factories catch everything that wriggles, we should not be surprised about the exodus from Africa.

EU policies on subsidies also create reasons for people to flee their homes. They ensure that the Nobel prizewinning EU has some stains down its shirtfront. New walls and refugee reception camps along the coasts are no solution to bad policies. They simply give the illusion that we can continue sub-

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sidizing European exports of food with no obligation to share out Europe's wealth. In Max Frisch's play *The Chinese Wall* the emperor built his wall "to hold back the future". Today, this emperor has his commissioners in Europe.

We propagate an open society, and I do it too. There are plenty of people in Germany who are afraid of this because it makes them feel vulnerable, as if they are losing control of their destiny. What kind of security does a society need in order to be able to accept immigration? It is dangerous when migration is instrumentalised to justify policies of surveillance rather than social policies. Good integration policy is an element of social policy.

Integration demands a great deal from new citizens, but old citizens also have to play their part. Integration throws doubt on old certainties. Immigration changes society. Until now, most Germans have failed to fully understand the depth of these changes. Once we old citizens realized that many immigrants, particularly Turks, were not planning to return home, to a greater or lesser extent we expected and believed that they would integrate. And we felt we were doing our bit by eating their doner kebabs.

The key task of socialization in Germany as an immigration country will have to be a willingness not only to tolerate, but to accept and respect heterogeneity as the norm. It is not merely a question of tolerance; it is a matter of respecting one another. I don't care if it is called multiculturalism or cultural diversity or something else. I feel there is a growing awareness that immigration also

brings us cultural wealth.

When I was a law student, we discussed the problems arising from the paragraphs on theft in the criminal code. With reference to a thief who steals food and eats it straight away, my professor used a very apt phrase: "Die Insichnahme ist die intensivste Form der Ansichnahme" (putting something inside you is the most intensive way of appropriating it). If this sentence were also true of our immigration society, we would be much further down the road. Immigration should not be an issue that only shows its face in hotels, restaurants and residents' registration offices. Immigration has a different face: in schools, in all kinds of educational curricula, in school textbooks, in theatre repertoires and in the many different ways that we talk about integration.

The turnover of foreign restaurants and snack bars in Germany is not a good measure of integration. Integration means much more than the number of kebab shops in German pedestrian zones. Integration is more than stuffing yourself with things that taste good; more than accepting services that you need. Integration means giving migrants a new home and – from the migrants' point of view – finding a new home. Migrants are not single-cell organisms. They may have children, they have families, they need to feel, know and experience the fact that they are welcome.

Do we want a Europe where everything is about performance, market value, where the value of people is only measured in economic terms? In today's economy, the image of man is that of homo faber mobilis. A pure homo

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faber is a thing of the past. These were the people of the modern era. In our post-modern era, it is clearly not enough to be simply homo faber, a person who simply works. It is now necessary to be homo faber mobilis, someone who is highly flexible, mobile and adaptable. This view of the world believes that people who are unemployed only have themselves to blame. If they were more mobile, flexible and adaptable – less comfortable – then they would be sure to find work. Many economic institutes and politicians are now calling for a new type of person, which I call homo faber novus mobilis. This is an incredibly mobile, incredibly flexible, incredibly robust, unruffleable, adaptable person, a person who is not constrained by borders or obstacles. In today's economy, man has to be homo faber novus mobilis.

The reality of life in individual countries and the EU as a whole is of course somewhat more limited. Unlike snails, people no longer carry their houses on their backs. And because, unlike snails, they are not hermaphrodites, they have other social needs: finding a life partner, starting a family, being involved in a sports club or choir, sending their children to school and cultivating friendships. All these factors present obstacles to being totally mobile, constantly

available and always ready for action. When we are talking about migration and arguing for an open society, we cannot and must not assume that we are talking about people with no children, family or social ties. Migration must not lead to a permanent uprooting and a sense of having no home. Any evaluation of migration must not forget the need for roots, the sense of being settled and having continuity. In other words, Europe should not become a continent of people with shallow roots. Flexibility and mobility are not ends in themselves. Green cards and blue cards may be important; and it is important to dismantle the bureaucratic hurdles that impede migration. It is also important to have a simple system for recognizing foreign professional qualifications. But people's professional lives should not be turned into a new form of nomadism. People need a home, even when times are volatile. This is the meaning and the aim of integration.

More than 80 years ago, the writer Joseph Roth mourned the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a union of many peoples, when he wrote: "If one uses the same yardstick for peoples, it implies that they seek in vain for national virtues, so-called, and that these are even more questionable than human virtues. For this reason I hate nationalism and nation states. My old home [...] was a great mansion with many doors and many chambers, for every condition of men. This mansion has been divided, split up, splintered. I have nothing more to seek for, there. I am used to living in a home, not in cabins."

At a time when we are building the house that is Europe and the various heads of go-

vernment are discussing its interior design, it is remarkable how more and more parties are going to elections in France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Holland, Italy and Germany proclaiming their pride in the fact that they still live in their old cabins. Europe should be a great mansion, a house for many different peoples, religions and cultures; a house that has room for its violent history and where this history serves as a warning.

Shortly before his death in 2004, I spoke with the elderly and wise Viennese Cardinal Franz König. It was a time of particularly fierce agitation against foreigners and immigrants during Austrian election campaigns. In this interview, Cardinal König said some words that should be part of the EU's agenda: "We have so many different cultures on our home soil. This wealth must not be steamrolled; it must shape a unified Europe." Sometimes even a cardinal is completely, categorically and undisputedly right. The wealth of languages, cultures, traditions, religions and people – this wealth must be embraced in Germany and in the European Union. This is a culture of welcome. This is modern democracy. This is Europe. This is what brings peace and prosperity. This is what makes Europe a home.

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Here's to cocktail identities
Modernity is characterised by continuous and accelerating change, replacing sets of static contexts with a fluid and dynamic reality that demands continuous adjustments by people, governments and other agencies. We should assume that, generally, people welcome cultural diversity, recognise its potentials and want it to work.

By Aurelie Broeckerhoff, Phoebe Griffith and Mike Hardy

Life in the 21st century is characterised by mobility. The effect has been that diversity across Europe is increasing and changing. Diversity is no longer a mainly urban phenomenon – smaller towns and villages show an increasingly complex and multi-layered demographic. The nature of diversity, its sources and expressions, have multiplied. Looking at migration more specifically, societies have witnessed a growing range of countries of origin, migration trajectories and migrant statuses. Most demographic forecasts suggest that these trends of increasing complexity are likely to continue, and even intensify, in the future.

As a result, coexistence is increasingly characterised by a multi-layered and multi-faceted web of different identities. What should be done, if anything, about the emergence of these new kinds of culturally diverse communities and the experiences of rapid social change that extensive migration can bring? There are two dominant perspectives which currently frame this debate. The first perspective sees the impact of diversity as largely corrosive for communities and argues for policy interventions to mitigate against this. The second perspective focuses more on the beneficial impact of diversity and sees adaptation over time, rather than government policy, as the best way of addressing tensions that may arise.

Cycle of polemic and rebuttal

These two very different perspectives have become caught in an unhelpful cycle of polemic and rebuttal. This has come at the expense of genuine enquiry and evidence-led policy. We therefore propose what we think is a more unifying perspective that does not need to be driven by the assumption that

trying to draw the advantages of diversity with state (or others') intervention is an exclusive alternative to letting time 'heal'. A policy framework that explicitly recognises both mitigation by direct intervention and the growing 'at-ease-with-change-and-diversity' that time can bring is more likely to offer a genuine way forward. This perspective draws on some of the research evidence in the UK that shows how lived experience of diversity normalises its existence in many cases, but that more structural inequalities and tensions still persist. Grounded in an interest of lived diversity, it might provide a more fruitful avenue for thinking through issues of cultural integration.

What we label the 'interventionist' perspective starts from a position that both migration, and the greater diversity that follows, challenge and are intrinsically harmful to the commonality of advanced, Western democracies. 'Interventionists' identify three fundamental challenges that are posed by diversity.

Firstly, they see a threat to the sense of commonality and mutuality which underpin advanced welfare states. As human nature preconditions us to seek out what is similar to us (what is called 'homophily'), they argue, people trust each other less or are less willing to cooperate when populations are more diverse. So, the consensus

> "A policy framework that explicitly recognises both mitigation by direct intervention and the growing 'at-ease-with-change-and-diversity' that time can bring is more likely to offer a genuine way forward."

for redistributive policies, which in Europe are grounded on common identity, breaks down.

Secondly, and linked to the loss of commonality, they argue that migrant newcomers can add to a sense of loss of commonality by retaining attachments to their countries of origin and importing values and lifestyles which diverge from the European standard. They may find actively opting in to participation in local life more difficult, or they may develop alternative networks, or continue in existing home-country-diaspora networks to express that attachment or fulfil their need to belong. Such a view problematises 'parallel lives' within defined communities or local areas and argues that this promotes separation and inhibits any sense of conviviality. Parallel lives highlight how the more visible and tangible difference, such as clothes, diets, languages and shopping habits – features of everyday living – are seen to act as obstacles to social cohesion.

As a third point, interventionists highlight how modern societies are already characterised by increasing churn and transience, and that this can be particularly and more challenging when societies are more diverse. So, given this reality, interventionists argue that increased diversity can make fragmentations and divisions more visible, and thus become associated with a breakdown in the development of social bonds and relationships – a kind of self-reinforcing process. Ultimately, this may lead to insecurity and a loss of sense of belonging particularly among those parts of the population that do not share the same history of

mobility or may feel more vulnerable to anxiety caused by change. Those uneasy with the risks of change may seek out strategies that appear to offer them a sense of security. They observe the growth in support for xenophobic political parties, or residential clustering – seeking out homogenous areas to live – as such strategies. Both these examples, in turn, contribute to further separation and fragmentation.

As a consequence, 'interventionists' see an important role for government to actively promote cultural integration. As levels of diversity grow, they argue, states need to take proactive steps to ensure that fragmented groups within society successfully 'fit in' with one another. The onus is mainly put on newcomers, who are asked to adapt to the culture of their new home country. A clear agenda is laid down: beyond working, paying tax and abiding by the law, newcomers should be encouraged to be active participants and stakeholders in the wider social and cultural lives of their adopted countries, and policies should promote their participation.

Strategies should start by promoting language learning. For example, states should test migrants at the point of naturalisation (or before) and ensure that language-learning provision is freely accessible and enforced. Steps should also be taken to ensure that newcomers learn about the culture and lifestyle of their new countries, and should display a level of commitment to the rights and duties of citizenship, liberal values, local community and display some level of loyalty to European states. In many European countries naturalisation is now conditional on migrants being able to demonstrate knowledge of the history and values of their new countries. And some European countries still place barriers on 'dual-citizenship'.

Alongside these policies, some governments have also taken active steps to tackle separation at the level of communities. The last Labour government in Britain pursued a policy of promoting community cohesion, for example. The aim was to use the levers of the state to tackle segregation, nurture interaction and, in the process, generate commonality. Policies included, for example, the reduction of funding for single ethnicity organisations and promotion of the English language by funding translation services (even removing foreign language newspapers from public libraries). In some towns of the UK, very active steps have been taken to promote mixing within the education system and in housing.

Diversity as a natural evolution

The second approach can be referred to as the 'adaptationist' perspective. From this stance, proponents see diversity as a natural and continuing evolution within modern societies and place trust in the ability of communities and individuals to adapt to increased diversity given time. 'Adaptationists' point to the desirable qualities of diverse areas as hubs of tolerance and cultural mixing, and argue that people in diverse areas naturally learn the skills necessary to navigate a complex cultural mix. As such,

"It may also be the case that diversity is not the real negative influence or the source of real concern, but is a proxy for other frustrations regarding broader structural, economic and social conditions not directly related to migration and diversity."

diversity becomes normalised and people are able to socialise successfully.

'Adaptationists' argue that proactive policies aimed at promoting cultural integration can run the risk of hardening cultural differences and are an inefficient intervention. Rather than focusing on policies, adaptationists see the passage of time as a better alternative. They point to the reality that the greatest concerns about migration or cultural diversity arise in areas that remain largely homogenous and where long-standing residents have experienced only very small-scale inward migration. It may also be the case that diversity is not the real negative influence or the source of real concern, but is a proxy for other frustrations regarding broader structural, economic and social conditions not directly related to migration and diversity.

Adaptationists also argue that far from posing a distinctive threat to the stability of communities or to social cohesion, newcomers tend to be more resilient, self-sufficient and entrepreneurial. Therefore they are more likely to reinvigorate otherwise decaying societies. They also argue that segregation arises as a consequence of the sense of vulnerability in otherwise hostile environments (people will of course seek out their own if others are unwelcoming).

Rather than designing policies that commit individuals to the development of deep social bonds within their local neighbourhoods, people should be encouraged and enabled to be more adaptable, mobile and open, so they can build relationships in and beyond the localities of their daily lives. With such support, adaptationists believe that people will be more able to adapt to diversity over time.

In contrast, policies aimed at specific groups are more likely to cause division because targeted groups simply end up feeling victimised. As a result they may be more likely to withdraw or less willing to participate in a 'mainstream' that sees them as suspect, again seeking refuge among those with whom they feel greater cultural affinity. At a more practical level, placing the pursuit of commonality into a separate 'community cohesion' or 'migrant integration' frame is by definition counterproductive as it becomes an exercise in targeting rather than one which genuinely unifies. Similarly, labelling people exclusively according to their migration status, nationality or race box inhibits rather than aids conviviality as it stresses what separates rather than what unites.

Experiences of diverse communities that appear really successful show that processes of socialisation which evolve through time are likely to be far more effective than programmes which explicitly set out to promote cultural integration. Government policy is by definition top-down and therefore lacks legitimacy at the level of communities, making it badly placed as an agent for building

bridges between people. Moreover, Government policy is too divorced from the reality of daily routines, everyday preoccupations and the dynamics of how meaningful relationships are formed.

Moving targets

It is also clear that there is a need to find a more constructive and edifying approach to discussions about the benefits and challenges of diversity, of phenomena such as migration that contribute to diversity and of policy approaches that seek to promote positive outcomes and mitigate against the downsides. Above all is the desirability within these discussions of recognising the power, potential and reality of cultural integration in today's Europe and elsewhere. If the present perspectives regularly find themselves in a cycle of polemic and rebuttal, they run the risk of being caught in the politics of policy whilst forgetting about the people that these policies serve.

So, the future-proofing of policy around cultural integration requires that we take more open and grounded approaches to understanding the dynamics of diverse societies and a more creative way of mobilising these insights to inform policies. Any policy that emerges to address issues of cultural integration that puts the onus and responsibility on one particular social group, or one part of the dynamic, fails to address questions of community and integration in their complexity. Understanding the dynamics of local neighbourhoods requires real clarity about social

relations and interactions in place and time.

To add to that point, we also believe that policies that fail to distinguish the subtleties and complexities that are emerging in an evolving social fabric of European societies will not provide an accurate enough tool to assess either the journey towards or any perceived destination of cultural integration. Crude measures such as responding yes or no to a question of national belonging does not adequately reflect people's cocktail identities.

Europe needs to develop a narrative that is more likely to support policies and interventions that sustain and better reflect the lived reality of people in their everyday lives.

A starting point is to identify and accept a set of assumptions and principles that are consistent with and supportive of both the journey and the destination of cultural integration. Recognising assumptions about the permanence of culturally diverse communities that face both exciting and enriched opportunities, and also the challenges for settled coexistence, we should assume that modernity is characterised by continuous and accelerating change, replacing sets of static contexts with a fluid and dynamic reality that demands continuous adjustments by people, governments and other agencies.

Focus on 'future-proofing'

More controversially, we should assume that, generally, people welcome cultural diversity, recognise its potentials and want it to work. This would mean accepting the ine-

vitable imperfections rather than discarding the whole package out of hand because of the difficulties and costs. We should replace looking backwards towards some nostalgic presentation of loss and stability, with a sense of tomorrow and a focus on forecasting and 'future-proofing'. Importantly, given the comments above, a new approach should actively incorporate the learning from both the interventionist and the adaptationist perspectives, but do so by identifying the limitations of both approaches.

In addition, we would challenge that notion that one size can fit all. At the same time, we would propose one key lesson, which is that locality matters. And that more extended and continuous study of the lived experience of all types of change in neighbourhoods of varying degrees of homogeneity and diversity are necessary; understanding drivers and responses for change, and recognising the point at which change may become seen as a threat, rather than progress. This approach will help tailor policies to community needs.

Analysing current challenges means we can better anticipate challenges that may occur in the future and recast cultural integration as a centrepiece rather than the after-thought or consequence of change. Thinking through the unintended consequences of intervention and non-intervention, and thinking about changes that may or may not occur in the future, may require

"More extended and continuous study of the lived experience of all types of change in neighbourhoods of varying degrees of homogeneity and diversity are necessary."

more insight and time, but may be worth it.

The biggest challenge of all seems to be the re-casting of cultural integration as both a process and a centrepiece rather than the after-thought or consequence of change. Cultural relations can be an input to contemporary living, rather than a good or bad consequence. Developing a national or even regional policy on migration because the movement of people creates difficulties for cultural integration, either immediately or downstream, seems to be entirely the wrong way and probably futile; working hard to help people to cope with change while working also to mitigate the pace and scope of change where possible, and consistent with broader national and regional policies, offers a less divisive and potentially more enabling approach.

So where do these principles and assumptions point policy-makers, and where must our thoughts turn to find our alternative way?

Fear of the other

Peoples' 'fear of the other' that is so powerfully associated with diversity can be helped by actively seeking to reduce and remove the role that diversity, per se, takes as the proxy for the other real and structural concerns about economic and social conditions and distribution. We can move the assessment and analysis to a longer-term perspective, and create a greater symmetry between the time-profile of policy and that of societal trends. Within this, developing a better un-

derstanding of local change, and its contribution to prejudice formation, is critical.

The agenda will reflect some new imperatives, but will move on, we trust, from the polemic and rebuttal we observe in the current debates. We have to recognise that cultural diversity is here to stay as a characteristic of our everyday lives, but we should acknowledge that the notion of a cultural integration may be more of a coping strategy than an end state.

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More participation, more interaction

The argument that participation improves citizenship and encourages integration is not new. Indeed, it is one of the premises of studies on immigration and culture. But what is new are attempts by academics to link cultural participation and citizenship. Culture is a strategic good, in that it increases the capacity of citizens to manage change and therefore to govern themselves. This strategic role justifies public investment in culture.

By Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Culture is perhaps one of the communication channels among citizens that has been little explored, despite being a fundamental policy for accommodating diversity. In times of financial crisis and growing economic differences among people, there may be diminished policy interest in socializing immigrant-related diversity into public culture. This context can even be an argument for justifying the need to promote culture economically, basically seen as a public expense after years of economic crisis. In this article, I would like to examine culture as a public investment in enhancing citizenship, especially when social circumstances increase the risk of losing social rights, of fostering social exclusion of immigrants and, in a nutshell, of devaluating citizenship.

The interest in studying cultural citizenship within diversity contexts arises from the emergent debate regarding the best policy strategy to accommodate diversity. It is also derived from the perennial concern of ensuring the principle of equality in a society that tends to have a growing population (such as immigrants and citizens with immigrant backgrounds) with a differentiated set of rights and/or cultural identities (religion, language, cultural practices) and/or markers of difference in relation to the national majority (accent, skin colour, for instance). In this framework of discussion, cultural citizenship also becomes a working category.

When examining the link between citizenship, culture and diversity, culture is initially seen as a channel for citizens' interactions and diversity inclusion, and cultural policy as carrying the function of enhancing citizenship.

Instrument of inclusion

By introducing the focus on citizenship into the cultural policy/diversity nexus, I assume, then, that cultural policy programs foster a notion of citizenship. Two focuses arise within this nexus: first, culture is seen as a distributive good that has to meet the equality principle as a public good; second, culture is seen as identity, and then makes

visible the tension between national identity maintenance and building with complex identities in contexts of diversity.

Considerations of cultural citizenship often revolve around the relationship between citizens and the institutions that give access to culture. This is why the debate on governance is growing. The basic premise orienting these emerging discussions is that, behind cultural policy programs, there is always an assumed conception of citizenship. The production of citizenship has appeared on the agenda of cultural policy only recently, with the seminal work by R. Rosaldo (1999), who used it to describe citizens' initiatives to promote cultural spaces in areas of poverty and alienation. It has also been used in a very fundamental way by others, highlighting the debates on democracy and identity that it entails.

Approaches to cultural policy

From a theoretical background, this research program is produced at the intersection of three ways of approaching cultural policies. From the point of view of citizenship studies, cultural policy basically means a policy of national identity and citizenship acquisition (naturalization). From the perspective of cultural studies, cultural policy essentially means the promotion and planning of artistic and creative activities. Finally, in terms of diversity studies, cultural policy designates the cultural integration of immigrants (with democratic values, common language, intercultural relations and civic norms). In this case, cultural citizenship may be seen as an effective mechanism to strengthen democratic values and national foundations. Here, we see how cultural citizenship transcends the sphere of traditional

cultural rights, as we enter into the realm of what we could call 'cultural competencies', in which states grant specific cultural rights based on collective history and contemporary policy. Most use the cultural capital approach when conceptualizing cultural citizenship. The social capital literature is already known and extensive, but that based on cultural capital is perhaps less well-known. There are, in fact, some studies pointing at the role that cultural capital may play in the construction of cultural citizenship, and some that even examine the relation between social and cultural capital, premised on the hypothesis that cultural capital can influence social capital. In a broad sense, this debate revolves around the consumption of cultural goods and services. Cultural capital is linked to Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus, namely "the provisioning of taste" or "consumption of specific cultural forms that mark people as members of specific classes". The Canadian social scientist Sharon Jeannotte, for instance, employs Bourdieu's categorization of cultural capital to distinguish three basic elements:

1) Embodied capital (or habitus), the system of lasting dispositions that form an individual's character and guides his or her actions and tastes;
2) Objectified capital, the means of cultural expression, such as painting, writing, and dance, that are symbolically transmissible to others, and
3) Institutionalized capital, the academic qualifications that establish the value of the holder of a given qualification.

We can maintain from this cultural capital field of research that there is a real need to build a grammar of cultural citizenship when culture meets citizenship and citizen-

ship meets culture, but also when diversity meets culture and citizenship. I will try to clarify myself within this literature, and to highlight analytically the semantic space where we can build this grammar. This research program is at the intersection of these three studies, and it interrelates their components in a particular way. Citizenship is the end to reach, and yet we will speak about framing, approaching, promoting citizenship. Culture is the means to reach citizenship, and with this will be considered as a channel for enhancing citizenship. Finally, diversity will be considered as a framework of interaction among people from different origins.

A strategic concept

In such an interdependent system, I would also like to combine a bottom-up (cultural social practices) and a top-down (cultural policies and programs) approach to culture. This basically means, from a theoretical point of view, that I am interested in analysing the ways policy administrations and civil society manages interactions between citizenship, culture and diversity. It is from this background that I approach the concept of 'cultural citizenship' and I see it as becoming a strategic concept.

What this ultimately means is that 'cul-

> "Culture is the means to reach citizenship, and with this will be considered as a channel for enhancing citizenship. Finally, diversity will be considered as a framework of interaction among people from different origins."

tural citizenship' is used politically for particular aims and one that also functions as a means to reach these aims. Following Stanley's views, culture is a strategic good, in that it increases the capacity of citizens to manage change and therefore to govern themselves. It is this strategic role that justifies governmental investment in culture. We are basically stressing the importance of cultural promotion and planning in the making of citizenship; or even, two conceptions of cultural citizenship, we are seeking to bridge citizenship with diversity, while stressing the centrality of culture for an adequate understanding of citizenship. When we link citizenship with culture, we want to pay attention to the appropriate means to develop citizenship. 'Cultural citizenship', then, refers to the use of appropriate cultural resources to foster citizenship.

We can articulate a concept of cultural citizenship as implying that culture can become a way of increasing the participation of immigrants and interactions in the whole of society. And it may even become a way of changing citizenship regimes. However, we must say that cultural citizenship should not become a means of pretending inclusion in a community when in fact immigrants and their descendants are excluded from political and social citizenship. Cultural citizenship may be regarded as a means of reaching the aim of acquiring other citizenship statuses, and it is in this way that we want to focus on it as a tool for inclusion.

The meaning of inclusion here points to the promotion of immigrants' participation in cultural practices – whether directly, through specific cultural mediators, or through existing networks in civil society (e.g., through neighbourhood associations, retailers, sports, etc.). It is broadly defined as a set of activities for making and using

cultural products, goods, and processes that enhance citizenship.

Participation enhances citizenship

This argument that participation enhances citizenship and promotes inclusion in diversity contexts is not new and belongs indeed to one of the starting premises in immigration and cultural studies. What is innovative is the line of research that tries to link cultural participation and citizenship. Initially begun as a quantitative concern for measuring citizenship participation in cultural activities, there has been very little qualitative research conducted on the topic. A promising line of research explores culture as a channel for political participation. It wonders if cultural participation is a basic building block of cultural citizenship or if it is a way to measure it. Participation is, then, considered as a means toward citizenship.

Other scholars explore artists' interests in engaging with the cultures of their community, thereby shaping and contributing to the cultures in which they live. Most consider that this participation is a recognized right in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it establishes "a right to participate in the cultural life of the community as a basic human right". Here, problems arise within the debate regarding how to map cultural participation, in terms of measuring access to cultural activities. Initially, participation was thought about in terms of modes of consumption and the use of cultural goods and activities. Some scholars suggest there are three categories of participation: creators, audiences and managers. Participation thus involves the creative and the productive, access and audience, and processes of management and decision-ma-

king. Finally, we can mention the seminal work linking diversity and cultural policy produced by UK-based Australian academic Tony Bennett *(Cultural policy and cultural diversity: mapping the policy domain, 2011)* when he states that "four principles are of paramount importance in developing such a revised vocabulary of citizenship."

The first of these consists of the entitlement to equal opportunity to participate in the full range of activities that constitute the field of culture in the society in question. Second is the entitlement of all members of society to be provided with the cultural means of functioning effectively within that society without being required to change their cultural allegiances, affiliations or identities. The third relates to the obligation of governments and other authorities to nurture the sources of diversity through imaginative mechanisms, arrived at through consultation, for sustaining and developing the different cultures that are active within the populations for which they are responsible. And finally, the fourth concerns the obligation, for the promotion of diversity, to try to establish ongoing interactions between differentiated cultures, rather than their development as separated enclaves, as the best means of transforming the ground on which cultural identities are formed in ways that will favour a continuing dynamic for diversity.

"The meaning of inclusion here points to the promotion of immigrants' participation in cultural practices – whether directly, through specific cultural mediators, or through existing networks in civil society."

Culture as a channel

The basic descriptive definition of cultural citizenship depends upon considering 'culture' as a channel for framing, approaching, and promoting citizenship. We are particularly invested in situating this concept in contexts of diversity, and in considering cultural policy as a way to accommodate diversity. The argument I want to put forward, and that will help me to structure the interpretative framework, is that we consider not one, but three conceptions of cultural citizenship, according to each democratic citizenship tradition.

We can consider each tradition as an ideal type that somehow overlaps in reality (in the concluding remarks I will suggest its potential applicability for analysing case studies in the future). Each tradition will offer a different answer, according to the four citizenship standards. Of course, we can imagine each tradition as drawing a certain model of society, but we will consider them analytically, and not as independent bases of societies.

Being rights-based, a liberal cultural policy seeking to make cultural citizenship will mainly focus on ensuring equality of access to all cultural goods distributed by authorities. Equality is thus understood in terms of distribution and access.

Being identity-based, a communitarian cultural policy will focus on constructing a collective, shared public identity in making cultural citizens. It understands this collective public identity either in national terms or in terms of other public entities such as local or neighbourhood ones.

A republican tradition is focused on seeking citizen involvement in the making of society, from a cultural point of view, so it will develop participatory and creative capa-

cities for making citizenship. A republican cultural citizenship will try to be involved in cultural planning and production.

The liberal tradition will basically seek to promote the consumption of cultural citizenship. This means that a cultural citizen is a spectator of culture, and it is this consumption of cultural productions that need to be promoted. For instance, a liberal concern would include the lack of participation of nationals or immigrants in museums or theatres, and thus use of cultural offerings is considered an indicator of success. According to my understanding, what matters to a liberal are not only rights of access, but also the willingness of consumers and the types of choices offered. This is primarily because we are treating culture as a public good that is distributed by the administration. A liberal cultural citizen is not simply one who does not break the rules, but one who moreover uses the public goods that are distributed. The use of cultural goods is performed, however, not through involvement in creative activity, but only through viewing and consumption. Balancing supply and demand of cultural productions is what drives the promotion of cultural citizenship.

A cultural policy seeking to promote communitarian cultural citizenship will mainly focus on national identity and tradition, on cultural heritage, and on insuring citizens' feelings of collective belonging. It understands democratization of culture in terms of providing a shared, common identity through cultural rights. At this point, we can, of course, follow a strict communitarian understanding of culture, underlining the clash between national tradition and identity and requests for diversity, or we can take a broader view of culture, including local or neighbourhood identity building, as well. Whatever the approach

to collective identity building, citizens are not mere consumers, but also producers of shared public culture. Regarding their participation in culture, they are not seen merely as spectators, but as community producers.

A cultural policy seeking to promote republican cultural citizenship will mainly focus on ensuring participatory channels for cultural production. It understands democratization of culture in terms of guaranteeing the participatory and creative capacity of citizens. Cultural citizens are basically seen as cultural producers. Creative citizenship supposes an appropriation by people of adequate resources for the creation, production, dissemination and consumption of their own culture. Therefore, we go from the citizen-as-consumer-of-culture to citizens valued for their creative cultural capacity. Citizen participation strengthens the participation of institutions directly or through specific cultural mediators, as well as through the network of existing civil society (e.g. neighbourhood associations, traders, sports, etc.).

To summarize, the liberal tradition sees citizens as cultural consumers, as citizen-spectators (for instance, the liberal concern can be illustrated as "how many immigrants go to the museums in comparison to national consumers?"); meanwhile the communitarian tradition regards citizens as cultural players, as participatory citizens (for instance, the communitarian concern can be stated as "how many immigrants participate in the organisation of festivities and/or take part in the collective cultural events of their neighbourhood?", which promotes their sense of belonging to their community, and community cohesion); and the republican democratic tradition of citizens promotes immigrants as cultural producers, as creative and participatory citizens (for instance,

"how are immigrant artists promoted?" or even "how is culture channelling and mobilizing immigrant protests? Let's say through music, painting, and so on).

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The need for a just mobility regime EU mobility is already in public discourse and increasingly being politicized in most EU countries, for different reasons and expectations. But what Europe really needs is a culture of mobility. *By Ricard Zapata-Barrero*

The free movement of people is one of the four basic principles of the European Union and the most essential pillar of EU citizenship. Already in existence in the late 1960s, free movement was established as a principle underlying EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and has become one of the most striking symbols for European integration and the formation of a common European identity. In addition, it is surely one of the most paradigmatic examples of the successful interplay of the economical, social and political dimensions of the EU.

The development of a European identity and the fortification of emotional bonds in other European countries at individual level can lead to a higher acceptance of pro-European politics at national and supranational level. However, this view of European citizenship as an opportunity for both nation state and citizens is far from being shared by all EU Member States. EU citizenship constitutes one of the clearest illustrations of both the achievements and limitations of EU integration processes. It undoubtedly constitutes an achievement because it is, worldwide, a unique case of supranational citizenship. On the other hand, however, it still presents major limitations, especially due to the fact that some of the rights guaranteed by EU laws are yet not fully secured by actual national

or local practices.

This remaining unsteady situation can hinder or even prevent the free movement of people within Member States. It is therefore not a surprise that, even if the freedom to look for a job throughout the whole EU is one of the fundamental freedoms of the single market, regional workforce mobility within the EU is still relatively low in comparison to other geographic areas, such as in the US. In line with what was stated in the European Commission EU Citizenship Reports, we are convinced that EU citizens must "enjoy their rights in their daily lives, without being confronted with unnecessary obstacles". EU citizens are free movers by definition. EU citizenship is unthinkable if free movement is hindered and vice versa.

Discussions dominated by fear

In fact, there is disagreement about the question as to whether the free movement of people within the EU borders should be seen as a burden or risk, rather than as an opportunity. In a nutshell, the free movement of workers and high in-mobility have

been two of the main goals of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty (1992). But today, when mobility rates are rising and more and more young people especially have benefited and still benefit from free movement, the political discussion in both the sending and receiving countries is dominated by possible disadvantages and threats (and fears) with regard to this mobility (brain drain vs. brain circulation; the fear of long-lasting economic imbalances between sending and receiving regions; the fear of foreign infiltration in the receiving countries, etc.).

The assumption of existing tensions regarding the free movement of workers is illustrated by various Eurobarometer studies, which surveyed individual perceptions about being mobile and about gains and losses of in-mobility for the respective nation states. While the majority of the domestic population in most EU countries, for instance, disagree with the opinion that mobility is beneficial from an economic and cultural viewpoint (see *Awareness of Home Affairs,* Eurobarometer 2012), most Europeans (60 percent) think that people moving within the EU is a good thing for European integration (Special Eurobarometer 2010: 72).

In addition, 29 percent of EU citizens think that increased mobility is a bad thing for families. More than one-fifth perceived increased mobility as problematic for the domestic labour market. A second hint that mobility is not solely perceived as an opportunity but also as a risk can be seen in the fact that 34 percent of EU citizens think the

chances of finding a job abroad are actually better than the chances of finding a job in their own country, but only 17 percent envisage working abroad at some time in the future (Special Eurobarometer 2010).

We are fully aware that the opportunities/risks of EU mobility depend on the country's perspective, since we assume the interpretation will not be the same in the country of reception as in the country of origin. For instance, a greater scale of departures may result in fundamental disturbances in social structures. If sending countries such as Poland and Spain – to give two different examples – do not experience return migration on a large scale, then long-term emigration will have the greatest impact on the economic, demographic and social situation of the sending states. The increasing fears, however, cannot solely be traced back to too much immigration from other EU countries, but are also driven by a rise in third-country migration.

Triangular mobility scheme

In the EU there is an emerging triangular mobility scheme between, roughly put, North, South and East-Central Europe. These three mobility trends can be characterized as the main sources of the aforementioned dissonance between and within the respective EU Member States since the beginning of the millennium.

a) From South to North: The migration of primarily young workers and

qualified people from the southwest Member States of the European Union (Italy, Spain and Portugal, for instance) to the northwest ones (Belgium, Germany, the UK and Sweden) over the course of the economic crisis between 2008 until today.

b) From East to South and from East to North: The continued migration from post-socialist countries from East-Central European Member States (Hungary, Poland, Romania) to the northern and southwest ones since 2004 and 2007. For instance, concentrating our attention on the northwest states of the EU as destinations excludes the bulk of Romanian migration (or mobility) to/within the EU. There are signs of a recent increase in mobility towards Germany, France and the UK, but Italy and Spain continue to be the main destination of large-scale migration.

It becomes clear that there is an emerging field of new EU mobility studies. EU mobility is already in public discourse and increasingly being politicized in most EU countries, for different reasons and expectations. Almost all EU countries are confronted with different constellations of opportunities, threats and risks, and thus interpret the new migratory trend(s) differently and react by formulating different social and policy measures. EU mobility was an important new issue in the last election campaign of the European Parliament in May 2014. The recent decision of Switzerland to restrict entry for EU citizens and the fact that Germany and the UK are restricting certain rights to EU migrants and inviting them to abandon the country if they are unemployed are the latest illustrations that

EU mobility is definitively at the centre of EU concerns. There is a need for a policy formulation and political discourse that, instead of seeing mobility as an asset, expresses it as a burden, as David Cameron has indicated in most of his speeches over recent years.

However, it is important to highlight that different actors within the respective countries may have different views on EU mobility. Thus, negative attitudes towards EU migrants, as reflected in the decision of the Swiss people, may not be shared by employers or qualified people who work within international networks, for instance. We could also add the tourism industry, international traders, organizers of fairs, universities, and in general all the stakeholders who are interested in the increased mobility of people.

In some cases, restricting mobility has even been discussed on EU ethnic grounds, as has been the case with Roma in Germany, Italy, France and Spain coming from different EU countries (Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, among others). With these different treatments and policies, are we demarcating first and second-class EU citizens, depending on whether people can move without restrictions or not? Indeed, the need to give a policy answer to these emerging new mobility trends has been on the EU agenda as a pending task since Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of Member States. The work on *Harnessing European Labour Mobility,* published

in April 2014, is here of great interest as it offers different scenarios.

In summary, a new triangular mobility scheme or post-2004 mobility regimes are underway, are reframing European societies, and are forcing the rethinking of the EU's fabric and of the ideals of EU citizenship. There is currently not a shared view of whether current EU mobility must be considered as an indicator of crisis (as a barrier or as an opportunity), which marks a new phase in comparison to past mobility experiences. At this moment, instead of being seen as an opportunity and a chance to diminish economic tensions from sending countries, sometimes mobility is seen as a barrier and a risk for people, as a loss of human resources (brain drain), or as an additional threat (of lower-class EU migrants) for receiving countries. This fact also needs to be reassessed from an overall EU point of view.

The intensified EU mobility has taken place amidst intensified currents of global South-North migration. Much of the new (national) governance of new mobility has been initiated by this latter process – and not simply as a response to the 'outflow' from 'the East'. EU migrants are even hierarchized, and Eastern Europeans are still more welcomed, relative to many 'visible minorities' from elsewhere (apart from Roma, who seem to be unwelcome everywhere). However, this is again relative, since in Italy, for instance, polls consistently place Romanians and Albanians at the top of the list of unwelcome aliens.

These mobility trends are, in this histo-rical moment, the basis of a difficult puzzle that prevents a common EU perception of mobility, as an advantage or a disadvantage, a blessing or a curse, an opportunity or a risk. The original common welfare market and labour system would say that increased mobility of EU citizens could strengthen the economical and political pillar of the EU integration process, but in fact there are three potential interpretative perspectives that frame the tension. The first is the ideal of the EU as a debordering space of free market and personal movement, as a union of European states. The second is the current EU mobility regime, with three different mobility areas (North, South, East) expressing different trends and perceptions. The third is concentrated on the nation state governmental level, which in most cases restricts this mobility, together with the EU level of governance.

The need for a just mobility regime

It is within this current EU mobility dynamics that I want to defend the need to discuss a culture of mobility and a just mobility regime. I introduce two new categories that have not been previously defined, but which frame the normative debate we would like to promote. Both are connected with the democratic mobility category that has not been conceptually explored. It takes into account the role of migrant networks and transnational ties.

This culture of mobility might be linked to the "culture of migration", in the sense

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of the American anthropologist Jeffrey H. Cohen and the London-based Professor of Transnational Studies, Ibrahim Sirkeci. In their book *Cultures of Migration: The Global Nature of Contemporary Mobility*, they describe cultural beliefs and social patterns that influence people to move. The culture-of-migration argument, simply put, is that migration is a learned social behaviour; people learn to migrate, and they learn to desire to migrate.

There is then a need to develop an integrated European mobility theory for EU migrants, including a just mobility regime in Europe, which should elaborate a code of ethics for Member States to regulate how they respond to mobility tensions. We are aware that the difficulty will lie in determining whose perspective should count towards the creation of a just mobility regime. From a state perspective, things look very different than from a migrant perspective – or from an EU one, for that matter. We can consider two levels of analysis: a vertical one between Member States and EU institutions, as well as between Member States and the EU migrants, and a horizontal one involving inter-EU member relations.

I call for some common criteria to be established to avoid regulatory competition for EU migrants. Unfair competition is taking place that favours de-capitalization

in the economic, social, and cultural codes of the sending countries. Classic examples of this mobility dumping are favourable tax policies (as in Denmark) for highly skilled workers, creating complex dynamics of tax competition, and the public call for Spanish nurses by Germany. This trend can have negative impacts on the development of the welfare state and on the economies of other Member States to foster economies of expertise at the expense of the rest. Also, it can hinder the survival of EU citizenship as a distinctive EU category. There is also the notion of sharing responsibilities and solidarity among Member States, which means that there should be a true sharing of the responsibility for hosting EU migrants.

Common criteria

To summarize, what this new EU mobility age is showing us is that there is a new gap between demographic dynamics, on the one hand, and processes, structures and institutions on the other that are reacting to national interests instead of EU ones. For instance, Spain is becoming an interesting country in that it is still attracting immigrants (the 'poorest' ones) but losing their own citizens (the 'best ones', 'the youngest and most educated ones'!). The same is true for Poland, which has shifted from typically emigrating to other EU Member States to simultaneously stimulating immigration from Ukraine and others.

These are good examples of similar scenarios in different parts of Europe. Thus,

we need to rethink the impact of mobility regimes inside Europe. All these reflections have to be channelled through European citizenship, and the concept of a culture of mobility, and ethical arguments have to be considered to produce a just mobility regime.

EU migrants constitute a fundamental demographic and economic resource for countries when they arrive. The current unbalance in the job markets and opportunities between the different Member States and the asymmetry of the young job seekers' mobility flows within the EU could constitute a potential cause of tension, recalling the long-standing brain drain debate. This issue, strictly connected with so-called 'ethical recruitment', is widely discussed. Even if this debate is often based on simplistic assumptions that do not take into account the individuals' motivations and rights, as well as the factors that 'push' people to move, it seems fundamental to think deeply about such issues. Moreover, young migrants and the special needs relating to their mobility are often absent in migration and labour policy discourses.

There is then a need to generate an ethical code of conduct for Member States towards other Member States and towards EU citizens. The proposed code of ethics

would try to give answers to tensions and concerns about mobility and to regulate State policies towards EU migrants and the other EU Member States, helping to rethink the intra-diplomatic relations on these issues within the Union. The way that the EU and its Member States respond to these new patterns of EU mobility and its effects will certainly determine the EU's political future. It is therefore essential to spread non-discrimination principles towards all EU migrants, to develop policies to dismantle all administrative obstacles to the exercise of EU citizens' rights, and to dissolve all tensions and concerns relating to the free movement of young people within the EU labour market. Only in this way can a 'just mobility regime' be achieved – both politically and economically – within the EU's territory.

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A delicate balancing act Radicalized youth are seen targeting Jewish schools, synagogues, and notoriously, turning their backs on Europe altogether by joining Islamist fighters in Syria and Iraq. The formation of overly distinct religious groups within Europe's largely secular societies is a symptom of failed integration policies. Above all, schools need to increase knowledge of other cultures and develop the abilities needed to build peaceful dialogue between cultures. *By Hela Khamarou*

A few years ago, I was asked how culture could act as a facilitator for uniting Europeans. This fundamental question had me ending up questioning the meaning of what it means to be 'European'. How does a simple word connect Croatia, the newest member of the European Union, with one of its founding members?

Today, the real question is no longer what unites disparate parts of Europe but how, inside one country, cultural differences are creating a political, economic and social fault line between host countries and second or third generations of immigrants. The lack of dialogue between the former and the latter is now palpable and concrete and is an issue that must be addressed.

This situation did not arise overnight, or even in the space of three years. It has

been lying dormant, waiting for the right moment to burst onto the scene. It seems to me that this predicament, particularly in France, has arisen out of our particular understanding of what constitutes cultural differences and out of our need to celebrate these differences. First and foremost, culture as a vector for bringing people together presupposes education. For diversity to be a statement it requires a solid education, or rather, a constructive, comprehensive method in which the dominant culture deals with the Other. I believe this is where we have gone astray. At first glance, it may seem a little odd to point out the shortcomings of French culture, but this can be justified by taking a look at French history and the country's current post-modern education system.

France's failure to recognize and embrace diversity does not mean that the country is not diverse. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Throughout history, its leaders, institutions and education system have always stressed unity over diversity. For a country formed by wars, enemy invasions (as during the Hundred Years War) and indigenous endeavours to plant their own flag on fo-

reign territories (such as Algeria), this might have seemed necessary. It could be argued that French culture is a product of attempts to maintain its own identity in the face of others while also imposing it on others.

Culture may be an artificial construct but this does not make it any less real. French culture as a baseline for social unity is first and foremost shaped around the French language. French was the litmus test of social and institutional unity and a means of promoting it, so it had to be protected against invading institutions and languages, and it was imposed upon those who were invaded by France. The 1539 Ordinance de Villers-Cotterêts, signed into law by Francis I, instates French as the state language. The main aim of this was to ensure French took over from Latin in official documents, but inevitably it also had an impact on the immense diversity of dialects used in many regions of France. In other words, the stipulation created a political framework that rejected diversity. The French Revolution entrenched this particular concept of national unity still further.

The Constitutional Council established under the French Fifth Republic on 4 October 1958 views the people as a single, homogeneous entity. Today, what are often referred to in the media as 'invisible minorities' have had absolutely no legal value in France since the French Revolution.

The problem is not that France never faced diversity, but rather that the country dealt with it by neglecting the issue. France can be seen as a microcosm of European diversity. France is diverse by dint of the dif-

ferent climates of the territories it possessed and possesses, the seas it bordered and borders, its cuisine, its multifarious traditions and customs, landscapes and peoples. France has succeeded in maintaining its national unity for a long time, despite this diversity.

Recently, however, an added dimension has begun to complicate this delicate balance. From the start of the post World War II era, and increasingly since the end of the Cold War, Europe has struggled to find a lasting solution to the problem of political refugees and economic immigration. Integrating all these newcomers into society has proven to be problematic. Many of them find themselves relegated to the margins of society.

Globalization has changed the rules of the game

The advent of globalization, an economic force first and foremost, adds another dimension to the issue. How do we integrate all the disparate cultures of refugees and immigrants who come seeking a better life in Europe? Newcomers are confronted not only with the 'indigenous' inhabitants of this new country, but also with other groups of newcomers, some of whom may have been their enemies in their home countries. An example of this is the Kurdish and Turkish groups in Germany. In Europe – and in France – peaceful coexistence is a prerequisite. And this is where the magic is failing to happen.

French and European media abound with articles pointing out the perceived

problem represented by Islam. Post 9/11, the sons and daughters of immigrants have felt stigmatized and, in response, have often turned to communitarianism rather than integrating into what German academics have dubbed the (national) *Leitkultur*. Radicalized youth are seen targeting Jewish schools, synagogues, and notoriously, turning their backs on Europe altogether by joining Islamist fighters in Syria and Iraq. Communitarianism is not the right response to the very real problem of discrimination based on race or religious identity. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing factors. The more Muslim youngsters feel that their and their parents' very real efforts to integrate have been in vain and assume the external trappings of their communities, the more indigenous, nationalist, indeed extremist groups will stress that their 'otherness' is irreconcilable with the national consensus culture. The formation of overly distinct religious groups within Europe's largely secular societies is a symptom of failed integration policies. They are not a solution to the particular woes of immigrants. Indeed, the opposite could be true.

So how do we escape from this dangerous catch-22? It is vital to acknowledge the cultural diversity that exists, while at the same time identifying communalities that may provide a basis for progress. During the Enlightenment, intellectuals were the first to acknowledge the existence of countries with

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different cultures and civilizations, which they deemed to be of equal importance to the Roman, Greek and other classical civilizations. For the first time, Europe acknowledged the Islamic, Chinese, Indian and Japanese cultures, whose arts, religion and knowledge were at least as ancient as Europe's. In the 18th century, France played a major role in this acknowledgment. During the Age of Reason, thinkers went a step further by defending the idea that progress could be made through three components: dialogue, law and trade.

However, these timid advances were short-lived when people started differentiating between societies, calling some 'barbaric' or 'savage', denying the idea of a common humanity. What followed was colonization and imperialism under the false pretext of a mission to bring 'civilization', which flouted the most fundamental rights of the subjugated peoples.

The Romantic movement, specifically in its German political emanation, called for a critique of the Enlightenment by cultivating the mystical and displaying an exotic fascination with other civilizations, particularly those considered to be barbaric, less educated or civilized, but more importantly, unique and utterly separate. They declared that the world was pluralistic, consisting of distinct cultures – organic entities that were closed to the outside world, fundamentally unable to communicate with each other and essentially in an indefinite state of war. This sentiment was at the root of the nationalistic movements of the 19th century and still resonates today in what is called the clash

of civilizations. The theories of the Enlightenment and Romanticism were never reconciled, rendering it extremely difficult for civilizations to create a cultural dialogue to confront the issue of 'otherness'. In order to do this, we need to draw two essential lessons from the past. Firstly, we need more intercultural dialogue and knowledge. In a globalized world, we have to challenge ourselves and reach out to each other. It is a difficult path, but as Europeans we should not limit ourselves to only knowing our own European origins and history. We should also aim to understand foreign cultures (here I use 'culture' as a generic word comprising faith, arts, science, customs, traditions, institutions, etc.). Our knowledge has hitherto been bound by our political frontiers. We tend not to look beyond the borders of our nations or perceived cultural spheres. And if we do, it is not with a neutral glance, but though a mirror distorted by fear of the unknown or economic interests.

No culture holds all the knowledge and secrets of humanity. Therefore we need to make an effort to understand, learn and accept other cultures. As such, we also need to preserve our history and that of other civilizations. When a country is being robbed of its artwork and artifacts during wars, we all need to come together as one to fight the evil and regain these treasures, as they are all pieces in our puzzle. For instance, the National Museum of Iraq was sacked in 2003 shortly after the beginning of the US-led invasion. This is a disaster not only for Iraqis but also for the whole world. This museum had a collection of artifacts from Mesopota-

mia, the 'cradle of civilization'. This is why the work done by UNESCO is fundamental to preserving our heritage and keeping our inheritance alive for generations to come.

A fragile combination

Secondly, we must never abandon the idea of social progress and development. This may seem to fly in the face of the first lesson referred to above, but it is a fragile combination of the two that might solve Europe's problem. There is no questioning the fact that if we insist on the diversity of cultures, we tend to disregard social progress; the basic human rights such as respect for life, freedom, equality and property. To give precedence to 'otherness' over these universal rights risks strengthening communitarianism, endangering a fundamental baseline and the social progress first articulated by the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Cultural diversity should not be allowed to undermine this great achievement.

A precarious balance must be struck between acknowledging diversity and insisting on fundamental human rights. Promoting diversity cannot be allowed to jeopardize the latter. Finding the right equilibrium between the two is the central challenge of our time.

In my view, the call for more diversity and fanning the flames of communitarianism not only threatens Europe but also every country within the European Union. Arguably, in the case of France we are partially responsible for this situation. We

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have mistaken integration for assimilation. The discourse of 'assimilation', as used by the French far right blames immigrants for "stealing jobs that belong to French citizens" and demands of them a wholesale denial of personal and cultural identity in favour of a very hard-to-define national consensus. The technical and biological meaning of the word 'assimilation' is the process whereby the body assimilates food, with the gastric juices transforming and totally dissolving nutrients into the organism. For immigrants to 'assimilate' into a country, they are totally deprived of their culture of origin. Yet no country was asked to assimilate during the formation of the European Union as an economic, political and cultural construct. Rather, the European project acknowledges and cherishes each country's cultural differences, while adopting common laws and institutions.

To take myself as an example, I am French by birth, but both my parents are Iraqi. I feel strongly attached to the classical education that I enjoyed, but I am also in tune with the Arab world. As a woman, my vision of the Arab world is distinct in that my educators have focused on the role

of women throughout Iraq's many wars, from emancipation to subjugation. As an Arab, my identity is complex. I belong to the Christian Chaldean minority. Yet, I am not a believer per se. That said, beyond my personal sphere I never thought of myself in these terms until the outside world forced me to do so. In the public arena, as a French citizen, I have been asked more times than I care to recount whether I am a Muslim. Some of my multiple identities should stay in the private realm. The world we live in tends to force faith and distinctness into the public realm.

It is paramount that we do not succumb to fear, nor reinforce communitarianism, which jeopardizes our common human rights. Secularism is the key to striking the right balance in that it relegates one's personal identities to the personal sphere, while treating individuals as equal in the public sphere. Refugees and immigrants have the right to maintain their identities, while signing on to Rousseau's social contract. To become a French citizen, it is not necessary to assimilate, but merely to respect the political contract, regardless of personal beliefs and customs. The expression of cultural differences should not be translated into individual behaviour and public policy in the host society.

I believe I have depicted a rather dark future for Europe. But I have also tried to point out an avenue towards a better understanding of integration through acknowledging otherness. This involves a massive effort, which needs to start in schools. In France, schooling used to be a stepping stone to a

successful career and everyone was on the same level. Today, school is failing to help students climb the ladder in society. Under the Third Republic, France had to integrate a different type of 'foreigner': Bretons, Alsatians, and other communities from remote rural parts of France that were far removed from the political establishment in the capital. By the 1950s, this integration was deemed a success. In today's globalized world France needs to integrate complete strangers; people who do not share the same traditions and values. Some people are calling for the country's borders to be closed. The education system is no longer the great equalizer that it once was.

Over the past 30 years, education has shifted from teaching the fundamentals of reading, writing and arithmetic towards empowering children and furthering their well-being. This may perhaps be viewed as a good thing, but schools are still falling short in terms of increasing knowledge of other cultures and developing the abilities needed to build peaceful dialogue between cultures based on a shared set of principles. Let us rethink our education system in order to build a stronger Europe.

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Europe, a continent of immigration

Europe, a continent of immigration Anti-Islam demonstrations in Germany, a resurgent Front National in France - the Right is enjoying a certain amount of success in Europe, perhaps because there is an ever-widening gap between winners and losers and a growing number of people who feel socially and societally disenfranchised. How can Europe move on from the economic crisis to create an inclusive immigration policy and a new European narrative that encompasses migrants? *By Isabel Schäfer*

Recent decades have seen a steady growth in migration to Europe and in mobility within the continent. It has been largely overlooked that, during this time, the majority of immigrants in the EU (including Germany) have come from other EU Member States and not from other regions of the world such as those dominated by Islam. We are familiar with the dark realities of the restrictive and, to some extent, inhuman European policies towards immigrants from the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. And, while it was hardly surprising that the political upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011 should spark a new wave of migration, the fact is often overlooked that the majority of refugees actually stayed in the region. It was neighbouring countries that bore the brunt of the movement of immigrants looking to escape from the civil wars in Libya and Syria. In reality, very few refugees have actually come to Europe.

And yet there is a new and growing wave of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment spreading across Europe. This new, increasingly negative image of Islam is being fostered not only by reports of atrocities being committed by the Islamic State (IS) in Syria, but also by the election victories achieved by Islamist parties following the Arab Spring. It is being advanced by images of disintegrating states amongst Europe's southern neighbours (such as Libya, Yemen and Syria) and Islamist-inspired international terrorism, which now poses a new threat to Europe in the shape of radicalized individuals returning from Syria.

Europe's foreign policy responses to these latest developments among its southern neighbours testify to a new sense of realism that has in part resulted in growing demands for the militarization and 'securitization' of European foreign and security policies.

These developments raise the question: are we simply returning to the same old ways of thinking that were prevalent after 9/11 and during the war on terror? Authoritarian regimes in the Arab world that have either returned or indeed never fell are using the (supposed) Islamist threat to justify resuming or maintaining their repressive policies. Me-

anwhile, European governments are using the same apparent threat to justify restrictions on immigration from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, the ongoing securitization of migration policies (Frontex), the expansion of security measures throughout Europe and on its borders, increases in military expenditure and the ongoing delivery of weapons to authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia.

A return to the old ways

The very real danger posed by a small number of radicalized Islamists, Salafists or jihadists is not in dispute, but it should not be grounds for a disproportionate response. Would it not be better to provide constructive support to Europe's southern neighbours while they are struggling with their processes of transition? Or indeed to put our relations with the existing and post-Arab Spring regimes on a brand new footing and recognize these countries' cultural, geographical, political and economic proximity to Europe and the interconnectedness that exists between the two regions? This would mean adopting a more constructive approach aimed at identifying the common interests that exist between European societies and those of North Africa and the Middle East, rather than pursuing a restrictive, anti-Islamic, neorealist security discourse.

However, this is not necessarily easy at a time when Europe has some major problems of its own. The growth of right-wing populism and the spread of right-wing conservative materialism have resulted in the rest of the political spectrum succumbing to a kind of cultural pessimism and a fear of the spectre of European disintegration, as evidenced by Scotland, Greece and Catalonia. Right now

there appears to be a certain amount of uncertainty in the face of phenomena such as the anti-Islam demonstrations organized by the German PEGIDA movement and of a new intellectual quality of hatred and racism on the part of the New Right that is particularly finding its expression on the Internet and in hate e-mails.

Pro-European voices are becoming fewer and fainter. The recent death of German sociologist Ulrich Beck means that Europe has lost one of its pre-eminent progressive thinkers. Why has it so rarely been possible to portray the EU as a positive narrative, as a "post-national constellation" (Jürgen Habermas) or to sell the idea of a European identity a form of cultural added value that exists in addition to and alongside other local and national identities?

The European project was built on the principle of open societies. This principle must not be eroded as Europe becomes a continent of immigration in the 21st century, especially as it is one of the key indicators of Europe's strength in the world. Fair, properly regulated, legal immigration should not mean only trying to attract the best minds to Europe, but should also involve giving opportunities to the more socially disadvantaged.

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The issue of immigration reflects the status of Europe's own integration and internal cohesion. Setting aside economic integration, mobility and harmonized mobile phone tariffs, which is the social project facing Europe's citizens and decision-makers? Which values and visions are showing Europe the way to a more inclusive identity project than that currently represented by the EU? Do we need a new European narrative and if so, what should this look like? Narratives are more often than not developed by elites and often have little or nothing to do with the day-to-day realities of the average citizen. And whilst these elites are racking their brains, isn't a new European narrative actually being developed and brokered from the bottom up?

Europe's crisis is not only about the economic and financial crisis. It is also a crisis of the legitimacy and credibility of European institutions and the European project as a whole.

Loss of confidence

Certain sections of the European population, including the younger generation, appear to have lost confidence in their political leaders or feel socially disenfranchised. We are particularly witnessing how right-wing populism has benefited from the crisis and how xenophobia in European societies is growing rather than declining.

The forecasts for the European Elections in May 2014 were alarming: it was assumed that one quarter of all seats in the European Parliament would go to right-wing populist candidates. As it happens, the result was not quite so dramatic, but right-wing, EU-critical parties still won 19 percent of the vote (enjoying particular success in France, the UK, Denmark and Austria). Right-wing populist parties stir up anti-European feelings and

sentiments and fan the flames of xenophobia – not just against immigrants from outside Europe, but also against immigrants from other EU Member States. A good example here would be the propaganda and verbal attacks directed at immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania by Germany's conservative CSU party.

There has also been an increase in the number of extreme right-wing acts of violence in southern Member States such as Greece. The reason why the Right might be enjoying a certain amount of success in Europe at the moment is because there is an ever-widening gap between winners and losers and a growing number of people who feel socially and societally disenfranchised – left behind by the relentless drive for modernization and globalization. In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, there are now whole regions that are drifting backwards. The gap between town and country is steadily widening, as is the gap between rich and poor. Meanwhile the middle stratum of society is starting to erode and fear of social exclusion is intensifying.

Increased mobility is a central achievement of European integration and should be viewed positively. We are now seeing a new generation of young people for whom it is quite normal to study three months in one place, work six months in another and then complete a 12-month postgraduate study course somewhere else completely. In tandem, they are building a network of personal relationships all over the European continent. For this 'Erasmus generation' or 'EasyJet generation' or, more accurately, the children of the first Erasmus generation, (also called 'new Europeans' by the European Commission), having a European identity is quite normal. This young generation is mobile, well-educated, multi-lingual and at home anywhere in Europe. However, in spite of the democratization

of the education system and more opportunities to travel, they still constitute an elite. In this generation, there are still plenty of young people who have never left their own neighbourhood, let alone spent a holiday in another European country.

It should also be noted that increased mobility is not necessarily always voluntary or desired. Many young Europeans (from Spain and Poland, for example) travel to other EU Member States in pursuit of study and training opportunities or to increase their chances of finding work. Given a choice, many of them would prefer to stay at home. There are also many young bi-national European couples, whose professional and personal plans fail to work out. Some of these real-life European projects are derailed by the administrative, personal and professional hurdles that they face.

The credibility of the EU must be called into question if governments encourage the process of Europeanization at societal level while falling back on traditional nation-state thinking and reasoning as soon as a crisis looms. The Spanish and Greek economic crises resulted in a kind of North-South conflict within Europe itself, as exemplified by Germany and Greece. Arguments raged about issues such as the harmonization of working hours, minimum wages, retirement age and education systems.

This raises the question of why, if there is a call for harmonization in these particular areas, the same does not apply to other policy areas, such as the banking system. Why, for example, should there be integrated markets within the EU but not integrated pan-European social policies? More regulation is required in this respect, but the EU's two key Member States, France and Germany, hold very different views on this matter. It is not enough to simply rescue the euro. In light of

the development of global markets, the EU should at least focus on introducing minimum standards into all European countries.

Europe is not an island. The future of Europe will also depend on what happens in neighbouring countries. The crisis in Southern Europe is predominantly economic and financial, while the crisis in the Southern Mediterranean is more about politics and security, although there are socio-economic problems as well. The Mediterranean region is, of course, extremely diverse. And yet, from 2011 onwards, protest movements sprang up almost simultaneously all around the region, from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya, Spain, Israel, Turkey and Greece. Even though the causes and specifics of the various countries' complaints might have been very different, the types of protests were very similar and included a number of common factors, such as the use of social media to organize the protests.

Since 2008/2009, trade relations between Southern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean region have been in decline as a result of the economic and financial crisis. The Southern European countries have been importing fewer goods from North Africa (including energy, consumer goods, textiles and food), which has only served to deepen the crisis in the Arab countries. The various political upheavals in the region have also disrupted production, which in turn has resulted in a drop in exports to the EU (with the exception of Israel and Turkey).

The security situation in some North African countries has also led to a drop in tourism, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, and this has also fuelled the crisis. This has, however, had a positive effect on tourism in Southern Europe. Many holidaymakers who might have gone to Tunisia or Egypt opted to take their holidays in countries such as the

Canary Islands, Spain, Greece and Cyprus instead. The crises in the two regions have been interlinked, but to the benefit of the Southern European economies. Southern European investments in North Africa have also declined significantly, partly due to the recession in Southern Europe and party due to the political upheavals in North Africa. Direct investment in Southern Europe by third parties has also declined, despite the drop in prices and wages.

When it comes to the aid given by the EU and EU Member States to Arab countries, we have seen the introduction of some new programmes and budget lines, but the total aid provided to the Southern Mediterranean region by Southern European EU Member States has fallen and some existing projects have had to be stopped or suspended for security reasons.

One thing is clear: the economic crisis has had a significant impact on migration. Many North African migrants in Southern Europe lost their jobs because of the recession (as happened in Spain) and some were forced to return to their home countries, which in turn increased the risk of potential conflict in North Africa. Another consequence is that the pull factor for migration has shifted, with many North African migrants now looking to move to countries in Northern Europe rather than Southern Europe. However, the widely-

"What has been largely overlooked in the heated debates over potential streams of refugees coming to Europe is that the majority of these refugees actually stay in their own region and flee to neighbouring countries (such as Lebanon and Jordan)."

predicted mass migration of people towards Europe as a result of the political upheavals in the MENA region has failed to materialize. A fact that has been largely overlooked in the heated debates over potential streams of refugees coming to Europe is that the majority of these refugees actually stay in their own region and flee to neighbouring countries (such as Lebanon and Jordan).

Added to this is the fact that, before the Arab Spring in 2011, the Arab countries that were in transition consistently held up Spain, Portugal and Greece as role models, because these particular European countries had already successfully moved from authoritarian to democratic regimes, developed thriving economies and gained EU membership. Morocco had long viewed Spain as a positive example for its own development, but this has now changed in the wake of the recession and high levels of youth unemployment that are so prevalent in Southern Europe. Ultimately, the EU and its economic and foreign trade policies must take some of the blame for a socio-economic situation in the MENA region that has become one of the major triggers and push factors for migration into Europe.

The vision of how the European Union might look in the future, both politically and economically, varies widely – not only between generations, political camps, regional and local actors, schools of thought and individuals, but also between Northern and Southern Member States. And yet all Member States are experiencing a general trend towards renationalization in response to the globalization, acceleration and growing complexity of world politics.

There are even some disagreements amongst Northern Europeans over the future of the EU. For example, the UK is against further integration, while Germany is in favour. Meanwhile, France would like to see a

strong EU but is not keen to give up its own foreign and security policies. Southern Europeans are also experiencing some differences of opinion. While Madrid is pursuing policies that are more nationally oriented, Catalonia is a separatist region which also happens to be very EU oriented. Italy under Berlusconi tended to be generally anti-EU and in favour of acting independently, and in Greece anti-EU sentiment has grown rather than declined on account of recent austerity measures.

Need for new immigration policies

The various crises within te EU do, however, also present some opportunities. They have prompted internal European discussions on a whole range of issues, from social injustice and redefining the social contract in Europe to vital reforms to the banking system, more equitable trading conditions, fairer wages (minimum wages, minimum standards for employees) and potential post-growth policies (such as the deglobalisation of supply chains). All these issues also serve to highlight the transnational nature of the challenges currently facing Europe.

In light of Europe's ageing population and the lack of skilled employees and employees in general in certain sectors, and given that the population of the Southern Mediterranean region is generally much younger, there should be potential for a win-win situation on both sides of the Mediterranean. Europe needs to start thinking in broader, more global terms, especially when it comes to its neighbours to the East and South. The aim should always be to maintain the principle of open societies. Open societies are not a luxury, but an inherent part of Europe's own identity and history.

Europe needs a new policy on immigration that reflects the realities of the 21st century. This means an EU immigration policy that is non-discriminatory and provides better protection for refugees and people in distress on the seas; a policy that is more humane towards refugees in general and is consistent with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. But the EU also needs to intensify its efforts to promote opportunities for legal immigration. At the end of the day, there needs to a common European narrative that goes beyond the basic principle of 'Unity in Diversity'. For a long time, it was the United States and Australia that were seen as examples of successful modern immigration states. Superficially at least, these two countries demonstrated that they were capable of assimilating immigrants – irrespective of their national, religious or ethnic backgrounds – into their melting pot. They then used superordinate patriotic symbols and universal references and discourses to create social communities in which every immigrant enjoys the same opportunities and rights. Although some ethnic groups of US citizens, such as African-Americans and Latin Americans, still face racism and discrimination despite multiculturalism, post-colonialism and the 'politics of identity and difference', there is no evidence to suggest that they feel any less a part of America as a nation.

A legitimate criticism of this melting pot integration strategy is that the original intention was to promote integration through cultural assimilation, which is to say the mixing of different cultures and values to create a common, integrated national culture. The aim was to create a kind of homogenous national culture that would engender a strong communal spirit rather than the respectful coexistence and cooperation of the different traditions and religions of the immigrant groups.

Another alternative is a system in which cultures are not coalesced but where each group lives in their own separate culture. Examples of this include the 'salad bowl' concept or the 'multicultural mosaic' in Canada, which is based on the principle of promoting specific cultural practices and languages. The Canadian model of pluricultural coexistence firmly embraces the principles of equal opportunity and tolerance towards cultural differences. Ignoring the fact that there have been some conceptual and practical shortcomings in implementing the different systems, it would be fair to say that the USA, Australia and Canada have been successful over the centuries in accepting people with different religions, cultures and traditions from around the world and assimilating them into essentially democratic societies.

It could be argued that when it comes to education and culture, Australia and the United States have had education systems that for years now have been much better developed than their European equivalents, especially with regard to early childhood, primary and secondary school education. From a very young age, children are taught cultural tolerance and how to deal with cultural differences and cultural diversity on a social level, so that it becomes a natural part of everyday life. The concept of community is actively promoted and put into practice. German educational institutions still lag behind and often leave very young children and the school generation to fend for themselves when it comes to dealing with questions of identity and numerous new social, multicultural, pluricultural and intercultural issues. While the cultural and social coexistence of people with different migration backgrounds is no longer unusual, national identities, clichés and prejudices still exist and genuine cultural exchange can often be very limited, despite people's best intentions. We also lack an inclusive European transnational concept of society that might be able to provide a philosophical superstructure upon which to build the foundations of new educational concepts of a similar nature. The shortcomings that exist within Europe are reflected in our dealings with the outside world and especially in our relations with the Mediterranean region.

We should be thinking of this as a common space and not as a border. There is also a pressing need to rethink and redefine Euro-Mediterranean relations in terms of shared prosperity (trade policies), sustainability, mobility, good neighbourliness, relationships of equals, cooperation at a civil society level, a more balanced distribution of power between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and a new vision for a long-term EU strategy aimed at integration and inclusion of the Mediterranean region in general. If this fails to happen, the socio-economic situation in the Southern Mediterranean region is likely to get worse, with the potential for more social unrest and more migration into Europe.

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The need for holistic policies

Integration means being part of society. It also means that people have fair and equal access to education, gainful employment, social security systems and healthcare. Integration can only work if it represents a mutual process of adaptation and adjustment between immigrants and their host societies and puts duties, responsibilities and respect at the forefront of any value system, including the country's legal system.

By Bernd Hemingway, Lisa Wortmeier and Florian Forster

There has never been a time when human mobility has played a more significant role than in today's society. There are currently some one billion migrants worldwide and of these, more than 232 million are international migrants, representing approximately three percent of the global population. Migration is and will continue to be a hugely significant trend during the 21st century – and the potential impact of mobility on our economic systems, societies and cultures cannot be ignored. At the International Organization for Migration IOM) we believe migration as inevitable as a result of a number of demographic trends and other key factors in our globalized world.

We also view migration as something that is both positive and desirable. Migration is vital for socio-economic development and growth, and it is especially important to Europe on account of the current challenges being posed by demographic change. Migrants make an important contribution to economic innovation, use many local services, consume local goods and pay into tax, social security and pension systems. There is no doubt that migration also poses certain challenges and risks – not only to host countries and societies, but also to the migrants themselves. For this reason, IOM believes that good migration management is needed to ensure that migration is of positive benefit to all concerned – migrants, host countries and countries of origin alike. Effective migration management should involve everything from labour migration and refugee policy to the fight against human smuggling and trafficking and the relationship between migration and development. The integration of immigrants into the society of their host country is a key component of any comprehensive migration management system. Immigration and integration policies should therefore always be thought of as being totally interdependent.

The issue of integration is currently a matter of regular political and public debate. Indeed, there are very few topics that attract quite so much public interest these days. Having said that, the potential impact of policy-making on migration and integration issues on the future of our society is still often underestimated. Today we live in societies that are characterized by a cultural diversity that is a direct consequence of the migration trends we have witnessed over recent decades. However, this growing diversity is often perceived as a threat to the social cohesion of these societies.

In many places, integration policies have proven to be inadequate, with generations of immigrants in some European countries continuing to live without any real sense of integration. What is needed is a broader public debate on migration and integration that involves all the actors who have a stake in this issue and that seeks to find innovative approaches aimed at creating more effective integration policies.

Integration is a complex process that naturally poses challenges to individuals, societies and governments alike. It forces everyone to deal with some sensitive issues. Migration is a process of change for everyone involved – for the migrants starting a new life in a country and culture that may be alien to them, and for the host countries that experience increased cultural diversity. The growing trend towards greater heterogeneity and cultural diversity in today's society poses a number of fundamental questions: How does a society deal with this kind of change? How can we raise the level of acceptance of immigrants and refugees among the general population? How do immigrants perceive their experiences in their new country and what is their attitude towards their new home? How can cultural diversity and cultural differences be used for the benefit of the migrants themselves, their country of origin and the host country?

"Migration is vital for socio-economic development and growth, and it is especially important to Europe on account of the current challenges being posed by demographic change."

It is essential that integration policies recognize the importance of these particular issues to modern societies. Integration is essential for all concerned in order to guarantee not just economic and cultural benefits, but also the stability and security of the societies involved. The aim of integration policies should be to give migrants the opportunity to realize their personal, economic and social potential, to reduce the alienation and marginalization experienced by many immigrants and to contribute to the social coherence and harmony of society.

Unilateral calls to assimilate

When it comes to integration, immigrants are often subjected to unilateral calls to assimilate. The willingness of immigrants to integrate is often equated with full adaptation to the ways of the majority population and there is a corresponding lack of discussion about the willingness of the host country to accept and recognize the immigrants. It should be stressed that integration 'into' society does not really exist, so there is a need for a broader understanding of the term integration that includes all people and groups within a particular society and is not simply limited to immigrants and specific religious and cultural issues. Integration can only really work if it represents a mutual process of adaptation and adjustment between immigrants and their host societies and puts duties, responsibilities and respect at the forefront of any value system, including the country's legal system.

Successful integration is in part down to the sense of personal responsibility felt by immigrants and their willingness to actively make an effort to fit into society and to recognize that their new country is in fact their home now. But at the same time, there is also a need for open societies that will actively welcome and

recognize new people both for their potential and their differences. What is needed is an integration policy that not only helps immigrants to integrate into society but which also promotes openness and acceptance on the part of the host country. These days, the question of integration is often discussed primarily in connection with the issue of Islam. The attack on the Charlie Hebdo editorial team in Paris in January 2015 brought the discussions on the integration of Muslims in many European countries back to the forefront of many people's attention. Hostility towards Islam and Muslims in general, a fear of being 'overrun by foreigners' and the 'Islamization of Europe' have all started to spread within certain sectors of society. There has also been a noticeable rise in the expression of xenophobic sentiments in many European countries.

The current debate on the Islamization of Europe is a good example of the often distorted perceptions that many people have when it comes to migration. More often than not, these perceptions are not a true reflection of reality and many prejudices and preconceptions have simply grown out of incorrect information. An infographic that recently appeared in *The Economist* underlines this fact and shows that the percentage of Muslims in the population in various European countries is grossly over-estimated on a regular basis. In an Ipsos-Mori survey carried out in 2014, German respondents estimated the number of Muslims in the country to be around 20 percent of the population, whereas the actual figure is in fact only 6 percent. The French believe that Muslims make up 30 percent of the population, whereas in reality they only make up 8 percent. When people focus on the cultural and religious differences between immigrants and the prevailing culture in the host country, immigration can often be perceived as a danger and an atmosphere of fear, discrimination and potential

violence can quickly develop between various immigrant groups and society in general.

A negative image of Muslims and Islam and a hostile attitude towards foreigners in general can naturally have a negative impact on the process of integrating immigrants. In order to develop effective integration policies, it is essential that we find ways of addressing and combating this kind of racist thinking, wherever it may surface. It is important not only to counter these sorts of prejudices and preconceptions, but also to underline the positive benefits that immigration can have. Governments, civil society actors and the media all have to play their part in promoting tolerance and mutual respect.

In addition to fears over the Islamization of Europe, many people have a number of misconceptions when it comes to the costs of migration. The current debate over so-called 'poverty migration' out of Eastern Europe, which is commonly perceived to be a burden on the social systems of European countries, only serves to highlight the fears felt by the general population. Campaigns such as IOM's "It is amazing what migrants bring" serve to highlight how easy it is to counter the widespread belief that immigrants cost their host countries a lot of money. This global campaign stresses the positive aspects of migration and demonstrates the many ways in which immigrants enrich societies and contribute to economic, social and cultural progress. By presenting concrete facts and data on various aspects of migration, the aim is to counter the widespread misunderstandings, misconceptions and negative perceptions that many people hold. Europe needs to revise and modernize its attitude towards migration and immigrants. What is needed is a culture of welcome that not only recognizes and nurtures the potential of new immigrants, but also accepts that immigration is in the best interests of both Germany and Europe as a whole. In order to obtain the necessary support for migration, it

is essential to ensure that the debate on immigration and integration focuses primarily on the positive effects of migration, including the necessity for an ageing Europe to take in new migrants, the need to maintain international competitiveness and the important contribution that immigrants make to economic development and prosperity. It is also important to emphasize the fact that integration is not just down to the authorities, but also requires individuals to play their part in helping to integrate new arrivals into their communities.

It is also important for politicians to take the question of integration as a cross-sectoral issue much more seriously than they have in the past. Integration policies should not simply be the remit of ministries of the interior – there needs to be a greater awareness of the fact that integration has a potential impact on a whole number of different areas of policy-making. Issues such as equal opportunities, education, the labour market and employment, health, social cohesion and national security, not to mention the relationship between migration, development policy and regional development, all have a significant role to play in developing integration policies. This means that there will need to be more productive cooperation between the various ministries and government actors at both federal and state level.

Integration means being a real part of so-

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ciety. It also means that people have fair and equal access to education, gainful employment, social security systems and healthcare. There is no doubt that knowledge of the local language has a vital role to play when it comes to integration and is essential if people wish to play a full and active part in a country's society. Learning the local language is therefore an important first step in the process of integration. However, policies aimed at promoting integration should not be limited to encouraging immigrants to learn the language, but should also actively support efforts to integrate them into working life or the education system. Education and vocational training is not only the key to helping people successfully integrate into the labour market, but also to helping them actively participate in social life and culture. It is the key to social advancement.

In Germany, academic success is to a large extent dependent on the professional qualifications and social status of a student's parents. Compared to other countries, the German education system is not particularly good at compensating for educational disadvantages. This is something which particularly affects people with a migrant background on account of their social status. The fact that there is a much higher percentage of early school leavers amongst immigrants can be a problem, as these young people run the risk of finding themselves permanently excluded from key areas of life. They may become marginalized and end up looking for alternatives within their own ethnic communities, which in turn increases the risk of radicalization. Education therefore has a key role to play in helping to prevent radicalization. It is essential for the importance of integration to be recognized within the education system in order to create more equality of opportunity and to help avoid the risk of radicalization.

It is generally agreed that integration into the labour market is essential for those seeking

to fully participate in society, and yet this is an area where inequality is particularly apparent. Creating equal opportunities in the labour market and combating discrimination and exploitation must therefore be another central plank of integration policies. One issue that urgently needs to be addressed in labour market policies is the recognition of professional qualifications obtained abroad. It is important to take active steps to prevent people from simply falling into the welfare net. The aim of measures taken in this area must be to encourage and support immigrants to use their abilities to play an active role in society. It should be possible to prepare migrants for their new life before they arrive in their target country by providing them with information on job opportunities, recognition of qualifications, the social, legal and education systems and even language courses.

It is also important to involve immigrants in shaping the culture and society of both Germany and Europe as a whole. This will require new thinking and some innovative approaches aimed at a participation and inclusion. It will also necessitate a values-based society and a culture that is both constantly self-renewing and open to accepting and working with new influences. Not simply the coexistence of closed-off subcommunities that do not communicate with each other, but a society built on dialogue and exchange. This means giving due consideration and respect to others rather than falling back on confrontation and polarization.

A billion-dollar industry for people smugglers

Another key issue in the current debate over European migration is the lack of adequate policies for dealing with the refugee question. The shortage of opportunities to migrate legal-ly into Europe is forcing many people into the hands of smugglers. People who are actually in genuine need of protection often end up travelling to Europe via illegal channels in order to submit an application for asylum so that they can be officially recognized as vulnerable or as refugees. Figures recently published by the European Commission suggest that 276,000 migrants travelled across the Mediterranean to Europe in the space of one year, representing a billion-dollar industry for human smugglers. This kind of smuggling endangers the migrants themselves and also serves to convince many sections of the population that the system is being overrun and that control has been lost.

For this reason, we need more official resettlement channels being to bring refugees and genuine humanitarian cases to Germany and Europe, along with the creation of more opportunities for legal labour migration. The common European policy on asylum and refugees has lagged behind its own expectations and there is now an urgent need to share responsibility when it comes to accepting refugees within the EU. This must include giving due consideration to the strengths and needs of the migrants. The joint responsibility of EU Member States must not simply mean a bureaucratic division but be based on finding appropriate solutions for the individuals concerned.

Any effective European refugee policy must also include active measures to be taken against the human smugglers, not only within the EU itself, but also in the transit countries and countries of origin in cooperation with the appropriate partner countries. Preventing the original causes of flight and forced migration and improving the local situation in the areas around conflict regions should also be considered an essential part of any migration policy.

When it comes to the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, the principle should be to start the process of integration as soon as possi-ble, even if it is not clear whether the person will be staying permanently. Statistics show that the majority of asylum seekers and refugees who are granted tolerated stay status do in fact remain in Germany in the long-term. It is important, therefore, for the integration process to encourage active participation in society, even during the period when the asylum seekers status is still being assessed. Integration policies should not boil down to a simple question of security – although one of the aims of integration should indeed be to maintain security and stability within societies. The conflict in Syria has resulted in warnings about European Islamists returning home after fighting in the Syrian civil war. The radicalization of individuals does indeed present a potential danger that needs to be taken seriously. However, this should not result in all people with a migrant background coming under general suspicion. Mechanisms need to be put in place to recognize the radicalization of individuals and to ensure that radicalized young people are not allowed to present a danger to their fellow citizens. This will require cooperation and exchange of information between security services and those responsible for integration policy.

We need better cooperation between security services, integration specialists, social actors (such as local actors involved in education, social and youth work, as well as politics) and the immigrants themselves. Any networks that have direct access to the various communities should try to promote mutual exchange and understanding amongst the immigrants and the security forces. Social cohesion and a culture of caring can lead to positive social control and help to identify radicalized individuals early with a view to intervening. Preventive measures are also important and need to be promoted and encouraged in a more targeted way, including involving the security services.

The issues surrounding integration and mi-gration policies cannot be simply addressed through a special programme, but are the ongoing responsibility of both the state and civil society. What are needed are coherent, holistic migration policies. The cooperation between the various actors involved is often inadequate and the different aspects of migration and integration policies are often viewed as separate issues. If we are to achieve better integration in the 21st century there is a pressing need for greater effort and more innovative approaches.

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The power of the media

Society imagines itself with the help of the media, because the media allow everyone to participate in public debate and observe each other. The news media tend to focus on political problems relating to immigration and asylum policies, while entertainment formats take a more integrative approach. Despite all the criticism, they at least provide many migrants with a platform for artistic expression, which they use to excellent effect. *By Anne Grüne*

In early 2015, civil society had to go out onto the streets of some of Germany's biggest cities in order to fight for more open, cosmopolitan attitudes. This revealed the fact that Germany's immigrant society does not always enjoy the support of enlightened communities. Instead, the xenophobic and Islamophobic slogans of citizens' movements such as the Dresden-based Pegida alliance and a German politican's struggle with a particular phrase about whether Islam belongs to Germany are evidence of a regressive understanding of culture and a lack of engagement with current images of the self and others.

This is not just the case in Germany, but in the whole of Europe, where there is a clear and worrying tendency towards right-wing populism and neo-nationalism becoming socially and politically acceptable. So why doesn't Europe foster a general culture of welcome towards refugees, immigrants and asylum-seekers, at a time when most of Europe's citizens are enjoying more prosperity than for many a year, despite the financial crisis? Why are even elements of the middle classes so prejudiced against migrants, despite the fact that they so rarely come into contact with them? Why is there still so much to do in terms of integrating migrants, and why do they still have to face the constant hurdles imposed by the host societies' lack of recognition and a self-image that is dominated by the idea of Leitkultur?

Integration and recognition may simply be easier if they continue to demand more of 'others' than of the 'self'. Collective constructs of identity then offer a suitable template for blaming social problems on 'others'. For as long as minorities do not share the real-life experiences of the majority, the power of interpretation remains largely with the providers of the guiding images

and stories: the media. So the media has a major role to play in the search for integration channels in a multicultural society. Academics have also become increasingly aware of the connection between the media and integration, resulting in a large number of studies on this topic. However, to date these studies have neglected the diversity of the media themselves. They are not just political, but also a part of pop culture. Entertainment is no less relevant than information. The fictional worlds of television, films and books are perhaps just as suited to influencing our ideas about a multicultural reality and in this way helping or hindering integration – such as via the route of perpetuating or shattering existing stereotypes and prejudices about 'others'.

The media's power to interpret

One of the media's tasks is to bring opinions and images to the public domain and create a space for public debate which includes both minorities and majorities. We could say that society imagines itself with the help of the media, because the media allow everyone to participate in public debate and make it possible for groups and members of society to observe each other. But many studies have been carried out that accuse the media in European immigrant societies of

"So why doesn't Europe foster a general culture of welcome towards refugees, immigrants and asylum-seekers, at a time when most of Europe's citizens are enjoying more prosperity than for many a year, despite the financial crisis?"

failing to adequately fulfil this role.

They tend to offer the public a picture of problem-ridden 'others' and a cultural essentialist self. An occasional case of double standards – in which Europe likes to appear as a culturally cemented community in national discourses on integration but in which neighbouring European states are happily stereotyped as 'foreign' in economic and political discourses – is also rarely given a sufficiently self-critical treatment by the media.

A stereotypical and narrow representation can be seen not only in the images of the far-off world where migrants hail from but also in images of the migrants themselves. If we assume that few members of mainstream society have any personal contact with the migrants' home regions going beyond the image portrayed in the media, then it is plausible that this media image has an influence on people's perceptions. But if the media are always portraying this far-off world only in terms of its problems or indeed not at all, this has potentially unimagined long-term consequences for our knowledge of the world. Large swaths of Africa remain a blind spot in the reports of foreign correspondents and the Muslim world is reduced to being the home of terrorism and traditionalism. We know far too little about Muslim lives that go beyond such stereotypes.

Of course the media are not our only sources of knowledge and ideas, but they have played their part in ensuring that our view of the Muslim world is framed more by the fact that women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive and by terrorism in Iraq

and Syria than by the fact that Indonesia has made great strides in introducing democracy or that many academic professions in Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey include large numbers of women. It is then easy to see how such media agendas create crude connections between far-off IS terror and assumptions about an underlying propensity for violence among Muslims in Europe. And the image of immigrants that the European public derive from TV and the press rarely represents the many facets of everyday reality.

The media generally focuses on political problems relating to immigration and asylum policies. In many cases this revolves around conflict scenarios with immigrants (particularly relating to crime and refusal to integrate) and unacceptable cultural practices or backwardness (particularly forced marriages and the oppression of women). Generally there are few comparisons with similar problems in the various subcultures of mainstream society. For example, studies show that, on average, Muslims living in Germany have no greater propensity for political extremism than members of non-Muslim society. Positive aspects of everyday multiculturalism and recognition of migrant ways of working and living are mentioned only rarely. Of course there is the occasional mention, at least in local journalism, of the fact that female migrants can be quite normal neighbours with a wide range of roles, but mainstream media still tend to present them only as victims, perpetrators or commentators on their own culture.

Migrants are seldom presented as equal actors in social issues. Muslim women and

imams are popular guests on talk shows when the discussion is about headscarves and freedom of opinion, but not when it is about financial crises or global warming. Pluralistic self-representation is also rarely seen on political talk shows. The opinion-forming media follow familiar patterns in the way they select people to interview. Perhaps this is linked to the dwindling number of journalists with migrant backgrounds in media institutions (apart from a few prominent exceptions). As a result, migrants have little chance of contributing or bringing their perspective to media production or presentation.

But this does not explain why stereotypes and narrative traditions are so rarely shaken up and adjusted. This is something that applies to all European Member States to a greater or lesser extent. The image of the 'other' in Europe therefore remains fragmentary and diffuse. Social problems tend to be debated by spokespeople for the majority, running counter to the ideal of open dialo-

"Of course the media are not our only sources of knowledge and ideas, but they have played their part in ensuring that our view of the Muslim world is framed more by the fact that women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive and by terrorism in Iraq and Syria than by the fact that Indonesia has made great strides in introducing democracy or that many academic professions in Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey include large numbers of women."

gue within society. The exchange of opinions with minorities is prone to interference.

Europe's mainstream media have been studied in a number of different ways, but the overall tone of the findings remains the same. The relationship between the media in Europe's receiving societies and the non-European immigration community is problematical. In this respect, the media are still to some extent concerned with what has been occupying cultural theorists since the 1970s, namely a turning away from the theoretical indivisibility of cultural and political communities. Cultural systems are seldom homogenous or even temporally stable. It remains at least questionable whether they are coupled to political systems. Certain cultural traditions may be conserved in the memory of large communities, but everyday cultural activity is subject to constant change and hybridisation.

In modern day life, we can use of bits and pieces from different types of lives and orient our work on identity towards changing trends. Indeed, if we are to believe the media elsewhere, we should be constantly improving and reinventing ourselves. However, the tendencies of modernity towards individualisation do not fit so well with national concepts of culture. The parallel desire for multicultural consumerism and monocultural lifestyles remains paradoxical. Official state citizenship does not allow simple conclusions to be drawn about the cultural habitus of individuals and groups. It should long have been recognised that subcultures in different social systems often have more similarities to each other than different sub-

cultures within one society. This also applies to migrant communities, which are equally lacking in homogeneity. They probably find it as difficult as mainstream society to agree on a collective description of identity. But there is still too little awareness of such simple facts. Here, Europe is obviously lacking a clear multicultural self-image.

Pop culture and politics

These observations apply exclusively to European news channels. But it is often forgotten that the media consist of more than just information. Television in particular is largely an entertainment medium; entertainment programmes are watched much more than informational broadcasts. Yet in the discourse on media, immigration and integration the media seems to consist almost exclusively of news and magazines. But like the news, the entertainment sector of the media also provides stories about the world and has the potential to shake up familiar worlds of images with the topics, character depictions and narratives that it presents. But on our quest for ways in which the media can aid integration, we have perhaps strayed too far onto the high road of political culture and forgotten about the people's fairground. It may be that the most successful integrative cultural project currently bears the name 'pop' not 'politics'.

At least it seems that the verdict on the integrative potential of the less politicised section of everyday media should be much milder. This is also linked to the fact that

a cultural demarcation in many areas of pop culture seems unlikely. For example, youth and fan scenes are inspired by global or transcultural trends, which make national cultural essentialism seem pointless. Rap and hip hop are neither German nor Turkish, as is also the case with most of the films shown in mainstream cinemas. Migrants and mainstream society may get their information from different media, as foreign-language media often play an important role for immigrants. But perceived cultural differences often become blurred in the area of entertainment. So, for example, millionaires, superstars, singers and chefs are sought after in every corner of the world and are equally popular with local audiences. Many shows are oriented towards the same concepts, with a similar look and similar music, so they are accessible to audiences all over the world. Why should immigrants from predominantly Muslim societies be supposed to be incompatible with Western culture, when Muslims and non-Muslims alike cheer people on when they are showing off their talents on entertainment shows – imitating Michael Jackson or adapting hip hop songs?

Of course *Arab Idol*, the Arab version of the show, was won by a Palestinian youth whose music is largely unknown in Europe, but he won according to the same principles as Germany's *Supertalente* or France's *Nouvelle Stars*. These similarities in today's pop culture are just one proof of the unsustainability of theoretical assumptions about underlying cultural differences. In the world of entertainment, it is clear that the perceived

synchronicity of political and cultural communities has been broken and that national borders are not an obstacle to the exchange of cultural traditions.

In fact, a glance at their entertainment formats shows that the oft-criticised trash TV of the private broadcasters is often better at depicting integration than the public broadcasters' informational programmes. The Berlin broadsheet *Tagesspiegel* once dubbed Dieter Bohlen's talent show *Deutschland sucht den Superstar* "Migrantenstadl", thus suggesting that it was a talent show for migrants. But this ironic name does not detract from the serious potential for integration offered by these shows.

Despite all the criticism attracted by the commercial, conveyor-belt kind of marketing of would-be celebrities, they at least provide many migrants with a platform for artistic expression, which they use to excellent effect. Almost half of all participants in *Das Supertalent* have a migration background. The candidates receive no obvious special treatment – either positive or negative – because of their migrant status. Here, entertainment provides less homogenous constructions of stable native and mainstream cultures. Everyone has the same chance to subject themselves to the primacy of entertainment, to be publicly celebrated or mocked and to take part in a joint cul-

"Despite all the criticism attracted by the commercial, conveyor-belt kind of marketing of would-be celebrities, they at least provide many migrants with a platform for artistic expression, which they use to excellent effect."

tural project with an Anglo-American flavour. This means that language and origins are less important than the ability to excite the masses with the talent that is sought at the time. Ambitious young entertainers with Italian or Turkish roots sing and dance alongside young hopefuls who have been born and raised in Bavaria or Lower Saxony. Candidates from Pakistan and Potsdam are mocked in equal measure.

Domesticated foreigners?

Of course these examples should not detract from the fact that these entertainment formats still do not allow any recognition of differences. As with Muslim members of the German national football team, the participants can grab the attention with their name, appearance and talent, but their religious identity tends to remain hidden. So entertainment offers a space where migrants can present themselves in a more positive way, but certain facets of their identity, in fact precisely those that are reported negatively in the media, are often hidden and as a result not appreciated.

The participants may be multicultural, but their performances are less so – Arabic music or Asian lyrics generally remain firmly locked away in the drawer marked 'exotic'. So it is questionable whether migrants are actually presented as an enrichment or merely as domesticated foreigners. However, the entertainment shows still provide a space for integration and public recognition that has until now received little attention. It may not

show the whole range of hybrid culture but it may reveal an element that tends towards integration, and allow negative stereotypes to be broken.

Films also possess this potential but they have certainly not exploited it to the full. Hollywood has of course won over a global audience, and in this sense integrated them, but it has also created its own archetypes of victims and perpetrators. All too rarely is it our Arab neighbours who save the world. Quite the opposite in fact: Hollywood has clearly developed a tradition of demonising Arabs and creating an Arabophobe stereotype.

he potential of European films to help integration has also remained largely unexploited, but for other reasons. French cinema, the Danish Dogme movement and German arthouse cinema have certainly produced some successful, socially critical narratives. But these films are generally only discussed in national debates. Language barriers and historical traditions make it difficult for a truly European cinema to emerge. To date, most attempts to provide pan-European media offerings have either failed or are rare phenomena that attract small audiences.

Europe is a desirable haven for refugees and people seeking new lives, and the political framework works together to handle their reception, but integration and recognition continue to be a cultural issue that falls to the individual Member States. Images of the self and others vary in the different national discourse communities, even if the problems of xenophobia and socioeconomic integration issues are structurally similar.

However, the multicultural codes need to be more strongly anchored in national societies and transferred across Europe.

In the sense of a European multicultural reality, news and entertainment formats must make a better contribution to creating a more enlightened public. This does not mean ignoring existing problems, but the advantages and potential of multicultural realities must not be marginalised still further.

The expert debate should realise that integration and recognition are not only political and social projects but also have a cultural dimension, which in turn means that all cultural processes should be studied. In the end, a multicultural society will not only depend on the influence of the media to help or hinder its development. Social and political socialisation factors also play a major role in this respect. However, we should assume that mainstream society's image of foreigners is strongly influenced by the media because of the lack of personal contact with migrants. It is influenced by political news, but also by the entertainment shows that are so often derided.

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Are social media strengthening or loosening bonds?

Social media can be an empowering tool for migrants. It provides greater access to information about the new communities that migrants find themselves in. It can also reduce the social price a migrant pays when he or she leaves their country of origin. But social media will not break down the barriers that separate people from each other – nor will any foreseeable digital communication technology. *By Louis Reynolds*

It is an oft-repeated platitude that social media brings people together; yet in many important ways, it pulls people apart. Since the earliest days of the Internet, techno-optimists have prophesied that digital communications would be a liberating force for mankind, bringing us together as never before, while cynics have predicted a world of artificial relationships and lonely, unfulfilled citizens. As the information age dream of the nineties has become the reality of the early 21st century, we have come to understand that the digital advances which are so radically changing our societies have heralded neither great disaster nor the first steps towards utopia. They have merely been engines of complex change. Social media will not break down the barriers that separate people from each other – nor will any foreseeable digital communication technology. As technologist Howard Rheingold said of the Internet in 1993, "Every new communication technology […] brings people together in new ways and distances them in others. If we are to make good decisions as a society about a powerful new communication medium, we must not fail to look at the human element." The profound influence of social media on this 'human element' is why it is increasingly important in the context of integration.

Social media is in many ways an empowering tool, particularly for new migrants, but the growing role it plays in our lives threatens some of the fundamental dynamics that bring individual citizens together within society – dynamics which sit at the heart of social cohesion. That social media might in some ways threaten particular social networks seems counterintuitive. In order to understand why, it is important first to consider why we bother to talk about integration in the first place.

Commonly, public conversations about integration – both sympathetic and reactive – almost always focus purely on the details of migrant behaviour. These might concern

the extent to which new arrivals learn the native language, whether they assimilate into local communities, or whether they act in accordance with the values of their new home. That we rarely discuss broader aspects of integration is one of the reasons that the discourse in the United Kingdom is so fruitless. Because of the shallowness of this debate, it is quite easy to forget one of the principle reasons why integration is important; the role it plays in social cohesion.

Mutual integration of citizens

Integration, between ethnicities, religious groups, or any other sections of society, is more important than the convenience of sharing a language, or equal access to services. It presents significant economic opportunities for individuals, as Mark Granovetter demonstrated in *The Strength of Weak Ties*, and for society as a whole, as Francis Fukuyama argues in *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. Its social contributions are even more important, sitting at the heart of social cohesion. It is the mutual integration of citizens within society that binds society together. Nationally or locally, the mutual integration of citizens allow us to acknowledge mutual rights and come together effectively for collective aims, underpinning trust in our institutions and political representatives, and ultimately facilitating successful governance where otherwise it would be impossible. At its root, integration concerns all people within a society, because fundamentally it is

what makes it work.

The links that can bind societies together are numerous. Shared language, common culture, ethnicity, religion, political ideology and many factors besides can all form layers of social cohesion. Yet in most developed states, there is no longer – where there ever was – a homogenous ethnic or religious identity to place at the centre of social cohesion. Similarly, a shared political ideology cannot be the basis of social cohesion in a diverse, tolerant modern democracy, beyond the kind of 'overlapping consensus' regarding society's basic principles that John Rawls envisages.

Liberal democracies require, above all, a civic identity which allows dissimilar people to come together as a single cohesive whole. A civic identity is based on something that all members of the state can share in: the local and national institutions that represent us, the services we use, common social norms, customs and laws, our formal obligations, like the welfare state, and our everyday social interactions. Many of these core elements of civic identity depend on a common basis that increasingly seems rather archaic: territory. If our society is bound together by the value of our laws, our rights and responsibilities and our civil society, then it is dependent on the physical space that we inhabit, because it is dependent on the institutions of a modern state. We may not all share the same religion, ethnicity or beliefs, but we all obey a common law and

"Liberal democracies require, above all, a civic identity which allows dissimilar people to come together as a single cohesive whole."

common customs, and recognize certain responsibilities and freedoms, all defined and guaranteed by a shared territory.

All of this – the importance of shared values, physical proximity, territorial sovereignty – can appear dated. For a long time, political commentators and academics have been predicting, anticipating, or relishing the imminent death of the nation state at the hands of internationalism, the emerging 'market state', or the Internet. While a modern liberal democracy depends on geography, the increasingly sophisticated digital communications which underpin our globalized society seem to promise the death of geography, the end of physical space as an important factor in human interactions. Relatively low-cost, instantaneous communications are now widely available. In Europe, around 75 per cent of the population have access to the Internet. Approximately 40 per cent have a presence on social media. This technological change is having a significant effect on the role of physical space in our everyday interactions.

In a multitude of ways, social media can empower individuals across society. It can, for example, be used by governments or third sector organizations to increase political awareness and stimulate voter turnout. Indeed, the specific characteristics of social media make it a particularly useful means through which the hardest-to-reach communities – including recent migrants – can be politically mobilized, as demonstrated by our recent Demos project, *Like, Share, Vote*. Social media is not only a medium through which to sell the establishment.

Beppe Grillo's Movimente 5 Stelle in Italy, initially born out of Beppe Grillo's blog and local activist 'meetups' organised on meetup.com, presents an example of a powerful, diffuse networked movement that could not have emerged without social media.

Social media can be a particularly powerful tool for migrants. It provides greater access to information about the new communities that migrants find themselves in. Even more valuably, it provides informal peer-based networks of information, advice and support. This informal support can take the form of general social knowledge shared within an online community, or access to individuals with the knowledge that a new migrant needs, concerning labour markets, legal requirements or services that a migrant might not otherwise access.

Migrants follow migrants

Social media improves access to social capital, and to the weak social ties that make migration easier. Social capital has always been critical to immigration. Chain migration refers to the cumulative process where migrants from a region follow other migrants from that same region to the same place in their new country. This is because these social ties between migrants provide the social capital that catalyses migration. As a result, migrants follow migrants. In a similar manner, the weak social links formed over social media can increase access to the social capital critical to migration, reducing the threshold for population movement.

Social media can also reduce the social price a migrant pays when he or she leaves their country of origin. Social media represents 'the death of distance', the almost total reduction of the importance of geography in communications. It does not matter if a friend or family member is in the same building as you or across the world. You can still chat to them on Facebook in real time and keep up to date on their daily activities, because Web 2.0 is a de-territorialized space. Digital communications can't replace a face to face chat – yet – but can make it easier for a migrant to maintain strong links with families and friends back in the migrant's country of origin, the loss of which might have discouraged migration.

Online communities

New digital communication tools can help migrants maintain cultural and political links as well as social ones. Armed with social media, new migrants can more easily take part in the political debates of their home countries. Social media has also nurtured the development of a growing body of citizens who maintain transnational identities, where a person might identify with a particular national group without being present in the country or region associated with that identity. In many cases, the situation becomes more complex than having an identity based on transnational social links. People can form online communities which, while not based on strong social bonds with a physical place, are based on a

shared intra-group identification with it. Digital communities need not parallel offline social realities, and often a rigid distinction between online and offline communities can be misleading.

These are just a few of the myriad ways in which social media can bring us together. How is it, then, that it can also pull us apart?

Social media facilitates the establishment and maintenance of social networks, certainly, but it also allows us to be selective in the formation of those bonds. It offers an easy alternative to the formation of bonds based on a new physical space; for example, a new community into which a migrant moves. Social media allows these bonds with friends and family to be maintained without reference to locality or nationality. Yet it is those bonds that follow geography, and therefore local communities and the institutions dependent on physical space, which form the social cohesion holding together the modern liberal state.

Social media could be a barrier to integration, because it can provide migrants with a seductive alternative to forming new bonds within their new society. There is an ever greater ability to maintain a previous network of social links through web 2.0 without the need to form new ones. This is not to suggest that a person cannot have both international and national social links; rather, the pressure to form new links is reduced by the ease of access to old ones. Even when new social links are formed, the nature of social media interaction might encourage new

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migrants to take the path of least resistance – forming new social bonds that build on the existing social network that facilitated migration, rather than bonds that build on the wider social networks of the communities into which they migrate.

The dynamics of social media can passively reinforce this kind of social insularity, for example through the phenomena of the 'filter bubble.' The filter bubble, a coin termed by activist Eli Pariser, refers to the personalization of media consumption facilitated by social media algorithms and sophisticated digital technology. An algorithm – for example, the algorithm which determines what appears on your Facebook feed – makes selective calculations about the kind of content you are presented with, based on a range of factors; where you are, your search history, and what content you have previously like, shared, or viewed. If you engage with a certain type of content, or display certain characteristics, you will be presented with more of the same type of content, and less of any other type. This personalization isolates you from opposing viewpoints and different experiences, while supplying a stream of views you agree with, and material you have previously enjoyed. In this manner, the filter bubble can create ideological, cultural and social silos.

When sophisticated algorithms can surround users with opinions and media content that reinforces their beliefs, and when it is possible to be so selective in our social interactions, it is not difficult to see how social media might pose a challenge to social cohesion. It is also clear why this pro-

blem might be particularly acute for new migrants, who have less access to the geographically-based social networks of other citizens that run along, and thus reinforce, the structure of society.

Migrants have traditionally been described as being 'absent twice'; cut off from their home countries, but facing challenges in integrating into their new communities. Social media certainly makes migrants less absent from home, but it is not clear that it makes them less absent from their new society. As anthropologist Dr Lee Komito has pointed out, migrants have the opportunity to be, 'virtual migrants' rather than 'connected migrants'; "their physical locality can be irrelevant for their identity, as they continue to participate in […] their home community, regardless of where they currently live."

Absent twice in the filter bubble

The potential challenges posed by social media to the integration of new migrants acutely throw into sharp relief the challenges posed to social cohesion in wider society by a technology that so transforms the manner in which we associate. As we socialize more online and less offline, our norms and values are increasingly formed within networks of interest rather than of 'prior acquaintance', of shared opinion rather than necessary, open association. The filter bubble encourages this. Our diverse society is defined by its civic identity and in turn by the extent of its physical territory, neighbourhoods and shared spaces. There are, therefore, credible

reasons to believe that the type of social capital fostered by social media might come to diminish our capacity for tolerance, and undermine social cohesion.

Indeed, it might be doing so already. Social media is only one factor amongst many changing the way we interact. Nevertheless Britons are less likely to feel connected with other Britons than ten years ago, and are more much likely to define their identities in terms of their interests and personal opinions than their nationality. Moreover, the strength of the bonds within interest and opinion-based groups are increasing, while the bonds of nationality and shared culture are declining. Loneliness is also on the rise, with young people the loneliest of all and increasingly so. 'More research is required' is a common refrain, but in the case of social media's influence on society as a whole, it is worrying how little enquiry has accompanied the seismic changes that have taken place. That brings us back to Howard Rheingold. If we want to make good decisions about technology and society, we cannot afford to neglect the human element.

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Stimulating dissonances
In light of the increase in anti-Islam demonstrations and mosque protests in Europe, it is worth thinking back to the concepts of tolerance espoused by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. We should also reflect on the importance of town planning for the peaceful coexistence of different cultures. Any truly open urban environment is full of people who vary widely in terms of financial status, ethnicity, politics, sexual orientation and lifestyle and yet share the same space. *By Richard Sennett*

In the spirit of Ephraim Lessing, most of us would like to believe that it is possible for all the different people who live in Europe to enjoy a life of peaceful coexistence. In light of this, I would like to share some thoughts on the issue of tolerance, as I believe a great deal of nonsense has been spoken on this particular subject. Nonsense in the sense that many people seem to believe tolerance is a peaceful state in which people live together in harmony. In my view, this is an illusion. It is an illusion that coexistence means living your life in a peaceful state. It is more a case of living your life in a state of 'upheaval', not in the sense of unrest or violence, but in the sense that coexisting with people who are different to you may be something of a roller coaster ride. We need to find a way of coming to terms with this

fact and trying to enjoy the ride. Personally, I think we need to start viewing the frictions we might experience with others as a positive rather than always as something negative. This means that we need to think of these potential frictions as something positive that encourages us to think about our own way of life, whatever the disruptions these frictions may cause.

In this article, I would like to focus on one particular aspect of this issue, namely where we might find a space in which people can experience this kind of diversity and all the unpleasant, stimulating, destabilising and uncertain self-perception that goes with it. I believe this kind of space can be created in a particular type of town or city.

At this point, I would like to quote from Immanuel Kant's excellent essay on the subject of peace that he wrote in 1784. In the essay he uses a very insightful expression: "The crooked timber that man is made out of." Any genuinely open urban environment will be full of people who vary widely in terms of their financial status, ethnicity, politics, sexual orientation and lifestyle and yet share the same space. Does this crookedness need to be straightened out? Albert Speer

obviously thought so. He tried to mould the streets, parks, office buildings and houses of German cities, and especially Berlin, into a uniform shape. Today there are other forces at work that contribute to this straightening, including the growing financial inequality that is helping to divide formerly very diverse residential areas from each other. Our towns and cities are becoming more heterogeneous, but not more mixed.

The most popular form of residential area these days is the 'gated community'. This is what people want if they are given the choice. Kant would not be happy if he could see what is happening in today's towns and cities. If we look at the quote in its entirety, what he wrote was: "Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made, nothing entirely straight can be built." If we accept this, then good citizens should accept neighbours who are different to them without attempting to straighten them out. Kant believed that even the most diverse of people could live peacefully together. He was of the view that people could not only live together in a relatively chaotic space with all its corners, side streets and unexpected experiences but also actually enjoy life there. He was committed to the ideal of a society that is capable of living with complexity. Personally, I believe that words such as 'multicultural' and 'inclusive' are now worn-out clichés. I'm starting to wonder whether the right conditions for encounters cannot actually be physically created, whether towns and cities can be designed in such a way that the appropriate spaces are created to encourage encounters.

At this point I would like to give you a short insight into my book *The Open City*, in which I describe what I believe it would take to design such a city. I work on the assumption that a city will always require dividing lines between distinct areas and I generally tend to differentiate between two types of dividing line: borders and boundaries. These are the two fundamental types of dividing line that traditionally develop between different parts of a city.

The open city

The problem that we have today is that we tend to create more boundaries and so create closed spaces. We seem to have forgotten how to create borders. I started to develop these ideas around 15 years ago when I began teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and spent more time in the company of natural scientists. I met some biologists there who suggested that this difference between open borders and closed boundaries exists in nature too – at least under certain circumstances.

Let's take a look at the difference between a cell membrane and a cell wall. A cell membrane selectively allows the exchange of substances between the outside and in-

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side of the cell. The cell wall, on the other hand, retains as much as possible inside the cell; it effectively forms a rigid boundary. The cell membrane is open in a very special way, in as much as it is both permeable and resistant at the same time. When we think of something being open, we tend to think of an open door, which we can simply walk through. However, the concept of the open door cannot be realistically applied to human coexistence. Openness can still mean that tensions exist – the kind of tensions that are apparent in the interplay between permeability and resistance. The cell membrane tries to take in as many nutrients as possible, while at the same time acting to keep what is necessary inside the cell. It is this tension between permeability and resistance that creates openness, not the absence of tension – this is a natural phenomenon.

The tiger's no-go area

In contrast, I'd like to use the territory of the tiger in Asia as an example of a natural boundary. Tigers create boundaries by marking what they see as their territory. This territory then becomes a no-go area, a space that the tiger effectively bans others from entering. The difference here is that the territory is an area of limited activity. So in the natural world, the difference between a border and a boundary is that a border defines an area of high activity between different species, while a boundary defines a dead space. My argument is that this principle can be applied to humans and their activities too.

When you bring people together in different situations, you create life, but when you separate them, you are effectively sentencing the city to a slow death.

I once took a hair-raising helicopter flight over São Paulo and saw a typical example of the kind of boundary often created within cities. On the left hand side of a wall was a favela, on the other side was a very expensive apartment block. Every floor had a swimming pool on the balcony. The swimming pools overlooked the favela and the favela looked up at the swimming pools. When people ask me "How come there's so much violence in São Paulo?" "Why can't the people there get along with each other?" I show them one of the photos I took from the helicopter and this gives them a clear impression of what I mean by the difference between a border and a boundary.

So, how do we create a permeable border like a cell membrane in an urban context? Let me give you an example from the city of Copenhagen. In the old part of the city there is a home for patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease. Many of the residents with Alzheimer's are brought out to visit the local cafés instead of being kept out of sight – this is an example of permeability. This means that there is a permeable relationship between the inside and outside world. It may not always be particularly comfortable for a tourist if you have to sit in a café with three people suffering from advanced stages of Alzheimer's – and I can say this from first-hand experience – but it is reality. The truth lies within.

To round off these examples, I would like

to say something about liminality. These dividing lines that I have described to you are liminal spaces and I would like to briefly refer to the work of William James, one of the world's first major psychologists. At the end of the 19th century, he talked about what he referred to as the spotlight of the consciousness. When we are conscious of something, we shine a spotlight on it and zone those things on the periphery out of the focus of our awareness. According to James, this is the mechanism by which we concentrate on something.

Liminality, on the other hand, is an altogether different state, both psychologically and psychophysically. It is the very definition of peripheral vision. The conical field of vision in the human eye is a 60-degree circle, so a half circle would be 30 degrees. According to James, we naturally focus our view on a central point, but the question urban planners have to ask themselves is what can be seen on the periphery of that particular view. This is about liminality. It is about seeing the bigger picture and not just the centre. This is the basic principle espoused by the English psychologist and paediatrician Donald Woods Winnicott and deals with the way we view things on the periphery.

I believe that it is possible to create spaces in which people can experience a permeable membrane type of life; spaces in which many different types of people are brought together. Wouldn't this result in people integrating? Not necessarily. But it would at least create the kind of physical environment in which people could integrate.

I believe this is really important. Most of the experiences we have in cities are silent ones. I'm not talking about reading out the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights every time we go to buy a piece of cake or a bottle or milk. But people generally remain silent around people who are different to them, even though they are sharing the same physical space. Their experiences of coexistence tend to be of a physical nature, rather than a verbal one. I also believe urban planners have got it wrong, because they should be creating a physical experience in which seeing the way somebody moves, for example, or noticing whether they wear a burka or how they stand next to somebody else can actually lead to learning how to live together, no matter how disturbing that might seem. Ironically, the supporters of the Pegida movement live in an area of Germany with one of the lowest percentages of foreigners. It doesn't really surprise me that these people, who have very little actual contact with Muslims, think that all Muslims are terrorists. The reason for this is that they don't actually live in close contact with any Muslims.

Urban planning needs to be completely rethought. We need to be focusing on precisely these peripheral zones between different urban areas. For example, we should be buil-

"Urban planning needs to be completely rethought.
We need to be focusing on precisely these peripheral zones between different urban areas.
For example, we should be building schools on the edges of communities rather than in the middle of them."

ding schools on the edges of communities rather than in the middle of them. And, as in Copenhagen, we should take people who suffer from that terrible disease into the city, instead of keeping them in isolation. We need to start thinking of these peripheral zones between urban areas as our natural environment. They may not be the most attractive areas, but they are important. I believe this is where urban planning should start.

I would like to quote Kant once again, as he is often held up to support arguments in favour of cosmopolitan behaviour. It is worth remembering that the French word *cosmopolite* was originally used to describe diplomats. They were meant to be able to move easily from place to place, culture to culture, without becoming integrated or a part of them. In the 19th century this idea of mental mobility stood in stark contrast to the idea of physical mobility. In those days, a cosmopolitan person was somebody who could move around a city like one of Baudelaire's flaneurs and observe the various comings and goings from a distance. Cosmopolitans still felt at home no matter how far from home they might be. In the words of the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre, they felt they had a right to the whole city.

The advantage of this kind of attitude is that it stops people living lives full of fantasies about other people, as is the case with the supporters of the Pegida movement. They harbour strange ideas about Muslims for the simple reason that they never actually come into contact with them. My idea of a mixed city basically involves expanding the peripheral zones between areas, rather than creating concentrations of specific communities, so that people can coexist in all areas of the city.

Richard Sennett, American sociologist, was born in 1943 in Chicago, the son of Russian immigrants. He now lectures in sociology and history at New York University and the London School of Economics and Political Science. His main areas of research include the development of cities, the nature of work and cultural sociology. Recent publications: Cooperation: What Keeps Societies Together (Berlin 2012), The Culture of the New Capitalism (Berlin 2005), The Corrosion of Character. The Personal Consequences Of Work In the New Capitalism (Berlin 1998). He is married to the urban sociologist Saskia Sassen.

A resource of hope Sport is a culture, it is a language that helps nations, cities, communities and individuals to communicate. Its popularity makes it a sought-after medium for carrying messages. How can its impact be used as a tool of integration?

By Grant Jarvie and Hector Mackie

Sport is a component of society that can offer respite for individuals and contribute to social cohesion. It can have a positive effect upon communities, it can break down divides between populations, and it can connect individuals across the globe. Sport can play a part in the reconstruction of people and places, reconciliation of relationships, and the resolution of issues and animosities. It can also be the foundations from which other resources of hope can be built in order to realize lasting change.

Within Europe's cultural landscape, sport as a cultural component is regularly overlooked. Other elements that contribute to Europe's rich culture are often given greater priority. For example, the arts, language, and working practices are regularly seen as platforms to create social change and their roles have long been recognized as having an integrative impact upon society.

Surprisingly, even when the role of sport is talked about in the same vein it is overshadowed and often seen as a lesser contributor to European culture and social cohesion. This need not be the case. Those trying to create positive social change may be missing a trick by overlooking the role sport can play in providing a resource which can contribute to social cohesion and positive cultural relations.

A recent contributor to the EUNIC yearbook stated that 'artists do not believe any more than footballers that they can create world peace' or indeed resolve global challenges, but this misses the point. There are a multitude of instances through which art and sport, or even art with sport can provide grounds for optimism. We must realize that numerous platforms can simultaneously play an important role in European cultural relations. Indeed we cannot afford to overlook any aspect of culture and at very least like art, sport creates valuable spaces where a dialogue can occur. The link between sport and issues arising out of changing attitudes and policies towards European immigration and integration is regularly asserted but its potential is less well understood. It is acknowledged that at its worst sport can divide, contribute to racist behavior, and exacerbate ethnic tensions, but at its best it can provide moments of normality around which other resources of hope can be brought into play.

A moment of normality

We know quite a lot about the role of sport in the lives of asylum seekers and refugees. The potential of sport to act as a form of communication has been recognized by many. Michel Platini, President of UEFA, recently explained that young immigrants often learn to kick a football before they learn to speak the language of their host country. Here is an example of an opportunity to 'harness the potential of sport' and develop our understanding of its contribution to impact upon people's lives in a positive way. In the case of immigration, football's international presence crosses borders and could surely be the foundation of other more necessary foundation blocks or resources that help to build human capabilities (e.g. health and education).

To exemplify sport's practical use, at the instigation of the George Soros Foundation UEFA became involved in a project aimed at contributing to the integration of the Roma.

"Young immigrants often learn to kick a football before they learn to speak the language of their host country."

According to William Gaillard, special advisor to UEFA, it is rare for a person of Roma origin to play football in Eastern Europe without being subjected to violent attacks. However, football is embedded within Romani culture, historically and presently, it is a footballing demographic (Andre Pirlo, Juventus player and Italy's star at the 2014 World Cup is of Romani decent), but due to persistent discrimination Roma communities are often unable to reap the social benefits from sport. Football development programmes in these communities aim to support empowerment. With UEFA using football to 'tap into' cultural practices it becomes a resource of hope from which Roma communities and the societies with which they interact can more peacefully coexist.

In this instance football certainly has a role to play because it brings people into contact with one another, but football alone will not solve the problem of discrimination against ethnic minority groups. However, if sport can help to provide a degree of normality around which other resources can be built, then the very fact that it has the capacity to generate not just social, human, and economic capability, but also cultural capital, should be championed by all. Meaningful sports interventions work best when sport is part of a greater picture, and where sport can play a vital role as an agent of progress.

The most ardent cultural sceptic would have to recognize the numerous instances in which sport has served as a form of intervention and/or relations building. Peace beyond Borders uses sport as a tool to assist the brokerage of peace and conflict resoluti-

on in the borderlands around Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. The boxing girls of Kabul, described and covered in a documentary released by the Film Board of Canada tells the story of 3 girls who take up professional boxing and are determined to fight their way onto the international stage. In so doing they challenge Taliban beliefs about sport, and women and boxing in particular. Didier Drogba used his position as an international footballer to talk openly about conflict in the Ivory Coast in what became known as 'Drogba Diplomacy'. At the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, North and South Korea marched under the same flag of the Korean Peninsula. Another example is Football 4 Peace, a sports-based project for Jewish and Arab children in northern Galilee that uses football as a basis for conflict resolution training.

In these instances, sport has a role to play in bringing people into contact with one another. Yet, as stated, sport alone will not solve the problem of discrimination against ethnic minority groups or disadvantaged demographics and it needs to be incorporated within multidimensional development programmes. Within these, sport, amongst other things, can help to provide refugees and asylum seekers with a degree of normality around which other resources can be built. Meaningful sports interventions work best when sport is part of a greater picture where people can flourish within sport and therefore it can become an agent of change.

One final point needs to be made here: it is vital to recognize that one size does not fit all. Cultural diplomats, civil servants,

European cultural policy influencers and many other relevant officials need to embrace the idea that, if we are more nuanced and informed about what works where and when and under what circumstances, then sport is a valuable tool.

Sports undoubtedly help to change lives. As Nelson Mandela encapsulated: "sport has the power to change the world, it has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than government in breaking down racial barriers." This belief in sport requires us to push beyond our current understanding of its position in culture and its role in realizing a better world in which to live. We must refocus our energies in order to understand how we can use sport efficiently and responsibly to create change.

As highlighted above, there are countless examples of sport making a positive difference. However, there are also examples of sport and sports organizations contributing to a negative ultra-competitive, hyper-masculine, and exclusive culture. For example the International Olympic Committee has come under tremendous amounts of pressure regarding how it gender tests and gender groups its Olympic athletes. In most realms of public life there are numerous categorizations for gender, not just male and female. The IOC categorizes its athletes as only male and female, and so immediately alienates and excludes swaths of the world's population. Through this example we understand that the utilization of sport must be handled

delicately in order to avoid exclusivity and the exacerbation of societal problems.

Another potential of sport is the economic benefit it can produce. In the United Kingdom, a recent story of the day highlighted the joint £5.1 billion Sky/BT sponsorship deal of English premier league football. In 2010 UNESCO pointed out that a 0.4% levy on the football revenue from Europe's top leagues – England, Germany, Spain, Italy and France – would double the existing international aid budget for basic education in low-income countries. There are many creative initiatives whereby the redistribution of the money from sport is used to develop human, social, cultural and economic capabilities. With the recognition of using sport to accumulate large sums of money and the positive role it can play in society, it becomes doubly important for us to engage with its economic potential.

Let us consider another example, this time from outside Europe. Kenyan runners have often been acknowledged for their dominance at a number of distances in athletics. Often the considerable winnings from the athletic grand-prix circuit are redistributed within the villages and communities on the Kenyan side of the rift valley. In 2010

"Sport has the power to change the world, it has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than government in breaking down racial barriers." Nelson Mandela

Kenyan women were awarded in excess of £3 million.

Thus, expanding the capabilities of female runners fosters freedom in other domains. This happens through at least two channels. The first is the visibility of the runners who acquire global resources, achieve global athletic success, and then invest income directly into the local economy. The second pathway is the subjective perception that the female athlete is always a generous donor and dependable investor. This belief is partly founded on fact: several community projects financed by female runners illustrate that the female athlete redistributed her wealth generously, not just to her extended family but the wider community. In other words, non-runners believe that the income earned by a woman through athletics success would certainly extend to a wide network of people and that women's running was very much to be supported as well as encouraged for their daughters.

The two examples of football in Romani culture and running in Kenya illustrate and reinforce that sport can make a difference in a number of culturally specific situations. It also illustrates and reinforces that we must guard against an all-consuming logic that as a form of culture, sport is one universal thing or it is not. As mentioned earlier, those who seek to harness or use the power of sport need to understand in a more nuanced way what works where and when and under what circumstances. That being said, a considerable resource of hope exists but we need to go beyond narrow definitions of culture.

Sport is a culture which contributes to

entire cultures; it is undoubtedly a culture around which and through which many conversations take place. Imagined communities are presented through sport; business is conducted through sporting contacts; it is a language that helps nations, cities, communities and individuals to communicate; its popularity makes it a sought-after medium for carrying messages; nations build soft power strategies around sport; unions such as the European Union recognize that sport has a part in cultural relations; since 2003 the United Nations has increasingly used it as a development tool; sporting icons are sought after in terms of celebrity diplomacy and it provides for a specific form of trade and labour migration as sports workers move from country to country. Those interested in European cultural relations cannot really afford to ignore anything that helps people cope with their lives, and in this sense sport can bring with it resources of hope.

There is no single agent, group, organization or cultural platform that can carry the hopes of humanity, but there are many points of engagement. If any of these can offer valuable causes for optimism, can we afford to ignore them? Can European cultural relations or European immigration policies afford to ignore sport? The possibilities that exist within sport are those that can help form different views of the world, perhaps based upon cultural practices, discovery, research, and teaching, but also based upon opportunities to foster moments of normality, capability, trust, obligations, redistribution and respect through and with sport in a more humane Europe.

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The return of the compatriots

Centuries ago many Germans and Greeks settled in the giant Russian realm at the behest of the Tsar. The fall of the Soviet Union saw the repatriation of some of these minorities in both Germany and Greece, the lands of their forefathers – providing a useful opportunity to draw some comparisons. *By Christin Hess*

One group of migrants that is often overlooked is regularly referred to by different names, both by external observers and by the migrants themselves. 'Returnees', 'repatriates', co-ethnic migrants – immigrants with two separate ethnic backgrounds, often referred to in common English usage as 'ancestral migrants'. What is meant are people who, after years, decades or even centuries, return to the land their forefathers originally left for economic reasons in order to find a better life somewhere else, or were forced to flee due to political or religious persecution. In many cases a huge amount of time passes between the original emigration and the later return, which throws up a number of interesting questions relating to the importance of preserving cultural heritage and assimilation. This was the case

with the co-ethnic migrants from the former Soviet Union, who returned in thousands to their 'historic homelands' following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire. Among the migrants were Pontic Greeks, so-called 'Russian-Germans', ethnic Finns, Ukrainians, Poles and Russians, as well as people of Jewish origin (although here we would have to define 'co-ethnic' in a slightly different way). What it is that makes it worth focusing on these particular migrants when there have been examples of similar movements of migrants in other parts of the world, such as the Japanese returning from Brazil and Peru (nikkei) to Japan?

Migrants from the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence are particularly interesting because their respective migrations and integration back into their 'former homelands' happened at the same time and, to an extent, under very similar circumstances.

The migration of co-ethnic or ancestral migrants is a form of migration – and this is perhaps one of its most interesting aspects – which, on the face of it at least, runs counter to the idea and reality of a progressive globalisation.

The last Soviet population census in 1989 suggested that the Greeks and Germans were among 192 different ethnic groups living there at the time. How they ended up living in Russia is easy to explain, as both groups moved there as settlers – many of them encoura-

ged to move by the solicitations of Catherine the Great. They migrated from regions within today's Germany and Asia Minor during the 18th and 19th centuries and settled mostly in the South of Russia, in the Caucasus, at the Black Sea, in today's Ukraine and along the Volga.

Having a common religion was also a significant factor for many Pontic and Caucasian Greeks and many thousands fled to Russia as a result of the Russo-Turkish war. Both Germans and Greeks were later victims of Stalin's programmes of forced resettlement to Central Asia and Siberia – a traumatic episode in their histories, which still affects many today and which initiated an ongoing narrative of 'eternal rootlessness'. Although the situation of both ethnic groups in the Soviet Union significantly improved in the 1960s, '70s and '80s in socio-economic terms, thousands still took the opportunity to permanently move back to Germany and Greece after 1989.

This was made easier by the congruent immigration policies in both countries, which at that time were two of only ten percent of countries in the world that still defined citizenship based on the principle of jus sanguinis. As a result of each country's strong ethno-cultural sense of national identity, firmly rooted in a rhetoric in favour of settling war damages, both Greece and Germany offered specific diaspora groups, including those from the former Soviet Union, not only citizenship, but a certain amount of assistance in reintegrating.

The figures for 2015 suggest that there are more than 2.3 million 'late resettlers' from the former Soviet Union currently living in Germany. The figures for Greece are, unfortunately, less clear, due to a lack of recent censuses. However, we can be reasonably certain that approximately 200,000 repatriates have returned to the country. While at first glance

there would appear to be a significant difference in these numbers in absolute terms, the impact of these influxes of ancestral migrants on the host societies has been almost identical – not only in numerical terms (number of repatriates as a percentage of the total population), but also from a socio-economic and cultural perspective.

Based on my own observations, I think it would be fair to conclude that the potential for the new arrivals to successfully integrate, or indeed the perception of their potential to successfully integrate, is irrevocably bound up with the perception of the repatriates' cultural heritage and its proximity to the cultural canon of the host society. Some academics argue that, in spite of their common cultural backgrounds, the issues surrounding the integration of co-ethnic migrants do not differ significantly from those surrounding the integration of migrants of different ethnic origins.

This argument would appear to carry less weight in Greece than it does in Germany. My studies would suggest that, at first glance at least, the challenges faced by these migrant groups, whether in terms of looking for work and accommodation or in terms of cultural rapprochement, are in fact very similar. An inability to speak the host country's language proficiently when they arrive can be seen as a major factor in this respect. However, this explanation does not paint the whole picture. It does not take sufficient account of the very specific issues which surface when attempts are made to integrate co-ethnic migrants and which have a major influence on the successful cultural integration of those migrants.

I would like to suggest that the return of co-ethnic migrants is more influenced by expectations and the pressure that these expectations can bring with them, than any other form of migration. Expectations would appear to play much less of a role in other mi-

"Some would argue that, in spite of their common cultural backgrounds, the issues surrounding the integration of co-ethnic migrants do not differ significantly from those surrounding the integration of migrants of different ethnic origins."

gration scenarios and can therefore be seen as much less relevant. The political rhetoric surrounding the return of a country's presumed long-lost 'brethren' no doubt plays its part in building a certain amount of pressure of expectation with respect to their common cultural heritage.

State assistance with integration, or the 'prize' of citizenship at least, something which is denied to other immigrants, only serves to ramp up this pressure. In Greece the state even officially sanctioned a competition to prove similarity, by offering different privileges to different diaspora groups. The Soviet Greeks came out best in this respect, as they were more or less guaranteed Greek citizenship.

However, the local populations in Greece and Germany do not tend to assess the culture of immigrants on the basis of some officially recognised genealogy. Whether consciously or unconsciously, they tend to expect immigrants who claim to be Greek or German to actually demonstrate 'Greek' or 'German' behaviours, mentalities and cultural practices. This includes, of course, an ability to communicate in German or Greek. This would appear to be the yardstick by which the potential of the new arrivals to successfully integrate is measured.

In many cases, the migrants themselves,

many of whom travelled to their respective homelands well aware that they would become future citizens – something that would have had a major influence on their decision to leave their homes – had expectations of a very different sort. Many of those asked said that they expected an emotional return to their homeland and to receive an emotional welcome as well. Others simply wanted to rid themselves or their minority status.

For yet others, the key factor behind their decision to move was the possibility of building a better life in Western Europe for themselves and those who travelled with them. In some cases, the exact opposite – a total lack of expectations – proved to be the main problem. Many of those asked suggested that they were essentially unprepared for the journey at an intellectual level and when they arrived ended up facing a harsh reality that they had simply not anticipated. One thing that all the migrants had in common was the idea that Germany and Greece would not have changed in the decades, or even centuries, of their 'absence' – an idea that later seemed ridiculous to many of them.

Shedding their minority status

The majority of those immigrants questioned expected that the local population would recognise in them the national identity that they themselves believed they 'intrinsically' held. Partly as result of actual or perceived rejection, and partly because it is what they genuinely believed, many of the participants in the study suggested that they considered themselves to be the 'true' Germans or Greeks or, as one lady put it, "more German than the Germans". Some Pontic Greeks, and not just those who came from the former Soviet Union, believe to this day that

the Pontic Greek (a specific form of Greek) that they speak has more similarities with ancient Greek than the Modern Greek spoken by the local population.

Irrespective of the particular country or group, there would appear to be a tendency towards clinging on to preconceived images and ideas. And it is this that produces a second variable that really sets co-ethnic integration scenarios apart: the phenomenon that successful integration is much more intrinsically bound up with static images and presupposed fixed identities, and even stereotypical, essentialist presumptions about them, than is the case with other migrants. And yet this stands in direct contrast to the actual reality of changeable, variable or even multiple identities. I believe that this is the reason why the cultural integration of these immigrants in Greece and Germany was not without its problems, especially for the first generation, and why these problems still persist today.

The latter also led to the 'Russian-Germans' and 'Soviet Greeks' generally assimilated well during their time in Russia and the USSR – even with their minority status. And yet this was an adaptation that only really manifested itself retrospectively in Germany and Greece. Because of their real or perceived rejection by the local population, the more orthodox view of their own culture became even more pronounced among many of the repatriates. The result was that, in many places, the close-knit associations and ties that the Russian-Germans and Greeks from the former Soviet Union built up over the coming years, were built on the foundations of a perceived shared background and culture and on a high degree of trust in each other that was often summed up by the sentence 'We come from the same country, we are people of Soviet Union'. This is particularly true of

returnees who were born in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Older repatriates who lived through the Second World War and the persecutions often display multiple patterns of identity and are more critical of the Soviet Union as a lived reality and therefore as a point of reference. Overall, my study brought to light a wide range of examples of Greek and German repatriates who still keep in contact and feel bound together by their common experiences.

This perception of a different cultural heritage among those formally recognised as co-ethnic migrants has changed over the years with changes to migrations streams and add a new twist to the issue of their integration. In Greece, the growing number of immigrants from Asia (and particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh), from sub-Saharan Africa and, since the crisis, from the Middle East, has lead to an increase in anxiety amongst the local population, similar to the fear of 'being overrun by foreigners' expressed by people in Germany with regard to immigrants or established residents with Muslim backgrounds. The Greek and German migrants who have often been characterised as 'Russian' in the past now no longer seem so culturally foreign. Because they have been there for so long, they now seem to be much more a part of normal everyday life. Paradoxically, another transnational hurdle in these migrants' integration process can be found in their education.

Some labour market experts have argued that a higher level of education can often have a positive impact on the successful integration of migrants. One German civil servant recently suggested in an interview that it was generally assumed that highly qualified migrants had significantly fewer or even no problems integrating. However, this view is countered by the totally opposite experience of many returnees from the former Soviet

Union. One of the first comprehensive studies of Greek returnees showed that almost one third (27 percent) (the second biggest group in terms of absolute numbers) had higher educational qualifications. 27 percent of these migrants had qualifications in engineering, mechanical engineering and shipbuilding. Added to that were a large number of mechanics, electricians, plumbers and car mechanics. The one official survey carried out in the year 2000 listed one third of the former professions of Greek repatriates as "other professions", a suggestion perhaps that a large number of these professions did not have a Greek equivalent.

This may give us a potential insight into some of the difficulties that migrants may have faced when looking for jobs. For one thing, the Soviet planned economy, with its focus on specific industrial sectors and its tendency to fill gaps in certain professions with highly specialised university graduates, created qualifications and career paths that did not really exist in the German and Greek labour markets. Added to this is the fact that the labour markets in both countries are essentially dual labour markets that are strongly

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oriented towards qualifications obtained in the home country itself. A lack of proficiency in the local language could also be a problem, especially in the early days. Many migrants feel that the authorities viewed their qualifications with a certain amount of scepticism and prejudice. The counter argument put forward by employers is that they could not be sure to any degree of certainty that a qualification obtained in the Soviet Union covered roughly the same curriculum of the equivalent degree obtained in Germany.

Co-ethnic migrants with higher educational qualifications (e.g. university lecturers and doctors) often found themselves faced with the choice of obtaining additional qualifications in order to continue working in their chosen profession, something which would involve significant additional time and expense, or retraining (which could be just as expensive and time-consuming and would not necessarily guarantee any genuine work opportunities), or indeed accepting a lesser job.

For many, the latter was the only realistic option. Many highly qualified returnees in particular are still suffering as a result of this disruption to their chosen career path and the painful and often ignominious loss of status and identity. Added to this is a sense of class consciousness that might at first glance appear to be paradoxical but was in fact not only typical of the Soviet Union but also actively cultivated there (with highly educated people being seen as part of the intelligentsia). This kind of long-term involuntary underemployment or even unemployment often led to depression or chronic illness. One migrant in Thessaloniki, an ophthalmologist by profession, described her experiences with a sense of obvious resignation: "My brother is now firmly established as a professor and head of department (...) in Moscow. He's made it. Meanwhile, I've spent all this time in Greece

trying to prove that I'm actually a doctor and repeating the studies that I'd already done. The end result is that his name has already been entered into the annals of Russian history, while I'm having to start from scratch."

It has been shown that this is a problem that affects men and women in equal measure. Naturally, this phenomenon, which for the sake of simplicity I have call the 'reverse effect of qualifications', is not unique to the return of co-ethnic migrants from the Soviet Union, though it has been common among this particular group. It would appear to be a phenomenon that often occurs when there is a migration between countries that have very different socio-economic and/or political-ideological profiles. It serves to show the extent to which successful integration can be dependent on the perception of culture, rather than the actual culture, traditions or mentality. There is a need to reassess the importance of education and qualifications to the integration process. These problems clearly demonstrate the considerable influence that a lack of opportunity to exploit existing qualifications has on the integration process and the sense of self-worth of the individual concerned. It may well be that these difficulties experienced by highly qualified economic migrants can only be avoided by providing firm job offers in the destination country.

Even the second generation of children born in Germany and Greece to returnees from the Soviet Union cannot necessarily be said to be experiencing a trouble-free process of integration. Although they are often totally proficient in the language of the country they live in and do not need to go through the process of having their qualifications recognised, their cultural integration is often dependent on the extent to which their parents have brought them up in the cultural traditions of either the new country or their country of ori-

gin. This kind of ethnic-cultural migration, which began as a form of ethnic 'separation', has since become more 'globalised'. However, for a number of different reasons, including a lack of professional recognition, a not insignificant number of migrants in Germany and Greece have chosen to return to Russia. These days there is a significant amount of movement of Greeks from the former Soviet Union between Greece and their former areas of residence and the commercial centres of the Caucasus and the south of Russia. The reasons for this movement are predominantly economic in nature. This kind of transnational search for employment, even of a temporary nature, has become much more prevalent since the beginning of the economic and social crisis in Greece.

A few years ago, President Putin of Russia introduced a 'Compatriots programme' aimed at tempting former emigrants, including Greeks and Germans, to return to Russia. This would suggest that the formal 'return' to the country from which their forefathers had emigrated a long time ago is not necessarily the final step in a personal migration story that in some families spans many generations. It also suggests that the cycle of their diaspora existence has not yet come to an end.

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Multiculturalism, Canadian-style

In autumn 2014, two Islamist-motivated attacks in the country shattered Canada's reputation as a peaceful, multicultural society. Is Canada struggling with the same problems as Europe? Is the Canadian model a myth or reality? Europe's circumstances might be different, but can Canada still provide a model for immigration with its points system and emphasis on diversity?

By Stéfanie Lévesque

"Multiculturalism is dead", announced the British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010, as many of his European counterparts — most notably the Dutch, the German Premiers — had publicly rejected the policy. What exactly was he referring to?

The misunderstanding of what multiculturalism is often causes journalists and commentators to fall into sophistry. Multiculturalism is sometimes used as a synonym for religious, ethnical or cultural diversity. For instance, the adjective multicultural can be used to describe Canadian society, considering that more than 40% of the Canadian population belongs to neither of its two largest historical groups. It is however important to distinguish this concept of multiculturalism as sociological fact from its homonymous political ideology.

Multiculturalism, in its political sense, refers to a particular form of pluralism. From assimilation to melting pot, there are varied ways in which a country can choose to manage its cultural diversity; pluralism is one of those. The idea behind pluralism is for a country to accept immigrants from different cultures and to allow them to maintain some of their own particularities.

Supporters of multiculturalism argue that it assists in the integration of immigrants and minorities, removing barriers to their political participation and making them feel more welcomed, leading to a stronger sense of belonging to the host country. Critics argue that while multicultural policies tend to accept a country is composed of various cultural groups, they do not acknowledge diversity within these groups. Keenan Malik describes multiculturalism as a political process "the aim of which is to manage and institutionalize diversity by putting people into ethnic and cultural boxes, defining individual needs and rights by virtue of the boxes into which people are put, and using those boxes to shape public policy." Among other things, multiculturalism has been accused of promoting ghettoization, increasing stereotypes and of allowing political radicalism and illiberal practices to develop among immigrant groups.

That is for the general debate, but countries have understood and applied multicu-

lturalism in various ways. When we speak of Canadian multiculturalism, for instance, we speak of a very particular set of policies applied to the Canadian society.

The Canadian society encompasses a National majority (of British descendants), a National minority (of French descendants), many different autochthonous groups, as well as ethnic groups arising from immigration. Hence it is, in the words of Will Kymlicka, both a multinational and pluriethnic country. When we speak of 'Canadian Multiculturalism', or the 'Canadian example', we refer to the policies that have been used by the Canadian government to manage this complex diversity.

Cultural diversity in Canada was initially posed in terms of French-English relations. The Canadian confederation (1867) was the result of negotiations between the British conquerors and the French minority, which paved the way to a bicultural policy. Unfortunately, other cultural groups, for instance the Aboriginals, were largely disregarded.

In 1971, the liberal government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau announced that policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism would be implemented, making Canada the first country in the world to officially adopt such a policy. Accordingly, with the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, multiculturalism became recognized by law. Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982), reads; "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."

Multiculturalism is further reflected in the law through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988, which was enacted by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. It recognizes Canada's multicultural heritage, Aboriginal rights, equal rights regardless of colour and religion, minorities' rights to enjoy their cultures and the right to use other languages other than the two official ones. In addition to this, the Broadcasting Act of 1991 asserts that the Canadian broadcasting system should reflect the diversity of the country's cultures and include minority broadcasting.

Inclusiveness and mutual respect

The Canadian multicultural policy, placing emphasis on equality, inclusiveness and mutual respect, has been so important for Canadians that many consider it to be an integral component of the Canadian culture.

In addition to the Federal policies, all ten of Canada's provinces have adopted their own pluralist policies and legislations. While the other provinces went for multiculturalism, Quebec's policy has sought to promote interculturalism.

In 2008, a Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, headed by sociologist Gerard Bouchard and philosopher Charles Taylor, concluded that interculturalism was better suited to conditions in Quebec than the Canadian multiculturalism model, as it integrates the context of the majority culture. This is particularly important for the province's French-speaking majority, because they are a minority at federal level. For instance, Quebec has developed policies to ensure that immigrants integrate into the Province's French-speaking community.

Ottawa considers its liberal immigration policy as a part of its multiculturalism; Canada has one of the highest per capita immigration rate in the world, and it resettles over one in ten of the world's refugees. The country can make an honest claim to being open to immigration, but it is by no means accessible to all.

Since the first immigration act was introduced in Canada in 1867, immigration policies have ensured that certain types of immigrants (the criteria have varied throughout the years) would be kept out. While the first immigration policy was mainly enacted as a means to prevent diseases from entering the country, measures were subsequently added to prevent people considered to be criminals or activists who were against government policy.

After a freeze in immigration during World War I, the federal government released a new Immigration Act in 1919, which included a rule allowing the government to limit or prohibit the entry of undesirable races and nationalities (i.e. those who fought against Canada in the War, as well as some particular religious groups). As for the Immigration Act of 1952, it gave preferential treatment to British subjects, French citizens, American residents and Asians who wanted to reunite with their immediate relatives in Canada.

This discrimination on the basis of race or country of origin in Canadian immigration laws were only dropped by 1962. It was replaced by a system that is primarily driven by economic policy. Since the Points System was introduced in 1967, the selection of immigrants has been based on six factors: French and English skills, education, experience, age, arranged employment in Canada and adaptability.

Four new classes of 'accepted' immigrants were created in 1967: refugees, families, assisted relatives and independent immigrants. In the 1980s, the 'business' class was added, targeting immigrants who could bring significant funds to Canada. The 'prohibited classes' became those at risk of straining social welfare or health services.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, which was meant to replace the 1967 act, included some regulations targeted at preventing terrorists and criminals from entering the country. It also made it harder for people to immigrate as skilled workers, labourers and even as entrepreneurs under the Points System.

If the actual immigration policy is not directly motivated by discriminatory intent, it is difficult to overlook the fact that they constitute indirect discrimination (voluntary or not). The seemingly neutral criteria with regard to the country of provenance in fact produce a statistically measurable inequality. Adding a political element to it, some could even argue that we are in the presence of systemic discrimination.

Another inherent problem of Canada's immigration system is the unemployment or underemployment of immigrants. In 1997, the Foreign Credential Recognition (FCR) program was introduced, which awarded points to migrants on the basis of their studies. On the one hand it proves difficult for migrants and especially for refugees, to obtain the original credentials they need to present to the Alliance of Credential Evaluation Services of Canada (ACESC) for verification. On the other hand, some professions fall under the authority of occupational regulatory bodies. Licenses acquired outside Canada to practice medicine or engineering for example, are rarely considered to meet Canadian standards.

Taking pride in diversity

In a series of studies commissioned by the Multiculturalism and Human Rights

Branch of the Department of Canadian Heritage in 2008, researchers have been evaluating Canada's performance based on different dimensions of integration: economic integration into the labour market; political integration into the electoral process and other forms of political participation; social integration into the networks and spaces of civil society, from informal networks of friends and neighbours to membership in more formal organizations. Will Kymlicka, reported: "On the one hand, we have witnessed not only growing evidence of Canada's comparative advantage in the integration of immigrants, but also growing evidence that the multiculturalism policy has played an important role in this comparative success." Research has also revealed that Canadians are more likely to say that immigration is beneficial, less likely to believe that immigrants are prone to crime, and more likely to support multiculturalism and to view it as a source of pride.

The recent terrorist attacks in Canada, which should be viewed as isolated incidents have not changed this. Canada's policies should still be regarded as 'good examples'. Of course not all policies apply to every situation and of course Canadian multiculturalism has its flaws. European critics of the model have pointed out a need to renew the policy. There is more to multiculturalism than just welcoming and celebrating cultural diversity; immigration and integration policies have to work together in order to give ethnic minorities the opportunities to thrive, both socially and economically.

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Between controls and taboos Forced labour relies on an older and deeper layer in European society, a tradition of labour as discipline and a means of control. The workers' movement, with its goal of solidarity, was never entirely able to overcome this pernicious legacy. This disciplinary tradition needs to be borne in mind today, when the public debate about migration often seems in danger of focusing only on utility (and, implicitly, on 'uselessness'). *By Claus Leggewie*

The fact that millions of foreign workers were deported from German-occupied Europe during the Second World War and forced to work in factories, industry and agriculture on Third Reich territory or beyond has become one of the least-remembered chapters of German migration history. *Zwangsarbeit* (forced labour) barely features in Germans' collective memory of the period and took much longer than other Nazi crimes to be afforded even some degree of restitution. When former forced labourers living in the USA filed suits against German companies, German taxpayers and the industrial sector rather grudgingly shared the €5 billion cost. By June 2007, the money had been paid to a total of 1.5 million victims or their heirs.

Why did it take so long to redress this crime? And why was it done with such bad grace? Why is it so difficult, in general, to remember the facts of forced or even voluntary migration into Germany? When an official commemoration for immigrants murdered by neo-Nazis took place in Berlin in February 2012, why were many Germans almost shocked to be reminded that the history of migration stretched back well over a hundred years? One explanation would certainly be that historical research lacks the necessary sources, that there are methodological problems, and that historians hardly see migration as a field with career prospects. However, I think there are three deeper symbolic dimensions to the problem, which are simultaneously cornerstones of European collective identity and its dark side: the disciplinary nature of industrial work, the fear of 'nomads' with no fixed abode, and white racism. Here we can simply throw light on these barriers and reflect on the reasons for them.

The subject of *Zwangsarbeit* has been met with a great deal of resistance and wariness – from victims and perpetrators alike. In post-Nazi Germany, the main reason for this was that slave labour was a public crime,

organized by the state but welcomed and supported by the nation at large, who – following a long and ignoble tradition – believed that it would rehabilitate the 'workshy'.

In recent years, the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation (Stiftung EVZ) has been working to explain and commemorate this episode of German history and raise awareness among the wider public. It is less well known that an equal and opposite taboo exists on the other side. A great many forced labourers came from the Soviet Union and after 1945, survivors ended up in Soviet 'filtration camps'. Like Soviet prisoners of war, deportees were stigmatized as 'traitors' and very often ended up in the Gulag, a pillar of Soviet communism's repressive apparatus. Slave labour underpinned the forced industrialization carried out under Lenin and Stalin: prior to 1941, millions of 'class enemies', along with members of proscribed ethnic and religious minorities, were deported to the camps of the 'Gulag Archipelago'. Their numbers were filled out by the hundreds of thousands of German POWs and civilians who were sent to Siberia from Soviet-occupied regions during and after the Second World War. A great many died from starvation, sickness, overwork, cold and the unhygienic conditions of the camps and transportation.

These 'corrective labour camps' were a continuation of precursor policies in Tsarist Russia, yet their existence was officially denied – a secret that hung over the heads of Soviet citizens like the sword of Damocles and which could claim their lives if they made the smallest slip or were the victims

of malicious denunciation. The subject was only finally debated during the post-Stalinist thaw, above all in the fiction and essays of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Even today, the work of documenting the camp system remains incomplete. Perpetrators have still not been brought to justice and no line has been drawn under this part of the past. The myth of the sacrifices made during the Great Patriotic War meant that even those affected by Stalin's repression colluded in making it a topic that was taboo.

Delayed restitution

Germany did not fully begin to make reparations until 2000 (by which time most former deportees were either dead or very old); in Russia, victims have not received even rhetorical justice. This reluctance can be explained by the noxious tradition of penal labour that dominated both totalitarian systems between 1930 and 1960, regardless of ideological differences. However, forced labour also relies on an older and deeper layer in European society, a tradition of labour as discipline and a means of control. The workers' movement, with its goal of solidarity, was never entirely able to overcome this pernicious legacy. This disciplinary tradition needs to be borne in mind today, when the public debate about migration often seems in danger of focusing only on utility (and, implicitly, on 'uselessness').

These taboos stifle and distort attempts to write the history of the migrant workers, the *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers), who came

more willingly than the *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign workers) during the war, but who were nevertheless subject to other sorts of pressure. The blurring of the line between forced and voluntary labour has become more widespread with the globalization of the labour markets, which cannot emerge without drastic suffering in the world's poorest regions and urban agglomerations, and where the workforce is often subject to what amounts to nothing less than slavery.

Taboos also affect other groups in migration history: despised ethnic minority groups with a tradition of travelling, such as the Roma and Sinti; asylum-seekers and refugees; those who find themselves called 'migrant workers', even when their families have lived in the country for four generations. At a few locations in Europe, museums of migration have documented in detail the various origins of migrant flows and the reasons for them – which are always some combination of necessity and free will. Indeed, we may even say that these days we no longer need museums of migration, since in many of the most densely-populated regions of Europe, having immigrant roots is entirely normal and 'commemoration' can no longer be hidden away in special museums. When parts of the population are called 'problem groups', this is not because they are problematic per

se, but because they pose problems for the majority, calling into question Europe's own self-image and provoking the same defensive reaction as did forced labour.

Public opinion in liberal societies with high immigration levels has generally been unwilling to admit the connections and continuities between the forced labour of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century (and their authoritarian, nineteenth-century predecessors) and the voluntary labour migration of today. It is important to explain the effects of global inequality on deregulated labour markets in the North, not least because demographic changes in these countries will only lead to more demand for skilled and unskilled labour. The criteria of utility and social discipline will come to play a large role, with widespread xenophobia and racist attitudes ever present in the background. At the same time, the transnationalization of labour markets, together with societal breakdown, widening social divisions and ecological problems and disasters in the global South, will probably increase levels of migration.

Ethnic discrimination in Europe did not come to an end in 1945. In many towns and villages of Eastern Europe, neighbourhood groups and local councils have erected fences and walls around so-called 'gypsy quarters', seeing this as the only way to protect themselves against the anti-social behaviour and theft for which the Roma are so often blamed. In Slovakia, where Roma make up around ten per cent of the population, 'gypsy ghettos' are forming; twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, new walls are being

"There are three deeper symbolic dimensions to the problem, which are simultaneously cornerstones of European collective identity and its dark side: the disciplinary nature of industrial work, the fear of 'nomads' with no fixed abode, and white racism."

erected, in the heart of Europe, and against a European people. Similar measures have been taken in the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where Roma are subject to systematic discrimination and social exclusion. The end of the socialist economy was a catastrophe for the Roma, given that the great majority of them were employed in the state-run agricultural sector. When this was privatized, they lost their jobs and moved from the countryside to the 'gypsy quarters' (mahalas) in the towns and cities.

In Western Europe too, where most Roma have lived a settled life for centuries, they have remained a fly in the social ointment. Again and again, Roma experience conflict with neighbours and the police, have their encampments searched and are told to move on, whether or not they have the proper approval. The situation escalated in Italy and France in the summer of 2010, when the governments of both countries instituted a deliberate policy of breaking up Roma camps, risking serious conflict with the European Commission. There are very few countries in the EU where Roma can live free from prejudice – which ranges from verbal abuse to full-blown official harassment – even though they are EU citizens and thus, as the French case showed, cannot easily be deported.

The gypsies' marginal role has less to do with their origin than with their status, even though they are actually a perfect embodiment of Europe's social mobility. This harks back to the ancient division between settled farming peoples (gadjo in Romani languages) and nomads. In agrarian societies, nomadic and semi-nomadic people were usually feared, since such 'masterless men' did not fit the patterns of collective identity established by ethnic belonging and ties to a settled, local landscape. It seems likely that such perceptions have lasted into post-agrarian societies, even though (or possibly because) such societies have given rise to new forms of nomadism, to transnational lives and lifestyles, particularly the highly mobile workforce at the very top and very bottom of the pay scale. Further grounds for intolerance and exclusion are that the Roma live in patriarchal family and clan structures, that these households run their own affairs in a very close-knit manner, and that they observe ritual purity laws. In folklore, the Roma are seen as exotic and strange people who refuse to adopt majority norms and are generally dangerous; even the more benevolent view of the Roma as musical virtuosi, passionate flamenco dancers and devout pilgrims (for instance in the annual pilgrimage to Sainte-Marie-de-la-Mer in the Camargue) is loaded with patronizing and marginalizing assumptions. As with the Jewish minority in Europe, governments and majority populations have, at various times, either imposed limits on Roma people's mobility or forced them to migrate, aggressively targeting those who suffer most from the status quo. This is all despite the evident fact that the over-

whelming majority of Roma are settled, and that the proportion of truly 'nomadic' Roma is constantly dwindling.

Even though the great majority of Roma are citizens of the country in which they live, or possess the legal residency papers, we may metaphorically say that they are a stateless group. The Roma are Europe's pariahs and disenfranchised par excellence, and their negative reputation far exceeds all others. The European Union would do well to intensify the current, diffuse efforts to guarantee lasting inclusion and integration for the Roma while respecting their specific cultural traits. This would serve not only to protect them as a minority, but would also help preserve freedom of movement within the Schengen space, which is increasingly being jeopardized by arguments about migration levels and the fight against terrorism, with an eye to outflanking the far-right.

'Illegals' and white racism

The last taboo group is that of the 'illegal immigrants', a catch-all term for those who have broken the law in their country of destination by having either incorrect residence documents or forged or expired papers. Such infringements are usually compounded by illegal labour and tax offences. Despite this, unregistered workers without the proper residency and work permits are to be found in most rich industrial nations, because employers have arranged for them to come and work in conditions often verging on slavery. This is especially true of prostituted women.

Obviously, it is unknown exactly how many of these undocumented or unregistered persons reside in Europe, but realistic estimates put them in the millions.

With this group, European colonial history comes full circle. A great number of these 'illegal', unregistered or 'irregular' immigrants come from sub-Saharan Africa and other former colonies of the global South. They have fled, often under appalling conditions, from penury, civil war, political oppression and the ravages of ecological and climatic crisis. They travel thousands of miles, on foot, in overcrowded trucks, in airless containers and on unseaworthy boats, to reach the European enclaves in Africa and the shores of Europe itself. Because the European Union (like the US) has erected high walls to prevent illegal border crossings, they turn to professional people smugglers for help.

The typical voyager on this dangerous journey is neither a 'guest worker' nor one of those third or fourth-generation children of immigrants notoriously derided as 'hijab girls'. Rather, the representative figure is the shipwrecked migrant picked up by the coastguard, taken straight to an internment camp and deported back to his country of origin as quickly as possible. In recent decades, the Mediterranean has become a mass grave for the new boat people. Over the years, European governments have struck shameful deals with Arab potentates and kleptocrats; yet when these rulers were swept away by the Arab Spring of 2011, the EU's Mediterranean policies failed to soften as a result.

Faced with high levels of migration, Eu-

"The end of the socialist economy was a catastrophe for the Roma, given that the great majority of them were employed in the state-run agricultural sector. When this was privatized, they lost their jobs."

rope has tried to erect barriers, to make itself a fortress, but such metaphors and imagery play into populist talk of a flood of immigrants. Such talk is intended to conceal a humanitarian catastrophe. Despite claims to the contrary, the majority of refugees and migrants worldwide do not head for Europe but remain in the poorest regions of the global South. Credible estimates place the illegal population of Europe at a maximum of 1.5 per cent, most of whom have not made the same odyssey as the boat people but, with the aid of false papers and professional people smugglers, have arrived in Europe as tourists, where they are exploited by unscrupulous employers who are only too pleased to see them.

States and supra-state groupings such as the European Union certainly have the right to register and control the flow of migrants across their borders. However, their efforts in this direction are confounded by the sheer fact of socio-economic disparity between the rich OECD countries and 'the rest'. Attempts to control migration also do not square with a process of transnationalization, which on the one hand posits a mobility of goods, capital and people, in so far as this serves global economic and financial transactions and influxes of tourists, but on the other hand wants to slam the shutters on the unwanted aspects of globalization.

Consequently, states that are now merely quasi-sovereign entities have lost much of their ability for control and planning. Meanwhile, in the richer nations, social and political movements are increasingly opposing the moral scandal of a border regime that fans the flames of xenophobia by upping the rhetorical ante. This is exactly why the third taboo group offers a perfect symbol of transnationalisation (and diaspora), breaking open the cozy, prosperous container

of the nation state and exposing the risks of bare, unprotected existence.

Given its various dimensions, the outlines of which are sketched above, migration should be seen not as a peripheral phenomenon but as central to Europe's shared memory. For economic reasons, rich countries are eager to recruit (highly) skilled workers from the global South, but at the same time barricade themselves in for reasons of security or cultural anxiety. This glaring contradiction casts a shadow over any discussion of the history of European migration. The responsibility for this may lie with the three symbolic dimensions that form the cornerstones of European collective identity and its dark side: the disciplinary nature of industrial work, the fear of 'nomads' with no fixed abode, and white racism. There are many practical as well as academic reasons why we should remove these barriers through a rational, generous immigration policy.

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
Chapter 3: Europe, a continent of immigration —
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More inclusion, less hysteria
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
Europe is itself the result of an arduous and at
times violent journey from a collection of small
states to a multinational entity. Today it is facing
a historic challenge: the integration of hundreds of
thousands of migrants. How can Europe now move on
from the economic and financial crisis to create an
inclusive immigration policy and a new European nar-
rative that encompasses migrants?

An uncontrollable natural phenomenon

There have been great migrations from East to West, in the course of which the peoples of the Caucasus changed the culture and biological heredity of the natives. What Europe is still trying to tackle as immigration is in fact migration. The Third World is knocking at our doors, and it will come in, even if we are not in agreement.

By Umberto Eco

Some years ago, upon the constitution of the Académie Universelle des Cultures in Paris, an organization made up of artists and scientists from all over the world, a statute or charter was drawn up. And one of the introductory declarations of this charter, which was also intended to define the scientific and moral duties of the academy, was that the coming millennium would witness a "great cross-breeding of cultures".

If the course of events is not suddenly inverted (and everything is possible), we must prepare ourselves for the fact that in the next millennium Europe will be like New York or some Latin American countries. In New York we see the negation of the melting pot concept: different cultures coexist, from Puerto Ricans to Chinese, from Koreans to Pakistanis. Some groups have merged with one another (like Italians and Irish, Jews and Poles), others have kept themselves separate (living in different districts, speaking different languages and following different traditions), and all come together on the basis of some common laws and a common lingua franca, English, which each group speaks well enough to make themselves understood.

I ask you to bear in mind that in New York, where the so-called white population is on the way to becoming a minority, 42 percent of the whites are Jews and the other 58 percent are of the most disparate origins, and of their number the Wasps, the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, are the minority (there are Polish Catholics, Italians, Hispanic-Americans, Irish, etc.).

In Latin America, depending on the country, different phenomena have occurred: sometimes the Spanish colonizers interbred with the Indians, sometimes (as in Brazil) with the Africans too, and sometimes languages and populations known as 'Creole' came into being. It is very difficult, even if we think in racial terms, to say whether a Mexican or a Peruvian is of European or Amerindian origin. And it's even harder to decide about, let's say, a Jamaican. So, the future of Europe holds a phenomenon of this kind, and no racist or backward-looking reactionary will be able to prevent it.

I believe that a distinction must be drawn between the concept of 'immigration' and that of 'migration'. Immigration occurs when some individuals (even many individuals, but in numbers that are statistically irrelevant with respect to the original stock) move from one country to another (like the Italians and the Irish in America, or the Turks today in Germany). The phenomenon of immigration may be controlled politically, restricted, encouraged, planned or accepted.

This is not the case with migration. Violent or pacific as it may be, it is like a natural phenomenon: it happens, and no one can control it. Migration occurs when an entire people moves from one territory to another (the number remaining in the original territory is of no importance: what counts is the extent to which the migrants change the culture of the territory to which they have migrated). There have been great migrations from East to West, in the course of which the peoples of the Caucasus changed the culture and biological heredity of the natives. Then there were the migrations of the 'barbarian' peoples that invaded the Roman Empire and created new kingdoms and new cultures called 'Romano-barbarian' or 'Romano-Germanic'. There was European migration toward the American continent, from the East Coast and gradually across to California, and also from the Caribbean islands and Mexico all the way to Tierra del Fuego.

Interrupted migrations

Even though this was in part politically planned, I use the term 'migration' because the European whites did not adopt the customs and culture of the natives, but rather founded a new civilization to which even the natives (those who survived) adapted. There have been interrupted migrations, like those of the Arab peoples who got as far as the Iberian Peninsula. There have been forms of migration that were planned and partial, but no less influential for this, like that of the Europeans to the east and south (hence the birth of the so-called postcolonial nations), where the migrants nonetheless changed the culture of the autochthonous peoples. I don't think that anyone has so far described a phenomenology of the different types of migration, but migration is certainly different from immigration.

We only have immigration when the migrants (admitted according to political decisions) accept most of the customs of the

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country into which they have immigrated, while migration occurs when the migrants (whom no one can stop at the frontiers) radically transform the culture of the territory they have migrated to.

Today, after a nineteenth century full of immigrants, we find ourselves faced with unclear phenomena. In a climate marked by pronounced mobility, it is very difficult to say whether a certain movement of people is immigration or migration. There is certainly an unstoppable flow from the south to the north (as Africans and Middle Easterners head for Europe), the Indians have invaded Africa and the Pacific Islands, the Chinese are everywhere, and the Japanese are present with their industrial and economic organizations even though they have not moved physically in any significant numbers.

Is it possible to distinguish immigration from migration when the entire planet is becoming the territory of intersecting movements of people? I think it is possible: as I have said, immigration can be controlled politically, but like natural phenomena, migration cannot be. As long as there is immigration, peoples can hope to keep the immigrants in a ghetto, so that they do not mix with the natives. When migration occurs, there are no more ghettoes, and intermarriage is uncontrollable.

What Europe is still trying to tackle as immigration is in fact migration. The Third World is knocking at our doors, and it will come in even if we are not in agreement. The problem is no longer to decide (as politicians pretend) whether students at a Paris university can wear the chador or how many mosques should be built in Rome.

The problem is that in the third millennium (and since I am not a prophet, I cannot say exactly when) Europe will become a multiracial continent – or a 'coloured' one, if you prefer. That's how it will be, whether you like it or not.

This meeting (or clash) or cultures could lead to bloodshed, and I believe to a certain extent that it will. Such a result cannot be avoided and will last a long time. However, racists ought to be (in theory) a race on the way to extinction.

Was there a patrician class in ancient Rome that could not tolerate the idea of Gauls, or Samaritans, or Jews like Saint Paul becoming Roman citizens, or of an African ascending the imperial throne, as indeed happened in the end? The patricians have been forgotten, defeated by history. Roman civilization was a hybrid culture. Racists will say that this is why it fell, but its fall took five hundred years – which strikes me as time enough for us too to make plans for the future.

Forms of intolerance

Fundamentalism and integralism are usually considered to be closely linked concepts and as the two most obvious forms of intolerance. If I consult two excellent references like the *Petit Robert* and the *Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue Française*, I find in the definition of 'fundamentalism' an immediate reference to integralism. Which prompts me to think that all forms

"Modern Western fundamentalism was born in Protestant circles in the nineteenth-century United States, and its characteristic feature is the decision to interpret the Scriptures literally, especially with regard to those notions of cosmology whose truth the science of the day seemed to doubt."

of fundamentalism are forms of integralism and vice versa. But even if this were so, it would not mean that all intolerant people are fundamentalists or integralists. Even though at present we are faced with different forms of fundamentalism and examples of integralism are visible everywhere, the problem of intolerance is deeper and more dangerous.

In historical terms fundamentalism is a hermeneutic principle, linked to the interpretation of a holy book. Modern Western fundamentalism was born in Protestant circles in the nineteenth-century United States, and its characteristic feature is the decision to interpret the Scriptures literally, especially with regard to those notions of cosmology whose truth the science of the day seemed to doubt. Hence the frequently intolerant rejection of all allegorical interpretations and especially of all forms of education that attempted to undermine faith in the biblical text, as occurred with the triumph of Darwinism.

This form of fundamentalist literalism is ancient, and even in the days of the Fathers of the Church there were debates between partisans of the letter and supporters of a suppler hermeneutics, like that of Saint Augustine.

But in the modern world, strict fundamentalism could only be Protestant, given that in order to be a fundamentalist you have to assume that the truth is given by a certain interpretation of the Bible. In the Catholic world it is the authority of the Church that guarantees the validity of the interpretation, and so the Catholic equivalent of Protestant fundamentalism takes if anything the form of traditionalism. I shall omit any consideration of the natural of Muslim and Jewish fundamentalism, which I leave to the experts.

Is fundamentalism necessarily intolerant? On a hermeneutic level it is, but not necessarily on a political one. It is possible to imagine a fundamentalist sect that assumes its own elect to be the privileged possessors of the correct interpretation of the Scriptures, without however indulging in any form of proselytism and consequently without wishing to oblige others to share those beliefs or to fight for a society based on them.

'Integralism', on the other hand, refers to a religious and political position whereby religious principles must become at once the model of political life and the source of the laws of the state. While fundamentalism and integralism are in principle conservative, there are forms of integralism that claim to be progressive and revolutionary. There are Catholic integralist movements that are not fundamentalist, fighting for a society totally inspired by religious principles but without imposing a literal interpretation of the Scriptures, and maybe prepared to accept a theology like that of Teilhard de Chardin.

Political correctness

The nuances can be even subtler. Think of the phenomenon of political correctness in America. This sprang from the desire to encourage tolerance and the recognition of all differences, religious, racial, and sexual, and yet it is becoming a new form of fundamentalism that is affecting everyday language in practically ritual fashion, and that works on the letter at the expense of the spirit – and so you can discriminate against blind persons provided you have the delicacy to call them the 'sightless', and above all you can discriminate against those who do not follow the rules of political correctness.

And racism? Nazi racism was certainly totalitarian, it had pretensions to being scientific, but there was nothing fundamentalist about the doctrine of race. An unscientific racism like that of Italy's Lega Nord does not have the same cultural roots of pseudoscientific racism (in reality it has no cultural roots), yet it is racism.

And intolerance? Can it be reduced to these differences and the kinship between fundamentalism, integralism and racism? There have been nonracist forms of intolerance (like the persecution of heretics or the intolerance of dissidents in dictatorships). Intolerance is something far deeper, lying at the roots of all the phenomena I am considering here. Fundamentalism, integralism, and pseudoscientific racism are theoretical positions that presuppose a doctrine. Intolerance comes before any doctrine. In this sense intolerance has biological roots, it manifests itself among animals as territoriality,

it is based on emotional reactions that are often superficial – we cannot bear those that are different from us, because their skin is a different colour; because they speak a language we do not understand; because they eat frog, dogs, monkeys, pigs, or garlic; because they tattoo themselves, etc.

Intolerance for what is different or unknown is as natural in children as their instinct to possess all they desire. Children are educated gradually to tolerance, just as they are taught to respect the property of others and, even before that, to control their sphincters.

Unfortunately, while children learn to control their own bodies, tolerance is a permanent educational problem with adults, because in everyday life we are forever exposed to the trauma of difference. Academics often deal with the doctrines of difference, but devote insufficient attention to uncontrolled intolerance, because it eludes all definition and critical consideration. Yet the doctrines of difference do not produce uncontrolled intolerance: on the contrary, they exploit a pre-existing and diffuse reservoir of intolerance. Take the witch hunts. This phenomenon was a product not of the 'Dark Ages' but of the modern age.

The *Malleus Maleficarum*, commonly known as *the Hammer of the Witches*, was written six years before the discovery of America and was a contemporary of Florentine humanism; Jean Bodin's *Démonomanie des sorciers* came from the pen of a Renaissance man who wrote after Copernicus. My intention here is not to explain why the modern world produces theoretical

justifications for witch hunts; all I want to do is point out that this doctrine became successful because popular fear of witches was already a reality. That fear can be found in classical antiquity (Horace), in the edict of King Rotari, and in the *Summa theologica* of Saint Thomas. It was considered a part of everyday life, just as the penal code provides for muggers. Without this popular belief a doctrine of witchcraft and the systematic persecution of witches could never have gained currency.

Pseudoscientific anti-Semitism arose in the course of the nineteenth century and became totalitarian anthropology and industrialized genocide only in the twentieth. But it could never have arisen had an anti-Jewish polemic not been under way for centuries, since the days of the Fathers of the Church, or if the common people had not translated anti-Semitism into practice, a situation that endured wherever there was a ghetto. The anti-Jacobin theories of Jewish conspiracy circulating at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not create popular anti-Semitism, but rather exploited a hatred for difference that already existed.

The most dangerous form of intolerance is precisely the kind that arises in the absence of any doctrine, fuelled by elemental drives. This is why it cannot be criticized or curbed by rational argument. The theoretical foun-

"I find the intolerance of Bossi's Lega Nord more dangerous than that of Le Pen's Front National. The historical background of Le Pen's movement is characterized by the perfidy of right-wing intellectuals, while Bossi has nothing but uncontrolled drives."

dations of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* can be confuted by a battery of fairly simple arguments, but if the ideas proposed in it have survived and continue to survive all objections, it is because they are founded on uncontrolled intolerance, which is immune to all criticism. I find the intolerance of Bossi's Lega Nord more dangerous than that of Le Pen's Front National. The historical background of Le Pen's movement is characterized by the perfidy of right-wing intellectuals, while Bossi has nothing but uncontrolled drives.

Look at what happened in Italy a few years ago, when twelve thousand Albanians entered the country in little over a week. The public and official model was one of welcome. Most of those who want to stop this kind of exodus, which could become more than the country can handle, use economic and demographic arguments. But all theories are rendered superfluous by a creeping intolerance that gains new ground with every day that passes. Uncontrolled intolerance is based on a categorical short circuit that is then leased out to every future racist doctrine: if some of the Albanians who have come to Italy in recent years have become thieves and prostitutes (and this is true), then all Albanians are thieves and prostitutes.

This is a frightening short circuit, because it constitutes a constant temptation for all of us: all it takes is for someone to steal our baggage at an airport anywhere in the world, and we go back home saying that the people of that country cannot be trusted.

The most frightening form of intolerance is that of the poor, who are the first victims of difference. There is no racism among the

rich. The rich have produced, if anything, the doctrines of racism. The poor, on the other hand, have produced its practice, which is far more dangerous.

Intellectuals cannot fight uncontrolled intolerance, because when faced with pure unthinking animality, thought finds itself defenceless. But it is too late when war is waged on doctrinal intolerance, for when intolerance is transformed into doctrine the war is already lost, and those who ought to fight it become the first victims. Yet it is here that the challenge lies. To inculcate tolerance in adults who shoot at one another for ethnic and religious reasons is a waste of time. Too late. Therefore uncontrolled intolerance has to be beaten at the roots, through constant education that starts from earliest infancy, before it is written down in a book, and before it becomes a behavioural 'skin' that is too thick and too tough.

Umberto Eco was born in 1932. He is a novelist, columnist, philosopher and media scholar. His published works range from the History of Beauty to the novel The Name of the Rose, which brought him worldwide fame. This English version of this article is based on his book Five Moral Pieces published by Martin Warburg and Secker Ltd in 2001 and translated from the Italian by Alastair McEwan.

Inclusion or hysteria? The success currently being enjoyed by right-wing populist parties is turning the spotlight on Europe's trend towards renationalization. And now the equally diffuse and moderately popular European sense of identity should – nay must – be strengthened still further if we are to build a concept of Europe that is more inclusive of migrants and others. This will not be an easy task, but there is no alternative to creating an identity for Europe as an immigration society. *By Tanja Dückers*

Many Europeans find it difficult to cope with the idea of having both a national and European identity, despite the fact that the issue of 'European identity' has been omnipresent in public debate since the EU's expansion eastwards. I came across a good example of this during a business trip in 2005. I was sent to cover World Youth Day in Cologne for the German weekly *Die Zeit*. Pope Benedict XVI had just been appointed and this was his first visit to Germany since being elected.

Quite unexpectedly, I found myself learning more about nationalism and attitudes towards Europe than about the state of Christianity and the Pope, who tended to remain very much in the background. Rather than seeing an emphasis on the Christian ideals of equality, humility and modesty, my dominant impression was that these boisterous young people were proclaiming the importance of identity and patriotism. The atmosphere was similar to the public screening of a World Cup match. Over here, young people were waving huge red, white and blue flags and chanting "Vive la France"; over there, youthful voices were yelling "Bella Italia!"; and at the back a hundred youths in a sea of red and white flags screamed: "Polska!" They waved their flags at each other, wrapped them around themselves and sported headbands in their national colours.

The European flag waves forlornly

Alongside this conspicuous flaunting of national identity, the global pilgrims were also keen to show off their particular regional characteristics. Bavarians waved the Bavarian – not the German – flag, and travellers from Krakow wrote the name of their city on their Polish flags. But suddenly this sea of flags revealed something very unusual, a rare species. Barely distinguishable from the evening sky over Cologne, the yellow stars of a single European flag peeked out shyly from the mass of Stars 'n' Stripes,

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Ordem e Progresso, Red and White and Black/Red/Gold. Among the hundreds of thousands of flags I only saw this one European flag – and this in 2004, the year when the EU was expanding eastwards. The people waving the EU flag were French. I had a word with them: "You're the only ones with a European flag..." - "Yes, nobody knows where we're from, it's quite a problem, they're all giving us funny looks and some people are saying... some stupid things to us about the EU, but... to be quite honest, we like the European idea." They cast a nervous glance over their shoulders to see if anyone had overheard their heresy.

Over the last decade, nothing has really changed in terms of the popularity of the European identity. On the contrary, the growth experienced by extreme right parties at the last European elections in May 2014 demonstrates a clear trend towards renationalization. And now the equally diffuse and moderately popular European sense of identity should – nay, must – be strengthened still further if we are to build a concept of Europe that is more inclusive of migrants and others. This will not be an easy task, but there is no other way for Germany and Europe to create an identity as a country and continent of immigration in the way that this has been achieved by the USA, Canada and Australia.

But before I begin addressing the issue of an expanded concept of European identity, it should be noted that very few people have really grasped the fact that Germany has become an immigration country and Europe has become an immigration continent. Germany has now taken its place in the premier league of immigration countries.

This ignorance and rejection is currently the biggest hurdle to establishing a European identity that includes migrants. Many Europeans agree with the statement that "immigrants who live here are threatening my personal way of life and my values", as has been shown by a recent study published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Germany entitled *Die Abwertung der Anderen* [Devaluing Others]. The results of the FES study show that in Europe there is widespread hostility towards groups of other people, along with denigrating attitudes and prejudices towards anyone or anything perceived as 'foreign' or 'other'. Public approval of such derogatory statements is lowest in the Netherlands and highest in Poland and Hungary.

When it came to levels of xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism, the study identified only minimal differences between the various countries. Europeans seem to be united by their rejection of foreigners: "Approximately half of all European respondents believed that there are too many immigrants in their country", says the study.

And around half denounce Islam as a religion of intolerance. Prejudice and rejection even exists in the countries of Eastern Europe, where Muslims make up only a small percentage of the population. Islam is viewed with universal suspicion. Particularly in Germany and Poland, the majority of people believe that Islam is incompatible with their culture. In the wake of the terrible attacks in Paris, it seems likely that this trend will only intensify across Europe.

Another example is the treatment of refugees. A taster of this was provided by the refugee debate sparked by the Arab uprisings. The migrants who landed in Italy triggered hysterical discussions about whether Bavaria and Austria should reinstate border controls. The renationalization of European politics that emerged at the start of the financial and currency crisis is now colouring the debate on migration. EU governments are increasingly hammering on about their national interests – or what they think are their national interests. It can be useful for parties to stir up anti-refugee sentiment in the run-up to elections, and there is always an election being held somewhere in Europe.

One of the few politicians to take a positive, forward-looking approach to immigration is Germany's foreign minister. During a panel discussion at Berlin's Gorki Theatre, Franz Walter Steinmeier commented that Germany has finally come to understand that it is a country of immigration and that this factor should enrich its national identity. Many German citizens still fail to understand that immigration is a necessity for Germany. In his book published in autumn 2014 entitled *Die Deutschland-Blase. Das letzte Hurra einer großen Wirtschaftsnation*, Olaf Gersemann, business editor at Germany's Die Welt publishing group, wrote that Germany needs to take in 400,000 migrants every year in order to maintain its population levels.

By establishing a positive image of itself as a continent of immigration, Europe can not only address an economic and demographic imperative, but also seize an opportunity to forge its identity. Over recent years we have observed how overly anxious attempts to forge a national or European identity made up of individual characteristics (such as 'Christian', 'democrat', etc.) have been unconvincing. But of course there are a few misguided souls who are still trying to cling to them.

At this point we are reminded of the unfortunate *Leitkultur* debate, which included arguments about whether Christianity is an essential element of the German identity. Lines were drawn between Christians and Muslims, quite regardless of the fact that almost half of the German population have now turned away from the Christian church. And the argument paid no attention to the lifestyles of religious people: perhaps a devout Catholic has much more in common with a faithful Muslim in terms of values and morals than with an atheist neighbour, who spends all his time at techno raves. In sociological terms, the *Leitkultur* discussion was a squalid little debate, and it is little wonder that it produced no satisfactory results. It was drawn with such a broad brush that in the end German citizens failed to recognize themselves within it.

There have also been countless attempts to construct a European identity through erecting barriers, rather than through professing a European identity in an affirmative way. We should remember the notion expressed in Germany's news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, by the author Durs Grünbein, who claimed that Europeans are more peace-loving and civilized than Americans. When we look back at the 20th century, the idea

"Very few people have really grasped the fact that Europe has become an immigration continent."

of peace-loving Europeans collapses like a house of cards. And even the incredible brutality of the civil war in the Balkans – in which men were forcibly castrated or forced to drink from petrol canisters – did not cause Grünbein to deviate from his belief that Europeans are civilized.

At countless meetings and conferences, we have heard how the world can learn from Europe and why Europe is the home of democracy, human rights and tolerance. But in parallel to these self-congratulatory debates, elsewhere in Europe Greek pensioners were being deprived of their last euro; North Africans were being beaten to within an inch of their lives in Spain; Slovenians were being excluded from clubs in Italy because they were not Italian; Turkish fellow citizens in Berlin were being refused a lease for a garden shed; German guest workers were being ridiculed in Switzerland, and so on.

Other so-called leading public figures agreed with the succinct and glibly dualistic theory from the US that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. This theory was formerly applied to men and women, which highlights even more the idea's lack of substance. The tendency of Europeans to only think of themselves as Europeans when they are being criticized by others (Americans, Chinese, Russians, etc.) is a sign of a keen desire for a sense of identity that is rarely expressed in public.

So what does it mean for the weak European identity if another aspect is added to it? First of all, it means we have to distance ourselves more clearly from the "We are not..." types of definitions. Identities that encourage exclusion such as 'We are not Muslims,

not Indians, not Africans' are becoming increasingly less credible and true.

A hub between East and West

Instead, Europe needs to focus on its place in the world as a hub between East and West, a global centre for trading and transiting, a melting pot. Europe has always been a busy trading region, a melting pot, a place where discoveries have been made thanks to contact with others, a centre for the exchange of ideas and for disputes – sometimes leading to armed conflict. There is no other region in the world where so many small countries (in terms of surface area) are packed so closely together. There is no other region whose geography is so broken up into tiny fragments and so interconnected. After Australia, Europe is the world's smallest continent. It is a particularly densely populated region, if we ignore Northern Scandinavia and Spain's mountainous centre.

There is no point in trying to claim that Europeans are a peace-loving people. It would be more honest to recognize the bitter truth of Europe's extremely warlike history. It is hardly surprising that Europeans are having a hard time pinning down their European identity. Over the course of its history, the continent has been shaped by so many different influences, from the Moors in Spain to over 500 years of Turkish rule in Bulgaria. Using terminology that highlights exclusion only leads to false statements in historical terms. Europe can only understand itself as a busy, turbulent global marketplace, a multi-ethnic state, and it can

only represent a nomadic form of nationalism. Europeans could be viewed as multicultural by birth – if they allow themselves this openness and do not deny it out of fear, as is the case with the Pegida supporters who are currently demonstrating against Islam in parts of Eastern Germany.

The recently deceased German sociologist Ulrich Beck was one of the first to think of Europeans as cosmopolitan people. According to Beck – and also Jürgen Habermas – from its conception, the EU has been the most progressive political structure in a world that is caught between harking back to old nationalisms and the ubiquitous phenomena of globalization and the erection of barriers, driven forward by economic considerations. But, for Beck, Europe did not mean the end of the old nation states. He believed that the new Europe would embrace the old while gently changing it. The One – the transnational identity – does not exclude the Other – the original identity.

I would like to take Beck's matryoshka principle one stage further, ("the European identity houses the national identity, the national identity houses the regional identity"). This is where my idea of 'nomadic nationalism' comes in. First of all, this phrase indicates that over the course of their history, almost all Europeans have grown up in a region with many cultural and ethnic differences.

Nomadic nationalism should not be con-

fused with anti-nationalism. Anti-nationalism seems innocuous enough, but it tends to take away more than it gives, whereas people are enriched by nomadic nationalism. In my own case, it means that I am proud of the typical Rhineland sense of humour that my father brought to our family. When I am in the Münsterland, I identify with my mother's Westphalian heritage and go back home to Berlin laden down with pumpernickel (a type of black bread) and other Westphalian delicacies. One part of my identity has its roots in the Rhineland and Westphalia. But I was born and raised in Berlin, and later on I spent a year at school in the USA. I have always been fascinated by Berlin's history. Films showing Berlin in ruins make me feel physically sick because I identify so strongly with my home town.

But after living in the US, I find it hard to cope with feeling closed in. I long for broad horizons and loads of light. And now I often eat toast with peanut butter and jelly for breakfast. This seemingly banal culinary detail exists alongside rather less banal feelings. I cannot stand blanket anti-Americanism – particularly not from people who have never even glanced at the American constitution and who often have never visited the country. I protested about the NSA affair outside the German Chancellery and yet I think of myself as a transatlantic leftist. I have also lived in a few other countries, mainly in Eastern Europe, but also Spain. But it is not necessary to experience so many different countries in order to develop a sense of nomadic nationalism. It just takes a class trip, a vacation, a pen pal, a friend in a chat room, or sometimes just an idea about

"By establishing a positive image of itself as a continent of immigration, Europe can not only address an economic and demographic imperative, but also seize an opportunity to forge its identity."

a country (because nationalism is always totally subjective and irrational) to gain a broader sense of identity.

Nomadic nationalists are not post-modern, anything-goes types of people. They do not create illusory worlds in eclectic fashion, but look for what they as individuals want to feel proud of, what has impressed them in the various countries that they have lived in or visited. These things provide them with an internal guideline.

One size fits all?

Nationalism is not a one-size-fits-all concept. A migrant does not like the political conditions in Eritrea just because he comes from Eritrea and for a long time knew nothing else. He is trying to get away from this habitual way of thinking. But after thirty years he doesn't have to like German food more than Eritrean food. He may get used to eating with a knife and fork, but in fact he would rather eat his warm vegetable pitta with his hands. He is not a nihilist who has no interest in collective values, achievements and performances, but rather he defends certain good things about his region or country to other people. But when deciding what he feels belongs to him, he is not tied to a passport, a place of residence or a particular country.

Migrants can feel at home here if they adopt this kind of open approach to national identity. But it is necessary to be open in order to be able to – and want to – expand and modify one's own sense of identity. Of course it is possible to live in Europe like on

a desert island, in a kind of parallel society when it comes to identity. But building these kinds of barriers takes energy and results in isolation and self-imposed cultural deprivation.

There is no denying the differentiation of society, which of course also includes renationalisation and the trend towards returning to the provinces. In an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, political scientist and journalist Antje Schrupp wrote: "People are not only diversifying (...) along the lines of gender, but also in line with other demographic characteristics such as age, religion, sexual identity, body shape, and so on. In all these aspects, there is a strong need for the previously invisible, the formerly marginalised, to be finally seen and recognised in all its difference. They want to have a public presence, to be named and taken into account. Fat people post photos of themselves online and blog about their experiences; Muslim women wear the headscarf more frequently than previously; old people no longer try to conceal their age; gays and lesbians marry and celebrate their love in public."

The ongoing diversification of the concept of man ties in perfectly with an individualised or nomadic nationalism that cannot be included nor excluded because it does not relate to a homogenous group.

In spite of the recognition afforded to differences large and small, there are still a few terms that Europe as a whole can agree on (moving beyond my use of words such as hub and trading centre), and which could be

"Migrants can feel at home here if they adopt this kind of open approach to national identity."

part of an outward-looking, collective European sense of nation. It is not possible for me to mention all the historical references in this respect, from the Renaissance to the Thirty Years' War, so I will concentrate on the events of the 20th and 21st centuries. The common experiences of the First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust are collective experiences that have affected all Europeans. And the bipolar world order of the Cold War was also experienced and suffered by West, Central and East Europeans, even if in different ways.

The same is true of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the removal of the divisions that split Europe in two. Apart from Belarus, every country in Europe is a democracy (it is questionable whether Russia should be counted as part of Europe – its political system could be viewed as an authoritarian state or, in similar euphemistic vein, a managed democracy). This is a key commonality that forges identity. And again, apart from Belarus, every country in Europe has abolished the death penalty (though this is not a priori a sign of democracy) and, at least at statutory level, operates policies that are tolerant towards minorities.

In Europe (with certain limitations) there is generally a separation of state and religion. There is a need for some degree of reform in this respect – for example the German government still collects taxes for the Christian churches, pays the salaries of religious education teachers, funds church-run child care and gives financial support to bishops. If they are to feel a sense of belonging, migrants have to at least recognize these few crucial characteristics that are common to

all European states.

It is to be hoped that as many Europeans as possible will open themselves up to the idea of Europe as a migrant-friendly continent and play their part in creating an identity that is not too narrow in conceptual or intellectual terms, so that people from other continents have a chance of feeling that they belong, in principle at least, and have an identity as Europeans in the sense of nomadic nationalism.

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It's a crazy world – I'm keeping my distance

We should distance ourselves from atrocities. Of late, I've been reading this more and more frequently. We open up the newspaper and another journalist tells us that we should have nothing to do with certain groups. For example, we have to distance ourselves from beheadings, the current modus operandi of Islamic State terrorists. The atrocities that we have to distance ourselves from are generally committed by Muslims. Muslims also have to distance themselves. Although Islamists belong to the Islamist group and Muslims belong to the Muslim group, Islamists are never called on to distance themselves from Islamist acts of violence. But there are Islamists who reject violence. They are Islamists who want a state's laws and regulations to be built on Islamism. There are in fact a great many of them, and they can be found in many different countries. Indeed, the German government has diplomatic relations with some of these Islamists. As long as they are not beheading people and have the money to buy our goods and weapons...Anyway, I will never understand why Muslims have to distance themselves from Islamists. Because Muslims are people of faith, while Islamists are political terrorists – criminals. The ideology behind criminal acts always comes from a constructed view of the world. A construction is the essence of criminality; it provides moral justification for one's actions and prevents the emergence of questions of guilt. Is it conceivable that all men should distance themselves from actions such as those committed by Islamic State? Beheadings are always carried out by men. Terrorism is almost exclusively carried out by men. Calling for them to distance themselves is of course a new form of racism. Because now upstanding citizens are only upstanding citizens if they keep on distancing themselves. Otherwise we have to assume that they are secretly in favour of cruelty and crimes against humanity. Behind every doorbell bearing the name Yilmaz or Yildirim there reside citizens who have not loudly distanced themselves. Except for recently, when devout Muslims began praying on the streets of Berlin. As a sign of their distance from the acts of cruelty committed by Islamic State, and at the same time as a plea for solidarity, in the event that they too are afflicted by atrocities. When did this happen? When did our fellow citizens and neighbours become suspects? Why did they receive a visit from government officials for being so well-behaved as to distance themselves (and throw themselves into the dust in front of everyone, sorry, creep out of their 'dark backyards' to pray 'against terror and racism' on the streets). It's a crazy world!

Yes, distancing is a complicated matter. But it's also a fad. I'm sure it won't last much longer, and I am also called upon to distance myself, despite the fact that I am an upstanding, well-behaved columnist who is loyal to my country. I hereby distance myself as a preventive measure against future atrocious columns. Should my colleague Harald Martenstein every write something that is not in accordance with the basic freedoms of our country, I clearly distance myself from him and as a sign of my distancing I will write my Friday column on the street instead of in my room looking out over my back yard. Perhaps then I'll get a visit from our new Minister for Culture, Tim Renner, or from Professor Monika Grütters, Minister for Culture and Media, and have our photo taken on a German day of action called "Columns Against Terror and Racism", which I hereby call for. I think all meat eaters should distance themselves from the atrocities committed by the meat industry. Because all violence against animals is committed in the name of non-vegetarians. Animals are kept in terrible conditions and barbarically slaughtered just so that people can eat cheap meat. And while we're on the subject of animal protection, of course I totally distance myself from the abhorrent plays that are staged in our theatre. An example of these was the new sex play that was recently staged. The actor Thomas Wodianka, who I was secretly in love with (I say 'was' because, according to this view, it is no longer possible to have a girly crush), wore a black, see-through mesh garment. On his head he wore a blow-up animal head. An elephant? A rhino? I couldn't tell from where I was sitting. The trunk rose up into the air like the minaret of the Sultan Ahmed mosque. I'm saying nothing about the other trunk. In short – I am distancing myself from it. Because no elephant in this world deserves to be caricatured, abused and stigmatized in a sex play at our theatre.

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Across the Mare Nostrum to the promised land

While Europeans ponder building higher walls, keeping immigrants at bay and protecting Europe's cultural values, the Chinese are investing at will. They are buying palaces in Venice, turning them into hotels and thus making money out of Europe's cultural treasures. Author Slavenka Drakulić set off in search of clues to Italy, a country that has traditionally been a country of emigration but that today is itself a magnet for refugees and migrants. *By Slavenka Drakulić*

To its people, Venice is probably at its most beautiful when seen from afar, like in one of Canaletto's eighteenth century *vedute*. On an autumn afternoon, when its magnificent palaces are reflected in the shimmering water, Venice, in all its unreal beauty, really does look like a movie set. Indeed Venice today is not much more than a stage setting.

When my first floor neighbour at the palazzo where I had rented an apartment finally came downstairs, I pulled shut the heavy front door. In her late eighties, Signora Immacolata walked with a cane. We headed down Calle dei Fabbri for her to show me the nearest supermarket. Our progress was slow, not only because of her but because at nine o'clock in the morning the street leading from the Rialto Bridge to Saint Mark's Square was already packed with tourists. Diminutive and stooped, dressed in black, Signora Immacolata barely managed to make her way through the crowds, dragging her shopping cart behind her. When we reached the first little bridge she stopped. Holding onto the railing, she barely managed to haul herself onto it. There are two such bridges crossing the canal on the way to the supermarket and both of them are stepped. Even though the Co-op supermarket near the Campo Santa Maria Formosa is only a leisurely five or six-minute walk from her house, it takes Signora Immacolata at least twenty minutes to get there. And when we arrive we find a long line at the checkout counter, because every budget-conscious tourist invariably seems to find their way here. All in all, it takes the old lady at least an hour to do her shopping. "And it's like that every day..." she sighs. Her legs are still okay but she cannot carry things up the stairs. Luckily, her badante, the Croatian woman who looks after her, is due back soon.

There used to be a bakery near her apartment in Corte Gragolina, and little general stores, and a butcher's and a green grocer's, and a newsstand, and a cobbler – in short,

everything needed for everyday life was close at hand. Now they have all been transformed into souvenir shops. Her street is a continuous succession of small shops selling fake Murano glass, pizzerias charging eight euros a slice, tourist restaurants, bars and pastry shops. The entire area around Saint Mark's Square has only two supermarkets, one smaller than the other, and, I think, a single post office that I had a hard time finding.

"Venice is not a city you can live in normally anymore," says my neighbour, a bank clerk who lives in the building across from ours. "You can't make it to work or to an appointment on time in the morning because it's so crowded that somebody my age simply can't push his way onto the vaporetto. The whole infrastructure is geared toward tourists, from the prices in stores and restaurants to the theatre performances in English and concerts of classical music in churches where the musicians wear Baroque costume. Property is absurdly expensive, and there are fewer and fewer supermarkets, schools, kindergartens, clinics, hospitals."

From waiter to care worker

My neighbour is right, of course. In the past fifty years, the historical centre of Venice has lost some 60 per cent of its population. Based on the current number of residents in the comune as a whole, less than 1 in 4 Venetians, mostly older people, live in the city's historical centre. Just a few decades ago, 150,000 people lived in the old part of town, but today that number is barely 60,000, and it is steadily declining. This is partly because Venice is too expensive to live in and people are moving to outlying areas, to Mestre for instance, and partly because there is no work for the young and educated. Venice has an excellent university, lots of young people come here to study, but they don't stay. "If you don't want to be a waiter or a maid or to help the elderly, you don't have much of a choice. And even those jobs have been taken by foreigners, by immigrants," says my neighbour resignedly.

Still, there's no need to shed a tear for the Venetians. Some are earning a pretty penny from renting out apartments, while others have sold their property and are now nibbling away at their capital. The fact remains, however, that for those who live here – and it is an aging population – life is becoming increasingly hard. One has to survive the onslaught of millions of tourists every year, that mass of people pouring through the streets of this magnificent city of canals and little alleyways that are rarely more than three or four metres wide. Venetians know only too well that they are living not in a city but in a museum. And that Venice is becoming less and less a real, living city, and more and more a museum of Europe's past, embodying all the glory, wealth, power, beauty and art of times long past. That is precisely why millions of tourists come to see it. The mass tourism industry was the first to realize that there was money to be made, not only out of the splendour of Venice but also its importance as an open-air museum. At the same time, the Venice of

> "This is a lively town.
> If Venice is where old Europe is dying, then Bari is where new Europe is emerging. It is one of the entry points for immigrants to Europe."

today is a perfect metaphor for Europe as it once was, the Europe whose culture and values Europeans swear by, take pride in and wish to preserve.

Bari, in the far south of Italy, offers a very different picture from Venice. It is still warm. It is the end of September, but the holidaymakers have gone. On a Sunday evening in the Piazza del Ferrarese in the old part of town, the incidental tourist will find the locals perched on a low wall or sitting in little cafés drinking beer or strolling around the square, which serves as a kind of corso, a promenade. The several thousand people gathered in the square look as if they all know each other, children are playing tag at nine o'clock in the evening, teenagers are cooling themselves off with an ice-cream and their nicely dressed parents, and even grandparents, are standing around talking loudly, gesticulating, like in one of Vittorio De Sica's black-and-white movies from the 1960s. This is a lively town. If Venice is where old Europe is dying, then Bari is where new Europe is emerging. It is one of the entry points for immigrants to Europe.

Twenty years ago, in the summer of 1991, an Albanian freighter called the Vlora sailed into the port of Bari carrying more than twenty thousand refugees. Older readers will probably remember that Albanian exodus across the Adriatic Sea, prior to their 'velvet revolution', if the Albanians ever had one. A picture of the huge freighter crammed with people made the rounds of the world at the time. Sometimes, a single photograph can symbolize a particular time or a historical event. So it was with Jeff Widener's photograph of a lone man facing a column of tanks in Tiananmen Square. And with Nick Ut's picture of the naked little Vietnamese girl and her brothers scorched by napalm; with Eddie Adams's photograph of a police chief in Saigon shooting dead a Vietcong with his pistol; and with the recent photo of prisoners being tortured at Abu Ghraib. And so it is with Luca Turi's famous photograph of the Vlora. His exhibition, *Flight of the Eagles,* marking the twentieth anniversary of the event, had just opened in the foyer of the Teatro Petruzzelli. As the Vlora sails in, people throng the decks and railings, clusters of human beings hang from the smoke-stack, from the ropes, from the masts. In the next picture they are within reach of the shore and are jumping into the water, swimming, as if afraid that the land will slip from their grasp. And then there is a superb but terrifying picture of a vast mass of people, taken from above, who have disembarked and are on the waterfront, standing under the scorching sun. This scene of 20,000 people frozen just at the moment they have finally made it onto dry land looks positively biblical.

Scapegoats of Europe's anti-immigration policy

Those years saw a wave of some 100,000 Albanians enter Italy – today their number

stands at about half a million. Since Romania joined the European Union, there has also been an incoming wave of almost a million Romanians. Roughly ten per cent of the Romanians are said to be Roma, the latest scapegoats of Europe's anti-immigration policy. The West deports them and revokes their residence permits (as in Italy and France), while in the East they are fenced into ghettos, beaten up and murdered (as in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary).

And yet, a mere five or six years ago, foreigners in Italy, and indeed in Europe, did not pose the problem they do today. Anti-immigration, and in particular anti-Muslim hysteria, intensified after the publication of controversial caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in 2005, assuming serious proportions with the onset of the recession in 2008. The people of Bari were supportive and helpful, because at the end of the nineteenth century millions of Italy's poor emigrated from the city and from the province of Puglia to America, the promised land, where in a matter of two or three generations they became completely assimilated. Some hundred years later, Italy had become the promised land for other immigrants.

Of late, Bari has served as a transit town for immigrants, more for refugees than for economic immigrants. Accommodated near the airport, they are part of the latest wave of some forty thousand refugees who have reached the island of Lampedusa from Tunisia and Libya, following the political upheavals there. The authorities house the new immigrants in one of the Reception Centres for Asylum-Seekers (CARA) and then a com-

mission decides on their fate. Italy has eight such CARA centres, thirteen Centres for Identification and Expulsion (CIE) and seven First-Asylum and Identification Centres (CPSA), with only a few commissions deciding the future of these people. Last summer, Bari was again cast into the public eye because of the refugees, more precisely the asylum-seekers from CIE. At the beginning of August, hundreds took to the streets on the outskirts of town, stopping trains and clashing with the police. The result was 80 injured and 29 arrests.

I ask my new acquaintances about the incident. Every day at lunch time they gather at a bar, the Il Borghese, on the corner of Via de Rossi and Corso Vittorio Emanuele: lawyers Dario Belluccio and Maria Pia Vigilante from Giraffe, an organization that gives legal advice to immigrants; Maddalena Tulanti, the editor of the local paper Corriere del Mezzogiorno; social worker Silvana Serini; Erminia Rizzi from the local Immigrants Advice Bureau. This is a particularly difficult problem, says Dario, a human rights activist and one of the few people to have access to the CIE, which is off limits to both lawyers and journalists. When the Libyans arrived, they came with a smaller number of people from Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and some other African countries, who had been working and living in Libya for years. Under the law, they are not entitled to war refugee status like the Libyans, but are treated according to their country of origin, regardless of how long they may have lived and worked in Libya. They therefore have no chance of ob-

taining a temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Not only do their cases take agonizingly long to resolve, but in the meantime the authorities are treating them like common criminals. Deprived of contact with the outside, their living conditions are worse than prison, says Dario. By taking to the street they were trying to draw attention to their impossible situation.

Among the refugees in Lampedusa are a large number of children. Silvana looks after unaccompanied minors, in other words parentless child refugees. She tells me about two brothers, war refugees from Afghanistan, who came as teenagers. They were illiterate but now are finishing school and working, she says proudly. Then she takes out the latest issue of the weekly *l'Espresso*; in it there is a report by Fabrizio Gatti entitled *A Children's Prison,* about 225 children and adolescents imprisoned for months on end, housed with adults at the CPSA camp in Lampedusa. They live in squalid conditions, without even minimum care, even though these are traumatized children, some of whom have not only witnessed the violent deaths of their parents but also have gone hungry and thirsty for days. In the six months between March and the end of August 2011, 707 children landed on this island, some of them mere toddlers or in-

"They have no chance of obtaining a temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Not only do their cases take agonizingly long to resolve, but in the meantime the authorities are treating them like common criminals."

fants, while others were born on Lampedusa itself. Their situation is even worse and even more uncertain.

Don Angelo, a priest at the church of San Sabino (right next to the city beach of Pane e Pomadoro), is the best address in town when refugees need to get help, I'm told. He had just graduated from the seminary when the Albanians disembarked; he saw them on the waterfront and in the stadium, where 10,000 people were detained. The authorities released them only after the intervention of Don Tonino (the well-known pacifist and bishop Antonio Bello). Don Angelo had also been on humanitarian missions during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This tall man with red hair and a disarming smile talks about "institutional racism", about the reasons for the frustration of the rioters, who feel that they are utterly discriminated against compared with the Libyans and Tunisians, even in terms of the colour of their skin. He confirms Dario's assessment that they live in impossible conditions, in complete uncertainty as to the length and outcome of the legal procedure to which they are subject. "Their anger is contagious, it will spread to other centres. This is no longer a situation where immigrants gratefully accept a crust of bread, and then keep quiet and wait. They want an answer." Indeed, even before Bari, embittered by the way the authorities were treating them, immigrants protested in Mineo, then in Crotone, but also in the north of Italy. "It's about despair, not some externally orchestrated revolt. It's incredible that the authorities don't see that," Don Angelo tells me.

The gulf between the refugees and the authorities is one side of the coin. But a gulf has also emerged between the locals and the refugees. The inhabitants of Lampedusa, which is closer to Tunisia than it is to Sicily and has a population of just over 5,000, initially pulled the drowning people out of the sea, saving hundreds of lives, and helping refugees to survive. But last September, by which time no less than 40,000 Africans had come onto the island, things went sour. The locals turned against the refugees when the latter set fire to the CPSA, the First Asylum Centre, where about 1,000 refugees were accommodated (far more than the Centre's actual capacity). They were hoping to force the authorities to speed up the resolution of their status; some twenty people were injured in clashes with the police.

Things are turning sour

The fact is that the government is too slow in keeping its promise either to transfer them onto the mainland or deport them; and so, after the rioting, the mayor declared that he would not let a single more refugee onto the island. As a result, this isolated, neglected island became a kind of victim itself, a hostage to the authorities' machinations. Because something had to have gone very wrong for the locals to switch from solidarity to disgust in a matter of a few months. Something had to have greatly changed for those same Lampedusans, who had been the first to reach out and rescue hundreds of drowning refugees, now to hurl stones at

them, shouting "throw them back into the sea, they're all criminals!" Clearly this small island community, which lives in difficult conditions itself, cannot carry such a heavy burden without help from the state.

Emanuele Crialese's film *Terraferma* (*Dry Land*), which won a special prize at the 2011 Venice Film Festival, is about precisely this clash between humane principles and the law after a group of refugees arrive on just such a small, unnamed island. I saw it in Bari the day after it premiered. There were only ten of us in the audience at the 6.30 pm showing. Maybe it was too early for the movies, maybe it was too hot. Or maybe the viewing audience was so small because the film deals with a complex issue.

The island is inhabited by fishermen. But since they can't eke out a living from fishing alone, in the summer they live off of tourism. When the sea disgorged the first refugees from North Africa onto their island, it complicated their lives, corroded family relationships and raised moral dilemmas. The refugees are not only a 'bad advertisement' for this little tourist paradise, they bring the kind of problems the locals are unused to and cannot understand. One fisherman puts it this way: "Can it be that the state is prohibiting us from rescuing people from the sea? All our lives we've done just the opposite, and if this is how it is now, then our ways are above this law."

"A beautiful, very humane movie," an older gentleman unexpectedly remarked to me as we were leaving the movie theatre. There were several films on the subject at Mostra this year, films like Andrea Segra's *Io sono*

Li, Francesco Patierno's *Cose dell'altro mondo* and the great Italian director Ermanno Olmi's *Il villaggio di cartone*. Much is also being written about the problems of immigrants and refugees, not only by well-known commentators but also by sociologists, politologists and writers like Gabriele del Grande and Luca Rastello, to name just two. But the refugees themselves, those who have stayed on in Italy, are also writing. People like Elvira Mujcic, originally from Bosnia, and Igiaba Scego, whose parents are from Somalia. In Italy, there seems to be far greater social and especially artistic awareness of the refugees and immigrants than is to be found in the official policy, which favours closing the borders to them.

Many people in Italy still remember the exodus that ravaged whole swathes of the country, especially at the start of the twentieth century. Italians know that few people leave their country, culture and language for the sake of pure adventurism. They emigrate out of brute necessity, usually to escape war or economic poverty, prepared to risk even their own lives as they set off into the unknown, very much like today's North African newcomers. In the past 150 years, 18 million people have emigrated from Italy, a figure equivalent to the population of a medium-sized European country. Mostly, they went to America – more than five million of them, far exceeding the number of Irish emigrants.

"There seems to be far greater social and especially artistic awareness of the refugees and immigrants than is to be found in the official policy, which favours closing the borders to them."

Visiting the Museum of Italian Emigration in Rome, I saw why documenting emigration (and immigration) is important for the history of a nation, and for understanding its underlying reasons. Located to the side of the Il Vittoriano monument, on the Piazza Dell'ara Coeli, the entrance to the museum is inconspicuous, certainly not a place where you will see swarms of tourists. No, mostly it's Italians you see here, walking around, looking at the video archive, the library, the rooms exhibiting frayed suitcases and yellowed shipping charts, with passenger lists and identity cards and passports, faded photographs from home, and the first photographs of arrival in their new, far-away countries and continents. Perhaps these visitors are remembering their ancestors, or perhaps they are looking for their names on the lists. Letters, diaries, sports clubs, folklore groups – they all tell individual stories of the despair and hopes of these impoverished peasants, who left the south for an unknown world, on their own, some barely fourteen years old. Just like the desperate of today. This was all just a few generations ago; there are still people who talk in front of the camera about the drama of leaving, about relatives or parents standing on the pier, waving until they become mere dots on the horizon.

As I walked around the museum, I thought of the Haus am Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin. There you can see the many different ways that the East Germans tried to escape to West Berlin, ringed by a 140 kilometre-long wall. Some of these attempts were quite incredible, from flying with a

balloon to digging a tunnel under the wall, smuggling people in the trunk of a car or swimming the Baltic Straits.

At the beginning of the movie *Terraferma*, a flimsy overcrowded boat sinks and all that is left floating on the water are letters, photographs, documents, toothbrushes... Shouldn't such items be collected as symbols of identity and exhibited in a similar museum dedicated to the refugees of North Africa? Shouldn't it collect testimonies to the ordeals of those who suffocated on deck, who drank urine just to survive, who threw living people over the railings? That, of course, would be a museum dedicated to suffering. But it is something the refugees deserve, wherever they may come from.

So I was glad when, not even a week later, I spotted a small news item in an Italian newspaper: "Pieces of wood, family photographs, pages from the Quran, shoes, food boxes, music cassettes... items salvaged from the sea or left behind on the boats that carry thousands of immigrants across the Mediterranean every year, all this can be found in a small room, ten square metres in size, which forms the heart of the museum of immigration set up in Lampedusa by volunteers of the Askavusa association." It was founded by a local artist, Giacomo Sferlazzo, in the hope that others would join the initiative.

You can also find immigration figures at the Museum of Italian Emigration. Italy has 3,891,295 immigrants, accounting for 6.5 per cent of the population. Caritas Migrantes gives different figures, placing them at roughly five million immigrants or 7 per cent of the population. Interestingly – and

this was confirmed by many of the people I met – Islamophobia is not prevalent here and fear of Muslims is not used as a means of propaganda as it is in the north of the continent. However, activists like Don Angelo and some journalists caution that a different kind of generalization is at work – both the law and the media criminalize refugees as a group. By and large, the authorities treat them like common criminals, even though they have done nothing to deserve it. This is one of the reasons why they are protesting. And even that is a problem, because Europe is still not used to refugees protesting. Europeans expect only gratitude.

Public television plays an especially interesting role in the policy of fear. Citing research conducted by Demos&Pi, *La Repubblica* writes that in the first four months of 2011, in Italy news about immigrants accounted for 13.9 per cent of news programs on TG1. For the sake of comparison, this figure stands in France at 1.6 per cent on France 2 television and in Germany at 0.6 per cent on ARD. It is worth noting, however, that Italy was experiencing a so-called 'invasion' of immigrants at the time. All the same, the heavy news coverage did not have a decisive impact on the viewing audience. According to the same source, only six per cent of Italians cited immigrants as their main concern, compared to 55 per cent who cited the cost of living. "This goes to show how the sense of insecurity is a political and media 'construction', which introduces and stokes 'fear of others' and increases the already present feeling of insecurity that exists

"Fear of Muslims is not used as a means of propaganda as it is in the north of the continent."

A warm welcome to the concentration camp

The idea of accommodating refugees in former concentration camps is certainly newsworthy. The mayor of the German town of Schwerte, Heinrich Böckelühr, a member of the conservative CDU party, had this idea when his town was allocated 21 refugees. This small town near Dortmund simply had nowhere to put the refugees. But then he had an idea. Why not use Buchenwald and its outpost in Schwerte-Ost to accommodate asylum-seekers? It may be a 40-minute walk from the town centre and in the middle of an industrial estate, but still... The main thing is that these poor people have a roof over their heads and somewhere to call home. If the refugees go for a walk around the grounds, they will come across a memorial. On the ground there is a sculpture depicting a section of railway track. Trapped beneath the track are naked, emaciated bodies, their faces contorted by screams. It commemorates the Polish labourers who were forced to work in this camp. The local newspapers report that the first eleven refugees have already moved in, with the rest to follow once the barracks have been renovated. I have seen photos of the accommodation. It's a dump. This is my point. In Germany and the rest of Europe we have many splendid, lovingly-maintained concentration camps, so why are we putting refugees in ramshackle camps? We should be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves. As Germans, we pride ourselves on our virtues of cleanliness and safety, but when people arrive from bombed-out countries we put them up in filthy camps.
Just recently we commemorated the liberation of Auschwitz. Couldn't the mayor of Schwert talk to his

colleagues in Oswiecim, the Polish town that is home to Auschwitz? Isn't it possible to live in Auschwitz?
The people of Schwerte don't understand what all the fuss is about. The papers are full of it, at home and abroad. American public broadcasters NPR called it "A German plan to house refugees in an old concentration camp". Apparently the decision was passed with a large majority on the Schwerte town council. The mayor commented: "We can't allow all these buildings to be taboo seventy years after the Second World War". That's true. But what can we do with these stigmatised buildings?
People are not allowed to run around or picnic at the Berlin Holocaust Memorial, but then that's Berlin. They are always a bit stricter than is really necessary. They want to preserve the dignity of those who died. You're also not allowed to have any kind of celebrations on the grass in front of the Reichstag. They want to preserve the dignity of parliament. But a concentration lager has no dignity in itself, it only has a past. The mayor believes this past has been adequately dealt with, as demonstrated by the memorial of the rails and the trapped people.
It occurs to me that the whole Ruhr area is a disused coalmine. Couldn't refugees be accommodated underground? It's a long way from town, but at least it's quiet. And perhaps there are some disused graves whose 20-year right of use has expired. They could lie down in those. At least in summer. Anyone arriving from a warzone will love the heavenly peace and quiet. And if the prisons weren't so full we could put the asylum-seekers behind bars with the criminals. At least they'd have some company.

Hospital morgues would of course be a blessing for cash-strapped local authorities. They must have the odd cold chamber free at night. You can survive in there if you've got a warm blanket. People who have lost their homes would be happy to have their own bed. And it's always spotlessly clean. Local politics means being smart, thinking outside the box. Context is everything. If people are no longer being wiped out in concentration camps but can now sleep there peacefully, cook their meals, let their children play, then it is now a former concentration camp with a human face.
Press reports suggest that similar plans are underway in Augsburg in the south of Germany. Accommodating refugees in disused concentration camps is the in thing. Once the old camps are full, we can always build new ones. Of course not horrible concentration camps, but nice ones. Will the people of Schwerte be welcoming their refugees with balloons and cake? With the mayor bidding them "a warm welcome to the former concentration camp of Schwerte-Ost"?
People can say and think what they want. But this issue of concentration camps and refugees is certainly newsworthy.

Mely Kiyak is a journalist and political columnist. See full biography on page 224.

for economic and (un)employment reasons," writes author Ilvo Diamanti.

There are numerous humanitarian and civic organizations, such as Fortress Europe, that advocate the rights of immigrants and offer them very tangible assistance. These organizations believe that immigrants will keep coming regardless of increasingly restrictive, and even immoral, legislation; regardless of the walls erected and the other obstacles awaiting them. Because where they come from things are even worse. Immigration policy should, therefore, be rational rather than based on fear, because the only ones to profit from the latter are politicians and parties that promise the impossible. Fear of immigrants is the yeast on which they grow.

In Rome, refugees live behind the Termini train station, in a part of town known as Esquilino. I realized how different Esquilino is from other neighbourhoods in when I took a walk down Via Carlo Alberto toward the Piazza Vittorio Emanuele. There I saw something that I last saw maybe fifty years ago in Yugoslavia: a street knife-grinder. The dark-skinned young man was hunched over a big whetstone, sharpening a knife for a woman leaning against a doorway, smoking, waiting for him to finish. They were speaking in Romanian.

This is where my friend Alessandra lives. Admittedly, you can't see the crowds in Piazza Vittorio Emanuele from the big balcony of her top, fifth-floor apartment. The piazza is ringed with shops selling all and sundry, not that there seem to be many buyers. The shops are mostly owned by the Chinese. But as soon as she walks out of her building,

Alessandra finds herself surrounded by people from different continents, of different colour, speaking different languages. She took in a little boy from Cameroon, but after a few years his mother took him back. Looking at David's photograph on her desk, I think of the difference between Europe and the States: had he arrived in America instead of Italy, this same little boy would have become American. In Italy neither he, nor indeed his offspring, will ever be Italian, citizens of Italy. But his white peers, whose parents come from Albania or Bosnia, will become Italian, as will their progeny.

Alessandra is a psychologist and works as a volunteer on projects that help immigrants adjust to and integrate into their new environment by learning the language, going to school and finding a job. The Fund for the Social Inclusion of Immigrants supports a whole range of these programmes and activities. Alessandra shows me a book and DVD called *La meta di me (Half of me),* the product of one project that focused on the second generation, the children of immigrants. There are plenty of such initiatives. Experience tells her that most of this generation will remain in Italy and that they need to be given a chance to become equal citizens as soon as possible. She thinks that immigration policy is all wrong. The law allowing immigrants to be joined by their families has been abolished, so that most economic immigrants and war refugees are young men, who wind up facing a whole slew of problems, from depression to alcoholism, drug addiction and crime. They have no motivation and no goal. Brute survival is not enough of an

incentive. Alessandra referred to something I had heard mentioned before – the experience of Italians in the United States. When you give people an opportunity to establish themselves in a society, they usually take it. To be sure, the American melting-pot offers a different model of integration; but equally, says Alessandra, immigration policy should be based both on the principle of solidarity and humaneness, and on the principle of mutual benefit.

Mutual benefit

One example of mutual benefit is Elvira Mujcic, a young woman who was not even thirteen when she came to Italy as a refugee from Srebrenica. A high school and college graduate, today she is a successful young Italian writer – for it is in Italian that she writes. As we lunch on *melanzane alla parmiggianna* in a little restaurant in Via del Boschetto, we talk about identity. She sees no contradiction between her Bosnian origins and the fact that she writes in Italian; indeed, she speaks it better than her mother tongue, which she periodically apologies for in the course of our conversation. Identity is not some rigid mould you fall into or not. On the contrary, we talk about how one identity, let's say Bosnian, does not rule out the other, Italian. She loves Bosnian food, but she loves the Italian language. She no

> "Had the young boy arrived in America instead of Italy, this same little boy would have become American. In Italy neither he, nor indeed his offspring, will ever be Italian."

longer wants to live in her birthplace, and it's not just because there is no work in Bosnia. She feels that she belongs here: this is where she went to school, where she lives and works, where she loves.

Still, it was easier for her to assimilate as a refugee because she is European. It is harder for those around the Piazza Vittorio Emanuele, especially if they come from other cultures and other continents. But even here there are success stories. Take the interesting story of the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio. Today it is quite well-known, with three albums under its belt, some three hundred concerts worldwide and a documentary film. It embraces musicians from Tunisia, Brazil, Cuba, America, Hungary, Ecuador, Argentina, Senegal, India and, of course, Italy – but its composition changes. The orchestra was formed in 2002 by conductor Mario Tronco as part of a project to help save the Apollo movie theatre.

Even more interesting than the story of the orchestra's formation is the kind of music it plays. In Rome one evening I managed to get a ticket to their premier of *The Magic Flute* at the Teatro Olimpia. Rome's leftist, progressive elite was in attendance that evening – I recognized a number of well-known public figures – because it was simply an event not to be missed. A casual visitor to the auditorium, who knew nothing about either the orchestra or the opera, would have seen it as part concert, part opera. They played a mixture of classical and ethno-music, jazz, pop, rap, reggae and mamba. Every so often, in between the Tunisian singer and the solo sections on the Arab lute and Afri-

can instruments such as the kora, djembe, dumduma and sabara, you could hear excerpts from The Magic Flute, such popular arias as the *Queen of the Night, Papageno, Sarastro, Pamino*. This "opera" is performed in six languages: Arabic, Portuguese, Spanish, German, English and Wolof. Not even the story follows the libretto and the ending comes as a complete surprise... Admittedly, this is not a performance of the opera. Even the poster warns us that it is an interpretation: "*The Magic Flute* according to the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio". Mario Tronco himself says that this is not about faithfully performing Mozart's piece: "We took great liberties with the score, we chose only what suits our orchestra. Our performance is full of references to other cultures. Our musicians come from far away, and I don't mean just geographically. Each one of them brings to this opera his or her own culture, own language..." Tronco says that while Mozart's opera is about "how it once was", the Orchestra's performance is about "how it will one day be".

And indeed, that opening night was for me as if the orchestra had cracked open the door to Europe's future. Mozart's music lies at the very heart of what we see as Europe's cultural heritage. Most Europeans would probably like to hear them give a pitch-perfect performance of the original, because that would be proof of integration. This interpretation/adaptation/improvisation on the theme of Mozart, however well-performed and interesting, sounds blasphemous to their ears. But it is more likely that non-European immigrants will also bring something of their own to Europe, and that we will increasingly be faced with a mixture of cultures, be it with Mozart or any other holy of European holies.

This interpretation showed that newco-

mers from other cultures will not necessarily completely adapt to our dominant culture, which is what they are expected to do, but will try to adapt the culture they encounter, in all its elements, to their own. And they will do so in both the arts and in life. Statistics will be the decisive factor here: with the number of immigrants from Africa and Asia growing, it may not be that just food, music, fashion and customs will undergo change – European laws may do so too. Yet very few people in Europe will openly say today: Yes, that's true, so what?

It seems that to talk about the integration and assimilation of immigrants (the only two models ever discussed) makes sense only up to a point – only when it concerns newcomers from Europe such as Albanians or Bosnians, but not when it concerns Roma, who come from the same part of the world but do not share the same culture or history. But what about the non-European immigrants pouring in from the south, via Lampedusa, Sicily, the Spanish coast, and from the east, from Afghanistan via the Turkish-Greek-Bulgarian border, where the largest number come from? Europeans, be they pro or contra immigration, agree on the civilizational bottom-line that newcomers, especially from different cultures, must not cross – the emancipation of women, respect for human rights, democracy. But what about art, which, by definition, breaches all boundaries?

Maybe it is better to be aware of how the greats like Mozart, Bach and Beethoven might sound in the future. But also of how many other traditions that we hold dear will change, if they haven't already. Take the production of Murano glass. The little island of Murano, famous for its glass since the end of the thirteenth century, presents a sorry picture today. Most of its factories have closed.

Angela, have mercy

Since last year, Turkey has taken in over one million refugees. In Germany, Yezidi Kurds from Iraq are the most well-known group among these refugees, but they only make up a small proportion of the figure. They have found refuge in Kurdish-speaking towns and cities in Turkey, although they all speak different forms of Kurdish.
Most of the refugees who arrived in Turkey last year were fleeing from the Assad regime in Syria. But some were members of the Free Syrian Army, who came to Turkey for a rest or who brought their families to Southern Turkey before simply crossing back over the border into Syria. A year ago it really was that simple to flee to Turkey from Syria. As Prime Minister at the time (and now President), Tayyip Erdogan personally invited Syrians to find refuge in 'his' country. But after their arrival, some of these Syrian guests revealed themselves to be fighters with the al-Nusra Front, a branch of al-Qaeda. A year ago, when I was on the Turkish/Syrian border, Syrian Kurd refugees were fleeing to Iraq. The international news agencies were stationed in Istanbul rather than Southern Turkey (in order to report on the Gezi movement there), so the news of endangered Syrian Kurds was relatively new. But the problem is relatively old. At least more than 12 months old. When I was at Hatay airport in Southern Turkey in September 2013, officials there told me that Islamists could happily use the airport via special entrances and exits.

But the Turkish government is taking a different political view now that the majority of refugees who are trapped at the Turkish border are not Assad opponents but Kurds who are threatened by IS. The Turkish president was afraid that the refugees would include fighters from the PKK, the Turkish underground organisation, so he ordered the borders to be tightened up. The poor thing. He was afraid of the PKK, despite the fact that he had been negotiating with them just a little while earlier. Yet he didn't lose a night's sleep over IS, with their many distasteful branches and forerunner organisations.
Over the last few weeks, there have been a number of petitions and events in Turkey under the banner Open the corridor! Sections of the Turkish population are calling on their government not to seal off the Kurds from Rojava, an area which is being threatened by IS. By opening up corridors, it should be easier for anti-IS units to defend themselves. Basically, people want those who are fighting against IS to have the same chances and opportunities as those given to armed Jihadis. Along the border with Syria, people living on the Turkish side are in uproar and feel they are being victimized. They formed human chains that stood for days along the Turkish side of the border, chains which did not even break down at night.
It is easy to pass judgement on the Turkish government, its policies and its approach to the refugee question. But while we are rightly pointing the finger at Turkey, we read that in an asylum centre in Germany's Hessen region, a guard trod on a refugee's neck and forced him to lie

in his own vomit. It is gradually dawning on us that Burbach was not an isolated case. The number of attacks on asylum centres in Germany has doubled since last year. If we are not careful, we will find ourselves in Amnesty International's annual report. A handful of refugees in our country is enough to ensure a knee-jerk reaction amongst our voters, parties and certain media as they move to the right. What would happen in Germany if it was faced with a million and a half refugees? I'm sure people would not be forming human chains asking for the borders to be opened wider for all and sundry. When have we ever heard Angela Merkel say a word about the refugee question in Germany? When the cases of abuse came to light, she sent her spokesman to say that the government was appalled.
Oh, Angela Merkel, have mercy and open up a protective corridor so that asylum seekers from Burbach and other parts of Germany can flee to a free and independent life. Shame alone is not an adequate political reaction.

Mely Kiyak is a journalist and political columnist. See full biography on page 224.

The jewellery, figurines, bowls, lamps, paper holders, and stoppers that are sold massively in hundreds of Venice's souvenir shops are made in China. Yes, you get a certificate saying that the necklace you bought is Murano glass, but more likely than not it is Murano glass Made in China. The ordinary tourist won't notice the difference or even wonder how the little island he visited the day before, where glass is not mass produced, can churn out such a vast amount of souvenirs. Or how such a wonderful glass ring or bracelet can cost just a few euros. And most importantly, how the vast majority of these items are identical, that is mass-produced. Because, on the little island of Murano, no two items made by hand can be the same. That is one distinction; their fine workmanship is the other.

I had a chance to see this for myself in a shop behind my apartment, on the corner of Calle Fiubero. Andrea, who works there, took me to the studio and showed me all sorts of objects, from a paper holder to lovely jewellery. They say it is hard to distinguish the Murano-made originals from their Chinese copies. On the Internet you can find warnings and information about how to tell the difference, but you can also find advertisements for Murano glass manufactured in China. Of course, this is nonsense, since Murano is the name not just of a certain glass-making technique, but also of the glass objects made in Murano. Andrea picked up two bracelets. One was of precise, flawless workmanship; the other, I could see with a bit of effort, was a crude, approximate Chinese imitation. Mass tourism has led to

a demand that Murano cannot meet, even when working at full capacity. And, as Andrea says, the Chinese have neither the same understanding of the original nor any moral dilemmas about producing imitations. But what upset me most was when he compared the millefiori pearl necklace made in Murano with the one from China. Because that was when I sadly realized that the necklace I had bought in another shop the previous day was a common or garden fake!

The 'danger of invasion', as European politicians are wont to exaggerate, lies not only in the number of immigrants (after all, there are only around 200,000 Chinese in Italy, and roughly 2,000 in Venice), but also in the investment of money and buying up of property. Money brings change much faster than immigrants. First the Chinese in Venice bought up small shops and turned them into 'Murano' glass souvenir and leatherwear shops. Then they bought bars and restaurants; now they are following up with palazzos, turning them into hotels.

One evening, as I was taking the vaporetto no. 2 from Ponte dell'Academia to the San Marco stop on the Riva delgi Schiavoni, I noticed that entire sections on this part of the Grand Canal were without light. Huge palaces were steeped in darkness, as if nobody lived there. These are the summer residences of the rich. But among them are

"But it is more likely that non-European immigrants will also bring something of their own to Europe, and that we will increasingly be faced with a mixture of cultures, be it with Mozart or any other holy of European holies."

also palaces that belong to the city and that the city is selling off, explained a friend of mine who lives here. Because change comes in many ways, not just with the poor wretches who make it in one piece to Lampedusa or some other patch of Italian soil; not just through food, fashion, customs and music, but also via banks, investments, money-laundering and corruption of the local administration. And while Europeans ponder future changes and whether to put up a wall around Europe (if only they knew what its boundaries were), while they contemplate measures that will contain immigrants at that same imaginary border and Europe's culture and the values that need to be preserved (although globalization, in other words Americanization, has already utterly changed them), the Chinese are freely investing, buying palaces in Venice in order to turn them into hotels, thus making even more money out of Europe's cultural treasures. From the Venetian viewpoint, in comparison with the investments of the Chinese – nota bene, some people here call it money-laundering – fear of Muslim immigrants in France and Germany and further north looks almost pathetic.

My neighbour says that Venice is increasingly turning not into a museum, as I romantically thought, but a Disneylandish amusement park owned by the Chinese, who alone profit from it. He is probably right. Be it at a slow or fast pace, legally or illegally, with or without money, as refugees or otherwise – the immigrants are coming. As I leave Venice with my fake Murano necklace, listening to the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio,

I try to imagine what Mozart would sound like if it were adapted, not performed, by a Chinese orchestra in the Teatro Fenice in the not so distant future.

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What we talk about when we talk about us

Corruption, drug dealing, poverty: all reasons why so many people leave Kosovo for Western Europe. Our author came to Germany in the 1990s, when he was a young man, and became a writer. Now he takes a journey back through the 20th century, from the battlefields of Western Europe to the scenes of the horror that played out in the former Yugoslavia. His European trip ends in the bitter present of his former home of Kosovo. *By Beqë Cufaj*

First of all, I have to rather shamefacedly admit that the title of this article is not particularly original. It is a play on two book titles by two authors. I'm sure most of you will have read their books, or at least heard of them. The first of these is Raymond Carver, the American short story writer. In his book *What We Talk About When We Talk About Love* he tackles married life, the neighbourhood, family, deathbeds, cakes, cathedrals, buses, casinos, trains, exile and home in a totally accessible way. His work covers every area of human drama in the last century.

The second book title belongs to his friend and the translator of his books into Japanese, Haruki Murakami, who is one of today's most popular authors. The title is: *What I Talk About When I Talk About Running*. This made me spontaneously decide to give this essay its title. Once again I admit rather shamefacedly that I did this without having the slightest idea about what I really wanted to say. I wanted to say something about myself and hence about us. Because, as the Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa tells us, each of us is not just a single 'I'. Within us we all have a number of 'I's, not always the best. Or vice versa.

In an attempt to avoid any kind of theorizing and moralizing, I will try to stick to what is perhaps the only thing I can do: tell stories. But I will be constantly aware that I am going to fail. You know it yourself: the whole depends on the extent to which you fail. The more, the better. The less, the worse.

Last year I gave a few readings from my latest novel in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, but apart from that, this is the first time for twelve months that I have brought my writing to the public. This applies equally to my writings in German (my second language) and in Albanian (my native tongue). It doesn't mean that I haven't written anything. On the contrary, in my retreat from public life, whether in Germany, Kosovo, Albania or the Balkans as a whole, I have never stopped writing. I have spent months sitting at my desk in Stuttgart, but failed in every respect. Without knowing where I would go and what I should even want in this still indeterminate place, and of course beset by all the risks that are the responsibility of a father and husband.

Curse or privilege?

Without a satisfactory result and with the attendant danger of continuing to lead the same life. What I am trying to say is that being an artist, and particularly a writer, is a special kind of madness. Particularly in our present times. I know that many of my colleagues have already said this in different times and circumstances. But now this particularly applies to the times we are living in. Up to ten years ago, as in the preceding hundreds of years, being an artist was not a curse but a privilege. But today we are all artists and writers, painters and musicians. In today's modern world, you can write a poem, story or novel at your desk, on your smartphone or on your laptop. You can take photos, design, sing, paint, create. Then you can post it on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or somewhere else where your family, friends and thousands and thousands of others can take a look at this or that 'work', which can remain within a small circle. Sometimes this can lead to totally unexpected success. If Max Brod had burned his friend Franz Kafka's manuscripts at his request, or if the handwritten works of Fernando Pessoa had not remained packed in boxes for many decades, then these two authors would never have been discovered and immortalized.

Today we are living in a new phase when it is quite scary to be faced with the unknown and wondering what is to come. Life moves fast, and we forget even faster. The new technologies have certainly brought progress but also the danger that their users can be easily controlled. More on this later. Now I'd like to tell you about my experiences over the last month.

On 21 December 2014 I took to train to Paris and then on to Normandy. Should the train take me into the light? I spent a night and a day in an area where, 70 years ago, thousands and thousands of young people, parents, children, people from all across Europe and the USA killed each other most brutally in the space of just a few months. They turned one of Europe's most beautiful coastlines into a mass grave, where people cannot avoid looking for sense where there is none, for logic when there is none, for ideology when there is none. They also cannot escape the feeling of fear and sorrow, the horror and the curse that is this immense graveyard.

Without coming up with a healthy explanation for collective insanity, man and mankind are preordained to destroy themselves,

> Life moves fast, and we forget even faster. The new technologies have certainly brought progress but also the danger that their users can be easily controlled."

far beyond any logic provided by ideology or mass manipulation. I pondered all this as I travelled out of Normandy towards Waterloo in Belgium and saw the house where Napoleon based himself, believing he could still win a victory. What victory? The victory that today remains one of the greatest defeats of mankind. Where Belgian farmers still stumble upon the bones of soldiers who were killed more than 150 years ago when they are laying the foundations for their houses. And despite the advances made by forensic science, it is still difficult to identify whether these soldiers were French, German, Belgian, Russian, Austrian or even Balkan!

Touching the past

The same can be said of the massacre of Leipzig... from where I had a difficult journey to Austria, avoiding my second home, Stuttgart! I don't know why. Or I do know why. I simply wanted to touch the past without the influence of the virtual world (the Internet) and the mobile world (and so with reduced contact). My journey took me to the central cemetery in Vienna. Suddenly I read the name of a well-known friend, who must be in her eighties. I had not seen her for some years. I read her name and thought she must have died. But no. This well-known Jewish lady had immortalised herself to some extent by inscribing her own date of birth. When death comes and she is laid to rest next to her husband, a stranger will inscribe her date of death. In contrast to her parents and siblings, she will rest in peace and not

"Srebrenica was a place where death could be felt in the earth and sky, in the trees, the bushes, the houses, the street, the squares, valleys and hills."

be reduced to dust and ashes by an insane ideology. In their music, did Brahms and his colleagues who rest there anticipate all the dramas that mankind has endured over the last century?

From the central cemetery I travelled by train, bus, on foot and even by thumb until I found myself in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First stop Sarajevo, where the First World War began 100 years ago, leading to the collapse of old Europe and to one of the great stains on modern Europe. 19 years ago – I repeat, just 19 years – 8,000 children, men and old men were butchered in the space of 48 hours, with the blessing of the Dutch and hence also of the European Blue Helmets. Just because they belonged to a people who where weaker than another. Under the command of Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic, the Serbs massacred unarmed, civilian Muslims and buried them in a mass grave to erase the traces of their crime. At the end of this terrible year, Srebrenica was a place where death could be felt in the earth and sky, in the trees, the bushes, the houses, the street, the squares, valleys and hills. And particularly in the dark, desperately unhappy faces of Serbs and Muslims alike.

From here, it was a short and easy trip to Serbia. My German nationality and pas-

sport meant I could travel freely (despite my Kosovo Albanian name) and without fear of being stopped or treated as an enemy, a terrorist fought against by the Milosevic regime in the last war in Kosovo in 1999. This regime was responsible for a decade of the bloodiest war to be waged in Europe since the Second World War.

The scars from this war have not yet healed. Serbia is a country that I simply must spend time in. In Novi Sad and Novi Becej in Vojvodina, but also in Belgrade and Raska. I want to see the area where my grandfather was killed during the Second World War – although I still don't know exactly where his remains lie. My father and my two brothers are dead. They never managed to find out whether his murder took place during the final offensive by the partisans against the Nazis and their collaborators (who seem to have included my grandfather). They never managed to find his grave. After the Second World War and the war in the 1990s, and armed with my German passport, I finally wanted to see the place where my grandfather's remains most probably lie. Without the slightest hope of learning anything. And I can only repeat that more than fifteen years later the bodies of over 1,000 Albanians, Kosovan civilians, are still missing. They were massacred and transported to Serbia in refrigerated vehicles, placed in cold storage, tipped in the Sava river and buried beneath the roads which

"And despite the advances made by forensic science, it is still difficult to identify whether these soldiers were French, German, Belgian, Russian, Austrian or even Balkan!"

have subsequently been asphalted and carry vehicles from Serbia, the Balkans and all over Europe. In December of last year, the remains of many Albanians were unearthed beneath a street in the southern Serbian town of Raska. Every minute a vehicle drives over it at speeds of 60 km/h.

Unhealed wounds

I can imagine you might be asking yourselves: why is the guy telling such dark tales and making a journey across Europe when it is clearly so painful? From Normandy in France through Belgium, Germany, Austria and the Balkans, the sad story of his grandfather, the bodies of thousands of missing people who are still a huge, living, unimaginable sorrow, and not only for their families. What has all this got to do with Stuttgart? My reply is: a great deal. While I try to gather together my recollections of this long, deeply painful journey, two things appear before me here on the 10th floor of a block erected with EU funding in the centre of the capital of this youngest European nation, the Republic of Kosovo. The action-packed journey to every corner of this land and Stuttgart. The still unhealed wounds of the last war in Kosovo, in which thousands upon thousands of innocent people died; and the arrival of the NATO forces, which included the German Bundeswehr for the first time since the Second World War, both in the military operations against the Milosevic troops and in the invasion of ground troops after their surrender.

"Never again!"

Even after the "Never again!", we Germans found ourselves drawn into a new war, this time as part of a new alliance, an alliance that opposed the Nazis in the Second World War. And this just nine years after German reunification, so in 1999, when the red-green ruling coalition displayed the Federal Republic's growing sense of responsibility in every area and every direction. Today, 25 years later, this reunification not only makes Europe Europe, but also makes Europe inconceivable without Germany's role and influence. That is both positive and worrying. Because it revives old memories about German dominance of the old continent and beyond.

The second image that appears before my eyes is that of Germany, of Stuttgart, in the 1950s. Were there crazy people like me with the time and energy to seek the impossible in desperation, to discover the sense of evil in man and mankind, when innocent young people were dying because someone told them, ordered them, to become murderers so that they too could end up among the dead lying on the endless fields of Europe. For hundreds of years.

I think about all this and look out over the Kosovan capital, Pristina, where I spent the first half of my life. In reality, my life is divided almost equally in two. I spent 24 years in Kosovo and have lived in Germany for almost 20 years. This gives me the right to feel I am divided in two, both temporally and physically. One half of me belongs to one country, the other half to another

country. It is a dual weight that burdens me at the point where one overlaps the other.

In Germany and Europe I often try to say that I am not just a Kosovo Albanian but also a Balkan. Balkan in the true sense of the word, from someone who also feels German. The times we live in are not so difficult, so a person can feel both to some extent. This is thanks to my upbringing in my native land. But also, I have to admit, thanks to the traumas of the war in the 1990s. In other words, as soon as I am in Kosovo I inevitably feel like a German who does not see this half-destroyed and half-rebuilt, half-wounded and half-healed, half-traumatized and half-overtraumatized, half-poor and half-very poor, half-decolonized and half-corrupt country that is partly oriented towards Europe and partly towards Turkey, this half-Muslim and 20 percent Christian country that has partly joined the UN and partly seeks new recognition.

A decade and a half after independence, Kosovo, the land of my birth, is still one of the most remarkable laboratories of the major powers. They are all seeking to realise their most bizarre projections. After the war, the Americans set up their largest military base since the Second World War. UN built its largest-ever mission and it is also home to the EU's largest international mission since it was founded. None of these institutions have achieved their goals. Kosovo is still a country that cannot spread its full authority across all its territory. Because Kosovo is still not a member of the UN. Because the citizens of Kosovo are the only ones in Europe who do not have the right to move freely in

the EU, despite being home to the largest mission in the EU's history. The EU was supposed to achieve this aim eight years ago through the fact of its presence in Kosovo, but every day it becomes ever more clear that it has not only failed in this, but that we, the taxpayers, have not the slightest inkling what people do in this country.

It is neo-colonialism 'light'. In Kosovo, we are seeing a repeat of a form of insanity that was prevalent with the French in Algeria, the British in India and the Germans in Africa – a kind of alliance between the major nations has found its place and is expressing itself in the most bizarre ways. An 'international community' which is not there to resolve problems but which has itself become part of the problem. It has done this by trying to mediate in the unresolved conflict with Serbia, from the northern part of Kosovo to the missing persons, as they are known there.

Europe's gateway to Turkey

Let's be clear here, the influence of the international community, and hence of the taxpayer, has been immense and indeed vitally important. But we should not ignore the uncomfortable reality that some 70 percent of all aid has flowed or is flowing back to its country of origin. Into the pockets of the international donors. This is not only true of post-war states such as Kosovo or

Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it also applies to Haiti and other regions that have been affected by natural catastrophes. Let's just think about Europe, or more specifically Germany after the Second World War. It is a fact that the Germans lost the war, but it is also a fact that it was German men and women who rebuilt this country and turned it into what it is today! Although I still feel that I am part of two countries, I cannot help being appalled. When I see this country – Pristina, the capital of Kosovo: concreted over, corrupt, criminalised and without the slightest hope of finding a way out of this almost depressive situation in the near future. With a winter greyness that seems part of a scene from a film directed by Krzysztof Kieslowski.

Leaving my sense of resignation to one side, I'd like to invoke the following scene to show what it means to live in Pristina. When I'm out shopping in Stuttgart-Degerloch, I might get irritated when an elderly lady who has probably lived her whole life on Löwenstraße and lived through all the aforementioned horrors wants to have a little chat with the sales assistant at the bakery or at the till at Lidl. Meanwhile, in Pristina another elderly lady is having to deal with her grandson's crying because she only has €5 in her purse, when the bill comes to €5.70. An orange juice costs 70 cents, so she has to sacrifice it in favour of the more essential milk. She needs that for the whole family! Should I feel happy when I give her the 70 cents for the orange juice and stop the child's crying? Not at all. On the contrary, this child will continue to cry. The fact that he has to

"One half of me belongs to one country, the other half to another country. It is a dual weight that burdens me at the point where one overlaps the other."

grow up with these problems should act as a red flag that signals the current state of the country. Should we, as citizens of what we could call the wealthy hemisphere, be happy that we are giving alms of all types to under-developed regions, not only of the Balkans, which is Europe's gateway to Turkey, but also to countries that are still developing or in difficulties?

A frozen conflict

Let's stay with Kosovo. It is the only country in Europe (to be more precise, I am referring to the northern part), where there is a frozen conflict between Belgrade and Pristina, where the USA and the major European nations led by the German government are making intensive efforts to find a peaceful solution to this regional conflict. Is it only ethnic hatred between the Serbs and the Albanians that leaves Serbia and Kosovo in a stalemate in some 15 percent of its territory? Of course not. This part of Kosovo has something that no other country in Europe has. It has something that only China has, and Russia and Africa to a lesser extent. All the major countries who are 'mediating' the ethnic conflict talk of peace, but they have an ulterior motive: mineral resources, and particularly ore, which they call 'rare earths'. More precisely, rare earths and other minerals from Europe's poorest country will provide one of Europe's larger countries with a monopoly for the next 200-300 years, as they are vital to produce modern technology such as microchips and

"The respect, cordiality and culture that exist between people in a particular neighbourhood, village or city reflect the culture and status of society as a whole."

computers on our continent.

As a person and as a writer, I have a tendency to exaggerate, and I have the Balkan genes when it comes to conspiracy theories. But at the same time I have a deliberate, realistic, German side to me and I pluck up the courage to say this: I believe the work of the international community (the UN, OSCE, EU) has produced a few excellent results in my country. The first of these is physical safety. In other words, Kosovo is a safe country. After this comes food. Food in Kosovo is similar to what can be found at the Stuttgarter Festle (regular street parties held in Stuttgart which serve culinary delicacies). And finally, the Internet and telecommunications. According to the latest figures from the UNDP, 78 percent of the population has access to the Internet. Even in the remotest villages, people have wireless Internet and cable TV!

The country has football clubs, but the fact that it is not a member of the UN means that neither the Kosovan national team, let alone individual clubs, are even allowed to play against the Stuttgart Kickers, and certainly not against Stuttgart's top football club, VfB. There is a well-developed cultural scene in the urban areas, particularly the underground scene, music, fine arts

and short films. The latter tend to be used as a form of protest against the difficulties people face in every area of their lives. There is also literature, but I never express an opinion on Kosovan and Albanian literature as a whole (literature from Albania), because when it comes to art and literature the situation is similar to that of Austria and Germany. The language is the same, but the scale is much smaller. I don't get involved because, to quote the great Franz Kafka: "Kleine Kulturen, streitsüchtige Kulturen!" [small cultures, belligerent cultures!]. In a word, as an author I have always tried to avoid public presentations and readings in the country whose language I am writing in. I simply don't feel comfortable and am basically afraid of making a fool of myself because people and colleagues have other worries and problems that they have to deal with on a daily basis.

In other words, if politics, the government and the opposition are corrupt, as is generally reported, then the elites in other areas such as the academia, media and art are equally corrupt! Everyone answers to somebody else and it is hard to tell who they are for or against. Hopes of major intellectual movements, of high-profile celebrities speaking out against the way things are going are basically zero. The rot is not only at the top, in government, but is all-invasive. The

"Everyone who understands what it means to belong to two countries – with or without dual citizenship – also feels the burden of responsibility to continue supporting democratization and the rule of law in this young country that is still in an incubator."

situation is so bad that, while I am reading these lines, someone could be asking themselves: What is this person doing?

More elbow grease

Or vice versa: why isn't this person trying to do more to improve things? When I ask myself these questions, they both seem valid. But at the same time I say that it is logical that we need much more time, effort, elbow grease and work on reality and on ourselves if the necessary changes are to be made. It is not only Kosovo that is corrupt, but the whole region. It once had a population of almost 22 million, but only nine million of them – in Slovenia and Croatia – have managed to join the EU. The other states (Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania) must above all take steps to halt and then fight this evil if they are to have a chance of becoming part of our family, the European family.

Perhaps I am speaking from a very comfortable position. At first glance. But at heart, this comfortable feeling conceals a great pain about the difficult situation of all these countries, and particularly Kosovo. As Germans and Europeans we bear a great responsibility because we have helped this country, in 1999 as a region and since 2008 as a state, to become an independent country. Everyone who understands what it means to belong to two countries – with or without dual citizenship – also feels the burden of responsibility to continue supporting democratization and the rule of law in

this young country, which is still in an incubator. Or perhaps in a laboratory. It's up for interpretation!

I can imagine that the result of my long journey, or, to quote Murakami, my long run, will be that I can't help talking about my love, as per Carver. There is no doubt that I love Stuttgart. I love every part of this city, good and bad. The thing I love about Stuttgart is its people. Whatever their nationality or origin. I know it's not easy to love people you don't know.

I have a story about this. Just after the war, I made a long and difficult journey with a German colleague. For two months, we were working on a feature for *Die Zeit*, the German weekly newspaper. When he heard me talking about the Albanians he said: "I fully understand how you can love your two million Albanians, but don't you think it would be hard work for me to love my 80 million Germans!" Today, ten years after our hard work on this feature, I say that I find it difficult to love all the 80 million Germans and then my two million Albanians on top.

So it's better to love Stuttgart. This brings me to the notion, or should I say conclusion, that people should love those who are close to them. The respect, cordiality and culture that exist between people in a particular neighbourhood, village or city reflect the culture and status of society as a whole. Despite all the everyday stresses and protests that time flies by so fast, we as Germans should be proud that today we are who we are. The world holds Germany and the Germans in high esteem. Because of the simple fact that the German model is one of the

"It is a fine line between success and failure. Success is a tempest that leaves behind a desert.
It takes everything with it. Failure is the feeling of toppling into an abyss."

most admired on earth, regardless of the prejudices and envy with all the likely or unlikely misunderstandings, regardless of intra-party differences, I say that the German work ethic, the way it has tackled the horrors of its past and its readiness to help other countries and continents have led us to where we are today.

When I say this, of course people can shake their heads and put my words under the microscope. But by every standard, this country and our region in particular are some of the most developed, safest, educated and integrated (in terms of policies towards foreigners) etc., etc. I also say that because of the fact that over the 20 years that I have lived in Germany, I have travelled right across this large and wonderful land from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in the north to Berchtesgaden and the Königsee in the south (though unfortunately I have never made it to the island of Sylt)! This good situation does not give me the right to think about the favourite saying of Jewish mothers that "when things are going well, start crying, because it means the bad times are just about to begin!"

There is still a lot to do and many dangers ahead, not only for us here in Stuttgart.

Beginning with climate change as a result of rapid industrialisation, and moving on to the dangers of terrorism and the potential for financial crashes which of course could cause everything to collapse like a house of cards! We all feel this fear, and as citizens of this country it is not only our responsibility, but we also have to work to exert pressure on every party and government so that we look after the environment, work to prevent terrorism, help countries that are going through difficult processes of transition, and by ensuring that high earners pay more and support the weaker sections of society.

A house of cards

There's a danger that I'm turning into a sermonizer, so I will stop here and mention that it is an honour for me that this city, where I have lived on and off for 20 years, has never disappointed me. Even when I was going through difficult times connected to the war in the 1990s, or when I was for a long time suffering from writer's block, or when I have been away for more than a month at a time, as on the last trip, Stuttgart has never turned its back on me. Without knowing why or how, my last stop in every movement or projection, a place where I can escape and find rest, both physical, emotional and psychological – things and doubts that are perhaps quite normal for a creator and par-

"At the end of the day,
one half has still not completed
the other. This still needs time.
It will take some years yet, until
Germany overtakes my homeland
in mathematical terms."

ticularly for the people of this extraordinary planet have brought be here, to Stuttgart. This must also be the reason why my little opus makes frequent reference to Kosovo and Stuttgart. And in my last book, the Stuttgart suburb of Degerloch is the only place that I specifically mention. If anyone asks me why I did this, I have no idea. All I know is that I can't write about things that I don't know, see, feel or touch. I would even go so far as to say that not even Kosovo has drawn from me the same degree of recognition and respect from as the place where I now live. This is why I know I have to keep on loving this place. Perhaps it's love at first sight. We all know there's no way back from that. Whether the love is won or lost.

Was my month-long trip a temptation to leave Stuttgart in order to find something that I have lost? I don't know. At the same time I must confess that the place of my birth appears in my mind's eye when I am physically in Stuttgart. Some of the villages on the high plateau of Dukagjin that I passed through after 19 years and where I saw in this last New Year. With a single question that I asked myself and that I do not want to hold back from you: I wanted to confront the idea that home is where one feels oneself drawn to. So where?

I think this is the wrong question, particularly in today's times. Home is where you want to rest in eternity and where you feel good. Our fast-paced times and transatlantic movements, let alone those that are happening on our own continent, are faster than travelling from Stuttgart to Hamburg by car or train. This does not mean that I have

made a decision. At the end of the day, one half has still not completed the other. This still needs time. It will take some years yet, until Germany and Stuttgart overtake my homeland and birthplace in mathematical terms. What I'm trying to say is that while I was visiting my parents' villages I visited by father's grave for the first time in many years. I asked myself whether I would have a better fate than my grandfather, whose first name I carry and whose grave is still unknown to us.

A long, difficult quest

The fact that I have focused on myself in this essay, when it should in fact be about us, must have been a result of this long, difficult quest. But I think that everyone who reads these words can imagine how important it is to know where your roots are, where you come from and what kind of work you want to do now and in the future. That we are basically all very similar. With our family stories, or those of war and peace. That we all have two or more 'I's. That it would do us all good to quickly make a decision about what we want to become, as long as it is not too late. That we all have only one life, that we have to live, and that we should not make the mistake of living this life in

the wrong way. That the responsibility for caring for our family, our environment, the place where we want to live is not only part of our lives but also a legacy.

I agree with a saying I read somewhere that for a family, the presence of an artist in their midst is a curse. The daily insecurity, the professional instability, the fear of failure, the unfulfilled responsibilities, everything that to most rational people seems like a huge and horrible nightmare when faced with a creative person who makes art a priority in their life. It is a fine line between success and failure. Success is a tempest that leaves behind a desert. It takes everything with it. Failure is the feeling of toppling into an abyss. Of course it is not only artists who have these kinds of feelings. Just about everyone who breathes and thinks about life and death shares these feelings. And life still goes on. To quote the great teacher William Faulkner, man is mankind and mankind will survive the unexpected, every danger, every catastrophe of whatever size.

While I sit in this country, in this apartment block and see the concrete city before me, my thoughts and my soul are in that corner of Stuttgart, and particularly with my dear wife and daughter. And while I read these lines, no-one can chase away my mental images of how from this part of our city the faces of the citizens of my other country, of Kosovo, Pristina and the surrounding villages will appear. Above all I see the graves of people who died in the last war in Kosovo 15 years ago. Do you know? Major families, emblematic families in Kosovo who sacrificed their children, women, sons, husbands and grandfathers and whose graves lie next to their houses. As never before in the recent history of the Balkans, in Kosovo the dead lie next to the living. A unique act

in the recent history of mankind. Will this act serve peace and a secure future? I don't know and we cannot know. I only know that when we speak and live life we have to love each other, even when we are running and rushing around. Because we as people, as humankind are one – and we are we!

Beqë Cufaj, born 1970, is a Kosovo Albanian writer who lives with his family in Stuttgart. He studied languages and literature in Pristina and today writes for a number of newspapers in the Balkans and Western Europe, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and the Courrier International. He has published several volumes of essays and prose. In 2000 he published Kosova – Rückkehr in ein verwüstetes Land (Zsolnay Verlag). This was followed in 2005 by his novel Der Glanz der Fremde. His most recent novel entitled projekt@party is published by Secession Verlag.

A Europe with two faces

A little piece of European cultural history from the Netherlands: Saint Nicholas rewards children who have been good on the eve of 6th December. He is accompanied by his black helpers. This is the tradition. But is it politically correct? This has triggered a degree of cultural controversy in this once so tolerant nation and is now throwing up some fundamental questions for Europe.

By Rindert de Groot and Farid Tabarki

No folklore character has stirred a Dutch national debate as fiery as Zwarte Piet (Black Peter), the coloured servant of Sinterklaas (Saint Nicholas). Every year he is a source of controversy, but in 2014 he was the object of genuine societal and political turmoil. Let us first describe this 'invented tradition' that has split Dutch society. Then, we'll draw a broader picture and shed some light on the way Europe nowadays deals with its cultural heritage and outside influences on it.

What is the Dutch discussion about Zwarte Piet all about? The Dutch celebrate the birthday of Sinterklaas on its eve, the 5th of December. According to tradition, every year in the month of November Sinterklaas arrives from his hideout in Spain by steamboat. He is accompanied by a bunch of helpers called Black Peter, all dressed in Renaissance garb, with black faces, afro curls, earrings and bright-red lipstick. In the days leading to the big celebration, Sinterklaas rides above the rooftops, which one of the Black Peters will climb down. If a child has been good, Black Peter will put a little present in the shoe the child has placed near the chimney (or central heating, in these modern times). The little ones receive bigger presents, usually accompanied by a poem, on the eve of the Saint's birthday.

Sinterklaas is the namesake of Santa Claus, who is toned down from the original and sports no religious signs and coloured helpers. In December, Dutch kids are in for a treat: most families welcome the more commercialised 'Ho Ho Ho' character as well, but usually leave out the fiction that he is the giver of presents. In contrast, even the Dutch television news presents Sinterklaas' actions as if the holy philanthropist exists for real. The travesty is taken much further than in Belgium, for example, whose Sinterklaas is for children only and politically much less sensitive.

Songs about Sinterklaas and Zwarte Piet are old-fashioned. In the mid-1800s the current tradition took its present form, greatly influenced by a book by former teacher Jan Schenkman, who came up with a blackamoor servant to the Saint. The current practice for children is to sing: 'Sinterklaasje, enter with your servant', and 'Although I am black as soot, I mean well'. Not very politically correct, one might argue. Hardly anybody (yet?) has taken exception to the fact Sinterklaas is a white male with ostentatious religious symbols – he wears a bishop's attire, complete with mitre and staff. The appearance of Zwarte Piet, however, has aroused its share of controversy.

Although I am as black as soot, I mean well

'Zwarte Piet is racism', read a placard by a protester in 2013 when Sinterklaas came into town, upon which he was promptly arrested and, shortly after, released with apologies. In 2014, the discussion exploded and the Netherlands split into two camps: one saying the tradition must be altered to make it more politically correct, the other saying that it must be preserved as it is: 'It's not political, it's just a celebration for kids', people say, or more conservatively: 'It's a tradition!'

The English comedian Russell Brand has called it a 'colonial hangover'. That sounds very near the mark, since the publication of Jan Schenkman's book coincided with the heyday of Dutch colonialism. It was only 10 years before slavery was finally abolished in Suriname, then a Dutch colony. But, as with real hangovers, some suffer with them more than others. The Surinam and Antillean communities are generally in favour of adapting Zwarte Piet, as are many progressive Dutch 'aboriginals' from the big cities, whereas people in the provinces generally want to keep the tradition as it is.

We find ourselves caught between a rock and a hard place. The solutions offered to solve the dilemma – rainbow Zwarte Pieten, and the like – all feel awkwardly artificial. Society is full of rituals and traditions that can trace their origins back to a disreputable past; simply purging them only makes us forget, rather than deal with this past. Yet the traditionalist camp's arguments are not very appealing either. They sound conservative, even xenophobic and populist. Some people go as far as to reproach the reformist camp saying: 'You want to steal away our childhood!' This latter remark is as absurd as it is interesting. How on earth can people feel the evolution of a tradition is a violation of their memories?

It seems the Dutch populace has become like the double-faced Roman god Janus, with one face looking behind and one looking forward. Janus is the god of innovation and transitions, as well as of war and peace. After all, any conflict invariably leads to a new situation in the future and never to a full restoration of the past. Such is the nature of the progression of time, and seen in that light, the conservatives have bad luck. All traditions, no matter how old, are firmly embedded in their present-day interpretation and social realities. The signs of the times have even left their mark

on Zwarte Piet over the last decades. From a fearsome character whose task it was to birch naughty children or to put them in a burlap sack and take them back to Spain, he has evolved into a playful character that slightly undermines Sinterklaas' authority and that children can easily relate to and identify with.

For the first time, the discussion about the so-called racism of Zwarte Piet has gone truly viral. Modern technology has multiplied the resonance of the arguments, both in favour of and against the traditional model. Thousands of Twitter users have made their voices heard. Online petitions, in both directions, have attracted a huge following. Everybody claims to know what the celebration is all about; it seems everyone has their own private version that happens to be the only feasible model for the celebration. Sinterklaas and Zwarte Piet are no longer a shared ritual, but everybody's personal property.

In this sense, the work of Walter Benjamin comes to mind. In his brilliant essay entitled *The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction*, he describes how modern techniques of reproduction remove the aura of the work of art, since authenticity is no longer a crucial factor. The work of art is "pried from its shell": uniqueness and permanence make way for transitoriness and reproducibility.

Neither Sinterklaas nor Zwarte Piet are works of art – they are traditions. However, it is interesting to look at Benjamin's insights at a time when reproducibility is the hallmark of any cultural expression. Even

more so than in Benjamin's time, asking for an original makes no sense at all. No photograph has an original negative anymore; authenticity is what any beholder may see in any of the various versions existing on any media. In present-day terms: artistic expressions are becoming mass-customized, like a striking photograph that goes viral as hundreds of social media addicts add their particular humorous caption. Walter Benjamin displayed true foresight back in the crisis-ridden Thirties when he said: "The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition. This tradition itself is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable." He maintained therefore, that given the irrelevance of the authenticity of the work of art, the link between art and tradition was broken. We would like to go further: nowadays, since no model handed down from the top of any social hierarchy can vouch for the integrity of the underlying tradition, the very tradition itself becomes a fluid concept, which anyone can claim and change.

We would like to quote a key passage of Benjamin's essay:

"The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions, it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting

"The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition. This tradition itself is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable."

Walter Benjamin

the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately connected with the contemporary mass movements. Their most powerful agent is the film. Its social significance, particularly in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage.'

We are just emerging from another crisis, some eighty years later, and we're seeing another renewal of mankind. At least three developments have gained momentum as never before. First, technological advancement has changed the social fabric of our society. The speed and number of the connections between us all mean that the links between any number of people are being built and broken at the speed of light. Flexible communication and cooperation is a second nature of digital natives, the lucky ones who have been born into a world where the internet and social media were already in place. Secondly, partly as a result of the former development, traditional social structures are on the brink of being shattered. Traditional, hierarchical modes of organization are giving way to flexibility and ad-hoc arrangements that can be adapted on the fly to suit emerging circumstances. Middle-managers and policy makers are tending to suffer the consequences, becoming increasingly irrelevant

as horizontally organized facilitators and do-it-yourself social initiators take over. Thirdly and importantly, place is becoming increasingly irrelevant. The world is a globalized marketplace and even the toughest borders are increasingly permeable. Mass immigration is a reality of the present day, as it is a must for the future.

Seen in this light, Walter Benjamin's words can be interpreted slightly differently. What he dubbed "the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage" may well be interpreted differently as 'destruction'. Cultural heritage is liquefied rather than liquidated: it becomes a truly fluid concept. Having lost the aura of authenticity, cultural heritage only has significance in the eye of its many beholders, that is to say, in myriad social realities.

Liquid modernity

The philosopher Zygmunt Bauman comes to mind, the originator of the term liquid modernity. Bauman does not believe in postmodernity as a radical break from the past, but rather stresses the continuity: liquidity as an addition to existing modern relations. In light of the metaphor he uses, this seems rather odd, as the physical phase transition from a solid to a liquid is rather abrupt. Add heat to a solid and at a certain, well-defined point, the whole fabric of the substance is suddenly changed beyond recognition. The particles in a solid substance can only escape from their strict order with much force, whereas they are free to move

around in a liquid. We have described this process in relation to the meaning of Europe. The image of a fortress with clearly defined structures to defend and support it now has little relevance. Rather, Europe is a scalable concept for all to customize to their own use. As we said then: "Europe is at the same time a political structure, an artistic continent and home to a wide variety of people – a truly fluid concept." We now want to take this a little further. We think the only successful way forward for Europe is to embrace liquidity and not try to fight against it. We will highlight three risks, but end with an opportunity.

First of all, we must beware of cultural entropy, where all unique traditions succumb to political correctness and find a common denominator that everyone can live with. If Europe were a cocktail, it should be served shaken, nor stirred. But it should be more like a B52 with its different layers of Kahlua, Baileys and Grand Marnier than a Long Island Iced Tea with its component parts firmly shaken beyond recognition.

Not all traditions should follow the example of the Parisian Moulin Rouge, which has turned itself from a seedy, maverick place for non-conformist artists and social libertines to a middle-of-the road tourist trap for the ageing bourgeoisie. Especially on the edges of our continent, many such traditions still persist and new ones are coming in with the influx of immigrants. We should covet them, and where necessary give them the benefit of the doubt, recognizing that there is no such thing as

'European culture', but that many personal traditions are as much a reality as an opportunity.

A second and related risk is the politicisation of our heritage. Walter Benjamin noted that: "The instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice – politics." The Nazi and Communist regimes' perspective on art in Benjamin's day are illuminating: indeed, art became a tool of the body politic, changing at the whim of whoever was in power. In other words, it is a bad idea to completely sever the link between artistic expression and the tradition and ritual that it is based on. We could broaden this statement to include tradition itself: allowing a tradition to become entirely self-supporting, makes it an object that any political endeavour can claim, adapt and enslave. Europe, a travesty of a national state without any of the recognisable emblems, is at risk of suffering the most. Everybody shapes Europe in their own image, and there is no original, no authentic source, to prove them wrong.

This leads us to call for a complement to the trend, the logical counterpart of the liquefaction of society that allows cultural heritage to remain a binding force in our social fabric: the re-embedding of traditions and culture.

What would the pan-European Zwarte Piet be like? He would, no doubt, dissolve into thin air. No amalgam of traditions

"The only successful way forward for Europe is to embrace liquidity and not try to fight against it."

around a child-friendly martyr will ever amount to anything as much fun (albeit politically incorrect) as the frolicking blackamoor assistant to Sinterklaas. However, we must view the origins of the character in light of current realities and an understanding of our past. This tradition, which the majority of the Dutch are unwilling to give up, should be clearly annotated. Those who want the story to be told in a different, adapted version should obviously be able to do so – I am confident that children won't mind if Zwarte Piet suddenly turns multicoloured, just like society itself has done in the last decades.

Both movements can be understood as the re-embedding of a tradition, with one foot in a better understanding of the past, and with the other in a future that we want to confront together. Reconciling both is the most difficult task of any transition – it takes at least a saint to do this, and maybe even a god such as Janus.

A celebration for adults

Alas, alas – in 2014, Europe had to say goodbye to its oldest claim to tradition, namely that it is the cradle of art. Excavations in Asia demonstrate that it wasn't Europe that saw the first human artefacts. The silhouette of a hand on a cave wall in Sulawesi was already discovered more than half a century ago, but could only recently be accurately dated. It has been found to be 40,000 years old, almost 3,000 years older than the cave art in El Castillo in

Spain, which previously held the claim to be the oldest.

With this realisation in mind, no tradition is safe from reinterpretation. What used to be 'ours' may originally turn out to be 'theirs'. The influx of new people and new ideas may therefore turn out not to be so new after all, but a continuation and acceleration of a millennia-old process. To some it might be scary, to others enriching, but it is never easy. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it: "Only a thin line separates enrichment from a loss of cultural identity; for cohabitation between autochthons and allochthons to be prevented from eroding cultural heritages, it therefore needs to be based on respecting the principles underlying the European 'social contract'... The point is, by both sides". And that social contract – not the least of European traditions – must be re-evaluated and re-embedded in current political and social realities itself.

We would like to conclude with an invented tradition that has emerged in the last decade in the Netherlands. It gained momentum when the thrifty and rigid era of reconstruction after World War II gave way to a wealthier and individualised society. In a liquid society, the opportunities for this tradition are at their height, allowing people to continually redefine themselves with regard to others.

I refer to the Sinterklaas celebration for adults, which has, much to our liking, become very fashionable. In a group of family or friends, everyone draws a lot with the name of another person from the group on it. He or she then buys a usually small

Ethnic appearance, blah, blah!

I'm often invited to read from my columns. My first reaction is always: Noooo! Whenever I show up somewhere, the audience is disappointed. They're disappointed that I don't come bursting through the door, belching and telling a juicy joke. For those who have never seen me in the flesh, I have quite a frail, ethereal appearance. I am trapped in the gossamer body of an elf and have a fragile voice. When I belch, my whole body erupts in a tidal wave.

Recently I was left standing at the station because my host was expecting to meet a sultry oriental lady. I ran after him shouting: "Don't judge me! Years of eating German food have lightened my skin and hair. I arrived in the world the colour of an unpeeled potato, but now I look like a peeled King Edward. The German people have imposed their food on me. Now this is what you get!" So then he took me to the venue. Sometimes I Google our ensemble at the Gorki Theatre. I look to see whether their agents have something new to tell us. Nothing is more embarrassing for theatre actors than a guest appearance on the latest cop or country doctor TV show. And even worse than appearing in a TV series is when actors accept an embarrassing role in an actual movie. Of course the classic thing is to be cast as a Turk.

In acting terms, this is about as demanding as carrying a glass of water across the room. Every actor hopes no-one will ever find out that they have played this part. Once I made the mistake of congratulating an actor on his appearance in a movie. He went rigid and gave me a cold stare. I thought: "Oh shit, he's going to beat me up!" The film really was a disaster, as bland as the Brandenburg landscape, which is dominated by its breathtaking nothingness.

On filmmakers.de I noticed that they give the height, skin colour, hobbies and 'ethnic appearance' of the actors listed. This is obviously a casting platform, but it's hard to find out any more about this company. Mehmet Yilmaz and Thomas Wodianka are two of my favourite colleagues in the ensemble to be listed on filmmakers. Thomas looks a little like a grown-up version of Oskar Matzerath from the film version of The Tin Drum. Mehmet looks like – I'm not sure how to describe him – well, the opposite of Thomas. Both are described as looking "Central European". What is the point of such a vague classification? No idea. In my opinion, both of these actors are the kings of craziness. Their agents don't promote their clients by saying they have a talent for silliness, a penchant for fun. I can confirm this is the case with both of these guys. They are the absolute grand seigneurs of absurdity and have a crazy appearance.

A few weeks ago, I travelled to Dresden with my little cabaret troupe, Hate Poetry, to counter the Pegida group's anti-Islam demonstrations. Hate Poetry is a group of journalists whose appearance could be described as Southeast European. We read out our readers' eloquent diatribes,

which could be described as 'racist reprimands, German authoritarian posturing". I would like to officially announce that we have succeeded – we have beaten Pegida! Just a few weeks after our performance, Pegida's former head Kathrin Oertel resigned and set up a new group. A group that will no longer have the word Islamization in its name and that aims to shed the Nazi element – so Pegida without an ideological foundation. 500 people came along to the launch of the new group. Mass movements that do not involve race hatred generally have little success in Eastern Germany. They need to get the word 'Islam' into their policy agenda as soon as possible, otherwise they will remain forever an esoteric sect. The right-wing party AfD only really began to grow after it began sneering at people who looked like they had a mixed ethnic background.

This week I have to do another reading. A message to the host: Please don't leave me standing on the station platform! I'm not an East European beggar but South Eastern Oriental bedtime reading with an ethnic appearance, blah, blah.

Mely Kiyak is a journalist and political columnist. See full biography on page 224.

present for that person and thinks of something original. Some groups choose to make a surprise (pronounced the French way), an original way to wrap the present, usually referring to character traits or hobbies of the recipient. More importantly, the present or surprise comes with a personalised poem in the name of Sinterklaas (and sometimes Zwarte Piet as well). This poem may confront the recipient with some of their shortcomings or missteps in the past year: personal criticism from an anonymous source that the recipient is forced to read aloud during the celebration. The mockery and teasing are a source of great fun, although they are sometimes hard to swallow for the addressee.

Not surprisingly, this invented tradition is very popular among foreigners in the Netherlands who are keen to understand something about our frankness. We recommend it to all of Europe – it suits a mature but changing, two-faced Europe, with one face looking respectfully at the past and the other optimistically towards the future.

Rindert de Groot is a knowledge entrepreneur, storyteller and presenter. He develops innovative concepts that combine formal and non-formal education in order to exploit the potential of knowledge by technological and social innovation. He founded the company Empowerplant, whose text and visual productions focus on international cooperation, sustainable culture and the knowledge society. He is also a member of the Round Table of Worldconnectors, a high-level think tank on international affairs in the Netherlands.

Farid Tabarki is a researcher into the zeitgeist and a trendwatcher. As the founder and director of Studio Zeitgeist, he focuses on shifts in society and economics. Radical transparency, radical decentralisation and the liquid society are among the concepts that he writes and speaks about. He has a column in the Dutch daily newspaper Financieele Dagblad and was Trendwatcher of the Year in 2012-2013. Since 2013, he is the only person under 40 to be listed in The Volkskrant list of the most influential Dutch people.

No new world without a new language

Terror attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, anti-Islam demonstrations in Germany. What is going wrong in Europe? It is clear that European societies have been experiencing cracks and tensions for some years now. Can culture help to straighten things out? Whatever happens, we have to question the alarming isolationist tendency that is particularly prevalent in France's cultural milieu – among artists, intellectuals and commentators. *By Alban Lefranc*

What can 'culture' do to counter the religious fanaticism, the murderous madness that has struck Paris and Copenhagen? The immediate response seems to be: absolutely nothing. If we come at it from the opposite direction, it would mean forgetting that Goebbels appreciated Dostoyevsky (the cruel irony being that he particularly loved one of the most profound books ever written about the phenomenon of nihilism, *Demons*, also sometimes entitled *The Possessed*), and that in 1932 the Nazis celebrated the centenary of Goethe's death with a clear conscience.

It seems to me that it is incredibly naive to refer to culture as a kind of self-contained essence that spreads goodness and neighbourly love in its wake. But how? Through capillary action? In bottles? Radovan Karadžić studied at Columbia University. Nikola Koljević, a highly respected Shakespeare scholar, ordered the phosphorus bombing of the central library in Sarajevo. There are countless examples of how high culture has never prevented people from committing the most terrible outrages. I believe it is much more pressing and necessary to challenge the alarming isolationist tendency that is particularly prevalent in France's cultural milieu – among artists, intellectuals, commentators and so on. With typical acerbity, author and film-maker Guy Debord said that their "métier is talking in the prevailing conditions". We must constantly examine the opportunity that is presented to us, that is presented to me now, to speak out about the current political circumstances (therefore from a series of crushing economic and symbolic power structures).

We must constantly remember that many people who live in our societies remain invisible, they never speak out. We also have to consider the rather graphic saying from 1968: literature is a garnish for those who fuck the people in the ass. We have to think about this desire for separateness and fathom what lies behind the language of domination, the empty phrases, the slogans – which all too often we simply adopt.

The breakthrough of archaic powers

In my view, Karl Kraus provides a valuable chapter in our present times because the kinds of archaic powers that we thought had disappeared (such as religious fanaticism) have broken through into our ultra-rationality. In the 1930s, Kraus had already identified the rise of National Socialism, this "concurrence of electrical engineering and mythology, of splitting the atom and funeral pyres, of everything that was and is no more". Similarly, the IS terror group is combining Hollywood propaganda films and the extremely effective use of social media with stonings, crucifixions and beheadings.

Karl Kraus wrote: "Language is the mother of thought, not its handmaiden." Nazi totalitarianism inveigled its way into people's minds though a series of expressions that were accepted automatically and thoughtlessly. So this Viennese polemicist wanted to teach us to "see abysses where there are platitudes". It is vital to make the mental effort to sniff out these platitudes. If humanity had no slogans it would need no weapons.

In times that are dominated by technical and scientific Newspeak and a crushing sense of political powerlessness, there is always the temptation for artists and intellectuals to talk themselves into believing that their actions have political meaning or political effect, contrary to all the obvious facts and blatant rebuttals of reality. After the initial shock of the Paris attacks in January, old habits seem to have re-established themselves as if nothing has happened.

All in all, it seems to me that it is simpler, more pressing and more painful to question the things that we all take for granted. This includes our responsibility for establishing (or disseminating) a Newspeak that is creating havoc in our language and even threatens to destroy the only opportunity for an encounter with others. Plato said that talking to each other requires mutual goodwill and a common language. We also know that in our circles there are ritual transgressions, incantations and righteous indignations that lead to nothing. In his writings about the state, Pierre Bourdieu compares the "heretic" (hérétique) with the "controlled transgressor" (transgresseur contrôlé) and quotes the famous words of author Nicolas Chamfort at the time of the French Revolution: "The vicar-general can smile at remarks about religion, the bishop can laugh out loud and the cardinal can say his piece."

It seems to me that publications with lovely, clear political subject matter and beautiful attention-grabbing titles such as 'Illegals', 'Migrants' and so on often have little to offer in literary or political terms. Every time the existing balance of power is questioned, it occurs through an operation on the language itself, its supposed evidence

> "Hitler's excesses were brought to an end with weapons, not with arguments."
>
> Pierre Legendre, The Crime of Corporal LortiePierre Legendre,

and the grammatical fictions that it entails. I feel more challenged by works that clearly demonstrate what Nietzsche called the grammatical fiction of the ego, which open the floodgates of meaning and do not allow themselves to be reduced to an intention or a discourse about the state of the world.

I have permission to quote at length from Alfred Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz*, to be precise from the second chapter of this novel. [Editor's note: English translation provided here solely for the purposes of this article.]

"The punishment begins.

He shook himself, swallowed. He began walking. Then he broke into a run and found himself on the tram. Among other people. The tram moved off. At first it was like sitting in the dentist's chair having a tooth pulled out with pliers, the pain mounted, his head felt about to explode. He turned his head back towards the red wall, but the tram whisked him along the tracks and soon only his head was still turned towards the prison. The tram rounded a corner, trees and houses were now blocking the view. Busy streets appeared, Seestrasse, people got on and off. Inwardly, he was screaming in terror: Watch out, watch out, it's starting. The tip of his nose felt icy, his cheeks were tingling. All the newspapers: Zwölf Uhr Mittagszeitung, B.Z., Die neueste Illustrierte, Die Funkstunde neu. "Has anyone just got on?" Now the security police have blue uniforms. He gets off the tram unnoticed, among other people. What was happening? Nothing. Get a grip, you emaciated pig, pull yourself together, you'll get a taste of my fist. A throng, such a throng. How it moved. My brains have run out of oil, they've totally dried out. What was all that. Shoe shops, hat shops, electric streetlights, distilleries. People have to have shoes when they're running around all the time, we also had a shoemaker, we want to hold on to that. A hundred gleaming panes, let them shine, they won't make you afraid, you can break them, what about those, they're well polished. Rosenthaler Platz was being dug up, he walked with the others on wooden planks. You blend in with the others, then everything goes by, then you notice nothing, man. In the shop windows there are dummies in suits, coats, skirts, tights and shoes. Outside everything is on the move but – behind – there was nothing! There – was – no – life! Happy faces, laughter, waiting on the traffic island opposite Aschinger in twos and threes, smoking cigarettes, leafing through newspapers. Standing like lampposts – and – becoming ever more frozen. They belonged with the houses, all white, all wood."

The thoughts expand like tendrils, without borders or limits. Someone speaks, labours, reveals, founders, never stops, throws everything in one pot, prioritises nothing, telescopes time and place – flying in the face of all logic. Of course madness is at large as soon as the fragile barrier between inside and outside is raised, when writing cuts through everything like a razor, as Virginia Woolf described it.

It is this consciousness of our porosity, our division, that perhaps makes us more suspicious of political discourse, more sensitive towards everything that purports to define and investigate us, a little less sure

of ourselves and our demarcations. A true Other for us ('us' in the broad sense of academics, artists, readers of these lines, etc.) could be the supporters of Le Pen with their paranoia, fear of losing social status, racism – at the heart of which a broad section of the French political classes have set up an appointment to tickle their tummies…this may also be the socially disadvantaged in the suburbs or elsewhere, who are susceptible to the siren calls of Salafism.

It is precisely this language, this Other, that literature may dare to reveal in order to make tangible the power and dizziness that is contained therein, but also to steer them elsewhere. Rather than adopt a moralising and hovering stance (which is totally ineffective and serves only to reassure us until the next attack), we could try to construct characters, discourses and refrains in order to try to discover these affects in ourselves, which are there with all the rest – and which are also (and of course not solely) a reaction to the violence of Newspeak. The stand-up

"It would help mankind if we could at least open up our ears to our own language – if not an eye for the writing of others – and revive the meanings that every day we unwittingly bring to our lips. [...] The nearer we are to the origin, the further we are from war. If humanity had no slogans it would need no weapons. We have to begin by hearing ourselves speak, thinking about it, and what has been lost will be found."

Karl Kraus, Schriften, vol. 7

style of Pierre Desproges and Coluche in France, of Lenny Bruce and Bill Hicks in the USA with their daring sketches, verbal derailments, their nonsense, provides a possible example of this opening up to another language (or we could also cite the yes men who adopt the language of power in order to hijack it all the more and reveal the kinds of absurdities that we have gradually assimilated).

Do not fear this potential proximity, let it unfurl in order to reveal the absurdity or madness, that which has not been thought about, its potential, unwitting comedy. I am fascinated by texts that give this worst case a voice, texts that are not afraid of their power but displace it, penetrate it, cause it to collide with something else. This is how we fight against the very real and growing danger that results from this worst case, and indeed it is much more effective than counter-arguments or heartfelt indignation. No virtuous pose can result from a paranoid discourse or from the power of nihilist destruction (whether or not it comes cloaked in religion).

Let us return to our earlier example: the prodigious power of Dostoyevsky's *Demons* is due to his empathy with his subject (Russian nihilists). As a man, Dostoyevsky hated them with all his heart, but as a writer he knew how to put words in their mouths to reveal their comedy and ideological paucity. This book is often terrifying, but also full of searing humour.

Let us also return to the kaleidoscope, the melting pot that is Berlin's Alexanderplatz, where people get drunk, kill themselves, pull out each other's hair. It flows seamlessly:

Isaac resisting his sacrifice by Abraham, the pimp Biberkopf and the little whore Mieze, railway timetables, voices on the streets, cries announcing the return of Agamemnon from Troy, a whole bestiary running wild. The description seems like an inexhaustible reservoir of voices and ways of enunciating that includes every point of view, beings, things, animals. Döblin acts as a mouthpiece for the violence and brutality of the milieu of interlopers where his story is set and allows the worst male violence to occur (from the point of view of the women who are raped or murdered in his book). It is striking to note that this book, which has now been turned into a museum piece and rendered (almost) inoffensive, received almost universal acclaim when it was translated into French by Olivier Le Lay in 2008. If it were to be published today, without the dubious glory of being a masterpiece from the past, I am quite sure that it would trigger endless 'social' debates and no doubt lead to terrible accusations against its author.

In conclusion, I would also like to call on the oh-so-stimulating example of Montaigne from another time in our history. The miracle of his *Essais* is that they constantly create equal relationships: between the reader and the author (who opens up the whole of his library), between the authors quoted (Lucretius rubs shoulders with Saint Augustine, Plato, Tacitus, Virgil and Muhammad), and also between human reason (the European horizon of the time at the end of the 16th century) and the animal or mineral world, or other alternate worlds (such as cannibalism). In Of Cannibals, Montaigne shifts the perspective by raising the question of the humanity of cannibals. If we are shocked by their cannibalism, they in turn are shocked by the inequality that rages in Europe.

And in *An Apology for Raymond Sebond* (*Essais*, volume 2, chapter 12), Montaigne questions the various ways in which the afterlife is portrayed, placing Muslims, Christians and Platonists in the same boat. In the following lines, I quote extensively from a excellent talk given by François Athané and Isabelle Schlichting at a colloquium organised by the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) entitled *Misinterpretations of Islam*. How should we imagine the afterlife? How is it conceived by Christians, Muslims and Platonists?

False ideas of another world

Montaigne shows us that there is a kind of fatality in representations because we are unable to escape from the experiential framework of our world. As a result, all representations of the next world are false. So Montaigne refers to the typically earthly joy of recognizing and being reunited with our nearest and dearest; Christian eschatology has used the resurrection to make lavish promises of such happiness in the next life.

If we take a classic topos of criticism of Islam by Christians, that is to say the sensuality of the Muslim paradise, the author shows that this criticism also applies to Christian portrayals of the afterlife. This is Montaigne's scepticism, which turns the tables in the form of a 'waterer watered': re-surrection and reunion with our nearest and dearest in the afterlife are just as much a joy for the senses as the houris, the "women of outstanding beauty" of the Koran.

So the eschatology is condemned to be contradictory: by constructing another world through an anthropological fatality it reduces this other world to our world. This has universal application, for the paradise of others as well as that of ourselves. Thus, Montaigne's scepticism leads to a theory about the universal; it turns on its head Christian ethnocentrism, which expresses itself in mockery of the Muslim paradise. Montaigne helps us to dismantle this mimetic trap. He shows that Christian mockery of the Muslim paradise can also be turned on the Christian view of the afterlife. The prejudice displayed towards others contradicts itself because, in a typically sceptical gesture, it is turned against the holder of this prejudice.

Montaigne was not particularly well-versed in the Muslim tradition, and here he displays what could be called a hermeneutic goodwill by selecting from two possible interpretations the one that gives the text the richest and most robust connotation. Nowadays, at a time when we are able to read translations of the Koran in paperback, it seems to me that the historical approach of this gentleman from Gascony is particularly fruitful.

With Döblin, with Montaigne, we find a porosity towards the alternate world(s) that offers us inexhaustible resources to fight against Newspeak (political, journalistic and cultural) and the violent impulses that they transmit.

Otherwise, we can adopt the words of French philosopher Jacques Bouveresse: "when speaking without thinking, it is normal to find oneself also acting without thin-king and, at the final stage, considering the action itself – preferably energetic and brutal – as the only way of really speaking, the only language that is still capable of being understood."

Alban Lefranc, born 1975, is a Paris-based writer and translator. He is founder and editor of the German-French literary journal La mer gelée. In 2009 his novel Vous n'étiez pas là was published by Verticales/Gallimard. His novel Angriffe. Fassbinder, Vesper, Nico. Drei Romane has been published in German by Blumenbar Verlag. It mixes documentary and biographical material, fictive voices and situations to create a complex study of biographical, artistic and historical connections.

Made in Europe

The language of art is universal. When artists migrate, this experience brings a creative energy that is an essential element of art production in the 20th and 21st centuries. A young Chinese artist has settled in Berlin in order to practice calligraphy, providing her with the necessary distance from the destruction of traditional Chinese characters wrought by the Cultural Revolution. It also provides the inspiration of a vibrant, artistic city, a place for art that is 'Made in Europe'. *By Jia*

I remember a little girl's colorful skirt waving in the breeze, and the sun casting swatches of light through the leaves. It was summer, five years ago. I was outdoors at the café of Berlin's Literaturhaus. At that moment, I fell in love with Berlin, which seemed to me a city full of green trees and bicycles, images that fused with those from when I was a little girl in Beijing. Berlin remains the center of new art production in Europe. This fact, combined with the idyll of that summer afternoon, sealed my decision to move to Berlin as quickly as possible. But Berlin isn't Beijing. I still see very few Asian faces on the street, and until now, I probably know fewer than ten Chinese in the city. It was a shock to learn that there is no Chinese bookstore.

Global strategist Pankaj Ghemawat published *World 3.0*, a book on how limited globalization really is. This condition may have its benefits. I learned that the inhabitants of my adopted city know very little about China, but they have plenty of curiosity. Being asked all the time about China by my friends, and living seven thousands kilometers distant from Beijing makes me think of my home country all the time. James Joyce lived most of his adult life in Trieste, Zurich, and Paris, but he only wrote about an Ireland he could neither escape nor forget.

Nostalgia is an eternal theme of literature and art. When I think about China from the vantage point of Mitteleuropa where I have no personal history, looking back helps me to understand better the gap between traditional Chinese civilization and the tsunami of Western trends that has swept over China. On the one hand, Chinese have been excited and curious about new influences from the West. But since we are still struggling to find our way through these cultural connections and differences, we often get lost and abandon our own culture. This problem especially afflicts the young.

Studying both architecture and traditional Chinese opera in Beijing pushed me to the forefront of this clash of cultures. For Chinese students, the thrust of our studies was toward Western architecture. It was the beginning of the 21st century. Beijing was preparing for the 2008 Olympics. China became the world's factory, and the world's biggest construction site. Three hundred million migrant workers moved to the cities. Twenty-four hours a day, construction sites filled Beijing with lights, dust, and endless noise. Hundreds of neighborhoods were demolished. When my book about traditional Chinese garden architecture was published in 2005, only 5.76 percent of Beijing's old city was intact. The developments for the Olympics saw to the rest. Travel restrictions during the closed period through the end of the Cultural Revolution made it impossible for Chinese to see modern architecture in situ. Even students of my generation would eagerly make notes and drawings of famous designs from the limited books in the library. For us, Modern Architecture was, in many respects, imaginary.

Later, when I attended my first Master's

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class in traditional Chinese opera, our professor told us that in the 1950s, there were more than 3,000 kinds of local opera in China; now less than 200 remain.

Bulldozing harmony

China's self-inflicted cultural destruction, its frenzy and despair, combined with increased idealistic worship of the West has yielded a strange state of affairs. The Chinese worked very hard to increase their GDP to reach fourth place in the world; but on the other hand, once the backward old China was no more, high hopes for a new, ideal system were darkened by the corrupt habits of patronage and 'relationships' exactly like those that have been practiced for thousands of years. Bulldozers not only demolished traditional buildings that were the essence of much of our history, but they also demolished much of the harmony, contentment and optimism that we inherited from traditional Chinese thought. Those born in the big cities during the 1980s, have found that 50 percent of their parents' marriages have ended in divorce. My own family was one of the casualties of this trend.

By contrast, all these features of social upheaval and cultural destruction reinforce my sense of Berlin as an idyll in a way that Berliners of my grandparents' generation would have found hard to believe. While I enjoyed studying German culture, and benefitting from its positive influences—happily discovering the similarities and differences between the two cultures—with the time

constraints of daily life, I simply cannot fill my time with the Chinese language anymore. But neither can I put aside my Chinese. Wittgenstein wrote that, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." Having lost the environment of the Chinese language, and with the limits of my German and English, art as universal language allows me expression. In this way, I first conceived my painting series based on Chinese characters: *The Chinese Version*.

Chinese characters have had a history as a developed writing system for no less than 3,300 years. Unlike alphabetical writing systems, Chinese characters do not represent sounds even if they have sounds associated with them. Rather, they are symbols that convey meanings. *An Analysis and Explanation of Characters* written by Xu Shen at the beginning of the first century AD summarized the ways of creating Chinese characters in the earliest known stages of written Chinese. The first major criterion was pictographic. For abstract concepts not conducive to pictographic representation, early Chinese developed the indicative method. They added a symbol to a drawing in order to indicate the concept. The associative method combined two existing pictographs in order for the reader to deduce the meaning. Another combination is a pictographic component to explain the meaning, added to another that represents both an associated sound (distinct from a true phonetic) and meaning of the whole character. Still others are borrowed to represent another concept with the same pronunciation.

Lines, dots and hooks

Gradually, Chinese characters comprising various lines, dots and hooks that derived from the ancient pictographs became ever more symbolic. This organic development continued until it was broken in 1955 when Mainland China imposed the simplification of Chinese characters. This directive had two stated purposes: the simplification of the 'structure' or the number of strokes in characters, and a reduction in the number of characters. In this way, not only the form of characters changed, but also thousands of characters simply disappeared from the Chinese lexicon.

The pretext for this directive was to increase literacy, but literacy rates in Hong Kong and Taiwan are slightly higher than those of Mainland China, despite the fact that their administrations never adopted simplified characters, and never limited the number of characters.

From the standpoint of language, the simplification program was a much more ambitious cultural atrocity than the Taliban dynamiting the Bamiyan Buddhas or the campaign of the First Emperor of Qin, to 'burn books and bury scholars.' It was more extreme than censorship because it not only restricted expression, but also, to a degree, it restricted the ability to conceive certain ideas.

For artists, it was a further calamity because imposed simplification desecrated our most indigenous and distinctive art form: calligraphy. Of course some people still practice calligraphy in simplified characters, but this is a calligraphy divorced from millennia of developments that enabled the form of characters to reflect their semantic content and vice versa.

In my work, I have used simplified cha-

racters, but I have mixed them with 'lost' characters that are no longer in use or prohibited by simplification. These are made to appear as though printed, but each is painted by hand with a brush rather like traditional calligraphy. In these works, the arrangement of the characters has no lexical or semantic relation. Instead, their relationship is entirely formal. At the same time, these works divest the simplified characters of the propagandistic role for which they were intended, and return to them a formal aesthetic. Another way of saying this is that one can return a formal aesthetic to simplified characters, but only by eliminating their lexical and semantic relations. Ultimately, this is also to return to Chinese characters their critical role, but entirely through formal artistic means.

Languages are dynamic and develop all the time, following in step with history. But the deliberate destruction of so much of the Chinese written language is a symptom of a historical tendency that is ongoing in so many places around the globe right through to the present day. In this sense, I believe that my work, which uses Chinese characters and is not only 'made in Germany' but also actually made possible in Germany, addresses a global problem. My hope is that this work will arouse people from many nations to reflect on what we have lost from our cultures, and how much of our world cultural heritage continues to be deliberately destroyed by depraved ideologies for which the destruction of culture is merely a prelude to the destruction of our humanity, and then to the destruction of human beings.

Words move, music moves
Only in time; but that which is only living
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.

— *Burnt Norton, T.S.Eliot*

Informed by Zen (Chan) thought, which aimed to free the mind for sudden enlightenment, mastery of the brush in Chinese calligraphy freed the hand to capture the mind's vision. Even in ancient China, artists had the freedom to abandon themselves to enlightenment and expression. The conscious artistry of the brush relied on the spontaneity of the hand to distill the essence in the mind. This unconscious unity of the inner (the mind) and the outer (the hand) hoped to allow the calligraphic work to render the living spirit of things.

In contrast, my work uses a font invented after the industrial revolution for printing presses that were imported to Japan and China. This font evokes the mechanization of industrial products 'perfectly' made by machine. There is no expressive freedom; everything conforms to a rigid order so as to be in compliance with the state standard—regardless of the individual will. In the end, these characters become the articulations of those who have lost their will. Some of the form remains, and the movement seems to be still there, moving perpetually in its stillness, like the Chinese jar in T.S.Eliot's poem, but opposite, and dead.

From the time the industrial revolution unlocked the gates to China, to the pre-

sent, when the invisible power of the Internet blunts cultural differences, part of the evident prosperity of our society is a direct fruit of scientific development. Not all change is growth, as not all movement is forward. We know that technological progress is real, but whether the progress of civilization is a reality is controversial. There is an old Chinese saying that, "Using copper as a mirror, we can tidy our clothes; using another person as a mirror, we can know our success or failure; using the past as a mirror, we can compel our rise or decline".

After five years, Berlin is not always like my idyll of the Literaturhaus on a summer's day. Berlin is a distinctive node in the global network. In the biggest city of immigrants in Germany, different nationalities face different problems. The increasing immigration of the young brings Berlin its vitality and leads to development, but attendant unemployment also brings social problems.

English is becoming ever more the lingua franca. Germans face changes in their own cultural identity. In Berlin, we are striving to become a tech hub, the next Silicon Valley. The startup industry gives young people a new direction for their talents. But a relatively conservative social system limits its speed. Last summer, I attended the DLD Women's Conference where Viviane Reding, a member of the European Parliament, held a dialogue with Claudia Nemat, a board member of Deutsche Telekom AG. Reding claimed to be disappointed by the shortsightedness and selfish national politics of Europe. She had hoped that after the crisis of 2008, Europe would develop pan-European

systems. Telekom, after all, is building a pan-European network. Both these women will present it to Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, who is going to promulgate the digital common market program in Europe. Then Nemat mentioned that, as a result of the complex infrastructure of Telekom, it would take at least one to two years to introduce a new product, a feat that Google and other foreign companies manage in a matter of weeks or days. The fact of bureaucratic delays brought us all back to reality. I remembered that in Berlin, it took me and most of my friends an average of two months to have internet service.

New York's sixth borough

New Yorkers in the art world call Berlin 'New York's sixth borough'. As a person who has chosen to live in Berlin, I see no reason for it to aspire to be an imitation Silicon Valley or an imitation New York. With the greatest population of artists, a profound and rich cultural base of Europe combined with influences from all over the world, why shouldn't Berlin make its own new historical contribution to which others should aspire? Perhaps we will manage this in either case, but the lack of sufficient economic support compels the art scene in Berlin to fend for itself. Art becomes a monopolistic system dominated by a few art authorities.

"Not all change is growth, as not all movement is forward. We know that technological progress is real, but whether the progress of civilization is a reality is controversial."

Across a cultural bridge, I hold my brush to paint *The Chinese Version* series in Germany, my adopted home. But invariably I remember a paragraph from Lin Yutang's book *My Country and My People:* "I am able to confess because, unlike these patriots, I am not ashamed of my country. And I can lay bare her troubles because I have not lost hope. China is bigger than her little patriots, and does not require their whitewashing. She will, as she always did, right herself again." These lines sum up not only my attitude towards China, but also my attitude towards Germany. To be critical of the current condition in order to be able to wish for something greater, something that could contribute further to global welfare is a consequence of genuine respect.

Jia is an artist who lives and works in Berlin. She was born in 1979 in Beijing in the People's Republic of China, where she studied architecture, performance and literature.

The long road from I to We

The concept of community is a proven one, yet egoism and conflict present constant threats to social cohesion. How do we create a global community that integrates the highest possible number of people while preventing them from turning into a faceless mass. Europe itself is the result of an arduous journey from a collection of small states to a multinational entity. Today it is facing a historic challenge: the integration of hundreds of thousands of migrants. *By Michael Gleich*

M e? No, you! Amazingly, the first words uttered by babies are not about themselves but about others: mummy, daddy, grandma. They only begin to develop a sense of self after their first birthday. It is possible to test whether the development of this sense of self by marking the child's forehead with a coloured spot and holding up a mirror. Does the child wipe its forehead to remove the spot? One small step for a child but a giant step for mankind. Are we seeing the origins of egoism? Is this how it all begins, the whole catastrophe of self-interest, hunger for power, animosity and fear?

Yes and no. The development of one's own, separate personality does indeed lie at the heart of many serious aberrations. Yet at the same time, contradictory as it sounds, separation is an absolute prerequisite for community. Only healthy, stable personalities are able to connect with others without losing themselves in the group and becoming unhealthy.

The birth of the ego marks the start of a lifelong battle. From now on, we will spend our lives vacillating between a desire for autonomy and a longing for togetherness. There are times when these two poles tear us in two. But they can also provide us with magical moments of pure bliss. Brain researcher Gerald Hüther comments in this respect: "People are always happy when they have an opportunity to satisfy their basic need for connection and closeness on the one hand and growth, autonomy and freedom on the other."

Yet the Zeitgeist of past eras gave a very different interpretation to the tensions between these two poles. Over the last 150 years, Western civilization has been dominated by the belief that our lives are dog-eat-dog, where only the strongest survive. Supporters of this view have backed it up by quoting the theories of naturalist Charles Darwin. Have they misun-

derstood his findings, or consciously twisted them in order to come up with a biological justification for war, egoism and boundless greed? Darwin himself did not identify aggression as being man's driving force. In fact he believed the opposite, that treating people well garners the respect of one's fellow man and earns the love of the people one lives with. This is what he called the greatest joy on earth.

A social organ

Cooperation drives evolution. This is also something that can be observed in young children. They learn everything from the people around them. The extreme example of 'wolf children' who grow up far from human contact and cannot even walk shows how much we depend on learning from each other. There is an African saying that it takes a village to raise a child. Neurobiology describes the human brain as a social organ which develops its complex connections in relation to other people. We have always intuitively known that we are nothing without others.

There is a stronger sense of community when a group of people discovers that, when working together, they can handle challenges that they could not tackle alone – whether it is helping neighbours to build a house or developing complex legal systems. Or when they discover the wonderful way in which society as a whole is more than the sum of its parts. Brainstorming produces ideas that the participants would not have come up with on their own, with one thought inspiring the next and

collective intelligence coming into play. The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk concludes that: "A group of people is always one degree 'more real' than each of its members."

So far, so social. So why is the world not full of peace, joy and understanding? What factors threaten the successful creation of a community? British social epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson sums up the problem in a single word: inequality. He defines it as the gap between the richest and poorest members of society. For Wilkinson, extreme inequality can be compared to an illness which affects all strata of society. He claims that this gap fluctuates widely across the various industrialized nations. In the United States, inequality is two to three times as high as in Denmark or Sweden. As a result, all the key social indicators are worse in the USA than in Scandinavia. The US has more prison inmates, a higher murder rate, more teenage pregnancies, lower levels of education and higher risk of disease. At the same time, surveys show that people in egalitarian societies have greater trust in other people and are more willing to work for the common good. Wilkinson's surprising message to the developed nations is as follows: when it comes to quality of life, it is not GDP that counts but the strength of a society's solidarity.

If there is nothing to bind people together, then societies waste many of the benefits that were the reason for their creation. While communities grow organically, underpinned by shared values, societies are based on the specific expectation of fair exchange between its members. Yet the yawning gap between rich and poor and the lack of social mobility are a threat to the balance of give and take. The

"Cooperation drives evolution. This is also something that can be observed in young children."

foundations of the social contract are crumbling. Cultural expert Christina von Braun also believes that, in extreme cases, the monetary system is at risk: "Any currency can crash if people lose trust in the community."

*Mobile, connected
and always on the move*

The global distribution of labour and the constant acceleration of production and innovation require a new type of worker, labelled 'flexible people' by US sociologist Richard Sennett. Mobile, connected and always on the move; new nomads who – if they want to keep their jobs – cannot stay long in one place or build ties with a group of people. In parallel, virtual sociotopes such as Facebook and Twitter have emerged on the Internet. They provide a new relaxed, loose and liquid definition of community and cohesion. The consequences of this remain to be seen.

In the real world, social innovators are forging new paths between freedom and solidarity. Multi-generational residential communities are based on solidarity and new synergies without reverting to the romanticism of the communes of the 1970s, whose narrow dogma always led to their break-up sooner or later. Mentoring programmes between Germans and migrant students in schools; village communities on the search for ecological or spiritual meaning; and groups of agricultural producers and consumers have shown that field trials are still continuing on the topic of 'freedom in solidarity'. If the journey from I to We goes smoothly, then the Self does not

get left behind but is a travelling companion that grows and flourishes.

But what if it doesn't go smoothly? The dark side of communities is their tendency to shut themselves off. They build walls, and those who are left outside bang their heads against them in frustration. Recent studies by psychologists and brain researchers suggest that aggression is not a basic human instinct but rather a reaction to painful experiences, which often include exclusion. An investigation into the motives of young school shooters showed that 70 percent felt a sense of social exclusion. Whether it is fights between gangs of youths or international conflicts between minorities, when people are denied their basic need to belong, it unleashes a storm within them.

But building ramparts does nothing to hold back the storm. Not when those battering themselves against them are determined to get inside at all costs. A Fortress Europe with outer borders secured by metre-high fences, soldiers in night-vision goggles and aerial surveillance is something of an anachronism in this respect. Migrants are attracted by the promise of a better life, or indeed are driven by the basic need to survive. Any attempt to prevent them from entering what is – in their eyes – the promised land of Europe will fail because of the sheer numbers of migrants and the boldness engendered by desperation.

Mare Nostrum, the European operation for rescuing migrants at sea, was abolished in December 2014. In just one year, it allowed Italy to save the lives of 170,000 people. This operation has been ended at a time when up to two million people from Northern Iraq and Syria are fleeing war, rape and genocide. It has

now been placed in the hands of Frontex, the European agency responsible for protecting Europe's borders. The barricading of an entire continent stands in stark contrast to the clear economic need for migration. Demographic problems caused by Europe's aging population are already rearing their heads and will lead to serious challenges for the labour market. There is a shortage of skilled workers and not enough people to pay the pensions.

Should immigration be made solely dependent on professional qualifications? Should we be taking in highly educated people while slamming the door in the faces of the less skilled? It would make more sense to allow a culture of integration to flourish, which would make it possible for newcomers (generally the bolder, more powerful personalities) to develop their potential. This would also benefit of Europe as a whole. The EU's motto is 'United in Diversity'. The ups and downs of its often bloody history mean that Europe is particularly suited to promoting a culture of diversity. How many centuries did princedoms and small states have to fight, conquer and subjugate each other before the idea of a nation state took hold, followed by the concept of a common market? When I was growing up in the

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1970s, it was still something special to have an exchange friend in France. In fact there were times when I was called a "sal boche", a dirty Boche. It was still just a few short years since these two neighbours had been arch enemies. And today? They are the closest of allies and are the stable core of NATO and the EU.

Europe has learned its lesson

Europe has learned its lesson. Really. Tolerance for diversity, the knowledge of how to organize immigration in a constructive way – all the cultural ingredients are present that will allow people from other regions, traditions and religions to join the social majority. There are populist mouthpieces which like to stoke people's fear that Europe will be overrun by foreigners. Sections of the population who rarely have contact with migrants are often particularly susceptible to these messages. They fear foreigners when there are no foreigners.

When people or whole societies feel insecure, there is always a temptation to play the 'ethnic card'. For example, I have just returned from a research trip to Northeast India. Eight states, 45 million people, most of whom have Chinese or Mongolian features. They look different from other Indians. So they are excluded. Young people who go to Delhi to study are sworn at, bullied and beaten. At the same time, the central government neglects the northeastern states and for years has treated them more like a colony than an equal member of the federation. Experts have identified 300 tribes and subtribes in this region. And now, at a time of globalization and lack of access to

money, power and jobs, many members of this ethnic group are beginning to shout loudly about their cultural identity. They are becoming increasingly chauvinistic. They claim a desire to return to their traditions, their roots, but in reality it is about their rights as a minority. They are playing a power game that in its extreme form has led to the creation of armed militias for their 'defence'.

A second example relates to a young Serb who beat a 23-year-old Turkish woman to death on a McDonald's car park. He had a history of failed attempts to gain a foothold in German society. In his deep insecurity, his frustration about feeling excluded and his injured pride, what did he do? He boasted on Facebook that he was a Sandžak. Sandžak is a largely Muslim region of Serbia. Yet this young man was neither religious nor Muslim. He was someone who had nothing but simply wanted to be a proud member of a community. A desperate attempt to compensate for the pain caused by his sense of exclusion.

For a long time, history seemed to be heading firmly in one direction: towards more community, more social structures, more integration. Communities were steadily expanding, from clans to villages to cities to regions to nations. At every stage, this expansion was a response to the problems of the existing, smaller structures. Today it is nation states that are literally being pushed to their limits in the face of global problems such as climate change, terrorism and poverty. The task they face is to move on to the next stage and create an 'individualized community' on a global scale that is bound together by universal values but still provides room for personal and national growth.

We need a global domestic policy, but this finds itself facing a countertrend, which I would like to call fragmentation. Along with the social and material inequalities already mentioned, there are other very dangerous trends that can tear societies apart. Secular, moderate groups have to find a way to get along with fundamentalist groups. The privatization of common resources, sometimes through the use of military force, creates social divisions. Terrorist movements such as Islamic State or Boko Haram seem to be appearing out of thin air. Separatist movements old and new are now challenging national borders that have long been considered sacrosanct.

Two seemingly contradictory developments are now emerging. On the one hand, the planet seems to be torn apart, full of conflict and divided by individual interests. But on the other hand, there have never been so many people on earth who realize that the great challenges of our time, such as dwindling energy resources, the environment and violent conflict, can only be overcome if we have a functioning global community. It is time for humanity to bite the bullet. This is a greater challenge than any mission to Mars. Perhaps we should call this ambitious project 'We are the world'!

Michael Gleich is a journalist and author. He focuses on presenting complex issues such as peace, mobility and the environment in ways that are easy to understand – and sometimes surprising. His books have been translated into several languages and won many awards.

Chapter 4: EUNIC and the national institutes for culture –

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Their contribution to successful immigration

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How can EUNIC, the European network of national institutes for culture, help to improve the integration of immigrants? Who should EUNIC be working with – special migrant groups, mainstream society in the host country or potential migrants before they leave home? Do we need new think tanks to generate new ideas and concepts? Whatever happens, EUNIC has to get involved at the point where integration policies are being pushed to their limits.

The potential of migration

Anti-Islam demonstrations and right-wing populism in Europe. How can we overcome xenophobia and growing distrust? It is clear that in Europe, common action on the integration of migrants needs to be put on the agenda. Such activities have the potential to empower migrants who want to live in the European Union and to include mainstream society in the host countries. *By Martin Eichtinger*

While for many European countries migration is a relatively new phenomenon, Austria has had a long tradition of incorporating immigrants from different backgrounds and transforming influences from other cultures into its own. When telephone books still existed in Vienna, a quick glance would famously reveal a majority of Slavic surnames in the German-speaking former capital of the multi-ethnic Hapsburg Empire.

Geographically situated in the center of Europe and the heartland of a slowly expanding multi-ethnic empire, Austria experienced first-hand many of the continent's centuries-long struggles, clashes and divides. But at times it also developed strategies on how to balance the different interests, beliefs and aspirations of the various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups within the empire.

In 1912, following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which with a strike added more than half a million Muslim citizens to the empire, Islam was officially recognized by the Austrian state, something unheard of in Western European countries at the time. This recognition meant that Austrian Muslims were entitled to their own religious practice while serving in the army. The law recognizing Islam was so progressive that it was left untouched by Austria for many decades, long after the Hapsburg Empire had disappeared. Only recently the government has undertaken to replace it with an entirely new law.

In Europe of today, migration has become the center of a heated, often controversial political debate. While the reasons for conflicts between the mainstream society and immigrant minorities are often economic or social, underlying cultural tensions and frictions have at times been underestimated or ignored in the past.

In Austria, this has clearly changed over recent years. Today, the integration of migrants has become a clear priority of Austrian politics. In an unprecedented step, a State Secretariat for Integration was established in 2011 in order to meet the political challenges of this important issue. The Austrian government thereby acknowledged the fact that integration is decisive in shaping our future. Consequently, a number of measures have been undertaken in order to turn the often-emotional discussion on integration into a more factual and analytical conversation.

A new tone in the public debate

Today the tone of the public debate has clearly shifted. While in the past, the conversation in Austria was dominated on the one hand by populist sentiments and on the other hand by overly idealistic and naïve concepts that amounted to wishful thinking, today a more pragmatic and realistic approach is taken. The government is trying to shape public perceptions on migration by emphasizing the opportunities that migration brings for society as a whole, without shying away from confronting some of the problems that occur when cultural barriers hinder successful integration.

First, in 2011, an independent Expert Council for Integration was created with the aim of analysing integration policies and formulating recommendations. This Council is headed by a renowned academic and publishes an annual integration report as well as a statistical yearbook on migration and integration. These two documents are complemented by an online database on integration projects by various public organisations.

Out of the many integration initiatives is the nomination of prominent Austrian personalities (such as David Alaba, an Austrian football player for Bayern Munich) with a migration background to act as 'Ambassadors for Integration'. This stands out as an attempt to shed light on successful role models for immigrants. Another helpful initiative has been giving awards to journalists who have dedicated a substantial part of their work to integration-related topics.

In 2014, a new government was formed and integration was put under the umbrella of the Foreign Ministry. The former State Secretary for integration, Mr. Sebastian Kurz, became Europe's youngest foreign minister. Combining integration and foreign affairs under one administration opened up an array of new opportunities. With the network of the Foreign Ministry, today it is possible for new policies and initiatives to reach immigrants before they even enter Austria via our diplomatic, consular, and cultural network around the world. The new approach means that integration involves the countries of origin and prepares immigrants in the best possible way for their lives in Austria.

When it comes to Austrian Foreign Policy, the dialogue of cultures has become a successful tool of soft power over recent years

"Today it is possible for new policies and initiatives to reach immigrants before they even enter Austria via our diplomatic, consular, and cultural network around the world."

and decades. We aim to use dialogue initiatives to contribute to trust and peace, combat prejudices and stereotypes and promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

In 2007 a Dialogue of Cultures Task Force was established in the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Over the past years, this task force has organized a number of conferences, supported the dialogue initiatives of other organisations and developed a network of dialogue partners.

A successful dialogue initiative has been developed in the past five years in collaboration with the European Integration Fund. In close cooperation with the Official Islamic Community in Austria a program that provides training and capacity building to religious leaders and active members of the Islamic Community in Austria was developed. 2014 marks the sixth edition of the project, fostering integration and participation. The project focuses on the following three groups:

- Since 2009 religious leaders from Turkey have been attending lectures, workshops and excursions in preparation for their 5-year postings in Austria. Given that the majority of those religious leaders only recently arrived in Austria, their level of familiarity with the country, system, and institutions is limited, making their temporary migration a challenging process at times. The training aims to provide information about and access to institutions, enabling religious leaders to better understand the prevailing structures and thus better connect with their constituencies and participate within society. Capacity building constitutes another integral part of the training, with a strong focus on women and youth.

- Since 2011, female delegates appointed by the faith community have received training; thus emphasizing their vital role as counselors and supporters of women, their valuable contribution in the process of integration and participation, as well as their potential to act as 'multipliers' within the community, passing on information and experience through inner-community initiatives.

- Since 2011 additional training has enabled volunteers working with the Islamic Community in Austria to become delegates for dialogue. The idea is to strengthen their skills and knowledge, in order to encourage interaction, reinforce communications, and build up partnerships between the Islamic community and Austrian society. Participation in the process of creating and shaping a common narrative takes center stage.

Having attended a ceremony where certificates were given to participants of these training programs, I witnessed personally how this dialogue initiative is very much appreciated by the members of the Islamic Community in Austria and Austrian public institutions alike.

The term 'intercultural dialogue' was consciously broadly defined. Analogous to the integration process itself, it is understood as a mutually active process in which both sides, i.e. the majority society as much as the migrants recognise the added value of migration and integration. The goal is to lessen fears and prejudices and to make the public discourse on immigration less tense. Like integration work as a whole, this field of activity and the measures implemented aim to prevent discrimination, so that diversity is seen as normality.

From our multilateral initiatives I'd like to highlight the 5th Global Forum of the UN Alliance of Civilisations, which took place in Vienna in 2013. Among other issues, the conference focused on how responsible leadership can make a difference in shaping a new narrative for migration, integration and mobility in the global economy. The conclusions highlighted the need to enhance education, training and data collection. Addressing myths and misperceptions on migration is an important task of all stakeholders involved in integration activities.

In June 2014 Vienna hosted the third edition of the Arab-European Young Leaders Forum, which focused on social entrepreneurship. This initiative fosters exchange between young leaders from NGO's, foundations, and the media from Europe and the Arab world and helps them enhance and embrace their intercultural competence.

In 2014 Austria created the Intercultural Achievement Award (IAA), which is aimed at dialogue institutions and projects around the world in the categories of education, art, economy, women, and youth.

Cultural Diplomacy and Migration

Cultural diplomacy as a form of soft power can play an important role in the integration of migrants. There are numerous potential synergies between domestic integration work and cultural diplomacy, which involves the country of origin and which could also prepare immigrants in the best possible way for their lives in Austria.

But migration increasingly needs to be viewed in a broader context, so national initiatives and policies alone are not sufficient. If EUNIC with its vast networks around the globe manages to establish itself as the European Union's best-suited cultural diplomacy tool in third countries, a European concept on culture and migration will need to be developed in order to provide a framework for European initiatives in the area of cultural dialogue. The experiences of some European countries may provide important inputs and inspiration for that endeavor.

Of course, within the Austrian Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, we try to mainstream our dialogue activities

"If EUNIC with its vast networks around the globe manages to establish itself as the European Union's best-suited cultural diplomacy tool in third countries, a European concept on culture and migration will need to be developed in order to provide a framework for European initiatives in the area of cultural dialogue."

among the Austrian Cultural Forums and the Austrian Embassies. For this reason we have developed a little handbook which we call Dialogue vademecum. This document outlines the rationale behind our dialogue activities and defines parameters for successful dialogue projects such as reciprocity, mutual commitment and the equal status of the dialogue partners. An essential part of this dialogue vademecum is a list of dialogue partners, which the Austrian Cultural Forums and Embassies can consult in order to organise dialogue projects.

Currently we are working on a document with good practice examples for successful dialogue projects by Austrian Cultural Forums and Embassies. We have to acknowledge, however, that local peculiarities have to be considered when designing a dialogue project. Furthermore, it is important to identify the target group of dialogue projects: do we only want to mediate between two or more groups of different backgrounds or do we want to reach a wider public in sending out messages which reflect our core values, such as the promotion of democracy, human rights nd the rule of law?

As far as Europe is concerned, common action on the integration of migrants needs to be put on the agenda. Such activities have the potential to empower migrants who want to live in the European Union and to include mainstream society in the host countries. Only then will we be able to successfully fight xenophobia and the growing distrust among Europeans and continue the long history of this continent as it moves towards a peaceful and culturally diverse future.

Martin Eichtinger is Austria's Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Before his current assignment he was for many years the Director General for International Cultural Policy in the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs.

Language and integration
Migrants often live in their new countries for years without adequate knowledge of its language. In some European cities there are areas where you hear almost exclusively Arabic, Turkish, Urdu or Hindi. Learning the language is one of the most important factors for successful integration. How can language proficiency be improved?
By Constanza Menzinger

Speaking the language of the community where you reside allows you to carry out actions of vital importance, such as looking for a house or a job and seeking health assistance. As everybody knows, language learning is a process made of gradual steps and it is influenced by cognitive, social and affective factors. Among these factors, motivation is the one that mostly influences successful language learning; the drive to learn a language is often linked to the interest experienced in communicating with people from different countries; the desire to gain a better understanding of another culture; or to the achievement of personal gains, such as the possibility of finding a better job or going to university.

Language learning requires time and commitment and, as many language teachers and learners know, motivation does not remain stable over time: it can increase and lessen depending on many circumstances. Generally speaking, motivation is nurtured by positive exchanges with natives and is influenced by their attitude. But sometimes it is the case that once learners have reached a level of competence that allows them to interact satisfactorily in everyday life, their motivation drops off. If learners have little exposure to a rich input and have no further incentives, fossilization can stop the learning process. In effect, language learning takes place not only through language courses in institutional settings, but also and mainly through effective and motivating communication with native speakers and other people from different countries who are learning the same language.

In adult migration contexts, the extent of contacts with people of the receiving society, as well as the purposes for which the language of the community is used, can vary greatly. Language learning and migration force learners to face systems of thought and ways of expressing oneself and classifying reality that are profoundly different from those they are used to. This process has sometimes been

described as taking on a new identity; places where the language of the host country is learnt are also places where learners explore their new identities.

As regards the relationship between linguistic integration and identity, Beacco, Little and Hedges (Beacco, J.C., Little, D. and Hedges, C., 2014: 14-15) describe four levels of integration of the receiving society's language into individual repertoires. Linguistic integration is passive when a migrant's language competence does not allow them to manage everyday communication effectively; it is functional when the language is used effectively to communicate in many personal, social and work situations, but little attention is paid to formal correctness; it is proactive when language learning is linked to personal goals, such as developing personal and social relationships and an advanced level of language competence; linguistic integration expands linguistic identity, when the language of the receiving society is fully integrated in the linguistic repertoire of the migrant and becomes part of his/her identity.

Predeparture training in the countries of origin

Over the last fifteen years, many European countries have set up a number of projects to provide language and vocational training courses for migrants before their departure from their countries of origin.

In Italy, migrants who receive professional training and attend Italian language courses in their countries of origin have a fast track to gaining a stay permit in Italy. After the courses, the participants are directed to job sectors identified by the Italian regions. In this context, in 2004 and 2005 the Italian Ministry of Employment, together with Società Dante Alighieri and the International Organization for Migrations, set up three experimental projects in Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Moldova. Società Dante Alighieri focused on organizing Italian language courses, whereas IOM provided professional training. These courses were held in Colombo, Tunis and Chisinau before the migrants left their home countries for Italy and involved more than 500 students. The courses included 80 hours of Italian lessons and 20 hours of 'knowledge of society'; the main goal was to provide the students with basic communication tools and give them a good start to language learning. The language lessons devoted special attention to job-related vocabulary, and the 'knowledge of society' classes dealt with cultural aspects linked to everyday life. The objective was to support future professional and social integration. At the end of the courses, participants underwent PLIDA examinations to test the level of competence reached in Italian. The level attained by the majority of students was PLIDA A1 (= A1 Common European Framework of Reference; Council of Europe, 2001).

In our experience, which has been reported and analyzed in *Formare nei Paesi di origine per integrare in Italia* (Arcangeli, Masi and Menzinger, 2006), the main advantage of these kinds of projects is to

be found in the attitude students develop towards the future hosting community and towards language learning. According to feedback received from students and teachers, learning the foreign language in one's own country and in a familiar environment lowers the stress that arises when you are urged to communicate after arriving in the host country.

Another positive feature is that the language teacher acts as a mediator between the two languages and the two cultures by encouraging an open attitude towards differences and helping the students to understand the cultural and language features peculiar to the host country. In this way, migrants experience less of a culture shock when they come into contact with the host country's language and culture.

In a very recent document, Maria Vincenca Desiderio and Kate Hopper, policy analysts at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) have analyzed the effectiveness of predeparture measures in the context of migrants' integration into the European labour market. The main critical issues that they observe in language training are the basic level required (A1), and the administrative delays between the migration candidate's completion of the requirement and their first admission to the country of destination, which make the skills become obsolete.

"Language learning and migration force learners to face systems of thought and ways of expressing oneself and classifying reality that are profoundly different from those they are used to."

These are indeed the main shortcomings of the projects; an A1 learner is described in the global scale of the Common European Framework as a basic user who "Can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very basic phrases aimed at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type. Can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer questions about personal details such as where he/she lives, people he/she knows and things he/she has. Can interact in a simple way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly and is prepared to help." (Council of Europe, 2001: 24). A person who is at the A1 level then, as the description above shows, is not able to communicate effectively on the workplace.

Language requirements in European Countries

In 2014 the Council of Europe published its Third Survey on Linguistic Integration of Adult Migrants. This document presents the findings of a survey on language requirements (tests of language proficiency, optional/compulsory integration programmes, etc.) linked to entry, permanence and citizenship in the Member States of the Council of Europe. More than 80% of Europe's Member States who responded to the survey reported that adult migrants are legally required to take a language course and/or a language test for at least one of the three administrative situations addressed: prior to entry, residence, and citizenship. Pre-entry requirements apply to migrants see-

king family reunion or to migrant workers in nine countries; the most common level required in these cases is A1 CEFR. In a larger number of countries language requirements are linked to residence permits; in such countries migrants must show they possess an A1, A2 or B1 CEFR. The majority of the countries require a certificate of A2 or B1 CEFR levels for citizenship.

In Italy, since 2011, migrants who wish to stay for more than a year have to sign an Integration agreement at the moment of their arrival. This obliges them to reach an A2 level in Italian within two years. Permanent residence permits are released to those migrants who can show they have reached A2, either through a certificate taken after passing a language test, or through a written declaration that they have attended an Italian language course. At the moment no language requirements are required to apply for Italian citizenship.

In this context, Società Dante Alighieri, together with the other three Italian language examination bodies, University for Foreigners of Siena and Perugia and University of Roma Tre has been commissioned by the Italian Ministry of the Interior to develop guidelines for the creation of an A2 level test for applicants for permanent residence permits.

Constanza Menzinger is Coordinator of the PLIDA language programme. PLIDA issues certificates of proficiency in Italian and is run by the Società Dante Alighieri in conjunction with La Sapienza University in Rome. It is recognized by Italian government ministries.

Cultural institutes are strong believers in the huge potential of cultural relations as a means of building trust and strong relations between people and civil society from different countries. The arts and culture professionals are particularly good at telling complex stories and of casting a critical eye on human endeavor. Culture touches peoples' minds as well as their hearts, or if you will, it speaks to both brain halves simultaneously and thereby better informs their decisions.

Human development is paradoxical; our world is in a state of constant flux. Fortunately, many development trends are for the better; the fight against extreme poverty is making visible progress in many places and lethal diseases are being managed one by one, albeit slowly. Other developments are sadly going in the negative direction. Conflicts and security threats seem to be ever more commonplace, including in the daily lives of those who, until recently, thought they could keep it from their doorsteps. The terror attacks in Paris and Copenhagen are sad reminders of the tensions that persist in contemporary European societies. All of this would suggest that trust between nations and peoples are a scarce resource these days.

I would like to share the vision of my own organization, the Swedish Institute, as an example. Our vision is a world where states and individuals trust each other and where our institute is one of the most successful and efficient organizations in contributing to that trust. This vision helps me and my staff to remember why we go to work each day, as it outlines a relevance of our work which goes beyond simple nation branding.

SI's work to build relationships and trust with civil society and individuals in other countries has important allies in our colleagues in other European countries. The objectives of the network of European Union National institutes for Culture (EUNIC) are closely related with ours: to strengthen dialogue and cultural exchanges within Europe and between the countries of Europe and the world. As a member, we strengthen our own organization's capacity and find platforms for collaboration with others around common challenges. As President from June 2014 to June 2015, we have had the opportunity to more significantly participate in shaping the future of the network.

More and more people are now pointing to the importance that the EU, alongside traditional diplomacy, places on relationship-building, people-to-people activities aiming at better understanding and enhanced trust between Europe and other countries. And, within the EU, there is currently a process to strengthen the role of culture in EU external relations. We are here talking about cultural relations in a broad sense, including cultural and educational exchanges by artists and professionals, capacity development in development countries, culture as an arena for crisis and conflict resolution, creative industries as drivers of development, etc. A recent international study commissioned by the European Commission shows a significant demand around the world for cultural exchanges with Europe. But there is also a criticism of a Europe too widely perceived as "projecting its image onto others", rather than listening and engaging in genuine dialogue.

EUNIC's ambition is now to become a natural partner for the EU in this work. EUNIC has a unique position thanks to its worldwide network of cultural institutes and similar bodies that can act on the ground. EUNIC has also been self-reflective and found that the network needs to develop in a more strategic direction. Many believe that EUNIC's work to date has focused too much on individual countries' agendas and too little on multilateral cooperation around common goals. Over the last couple of years, EUNIC has, therefore, taken a number of important decisions.

EUNIC Heads have committed to the principle of collaboration around a shared European agenda. We have also agreed to strengthen the capacity of our network, including that of our clusters of member institutes in over 90 places around the world, to collaborate better and more strategically. EUNIC has recently been granted a three-year project support from the Creative Europe Program for precisely this purpose.

The agenda for the Swedish institute is very much driven by challenges, both the challenges our own society is facing as well as the challenges that our partner countries are confronting. The main challenges of today's world are common to all of us; to solve them will require the world powers to cooperate more effectively. In the latest version of the Nation Brands Index 2014, people in 50 countries were asked what they believe to be the most pressing issues in today's world. The top five issues were indeed challenges of magnitude: 1. Resolving violent conflicts, 2. Protecting the environment, 3. Protecting and promoting human

rights, 4. Ensuring safe food and water, 5. Decreasing social inequality. Needless to say, all those who are ready to cooperate in addressing these challenges will be relevant in tomorrow's world.

One aspect of human life that is closely connected to all of the above challenges is the multifaceted and complex flow of migrants in today's world, whether it is manifested through currents of refugees from regions in conflict, war or terror, or from unprecedented droughts, flooding, tornados and the like fuelled by a changing climate. It is evident that migration is a topic which will continue to be relevant in the years to come.

Migration has helped shape Sweden. In 2014, the Swedish population grew by more than 100,000 – a new record – mainly due to immigration, with the three largest groups this year being Syrians, Eritreans and people with no state or country (stateless). In Europe, only Germany received more asylum seekers than Sweden in 2014, followed by Italy and France. In total Sweden has received over 70,000 refugees from the war in Syria. When we look back, we see that the story of Swedish migration has undergone many changes, and is the result of both emigration and immigration. About 16 percent of the current Swedish population was born in another country. What happens after immigration remains one of the hottest debates in our country. These debates highlight just how complicated and conflicting the issues surrounding diversity really are – from studies praising Sweden's integration policies to articles showing just how far Sweden still has to go in terms of integration.

EUNIC is now in the process of seeking out relevant areas to start off a more "European", shared agenda and the right thematic focus for

collaboration. As a young network with limited resources for common projects, EUNIC is also searching for the most suitable countries or regions where pilot actions around a common agenda could be initiated. The issue of migration could very well be a focus which provides answers to many of EUNIC's current queries. Migration is a good example of a challenge which is clearly common to all EU Member States. It is therefore a topical issue for cooperation between national institutes of culture that are keen to be relevant to EU institutions in the field of culture in EU external relations.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight the open and committed discussions EUNIC members have conducted this year. Together we have taken important steps towards a joint reading of EU cultural policies and the creation of processes of collaborative nature – and in this way to a deeper and more strategic cooperation.

Annika Rembe is Director-General of the Swedish Cultural Institute and President of EUNIC.

EUNIC Annual Report

Culture is recognised as a valuable component of the European Union (EU) external relations policy, and there is a proven demand for cultural relations with Europe. EUNIC has a strong commitment and extensive experience in the role of culture in the EU's external relations, endorsing the outcomes highlighted by the Preparatory Action: Culture in EU External Relations report. EUNIC represents all EU Member States and has a strong delivery capacity and worldwide expertise, with its members working in partnerships locally. EUNIC complements EU initiatives and activities in the field of culture, and aims to become the European Institution's first choice as a competence pool and think tank.

EUNIC continued its progress in 2014, thanks to the stability of the EUNIC Global office, the active Board of Directors and the commitment of the Strategy Group and EUNIC members, with the support of the various working groups, as well as through the work of all EUNIC clusters. EUNIC membership increased in 2014, bringing the total number of members to 33, from 27 EU Member States. In 2015, EUNIC members will represent all EU Member States.

A similar development was observed among the EUNIC clusters: 5 new clusters were founded in 2014, in Angola, Malaysia, Naples, Saint Petersburg and Sri Lanka, bringing the network of clusters to 94.

A major success for EUNIC in 2014 was receiving EU funding under the Creative Europe-Support to Networks Programme. The Crossroads for Culture (C4C) project will help the network further develop and professionalise, at both member and cluster level. Furthermore, C4C will work towards developing skills and knowledge of external cultural practitioners, and enhancing the transnational and international cooperation of

EU Member States.

In 2014, the EUNIC clusters around the world implemented 18 projects co-funded by the EUNIC Cluster Fund. The Cluster Fund scheme will be continued in 2015, the total amount of financial support offered to EUNIC clusters surpassing €130.000. The funding guidelines have been strategically reshaped to focus on helping clusters explore EUNIC-EU shared agendas, align their projects' objectives with EU foreign policy objectives, and collaborate more closely with the EU Delegations/Representations.

Based on the commitment to help EUNIC members establish and further develop local clusters and the whole network, EUNIC has created some new support tools. These included refreshed sub-websites and user manuals, visual identity guidelines, social media guidelines, shared collaborative space (EUNIC Intranet), and a much-appreciated Policy Flash, which summarises international developments in the fields of culture, education, youth, and development aid.

EUNIC has also been supporting the development and launch of a EUNIC mobile application, piloted initially by the EUNIC cluster in Prague. The objective of the app is to serve public hungry for culture in all EUNIC cluster locations. Over the coming year, EUNIC aims to extend the app to multiple clusters, and allow the public to be informed about nearby cultural events.

Finally, EUNIC would like to extend a sincere word of thanks to the many partners who have supported the organisation over recent years and helped it to consistently improve services for EUNIC clusters worldwide.

EUNIC GLOBAL

Crossroads for Culture

In 2014, EUNIC was awarded EU funding through the European Commission's Creative Europe-Support to Networks Programme for the project EUNIC – Crossroads for Culture – Enhancing EU Member States' transnational and international cooperation. The project was launched during the December 2014 General Assembly and will run for 3 years.

Crossroads for Culture aims to strengthen EUNIC's capacity to become a partner of choice for the European Union in the field of European cultural relations. The overall aim of reinforcing the EUNIC network and building the capacity of EUNIC members is to enable cultural players from all EU Member States to work transnationally, internationalise the culture and creative sectors, and further enhance European influence and attraction, both inside and outside Europe.

Collaborative Projects

MENA Pilot 1

The MENA/European training in cultural and creative sector management is a project-based training and a peer-to-peer cooperative learning experience with the aim of fostering regional exchanges within the MENA region.

Based on the consultation process carried out by EUNIC in the MENA region, three main areas of work have been identified: cultural policies, capacity building and mobility and exchange. The crosscutting issue through all these areas is the critical need to build capacities in the MENA cultural sector. Due to the current socio-political context of upheaval, we believe this to be the crucial mo-

ment to empower cultural actors with the necessary tools to contribute positively to change. The EUNIC MENA programme has therefore been designed as an incubator of projects focusing on capacity building in the creative and cultural policies sector.

This project was conceived by EUNIC Global in collaboration with the Marcel Hicter Foundation (organiser of the European Diploma in Cultural Project Management). It is supported by the EUNIC clusters in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco (Rabat and Casablanca), Palestine, and Tunisia, as well as the following institutions: Association Racines (organiser of various leadership training programs in North Africa), Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, Wallonie-Bruxelles International, Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs, Institute Camoes, Swedish Institute, Instituto Cervantes, Institut français, Romanian Cultural Institute, EU Delegation in Jordan, Cooperación española, AECID and FIIAPP. The principle of the EUNIC MENA Incubator is to develop projects which address the needs that have been identified, working with expert organizations from Europe & MENA.

Through its content and methodology, this MENA-focused capacity-building scheme is specific in the way that it not only aims to improve the skills of cultural managers in the field of cultural management, but also to coach participants to develop regional collaborative projects, with the support and follow-up of MENA and European expertise, and of EUNIC clusters. Its main aims are to empower the participants and develop the capacities and tools needed for creative cultural cooperation within MENA.

In the first residential phase of the training in culture and creative sector management, 15 participants from 7 different MENA countries came together in November 2014, in Casablan-

ca, Morocco. A follow-up session will be organised in Beirut, Lebanon, in April 2015.

EU-China 6D
The European-China Cultural Dialogue brings together intellectuals, cultural practitioners and cultural policy makers from Europe and China to strengthen cultural cooperation in the field of creative industries, and develop people-to-people relations. The tradition of organising the Cultural Dialogue reaches back to the year 2008, when the very first of the meetings took place in Beijing, China. The 2nd and 3rd editions of the Dialogue followed in 2009 and 2010, in Copenhagen and Shanghai respectively. The 4th edition was held in Luxembourg in October 2011, while the 5th Dialogue was held in Xi'an, China.

The 6th edition The European-Chinese Cultural Dialogue, which took place in Bucharest from 15-17 October 2014, was a great success. This was the verdict of the participants after three intense days of events. The dialogue, which is organised on an annual basis by EUNIC in collaboration with the Chinese National Academy of Arts, was coordinated in 2014 by the Romanian Cultural Institute.

The theme of the 6th European-Chinese Cultural Dialogue, Public Spaces – EU and China Sharing Perspectives, is of particular contemporary relevance due to the world's process of rapid urbanisation. The outlook of future cities represents a major challenge for both Europe and China. 27 Chinese delegates, 7 Chinese artists, 15 European participants, joined by Romanian public space experts and cultural diplomats, but also students, journalists and press, took part in the event.

The participants added up to over one hundred architects, artists, and decision-makers in cultural policies from Europe and China. They dis-

cussed the possibilities of artists making public spaces more dynamic by endowing them with new values and meanings, and by involving citizens. Other issues that stood out during the proceedings featured: the economic, cultural and social weight of such participatory attitudes towards public spaces; the creation of sustainable cities; creative images and visions about future urban spaces.

One of the most important accomplishments of the 6th edition of the European-Chinese Cultural Dialogue was the programme of residencies in the European cities of Vienna, Linz, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels, and Cork, supported by EUNIC members. During one month, 7 artists from China and Hong Kong experienced new creative opportunities, and shared their findings in Bucharest.

The European-Chinese Cultural Dialogue originated in a very simple idea: the creation of a framework for the two worlds to come together, to showcase the best of both cultures, and to share and search together for solutions to the challenges of our times.

EUNIC CLUSTERS
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Cluster Fund Projects
In 2014, the EUNIC clusters around the world implemented 17 projects co-funded by the EUNIC Cluster Fund. Following the application and selection procedure, EUNIC clusters received financial support to implement their projects, as listed below:

EUNIC Almaty: European Day of Languages
EUNIC Brazil: Europe Week in Brazil
EUNIC Bucharest: European Comics Festival in Bucharest
EUNIC Buenos Aires: EUNIC Festival of Contemporary European Dramaturgy
EUNIC Egypt: Upgrading the Rawabet space, downtown Cairo
EUNIC Greece: Arts for Social Development
EUNIC Jordan: Feasibility Study for a European Cultural Centre in Amman
EUNIC Krakow: PLAYPUBLIK 2014 – International Festival of Games on Public Space
EUNIC Latvia: European Sound and Audiovisual Arts Exhibition SKAN II (part of the Riga-European Capital of Culture 2014 programme)
EUNIC London-Brussels-Rabat-Casablanca: Sursum Linguae
EUNIC Lyon: Two minutes for Europe! – EUNIC competition 2014
EUNIC Morocco-Rabat: Culture as a tool for external relations – Support for structuring cultural policies in the MENA Region and in Africa
EUNIC Palestine: European Focus on Youth Literature and Comics – Professionalization of the Palestinian International Book Fair
EUNIC Serbia: City and Creativity: Openly about Public Spaces
EUNIC Spain: European cinema at school
EUNIC Stockholm: Multilingualism Visa Europe
EUNIC Thailand: European Heritage Map

Best practices from the regions
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Europe
EUNIC Serbia: City and Creativity – Openly About Public Spaces

After a successful series of workshops with the theme "City and Creativity" at the Belgrade Book Fair, EUNIC Serbia was invited by BINA (Belgrade International Week of Architecture) to take part in the 2014 edition, as a guest of honour.

The EUNIC cluster in Serbia requested support from the EUNIC Cluster Fund, in order to implement a project in the framework of this invitation. A series of common activities have been organised under this programme, between the cluster members that have agreed to participate: Austrian Cultural Forum Belgrade (with Austrian Institute), British Council, Goethe-Institut, French Institute, Cervantes Institute, Embassy of the Netherlands, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Portugal.

The "Graffiti" workshop aimed to show how graffiti could contribute to the urban landscape, and more widely about how art in public space can contribute to a more active citizenship. The "Public Space – Our Space" workshop brought together local artists dealing with designing a new concept of public playgrounds that are underdeveloped in Serbia. The "Green Revolution" workshop involved local artists and guerrilla gardeners dealing with urban gardening. It aimed to introduce a common EUNIC "garden", set up in the main city square, and then to transfer it to one of the neighbouring elementary schools.

The installations in a public space (outdoor space) brought together local and foreign artists invited by EUNIC members to focus on climate change, urban life, urban development, and social issues in big cities. An exhibition of photos and other do-

cumentation, presenting and further developing the Urban Incubator project, was carried out by the Goethe-Institut. The opening of the exhibition was preceded by a public debate on creative reinvention of city quarters. "City Signs" was another workshop, carried out by language teachers. It dealt with diversity of implementation and creative solutions for city signs and marks, through activities that foster and promote language learning. Finally, a EUNIC Info Point was established under this project, in the format of a stand offering answers to FAQ about EUNIC and its members.

Although EUNIC Serbia had planned for further, equally interesting events, as well as multiple collaborations with the EU Delegation; the tragic natural disaster that hit Serbia in spring 2014 toned down the events and celebrations. Nonetheless, through the knowledge and practice exchange fostered by this programme, the cluster has contributed to raising the importance of culture in external relations with Serbia.

MENA
EUNIC Jordan: Creative Jordan –Support for the Development of Creative Industries in Jordan

Throughout 2012 and 2013, EUNIC Jordan was tasked by the European Union Delegation in Amman with supporting the development of the creative industries in Jordan. The EU Delegation offered support in the format of 3 consecutive contracts. The two initial ones (2012 and 2013), focused on the development of creative industries in Jordan, whereas the most recent contract looks at the visibility of activities for the EU.

The EuroMed Forum, which was convened by EUNIC in Jordan in 2012, focused on forming regional networks, as well as identifying shared regional priorities and aspirations

for the creative sector. The Forum was a useful platform for EUNIC in Jordan to understand how best to move forward in its support for the creative sector. Further to the Forum, a Platform for Visionary Ideas was organised in the framework of Creative Jordan, resulting in the official recognition of the creative sector as a viable sector for employment.

As cultural relations organisations, EUNIC Jordan felt uniquely placed to bring together representatives of four different sub-sectors under one banner of creative industries – linking them all for the first time, and helping them to recognise that they share the same needs and face the same issues. EUNIC Jordan provided a sounding board for these sub-sectors to voice their needs and proposed solutions to the issues they face; and the resulting Call to Action represented the opinions of those sub-sectors.

The research included five focus groups, each representing a sector of the creative industries. They focused on the problems faced by each sector and solution for overcoming problems. The outcome was directly followed by a EU Med Culture Programme, a UNIDO Creative Industries Project, and related EUNIC Jordan activities (i.e. symposiums, trainings, opportunities fair).

In 2014, under the third contract, EUNIC Jordan looked once more into offering a platform for discussions. A multi-city Creative Cities Symposium brought together speakers from Europe, as well as local practitioners. The project is ongoing, and will continue in 2015. Through the framework of the 3 contracts and the continuous work in the field of the creative industries, EUNIC Jordan became the local go-to organization for creative industries.

Asia and Oceania
EUNIC Thailand: European Heritage Map and Cultural Calendar of Thailand

Thailand was never colonised, and is therefore unique in Asia in having a history of contacts with a wide range of countries that are now members of the EU. Shared Euro-Thai heritage can be found around the country, especially in the present and previous capital cities: Bangkok and Ayutthaya.

To highlight this common heritage, EUNIC Thailand has previously published the European Heritage Map of Bangkok and Ayutthaya, which highlighted 65 sites of cultural, economic and political interest. The map was so well received, that EUNIC Thailand decided to build on the momentum, by diversifying and increasing the map's distribution through a smart phone app. The app would target new audiences and build a bridge between European and Thai historical heritage through locally organised programmes, as well as through integration into social media networks.

With a view to increasing the distribution of the European Heritage Map of Bangkok and Ayutthaya, the project also aimed to interactively inform the public about on-going European activities in Thailand. It also planned to allow people to establish and share their personal relationship with the sites and EU cultural activities, through social media.

The project was funded by the Delegation of the European Union and the EUNIC Cluster Fund; the Embassies of Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands; and Alliance Française, Goethe-Institut, Instituto Camoes and British Council. The 'European Heritage Map and Cultural Calendar' smart phone application maps more than 200 common heritage sites, and is available both for iOS and Android users.

Sub-Saharan Africa
EUNIC Zimbabwe: Basket Case II
Basket Case II is a EUNIC Zimbabwe initiative and is funded by the European Union. The project was developed in two phases: artists' residencies and design workshops held during spring and summer 2014, and a major exhibition and catalogue planned for October, to coincide with the inauguration of the renovated National Gallery of Zimbabwe. The project also included a series of talks and debates on inter-disciplinary practice and sustainability in the fields of crafts, design and visual arts.

The EUNIC Zimbabwe Cluster (British Council, Alliance Française and Goethe-Institut) and The National Gallery of Zimbabwe, Harare, collaborated for the second edition of Basket Case, a visual art and design project, bringing together five prominent African and European artists (from Nigeria, Germany, Zimbabwe, UK, France), who worked to create new pieces in collaboration with basket weavers located in various parts of Zimbabwe. Two acclaimed European designers have also lead creative workshops with two weaving communities, drawing from their own expertise and the weavers' traditional craft, to develop innovative designs and enhance the communities' range of objects.

Other partners of this project were the Binga Craft Centre (Binga), Bulawayo Home Industries (Bulawayo), Lupane Women's Centre (Lupane), Step Trust (Honde Valley) and Zienzele Foundation (Masvingo). Basket Case II was curated by Christine Eyene, Guild Research Fellow in Contemporary Art, University of Central Lancashire, and Raphael Chikukwa, Chief Curator of the National Gallery of Zimbabwe.

Americas
EUNIC Brazil: Europe Week in Brazil

Europe Week has been organised in the capital of Brazil since 2004, each year gaining more visibility and reaching a wider public. Nowadays, it has become one of the traditional cultural events of Brazil's capital city. Europe Week has been a great soft power tool to promote certain aspects of EU external policy. Not only is it a great opportunity to present the richness and diversity of European culture, but is also a platform for dialogue with Brazilian civil society about relevant EU topics. EUNIC activities in Brazil promote European culture and values through the example of collaboration between national institutes, embassies, the EU Delegation and local partners.

The 10th edition of Europe Week took place between the 30 April and 25 May 2014. As homage to upcoming sports events to be held in Brazil, the Europe Week's theme was "Sport and Culture". Its main activities took place in Brasilia, Curitiba, and Rio de Janeiro. Among numerous attractions offered to the public (mostly free of charge) were: a European film festival, two symphony concerts, a jazz concert, a running race, a bazaar, a culinary week and more. Altogether the event attracted a great deal of media coverage. This, combined with an active campaign on social media (Facebook, Instagram and Twitter) guaranteed excellent visibility and success.

The project was financed by the annual contribution of EUNIC members and participating EU Member States, the strategic partnership with the EU Delegation, and the EUNIC Cluster Fund. Sponsorships were also used, while local partners have supported the programme in kind. EUNIC Brazil is also planning a 2015 edition of the event.

EUNIC Cluster Projects – Examples from 2014

January 2014
EUNIC Croatia: Cultural Fellowship 2013
EUNIC Israel: Another Look – The Restored European Film Project #2
EUNIC Toronto: EUNIC Book Club
EUNIC Vienna: WW1 Commemoration - 2014

February 2014
EUNIC South Africa: Rise and Fall of Apartheid Exhibition
EUNIC New York: Vienna Complex Festival 2014
EUNIC New York: Festival Neue Literatur 2014

March 2014
EUNIC Paris: Semaine des Cinemas Etrangers film festival
EUNIC Denmark: UNESCO Poetry Day – The power of Poetry
EUNIC Finland: Living Room Exhibition
EUNIC Peru: Peru Cultura Verde 2014 Award
EUNIC Zimbabwe: Basket Case II, March-October 2014

April 2014
EUNIC New York: Walking in the Air: Arts Criticism in Europe
EUNIC New York: Panorama European Film Festival

May 2014
EUNIC Ottawa: European Short Film Days
EUNIC Senegal: DAK'ART 2014
EUNIC London: European Literature Night
EUNIC Bucharest: EUNIC film festival

June – August 2014
EUNIC Berlin: Bal Littéraire and Scenic Readings
EUNIC London: Sheffield Doc/Fest
EUNIC Bucharest: Night of the Cultural Institutes
EUNIC Budapest: EU Jazz Express

September 2014
EUNIC Lebanon: Exhibition, 3-
EUNIC Namibia: 3rd Film Festival
EUNIC Brussels: Transpoesie
EUNIC clusters celebrate the EU Day of Languages
EUNIC London: Theatre of Europe, Staging Europe's most innovative theatre

October 2014
EUNIC Austria: Tag des Kaffee
EUNIC Lebanon: Women's Palaces
EUNIC Washington: Annual Concert
EUNIC Brussels: Pop & Shop
EUNIC Ottawa: Book Club

November 2014
EUNIC OPT: Rethink Palestine
EUNIC Bratislava: NU Dance Fest
EUNIC Iran: 25th Anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain
EUNIC Almaty: European Week of Animation in Kazakhstan
EUNIC Montevideo: European Literature Nights
EUNIC Athens: Pantone Green and a Glass of Lemonade
EUNIC Slovenia: Invitation to the Silent City
EUNIC New York: East and West: Cross-Cultural influences

December 2014
EUNIC Global: Crossroads for Culture project launch
EUNIC Prague: EUNIC App Eurotrash Party
EUNIC Athens: the Arts for Social Development
EUNIC Russia: Internships for Russian curators

EUNIC FACTS

EUNIC Members

Austria: Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs
Belgium: Wallonie-Bruxelles International
Belgium: Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs
Bulgaria: Ministry of Culture
Croatia: Foundation Croatia House
Cyprus: Ministry of Education and Culture
Czech Republic: Czech Centres
Denmark: Danish Cultural Institute
Estonia: Estonian Institute
Finland: Finnish Cultural and Academic Institutes
France: Foundation Alliance Française
France: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
France: Institut Français
Germany: Goethe-Institut
Germany: ifa – Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations
Greece: Hellenic Foundation for Culture
Greece: Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hungary: Balassi Institute
Ireland: Culture Ireland
Ireland: Società Dante Alighieri
Italy: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Latvia: Latvian Institute
Lithuania: Lithuanian Culture Institute
Luxembourg: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
The Netherlands: Dutch Culture
Poland: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Portugal: Instituto Camões
Romania: Romanian Cultural Institute
Slovakia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Slovenia: Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport
Spain: Instituto Cervantes
Sweden: Swedish Institute
UK: British Council

EUNIC Board of Directors

June 2013-June 2014
Charles-Etienne Lagasse, Wallonie-Bruxelles Internationale, Belgium – EUNIC President
Annika Rembe, Swedish Institute, Sweden – EUNIC Vice-President
Rafael Rodriguez-Ponga, Instituto Cervantes, Spain – EUNIC Second Vice-President

EUNIC Board since June 2014
Annika Rembe, Swedish Institute, Sweden – EUNIC President
Rafael Rodríguez-Ponga, Instituto Cervantes, Spain – EUNIC Vice-President
Pal Hatos, Balassi Institute, Hungary – EUNIC Second Vice-President until November 2014
Michael Metz-Mørch, Danish Cultural Institute, Denmark – EUNIC Second Vice-President since December 2014

EUNIC Global office

Full time staff
Helena Kovarikova, Director since July 2012
Kamila Gawronska, Network and Communications Officer since November 2011 (on temporary leave as of October)
Khadija El Bennaoui, MENA Project Coordinator November 2012 – March 2014
Roxana Apostol, Network and Communications officer since October 2014
Lina Kirjazovaite, Crossroads for Culture Project Manager since November 2014

Trainees
Communications Assistants:
Corina Pirva, September 2013 – March 2014
Francesca Farmer, February 2014 – August 2014
Federica Cacciaglia, August 2014 –

October 2014
Emilian Ostroveanu, since November 2014

Communications and Administration Assistants:
Eleonora Parisi, Communications and Administration Assistant, September 2013 – March 2014
Hazel Allan, Communications and Administration Assistant, March – September 2014
Philippa Tomlin, Communications and Administration Assistant since September 2014

Crossroads for Culture assistants:
Annik Merckx, Research Assistant since December 2014
Laura Navarro-Lacroix, Project Management Assistant since December 2014

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CULTURE REPORT

EUNIC YEARBOOK 2014/2015

"The Third World is knocking at Europe's door, and it is coming in, whether Europe wants it to or not." UMBERTO ECO

Europe is aging. Experts tell us that Europe needs a million young migrants every year to compensate for its increasing numbers of pensioners. While the continent is struggling to find a joint solution to the problem of refugees on its southern coastline, migrants have now been living in EU countries – sometimes for several generations – without adequate levels of integration into society as a whole. Be it religion, language, education, or media – culture is clearly the key to successful integration. While there is evidence of the harmonisation of civic and socioeconomic integration policies in Europe, the cultural dimension is still shaped by national concepts and perceptions of integration. This means that integration strategies within Europe vary widely. Which strategies have been successful? How can we make best use of the potentials of culture, and which concepts are needed to improve the cultural integration of migrants? How can Europe cope with the contradiction between repressive refugee policies and rational approaches towards migration? And finally, how can EUNIC, the European network of national institutes for culture, promote the cultural integration of migrants? A string of renowned scholars, authors and writers, including Umberto Eco, Francis Fukuyama, Bassam Tibi, Zygmunt Baumann, Richard Sennett, Slavenka Drakulić, Claus Leggewie and Mely Kiyak, look for answers in the Culture Report EUNIC Yearbook 2014/2015.

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